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Summary 
The aims of this European Commission funded project, carried out at the 
University of Glasgow, were to develop an approach for the inclusion of ethics in 
a science undergraduate curriculum and to evaluate the success of that approach. 
The moral nature of science as an academic discipline and as a professional 
career justifies the resources spent on novel ethics teaching within a science 
course. Choices in science - allocation of research funds, selection of research 
topics, interaction with research subjects (animals, environment, other humans) 
etc. - often, if not always, include some elements of morality. The dilemmas 
involved require decision-making which cannot, and should not, be made 
without reflection on the values that govern science and society at large. 
From the student perspective, the ethics curriculum aims to promote and 
accelerate moral development. In the context of ethics teaching in a science 
curriculum, moral development consists of two components: moral sensitivity 
and moral cognitive skills. Moral sensitivity is an ability to understand that moral 
aspects are as valid as factual data, and to distinguish between the two. Moral 
cognitive skills consist of an ability to  1) analyse the moral aspects of a situation, 
2) differentiate the significant from the insignificant, 3) foresee the moral 
consequences of actions, and 4) to make moral decisions, in particular when it is 
necessary to choose between two or more incompatible values. 
The core idea of moral development is progression through stages, each signified 
by certain skills and abilities to analyse and solve moral problems. This 
development is mostly linear and may continue through adulthood. All those 
equipped with the basic cognitive skills have an ability to reach the highest stage, 
although not all will. The progression is generally a move from a dualistic and 
selfish world-view, where moral networks relate only to other immediate agents, 
towards increased appreciation of multiplicity and a wider range of moral 
shareholders. At the higher stages, moral agents are increasingly able to 
approach moral problems with confidence and the skills required for forming mSummary 
consistent and sophisticated moral arguments. This stage-like understanding of 
moral development is based on the works of Kohlberg, Perry and Gilligan. 
xii 
The approach employed to encourage moral development in this research is 
based on supporting students' personal involvement in solving moral problems. 
Student-centred small group teaching is the pedagogical method that allows such 
involvement. In this research two teaching methods were developed and tested: 
1) Structured discussion groups, which involve both individual preparation, 
based on philosophical readings, and group discussions. 2) Problem-Based 
Learning exercises. All themes and material used in these teaching sessions were 
selected to provide links as close as possible with the existing scientific 
curriculum. For example, genetics students concentrated on genetic testing, and 
parasitology students on research issues relating to vaccine development and 
testing. 
During the research period of the 1999-2000 academic session, 250 students in 
Scottish University Level 3 participated in ethics teaching. Another 250 students 
formed a control group. Ethics was introduced into components of the science 
curriculum, which are not formally assessed or where the assessment is skill- and 
participation-based, to avoid any inequality among students. 
The ethics curriculum was evaluated by administrating the same Moral 
Development Questionnaire during the first weeks of term 1 and then again 
during the last weeks of term 2. The questionnaire consisted of three parts: 1) 
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) purchased from the University of Minneapolis. 
DIT is the most widely used test tool for measuring cognitive moral development 
based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development. 2) A moral sensitivity test 
consisting of a decision-making scenario in which students were asked to list no 
more than five considerations which they believed should be reflected upon 
before making the decision. The students' considerations were analysed and 
scored according to their depth of understanding of the moral elements in the 
decision-making. 3) An Osgood scale test on the meta-understanding of moral 
questions, based on Perry's Ethical Development Scheme. mSummary  Xlll 
The results from this work had three main elements: 
1.  The students' self-reported learning was dominantly in accordance 
with the aims of the teaching - increased awareness, initiative to think, 
and practice of moral decision-making skills. 
2.  The Moral Development Questionnaire results showed significant 
increases in students' moral sensitivity due to the ethics teaching they 
participated in. 
3.  The student population as a whole was using relatively low level 
moral decision-making tools in an inconsistent manner. 
The minimal ethics teaching intervention used in this study was a success as it 
captured students' motivation and interest and supported moral sensitivity 
development, which is the first step of moral development. The results show that 
ethics education is needed to support students' search for adequate moral 
decision-making tools and their ability to include moral considerations in their 
general decision-making. The intervention designed in this research provided a 
methodological approach to successful ethics teaching, while it was inadequate 
in length to provide significant benefits in moral decision-making to students. m  Introduction 
Introduction 
The aim of this European Commission funded project, carried out at the 
University of Glasgow, was to develop an approach for the inclusion of ethics in 
a science undergraduate curriculum and evaluate the success of that approach. 
The most obvious question to ask of any proposal to teach ethics is 'why should 
one want to undertake such a venture in the first place?' My answer to this 
question is that ethics should be taught because morality is part of any reflective 
personal life. This is to say that moral problems are inescapable. It is difficult to 
think of any possible life plan that would not be determined or conditioned by 
moral values. Ethical problems arise in all stages of life; they are part of all 
professions and academic disciplines; and social life is full of moral issues. 
Life sciences, as an academic discipline, and career opportunities in science, are 
therefore included in the field of morality. Choices in science - allocation of 
research funds, selection of research topics, interaction with research subjects 
(animals, environment, other humans) etc. - often, if not always, include some 
elements of morality. The dilemmas involved in these decisions require decision-
making which cannot, and should not, be made without reflection on the values 
that govern science and society at large. To enable scientists to deal with the 
moral aspects of decisions in science is a worthy goal that may justify the 
resources spent on ethics teaching within a science course. 
The importance of science ethics is highlighted by the growing influence of 
science in society. The more influential science becomes, the more ethical issues 
become associated with scientific practice directly, and scientists are increasingly 
required to participate in the value questions born from new knowledge and new 
technologies. Edward Hackett (1993) suggests five reasons for the growing 
prominence of science, which all suggest new areas where ethical judgements 
have to be made: 
1.  Increasing cost of science. Scientific projects have become 
increasingly expensive and visible to the public. This causes rising 
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performance expectations, budgets to swell and mega-projects to 
emerge (e.g. the Human Genome Project). As science uses scarce 
(public) resources, it is inviting increased accountability and scrutiny 
of its affairs. 
2 
2.  Science is a resource for power. Science is a resource for power 
offering the possibility of controlling aspects of nature and the 
attendant ability to alter the world. The most notable accomplishments 
of 20
th Century science include molecular biology and genetics, 
vaccines and antibiotics, information technology, and atomic physics. 
All of these have influenced people directly by providing medical 
benefits, comforts in new forms of power, or accessibility to 
information. But new science is not solely beneficial; atomic physics 
allowed for the creation of nuclear weapons causing direct physical 
and indirect psychological harm. Molecular biology, in particular 
genetics, and improved information technology have generated fears 
of misuse, surveillance, and discrimination. It may seem that those 
who control science also have control over many aspects of the world. 
3.  Science is a means of legitimising and justifying power. Science is a 
source of intellectual property, legitimacy, and prestige capable of 
explaining or justifying actions that might not otherwise win social 
acceptance. Scientific arguments can be used to disguise political 
preferences; and the exercise of power - in influencing and invoking 
scientific argument - conveys the ability to develop or restrict such 
arguments. Naturally, scientific knowledge can be used not to disguise 
but to support novel and beneficial policies that would not be accepted 
without scientific backing, showing their usefulness and desirability. 
Science, as long as it has at least a relatively independent status, may 
threaten to reveal such exercises of preference and power concealed in 
the guise of objective necessity. While knowledge is not the only 
source of power, it is an important source. Therefore there are 
motivations to control science and the direction it takes. 
4.  The high esteem of science is comparable to a religion. Science is the 
new religion, given the high esteem that has usually only been 
associated with religion. Life in science is often referred to as a 
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,  calling'. Religious metaphors are used as a rhetorical device to justify 
or provoke moral outrage or the practices of the sacred institutions of 
science. Misconduct is labelled sacrilege, dishonest scientists are 
betrayers of truth or false prophets, genetic engineering is accused of 
'playing god', etc .. 
5.  Intensification of the relation between scientific findings and social 
policy. Scientific research is increasingly involved in the formulation 
of public policy in the fields of public health, national defence, 
economic competitiveness, and the resolution of legal disputes. 
Science journalism has brought to the wider public the new findings of 
science and thus in its part created a tendency to expect science to 
produce answers to difficult questions in social and legal policy. 
This close interdependency that exists between science and public life influences 
the social organisation of science, scientists' roles and career opportunities, and 
even the principles that guide scientific work. For example, cuts in university 
budgets may increase dependency upon external research funding, and 
commercial contracts. Scientists may experience organisational pressures to 
become more entrepreneurial, to undertake more externally funded research, and 
to perform it according to businesslike practices of accountability, efficiency, 
secrecy, and the like. This might increase competition between scientists for 
research funding, which might in tum compromise standards of co-operation, 
communication, quality, and choice of problems. 
On each level of this example we can find moral issues; 'Is there a particular 
worth in universities being independent research organisations?', 'What is the 
value of open and accumulative academic information?', 'Who should decide on 
the research questions?', 'What methods of research are acceptable?', and 'Who 
should benefit from research results?'. These are moral questions, which require 
moral answers. To be able to engage in a moral discussion, one needs moral 
decision-making skills; skills to understand and recognise moral issues, and 
skills to find solutions to moral problems. 
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These skills are part of a basic personal repertoire of social skills and they are 
often acquired latently by observation and participation in social situations. Thus, 
while moral decision-making skills are not dependent on formal education, their 
development can be accelerated and supported by it. This is the aim of the ethics 
teaching developed and evaluated in the research described in this thesis - to find 
out how formal ethics education can support and accelerate the naturally 
occurring development of moral skills. 
The teaching of science ethics, as I will describe it, does not involve teaching 
'right' values or inculcating 'correct' behaviour. It rather consists of learning and 
practising the ethical skills of recognition, interpretation, understanding, 
solution-finding, and relating to moral problems perceived in their context and in 
relation to fundamental personal values. These are skills not only applicable to 
ethical problems in science, but to all moral dilemmas one may encounter. 
Therefore, even if one sees science only as a mechanism to produce hard data 
(with the exclusion of scientists from the moral consideration of applying that 
data), it is possible to see the value of ethics education within the undergraduate 
science curriculum. Moral skills, though in great demand within the scientific 
discipline, are also important skills in personal development towards a mature 
adult agency in any activity within a democratic society. 
Even though ethics has become prominent and an important part of scientific 
practice, British universities offering a degree in life sciences have so far not 
included ethics formally in their undergraduate curricula. This is in stark contrast 
with medical education, where as early as in the 1950's the General Medical 
Council recommended medical ethics to be taught to all medical students (Boyd, 
1987). Even though medical students may expect to face more obvious moral 
dilemmas in their future interactions with patients, the research related ethical 
issues in medicine are highly similar to those in the life sciences. There should 
be no reason why medical students alone should have formal training in dealing 
with the moral issues relating to life science and biomedical research . 
.In autumn 1998, I sent an e-mail survey to 58 heads of department/faculty of 
British universities offering an undergraduate life sciences degree. 37 
Henriikka Clarkeburn, June 2000 m  Introduction  5 
universities replied to the survey. Only 10 universities reported some ethics in 
their undergraduate science curriculum. The University of Aberdeen has 
compulsory ethics for fourth year bioscience students as part of 'Aspects of 
Research on Humans and Animals', which was also included in the degree 
examination. The University of Bath offers optional ethics tutorials for 3
rd and 4th 
year students. The University of Bristol conducts a short informative course on 
the ethical use of animals. The University of Central Lancashire offers an 
optional self-study module on ethics for 2
nd year students. Essex and Exeter 
Universities include ethics in their compulsory lectures and tutorials with 
assessment in the form of essays and exam questions. In the University of 
Plymouth, ethics is discussed in 3
rd year tutorials, while the University of 
Reading offers an optional course in  'History and Philosophy of Natural 
Sciences'. In the University of St Andrews students discuss ethics in compulsory 
and optional lectures and tutorials and answer essay questions on ethics in their 
exams. And finally, in the University of Swansea, undergraduate students in the 
2
nd year have compulsory lectures that touch on ethical issues. While all these 
universities have included ethics at some stage of their undergraduate degree, 
none indicated that ethics would be approached formally or that ethics teaching 
was used to reach certain goals or that the successfulness in reaching these goals 
would be measured. Full details of the e-mail survey can be found in 'Appendix 
I:  University Survey'. 
The lack of a formal and structured approach to ethics teaching in UK 
universities highlights the importance of this research. The importance of ethics 
is recognised and now it is the time to turn these values into action. To increase 
the benefits of this research and encourage joint efforts between universities on 
ethics teaching, the course material developed during this project will be made 
freely available on the Internet for other UK universities. 
The research described in this thesis is a somewhat unusual inter-disciplinary 
project. It is unusual for someone with a traditional philosophy training to be 
carrying out research in a science department on an educational problem. The 
structure of the thesis therefore needs to bring coherently together strands from 
different academic disciplines: philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, and science. 
Henriikka ClarkeburIl, June 2000 m  Introduction 
This results in longer than usual theoretical considerations in order to provide a 
sound basis for the experimental research work. 
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Before I outline the structure of this thesis, I would like to clarify how I will use 
the terms 'ethics' and 'moral' in this work. Ethics can mean three different 
things:  1) it can be used as a synonym for morality; 2) it can be used to refer to 
morality in a professional context, especially where codes are involved; or 3) it 
can be used to refer to the second-order study of morality or ethics in the first 
sense i.e.  it is the same as moral philosophy.  My usage of the terms is closest to 
the second definition. The aim is to develop an ethics curriculum, which would 
promote students' moral development. Personally, I might have been inclined to 
adopt the first interpretation of ethics being synonymous with moral, i.e. 
referring to ethical development instead of moral development, but as moral 
development is the chosen term in the literature, I considered it prudent to not 
adopt this practice. 
The research described in this thesis is divided into five Parts, each necessary for 
a careful analysis of the subject area. Part I is devoted to theoretical discussions 
on the conceptual issues relating to education and philosophy, mainly 
concentrating on the complex issue of educational aims. It emerges from Part I 
that ethics education should have intrinsic aims which promote individual moral 
development in fostering the growth of moral decision-making skills. 
Part II concentrates on psychological theories for assessing moral development. 
Assessment of moral development is important not only for the attainment of 
academic results, but also in order to justify the importance of an ethics course 
against the following external limitations: 
1.  resource limitations, and 
2.  time constraints. 
Firstly, when resources are scarce, they should be used where they produce the 
best benefits. In other words, even if the goals of ethics education are valid, 
ethics education may not be able support its place in a science undergraduate 
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curriculum unless it can be shown to make a distinguishable positive impact on 
students' moral development. 
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Secondly, the science curriculum cannot include all areas of science, or even a 
comprehensive coverage of a specialised area in science. The choice between 
what is included and what can be excluded while maintaining levels of academic 
excellence and meeting the external criteria of employers and public bodies, is 
thus inescapable. Competition for student time within and between departments 
is intense and proposals for new courses or programmes are likely to meet less 
than enthusiastic reception from staff members concerned with obtaining 
minimally adequate time for their own particular areas. This is further 
exacerbated by competition for scarce teaching resources. For these reasons, new 
inclusions in the curriculum are often required to satisfy both the criteria of 
adequate aims and of effectiveness in satisfying these aims. 
The question whether ethics deserves greater emphasis in the undergraduate 
science curriculum has not received unequivocal support from students or staff. 
Though Downie and Alexander (1989) report high staff agreement on the 
importance of ethics as part of the undergraduate science curriculum, the support 
seems to be highly theoretical in the absence of ethics teaching. Student interest 
in bioethics was shown to be high by Downie (1993), which as such supports the 
inclusion of ethics in a science undergraduate curriculum. An ability to show that 
teaching ethics has a significant positive impact might be useful in paving the 
way for further inclusion of ethics within curricula. Also the diversity of teaching 
methods used for achieving the aims of ethics education almost guarantees 
passionate debate and disagreement. In this situation the need for impartial, 
quantifiable, and objective standards of evaluation becomes ever more urgent. 
A further purpose of this evaluation process is to identify three elements and how 
they influence moral development: 
1.  Whether the approach adopted in ethics teaching makes a significant 
change in  'moral development scores' (see section 4.3.1  'Assessment 
of moral development by use of prototypic statements' for a discussion 
on what is meant by 'moral development scores') . The two 
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approaches compared here are Problem Based Learning (PBL) and 
structured tutorial discussions. No didactic methods are included as 
they are hypothesised not to be a successful method of teaching ethics 
to science students (see discussion in Part III - Theories for teaching 
ethics). Significant differences between teaching methods would give 
valuable information in making future pedagogical decisions regarding 
how to teach ethics. 
2.  Whether the number of hours spent working on an ethics problem is 
comparable with the advances in moral development. Time is a scarce 
commodity to both students and teaching staff and an indication of 
whether the utility rate of ethics education rises up to a certain point 
and starts to decrease afterwards will give valuable information in 
planning the optimum exposure to ethics in the curriculum in order to 
achieve the set aims. 
3.  From a theoretical point of view, there is an interest in finding any 
correlation between development of moral decision-making skills and 
moral sensitivity. If a positive correlation if found, it might be possible 
to use only one assessment method in the future, with confidence that 
it will measure both aspects of moral development. 
The assessment is therefore conducted for the purposes of research and 
pedagogical practice. The students assessed will not benefit directly from these 
research findings, though indirect benefit is to be expected in the form of 
improved teaching approaches. 
Part III discusses the teaching approaches most suitable for achieving the aims 
set for ethics education in Part I. It emerges from previous research that ethics 
courses are most successful when they involve student-centred approaches to 
learning. This approach changes the teacher's role from information provider to 
facilitator of student development. The skills involved in being a good facilitator 
are different from being a good teacher and are therefore discussed in detail. Two 
distinct teaching methods which allow a student-centred approach to learning 
moral decision-making skills are then discussed; Problem-based Learning and 
Structured group discussions. Part III also includes a description of the teaching 
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approaches adopted in this research for teaching ethics to University of Glasgow 
life sciences undergraduate students during the academic session of 1999-2000. 
Part IV describes and discusses the results of the research. First is the qualitative 
analysis of students' responses to the ethics teaching together with descriptions 
on how the course material was applied in the class-room. This is followed by an 
analysis of the Moral Development Questionnaire. 
Part V completes the work in a short discussion on the developed curriculum and 
the results. Part V also includes recommendations for the future based on the 
discussion. 
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Part I - Education and Ethics 
The desire to teach people to do what is right seems more than justified in a society 
where crime and dishonesty are commonplace. But ethics teaching does not fit into 
the boundaries of teaching moral rights and wrongs: in fact it is poorly understood 
in those terms. The teaching of morally right behaviour, as will become apparent in 
this Part, is not just an inadequate understanding of ethics education, but an 
untenable approach in a liberal multicultural university. 
Ethics education is not an isolated strand among educational activities, but in its 
structure comparable to them. In order to clarify the relationships between ethics 
education and general education theory, Part I will start with a conceptual analysis 
on basic educational terms: education, training, and indoctrination. Comparisons 
between education and training refer to the content aims of educational activities, 
while the comparison between indoctrination and education identify differences in 
educational methods. 
The rest of Part I will concentrate on content aims, leaving the structural issues to 
be further discussed in Part III. The discussion on educational aims concentrates on 
the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic aims. This dimension of aims is 
essential to structuring ethics education. The choice between intrinsic and extrinsic 
aims has direct influence 01) the acceptability of ethics education as an educational 
activity as well as on the pedagogy and assessment used. 
By the end of Part I the reader should have a clear understanding of the aims 
suggested for the research on science ethics education described in this thesis. Also, 
I hope to have convinced the reader that extrinsic aims are both unacceptable and 
impractical in ethics education and that ethics education is best organised around 
intrinsic aims, as they are described here. 
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1.  Education - General Theory 
The aim of this project is to develop an ethics learning programme for bioscience 
students. The more specific objective is to encourage students' moral development. 
What is meant by moral education or moral/ethical development is not self-evident, 
and thus the logical place to start this research is conceptual analysis. Successful 
conceptual analysis of the key concepts, which are concepts of the most 
polymorphous character, provides a solid ground for the entire research. 
This first chapter will concentrate on the analysis of 'education' as a generic 
concept and on the appreciation of its relation to both content and procedure. The 
exact nature of education becomes clearer through comparison with neighbouring 
concepts, 'training' and 'indoctrination', where training can be contrasted with 
education to illuminate the nature of educational content, and indoctrination can 
clarify the nature of educational method. 
1.1  Education - conceptual analysis 
Education is a generic concept and one would be mistaken in considering it as a 
name for one activity alone. Education is rather an umbrella under which several 
educational values and practices can be fitted. Instructing students on laboratory 
practice, encouraging scientific discovery by providing a suitable setting, 
promoting good manners during departmental meetings, and providing factual 
information in lecture theatres can all be classified as part of the educational 
process, even though they are distinctly separate activities with varying aims and 
embedded values. Still, all educational practices belong to a family of activities 
united by a sometimes complicated network of similarities. I will here concentrate 
on the central usage of the term 'education' and leave to less, if not negligible, 
attention the many peripheral uses the term. 
One of the common core elements in education as a concept is that something 
worthy of the time, effort, and resources should be achieved. This is also the core of 
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a famous formulation of education by R. S. Peters: "It [education] implies that 
something worthwhile is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a morally 
acceptable manner" (Peters, 1970, p. 25). In other words, education has normative 
implications. This can be viewed from a purely conceptual point of view. Both 
terms 'worthwhile' and 'morally acceptable' are value-laden statements, but 
describing education in these terms does not necessarily carry any commitment to 
the content - what is precisely to be understood as 'worthwhile' or 'morally 
acceptable'. At this stage all that is said is that education as a practice and 
discipline has normative implications and that both the value and content of these 
implications requires a separate analysis and appreciation. 
'Worthwhile' as a concept has unmistakably positive connotations. Therefore, in 
the normal use of the term, it is illogical to say that people have been educated, but 
that they have in no way changed for the better or that the attempt to educate is not 
a practice worth attempting. There might be disagreement on what type of changes 
are changes for the better and therefore what type of educational practices are 
worth attempting, but whatever they are, the user of the term has placed a positive 
value on them. This does not indicate, however, that it would be illogical to talk of 
'bad or poor education'. In doing so we think that the process of education was 
carried out poorly or indicate disagreement on the values chosen as the aims of an 
educational process. 
Education is also an 'achievement' term. Built into it is an idea of achieving 
something that is worthwhile. It is essentially a word for progress. But education is 
not just an achievement word as it covers both the trying and succeeding; the 
process and results. Therefore we cannot identify education in terms of worthwhile 
goals alone, but must supplement it with a definition relating to the process. R. S. 
Peters provided one in the passage quoted from him above, i.e. it is carried out in a 
manner which is morally acceptable (Peters, 1970). 
Both parts of education, the process and results, are important in classifying 
whether an activity is to be called education. I will use the method of comparison as 
a tool to define the parameters of educational activity, both in relation to content 
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and procedures. Comparing education with activities that resemble education, but 
are not, will provide useful distinctions and clarity. To do this for content, I will 
compare education with training, and for clarifying methods I will compare 
education with indoctrination. 
1.1.1  Training and education 
Here I will first describe the traditional conceptual difference between training and 
education, mainly following the argument and distinctions presented by Peters 
(1970). This clear cut division between training and education is then later 
criticised as inadequate for understanding education in all its various forms in 
present times. 
According to Peters (1970) training and education have distinct differences. I will 
look at four aspects of training and education where the contrasting elements help 
to provide distinction between the activities of training and education: 
1) normative vs. descriptive nature 
2) knowledge/understanding vs. skills 
3) wide vs. narrow cognitive perspective 
4) initiating commitment and care vs. (relative) ignorance 
The first distinction between education and training is their difference as normative 
and descriptive procedures. Educational aims have normative implications which 
are dependant on value systems. As I noted before, education is by definition 
something worthy in a normative sense. It brings about improvement in the person 
who is educated, which in more general terms leads to improvements for a society 
when it consists of educated citizens. Training, on the other hand, is defined as 
neutral and descriptive. It is most often applied to acquiring skills with no attention 
paid to the questions of how worthy these skills are or what moral implications they 
may hold. 
Learning to steal is one example. Because stealing is not a worthwhile activity, at 
least within the common set of values in a society, it is difficult to form a concept 
Henriikka ClarkeburIl, JUlie 2000 m  Part I - Education and Ethics  14 
of 'theft education', while on the other hand there seems to be no logical problem 
in calling it training, learning the skill of stealing (CaIman and Downie, 1988). But 
at the same time, it is possible to form an idea of theft education if we think of a 
society where some section of the population is forced to steal for livelihood 
without any alternative, or when stealing is done to possess falsely acquired goods 
with the intention to benefit those in great need i.e. the Robin Hood ideal. A better 
example can then be provided with torture. Trying to form a concept of torture 
education is extremely difficult, if not even impossible. It is difficult to imagine a 
situation where education in torture would be a worthy goal in individual 
development or from a societal point of view. On the other hand, torture training 
possesses no conceptual difficulties as learning the skills of torture requires no 
normative appreciation of their use. At least not as far as the distinction Peters puts 
forward. 
The second distinction is between knowledge/understanding and skills. Education 
provides an understanding of principles for the organisation of facts, while training 
provides skills for a particular task. Education therefore also provides at least some 
understanding of the 'reason why' of things, while training concentrates on the 
question 'how'. Taking this distinction a step further, education also transforms, at 
least in some way, a person's outlook of the world and the knowledge gained 
influences perception and creates understanding. Training, on the other hand, can 
be successful without any understanding of 'why', or any associative cognitive 
changes, only learning the isolated performance of a particular procedure (Peters, 
1970). For example, learning how to dissect a tadpole is not education, but training 
in skills. There is no logical problem in seeing the skill of dissecting a tadpole as 
necessary for other ends, in this case possibly an educational one, but training in the 
skill of dissecting is not alone either sufficient or necessary for creating 
understanding i.e. to be called education. 
The third distinction is that for any activity to be called education it must have a 
wide cognitive perspective. This means that an educational activity may widen and 
deepen one's understanding of matters other than those included in the activity 
itself. Education therefore involves wholeness while training has a more limited 
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scope. For example, consider biochemists who cannot understand why their subject 
should be of interest to zoologists or medical professionals, as they are solely and 
exclusively interested in the molecular structure of particular proteins. It might then 
be more accurate to say that such persons have been trained as biochemists than 
that they have been educated in the field of biochemistry. A person can therefore be 
trained in complicated skills and have a command of a complicated but narrow field 
of information, but the term education would be reserved for activities which 
broaden and deepen understanding in a wider sense. Training can also work in the 
opposite direction and rather narrow the consciousness and limit the scope of 
interest. This might even be required in training for highly specialised skills, like 
surgery for example (Peters, 1970; CaIman and Downie, 1988). 
A fourth and final distinction between education and training is that in an 
educational activity, those who are engaged in it must come to care about what they 
are doing. Imagine a student who has graduated from a university with a biology or 
chemistry degree, both activities that can be 'worthwhile' and has a wide 
perspective, but thereafter shows no interest in the subject. It might be more 
appropriate to call such a student highly trained in the field of biology or chemistry, 
but maybe not educated (CaIman and Downie, 1988). 
The above described distinctions between training and education were originally 
presented by Peters and are open to criticism. The most apparent weakness of this 
analysis is the unnaturally sharp distinction between education and training. In 
reality the two terms seem either less distinct or, at least in some cases, in what is 
normally called education, overlapping. 
First it is important to realise that training can also be broad-based as in training for 
the ministry of the Church. Secondly, when training is broad-based it is often 
impossible to reach the aims without wider understanding of the field and a deeper 
cognitive perspective. For example, being trained in some biochemical procedure 
may be a precondition for successfully understanding more advanced topics like the 
importance of nutrition in conception. This can work the other way round as well; 
to be successfully trained as a good laboratory researcher in biochemistry requires a 
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larger understanding of the processes in nature. i.e. to be educated in the field of 
biochemistry (CaIman and Downie, 1988). 
Despite these criticisms, comparing education and training has provided the 
following useful distinctions: 
1) In education we are directly involved in normative implications in 
defining educational aims, while in training the aims as skills are as such 
neutral and descriptive, and the judgement on how worthwhile they are is 
not directly connected with the process of training. 
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2) Education aims to increase understanding and knowledge, in particular to 
answer the question 'why', while training is more concentrated on 
improving skills and finding answers to the question 'how', 
3) Education is logically connected with a wider cognitive perspective, 
while training can have its interests in a limited skill or discipline. 
4) Education necessarily involves an interest in the subject, while training 
can leave a person uninterested in the skills and knowledge gained. 
5) It is important to realise that training and education are not used in the 
above described distinctive manner in most every day situations. Rather, 
training and education in most disciplines are both essential elements and 
often one cannot be achieved without another. The concepts are overlapping 
and interrelated. 
If  we accept the distinction between education and training as separable activities, 
our view on science education has to be a combination of training and education. 
Asking a question of 'what is it for?' in relation to different parts of the science 
curriculum, can be useful in clarifying which parts of the educational programme 
are best described as education and which training. If  it is easy to come up with an 
answer like 'the course is for developing a laboratory skill X', then it might be 
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more appropriate to talk about training. While on the other hand, if no apparent 
narrowly focused answers prevail, as in the case of bioethics courses perhaps, it is 
more appropriate to talk about education. Naturally there are many courses and 
teaching components that do not as obviously fall under either description. This 
should not be seen as a problem, but only as evidence that training and education 
go hand in hand in science education, both being incremental parts of the process. 
Students with science degrees should therefore be both educated and trained. They 
should have a wide cognitive perspective in how their field relates to other 
activities and still be trained in particular skills. These skills can be important either 
for a particular extrinsic purpose, or they are not taught with educational aims in 
mind because of either the complicated subject matter or lack of true interest for 
students in that particular field. Different subjects can be taught both with training 
and/or education in mind. For example, biochemistry can be taught as a tool to 
understand corporeal processes in humans and other animals i.e. as a subject 
worthwhile for its own sake. But biochemistry can also be taught as providing 
essential knowledge with a particular end in mind, for example, laboratory 
practices, when the activity would be most appropriately described as training 
rather than education. 
When I refer to science education I have this larger concept in mind. But there will 
be times, when it is crucial for me to make a clear distinction between education 
and training, and I hope to be able to make it apparent when I am using education 
or training in their more limited senses. 
1.1.2  Educational process and indoctrination 
The definition of education given at the start of section 1.1 included one statement 
on method; that education should be carried out in a morally acceptable manner. 
For most people this would mean that indoctrination cannot be included as one of 
the educational activities, as the basic procedural tenets of indoctrination are not 
morally acceptable. Analysing the concept of indoctrination and why it cannot be 
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accepted as a method of education will clarify at least some of the boundaries of 
morally acceptable methods of education. 
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Even though I have included an analysis of indoctrination here primarily as a 
method of distinguishing the boundaries of acceptable educational practice, it is 
also important to understand something of its content matter. For something to be 
considered indoctrination, both the method and content are necessarily of a certain 
type, and education can share the content but never the method. Indoctrination, as 
far as content is concerned, is about matters of belief and faith, attitude and values. 
The fact that a teacher might be able to influence, even radically, students attitudes 
and beliefs is not a sufficient indication that the student has been indoctrinated. 
Therefore it is a necessary condition of indoctrination that beliefs should be 
imparted, but it is not alone sufficient. The question of method becomes crucial in 
providing a distinction between education and indoctrination. 
For an educational process to be classified as indoctrination, the content of the 
activity must necessarily have three characteristics (Woods and Barrow 1975): 
1) It must contain a system of beliefs which are interrelated and cover a 
large section of a general set of attitude and value structures. 
2) It must be based upon certain propositions or postulates that cannot be 
demonstrated to be rationally true. 
3) The type of beliefs that take part in indoctrination are not only 
unprovable, but there is no shared understanding about the type of evidence 
that could be used to prove certain beliefs true or false. 
Moral and religious education are the most common areas where indoctrination 
takes place or at least is expected to be possible. Though these subjects are more 
prone to indoctrinal practices than many others, this is not to say that no other 
subjects are prone to indoctrinal practices. Even science, which is often taken to be 
truly factual in its content and therefore not a subject in threat of indoctrination, has 
elements of belief, faith and attitude built in it. Therefore it cannot be automatically 
considered immune to indoctrinating practices. Genetic research, for example, can 
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be strongly influenced by a belief that human nature is determined by genetic 
constitution, where this belief influences both the choice of research topics and 
interpretation of data. 
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Methods of indoctrination vary greatly from brain-washing techniques to subtle 
under-currents of education that are separate from the overt educational plans. The 
extremes of brain-washing and physical violations are quite broadly rejected as 
forms of education, but the further one travels down the line of increasingly subtle 
forms of educational activity proposed to be indoctrination, the harder it becomes 
to draw the line between what is indoctrination and what are acceptable forms of 
education. At the weakest end of the scale is an opinion that all education is in fact 
indoctrination and that this indoctrination is carried on by subtle strategies - dark 
sarcasm, choice of study elements, and the hidden curriculum etc. - rather than by 
overt means. According to this opinion, teachers are without any doubt conveying 
their biases in teaching and any such subtle passing of attitudes is to be considered 
indoctrination. An example would be that the current educational system re-
enforces sex and/or racial stereotypes that already exist in society just because 
education is structured in certain ways, because certain types of people influence 
the teaching etc. and that this qualifies as indoctrination. 
If  indoctrination as a term was reserved only for crude and overt practices, then 
there would probably be very few educational institutions anywhere in Britain, or 
in any other Western countries, which could be said to indoctrinate and there would 
be no point in looking for a way of distinguishing indoctrination from education. So 
it is worth accepting that there could be more subtle and less easily recognised 
processes which would qualify as indoctrination. On the other hand, if all that is 
commonly called education could in fact be indoctrination, the distinction would 
become redundant. In believing that there is a middle ground, distinction between 
these terms is therefore taken as a starting point for an analysis of what are 
acceptable educational methods and what are to be rejected in terms of 
indoctrination. 
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For an educational method to be called indoctrination, it should be a process of 
inculcating belief on matters of the above mentioned content by non-rational 
methods. This is where indoctrination comes to a head-on collision with the normal 
understanding of what are ethically acceptable methods of education - that is, 
providing truth or at least the best version of it available and allowing for 
alternative truths to challenge the status quo. Providing lies or distorted truths as 
the truth is not acceptable. Neither is providing a limited scope for verification. To 
aim at inculcating unfalsifiable truths, it is necessary to use some form of non-
rational persuasion designed to bring about unshakeable belief. An activity with 
such aims and employing methods of non-rational persuasion, possibly allied to a 
system of punishment, whether concrete or abstract, cannot be called education, but 
indoctrination. 
The intention of the teacher is also a necessary element for an educational situation 
to be indoctrinating. It would seem very strange to talk about a person trying to 
bring about unshakeable belief in a non-provable statement without making a 
reference to the intentions of the person engaged. The intention may not be 
obviously present, but unmistakably the person engaged in indoctrination cannot be 
without an intention to promote the beliefs in his/her students. If a teacher who 
ceases to present the various views held by different people on a controversial 
subject (whether it is religious, ethical or political), attempts a particular view on 
the issues to be taken as the only truth by the students, which logically requires 
overriding the rationality ofthose same students, then we are entitled to call the 
activity indoctrination (Woods and Barrow, 1975). 
When indoctrinating, the educator is conveying attitudes and biases in a way which 
overrides the autonomy of the students - their ability to think for themselves. This 
is the core of activities to be classified as indoctrination: they aim at limiting the 
use and development of personal intellect, the ability to think for oneself and 
choose independently and freely between non-factual issues that have elements of 
faith, attitude and belief unavoidably built into them. This is the opposite to 
education, which aims at encouraging personal attributes of rationality. 
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Engaging in ethics teaching is always susceptible to charges of indoctrination, and 
quite rightly so. Ethics teaching can take the form of indoctrination as it has a 
subject matter that contains non-provable beliefs and theories and the ethical and 
moral beliefs held by people have a strong impact on how they lead their lives. I 
wish to make it clear here, and hope that it will be apparent in all of the stages of 
this research, that the aims of the ethics teaching in the course of this project will be 
such that the threat of indoctrination should not cast a shadow on the educational 
efforts expended. How well I succeed in achieving this aim, ethics teaching that is 
not indoctrination, will be left to the reader, but at this point, there should be no 
doubt of the intent. 
1.2  Summary 
The concept of education can be limited by reference to both the content and 
methods of the activity. In reference to the content, the neighbouring concept is 
training. Peters (1970) offers four basic differences between training and education: 
1) normative vs. descriptive nature 
2) knowledge/understanding vs. skills 
3) wide vs. narrow cognitive perspective 
4)  initiating commitment and care vs. (relative) ignorance 
In reality the division is rarely clear-cut. Educational activities involve elements of 
both education and training, which in many cases are essential partners in achieving 
the overall aims. For the purposes of this research, the term education is used to 
refer to activities which have dominantly educational aims, while they may also 
contain elements of training in non-essential practices. 
In reference to the methods of education, the counter-point is indoctrination. 
Indoctrination by definition aims to inculcate beliefs of an unjustifiable nature by 
methods which undermine the students' autonomy to use their rational abilities to 
weigh different alternatives and to choose for themselves. Ethics education is 
susceptible to indoctrinating practices, but as I hope to show, ethics education need 
not be indoctrinative, but can fulfil the criteria for genuine educational practice. 
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2.  Educational aims 
Justification for educational efforts is often given by reference to educational aims. 
Reference to aims is intended to provide adequate reasons to justify the expenditure 
in both time and financial resources needed for education. Even though the reasons 
for ethics education stated in the Introduction may win wide acceptance as general 
reasons why ethics education can support its place as part of science education, the 
actual aims of an ethics curriculum can still be an issue of disagreement and 
controversy. Due to the controversial nature of an ethics education, justification for 
the use of resources and effort requires explicit explanations of the aims of such a 
curriculum. 
The aims discussed here are teacher-centred statements on what a course of study, 
in this case science ethics, is set to provide - what is the motivation for teaching 
science ethics and how can it benefit students? As will become obvious, the 
objective of the teacher-centred aims discussed here is to provide student-centred 
aims for studying science ethics - what can the students do as a result of their ethics 
studies? Teachers and students alike need aims for their educational activities and 
while most of this section concentrates on the motives a teacher or an educational 
institution could (and should?) have when introducing ethics into the undergraduate 
science curriculum, the true aims of ethics teaching emerge as student-centred. 
Inquiring about aims often includes a question about purposes and motives. Asking 
for the aims of ethics education could be answered by stating only specific aims 
like 'the aim of this ethics exercise is to teach the students concepts of utility and 
justice', but a more adequate answer would include a reference to the motives and 
purposes of the educational activity, like 'the aim of this exercise is to teach the 
students the concepts of utility and justice, because this will give them tools to 
understand the nature of moral problems'. Educational aims are logically connected 
to values through the normative nature of education itself. They are necessarily a 
reflection on understanding of the term 'worthwhile' i.e. what we value as the end 
product of education. For this reason it is essential to spell out these normative 
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elements often embedded in statements regarding motivation and purposes of ethics 
education. 
The value-richness of educational aims provides an additional reason for explaining 
these aims in detail. Because educational aims are rich in values, we can foresee no 
obvious agreement on what values should be promoted through these aims. In 
particular, proposing teaching in a subject even richer in values than many others, 
ethics, one has to be ready to provide analysis and clarification of the values which 
the teaching promotes and to be ready to face disagreement and argument regarding 
their importance and acceptability. Therefore, I believe that stating aims clearly and 
in detail is important in providing adequate information on the values embedded in 
the educational activity and in facilitating an opportunity for those disagreeing to 
voice their opinion. 
This chapter is written to support the integration of science ethics into the 
undergraduate bioscience curriculum, by explaining in detail the aims of including 
ethics. I will focus my analysis on one classificatory aspect, the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic aims of education. This is not the only distinction that can be 
drawn between educational aims, as they can be classified in a great variety of 
categories. These include distinguishing educational aims according to 
classification schemes based, as presented by Brezinka (1997), on: 
•  the degree of complexity, 
•  whether the aims are ultimate or intermediate, 
•  the level of abstraction, 
•  distinguishing between material and formal content (Aims are formal 
when they are general e.g. to enable a person to behave similarly with the 
greater moral whole to which he/she belongs, and material when they 
include specific aims e.g. learning to tie one's shoe laces), 
•  the number of people for whom specific educational aims are set 
(personal or collective), or 
•  whether the aims are intrinsic (good in themselves) or extrinsic (the good 
is external to education). 
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Statements on educational aims are a collection of classifications in chosen 
categories. Not all categories need to be included in each clarification of aims, but 
often more than one is required for an adequate explanation. Educational aims with 
great complexity and a high level of abstraction can come to resemble sentences of 
the following kind "a wish to image the physical-spiritual-intellectual final form of 
a person which has an aim-giving effect on conscious educational 
efforts"(Brezinka, 1997, p.  148), which are meaningless to most readers. For 
practical purposes, these types of aims-statements are less than useful, while they 
may serve some purpose in clarifying very high-level aims for educational practice 
and for discussion among people invested in the particular language used in such 
statements. My approach here will be less abstract and concentrates more on 
creating an aims statement for the benefit of the learner, not an educational 
academic. 
But why concentrate on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic aims? The 
dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic aims is important to an analysis of ethics 
education, because the choice of either intrinsic or extrinsic aims has a direct 
influence on the actual teaching choices in ethics. This choice also has implications 
for the general acceptability of an ethics education as this choice touches on the 
very fundamental issues of teacher and learner autonomy and plurality of values. 
Finally, the choice between intrinsic and extrinsic aims for ethics education is 
likely to influence how successful one is in justifying the efforts and resources 
required for an ethics curriculum. For these reasons, I provide a detailed discussion 
on the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic aims, before moving onto describing the 
aims of ethics education. 
The rest of this chapter has the following structure. First, an analysis of extrinsic 
aims in section 2.1, followed by an analysis of intrinsic aims in section 2.2. The 
chapter will conclude in a short summary. 
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2.1  Extrinsic aims of  education 
According to Hirst and Peters (1970), when educational aims are extrinsic, the 
educational process itself is considered neutral and the aims of education are 
decided outside the realm of education. Education is considered instrumental to 
something that is worthwhile, but which is external to it. It follows from this that 
extrinsic aims for a certain educational activity are aims which are only 
contingently associated with the actual subject matter or educational process. 
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Further, extrinsic aims of education also provide an explicit purpose for the 
educational activities. It is not just improved skills, but improved skills for a reason. 
The aim is thus an identified and pre-perceived utility. 
It can be said, for instance, that the aim (and often the justification) of 
studying/teaching science is that it will ensure better paid employment in the future. 
This would be an extrinsic aim for three main reasons: 
1.  Higher pay is only contingently associated with the actual educational 
content of a science curriculum, because better pay can be obtained by 
gaining other types of qualifications, and the increase in pay will vary 
with each employer. 
2.  Whether we consider better pay as a neutral aim or one with certain 
values attached to it has no importance as long as the method chosen for 
achieving that aim is chosen on practical premises, not based on any 
value analysis. 
3.  Better pay can simply be an explicit purpose for studying/teaching 
science; one the student knows and has named. 
So if better paid employment is all a student or a teacher is after when embarking 
on a science course, their aims and motives are extrinsic to the subject matter. 
In a purely extrinsic view, education plays no part in the selection of the ends it is 
to serve. The task of education would then be clear: achieve the given ends in the 
best possible manner, i.e. in a way that produces the best results with minimal 
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effort/cost. So, if the aim for teaching science is to secure better pay for the 
students after they have been awarded their degree, the course should be designed 
to match employer requirements for new recruits and geared up for providing 
students with all the necessary skills for the higher paying jobs. 
For educational aims to be extrinsic, it is not necessary that education as such does 
not participate in the selection of these aims. Educational bodies can participate in 
the choice of educational aims, but for educational aims to be extrinsic, they cannot 
promote any particular educational subject or curriculum for any other reason than 
as the best available method of achieving the already stated aims. For the aims to be 
extrinsic, one cannot promote science by reference to the value of science as such, 
but only as means to the identified aim. The same applies to choosing items within 
the curriculum - they should not be considered important in their own right, but 
instrumental for an external purpose. 
Extrinsic justifications logically vary in how strongly the educational activity (X) is 
justified in that it brought about the extrinsic aim (Y). Downie et al.  (1974) 
describe three levels of such justification: In the strongest sense of  justification the 
occurrence of X is both a necessary and sufficient causal condition of Y. For 
example, the educational activity of learning a certain laboratory technique is both 
necessary and sufficient for achieving the extrinsic aim of being able to carry out 
particular laboratory tests. In a weaker sense, X is only a necessary causal condition 
of Y, but not alone sufficient. For example it is necessary to learn how to use 
certain equipment in the laboratory to carry out an experiment, but it is not 
sufficient, as one needs also to know how to handle chemicals and how to interpret 
the results in order to complete the experiment successfully. In a still weaker sense 
X might be conducive to Y - it may make Y more likely or it may be necessary for 
the best forms of Y, but it is not alone either necessary (Y can be achieved without 
it), nor sufficient (more than X is required to achieve Y). For example learning 
about the broader theory relating to the experiment may be conducive to 
completing the project, though it is neither necessary nor sufficient for that 
particular project. 
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In the case of moral education, I believe it to be necessary to include a fourth 
option - that X is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the occurrence of Y. 
This is a weak form of  justification. Supposing that we are faced with two 
alternatives for reaching the aims of our ethics curriculum and doing X will enable 
us to reach those goals, but it is not the only available alternative; doing Z would 
also enable us to attain the same results. In such situation the claim that X was a 
sufficient causal condition of Y would not by itself give us a justification for doing 
X. Justification for doing X would then have to be supplemented with other 
relevant sets of criteria, like additional benefits and lower costs involved in 
comparison with those of Z. 
These forms of  justification of an educational activity apply to educational aims on 
two different levels: 
1.  Understanding the links between educational activities and the desired 
outcomes is a useful tool when deciding which educational method to 
adopt. In particular when the aims can apply to the entire teaching 
content of the curriculum. For example, what is the causal link between 
science education and higher pay? This type of  justification is unlikely to 
have the strongest possible causal links, i.e. science education being both 
necessary and sufficient for highly paid employment. It is rather the 
weakest justification: science education is conducive to higher pay. One 
then needs to evaluate whether the link is strong enough to justify the 
efforts of science education in order to achieve this aim. 
2.  The causal links can also be analysed for assessing the best possible 
teaching method for achieving the aims. In this case the aim can be either 
intrinsic or extrinsic as the analysis is directed at methods of education 
and not the aims of education. 
Competence has become a major element in discussions of educational aims. In 
most, but not all, cases competence aims are extrinsic. Educational establishments 
acknowledging and valuing employers' requirements for competent people are 
likely to design their curriculum so that it will produce graduates with proper 
competencies for the work place. Because these aims come from outside education 
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(the employers), and are often presented in a view of education as a neutral process 
in achieving these aims, they are best classified as extrinsic. However it is 
important to realise that the externally suggested aims of education are not 
necessarily extrinsic. An external body can suggest inclusions to a curriculum that 
promote skills that are intrinsic to becoming a member in a particular profession or 
discipline or intrinsic in the sense of personal development. 
The idea of competence is not a new one in education. What is new is the particular 
idea of competence that now guides many educational aims - a shift which also 
makes competence an extrinsic aim. In the past, education in universities has been 
dominated by a notion of academic competence - a certain capacity to see the world 
and to engage with it through one or more academic disciplines, and to be able to 
engage in conversation in a particular cognitive tradition. This idea of competence 
is similar to the intrinsic aim of 'educated man'. In the current discussion 
competence is defined according to the needs and demands of employment, which 
are external to the actual activity of education, i.e. an extrinsic aim for education 
(Barnett 1997). 
In summary, extrinsic aims of education do not promote any particular subject for 
its own inherent values. Education is viewed in general as a tool for some other, 
external, purpose. These purposes need not be mundane or material (e.g. earning 
more money), but for the aims to be extrinsic they should be identified externally to 
education, to fulfil some purpose not connected with the subject matter, and should 
be specific about these aims. 
2.2  Intrinsic aims of  education 
The fundamental difference between intrinsic and extrinsic aims of education is that 
while the extrinsic aims refer to a specific aim external to the activity, the intrinsic 
aims refer to the benefits to the learner. In other words, intrinsic educational aims 
do not refer to any particular benefit or goal for which education is necessary, 
conducive, or sufficient, but rather reference is made to general benefits or goals in 
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life. Intrinsic aims refer to gaining abilities and knowledge that are good for 
learners regardless of the kind of life they choose to lead. 
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We need not consider intrinsic aims to be remote from reality or ignorant of the 
challenges of life or as vague and impractical. More often than not the successful 
pursuit of intrinsic aims produces some kind of external benefits. The significant 
element is that the educational efforts are not primarily justified by these benefits. 
For example, an ethics curriculum which is justified by reference to broadening the 
scope of the learner's autonomy (which is an intrinsic aim), may well also make 
students more valuable employees, just because they are more autonomous 
individuals. This may produce valuable social benefits (better pay, more secure 
employment or improved career opportunities). But importantly to the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic aims, these benefits are not in this example the aims 
of ethics education, but rather incidental to the intrinsic aim of autonomy (Wringe, 
1988). 
Reference to intrinsic aims rather than extrinsic aims of education suggests a 
different approach to the challenges of life - that challenges are not in the primary 
sense specific problematic tasks within a profession but shared by all professions, 
and in nature encompassing life in general. 
The role of intrinsic aims in higher education has been highlighted by the Dearing 
Report (1997). Two key recommendations in this report for higher education was to 
'inspire and enable individuals to develop their capabilities to the highest potential 
levels throughout life, so that they grow intellectually, are well equipped for work, 
can contribute effectively to society and achieve personal fulfilment', and to 
'increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their 
application to the benefit of the economy and society'. 
Ethics education can provide an example of intrinsic educational aims, in light of 
theoretical appreciation and the Dearing report. An intrinsic aim of ethics education 
could be a wish to encourage students' development as moral agents. This aim 
,would be intrinsic (valuable in itself) if the attempt to encourage moral 
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development is not for any particular explicit reason. An explicit reason for ethics 
education could be, for example, that a better grasp of moral decision-making tools 
will provide a better opportunity for the students to find employment and therefore 
we should teach the students ethics. Another way of expressing this is to state that 
improved moral agency, when given as an intrinsic aim of ethics education, is not 
considered as a skill instrumental for any particular external activity or justified by 
reference to any specific benefits. Rather, it is valuable for the learners whatever 
they choose to do in life. It is learning for no specific purpose. 
Educational activities worthwhile in themselves possess a number of features which 
clarify their nature. According to Wringe (1988), intrinsic aims are; 
1)  held to be unending in scope, 
2)  essentially non-competitive; even though capable of generating intense 
rivalries, they are essentially non-competitive in respect of their objects 
(people may make discoveries in their scientific field without depriving 
the others of an opportunity to do the same); 
3) they are challenging and provide opportunities for a variety of 
excellencies in seemingly limitless gradations of perfection, 
4) they entail both standards appropriate to the particular disciplines and the 
exercise of certain generic intellectual virtues such as intelligence, 
persistence, integrity, clarity, respect for evidence, and non-arbitrariness. 
In general an intrinsic educational aim must have a wider perspective than teaching 
a particular skill, which can be mastered perfectly in a limited period of time. This 
definition follows the same logic as distinguishing education from training as 
dominantly different types of activities, a distinction discussed in section 1.1.1. 
Training does not, by definition, have intrinsic aims while education may have 
them, though this is not necessarily so. Some take the issue even further, and 
suggest that an activity should be called education only if its aims are intrinsic: all 
the rest should be called training. To Peters (1970), for instance, intrinsic 
educational aims are the only true educational aims. 
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Describing intrinsic aims as non-competitive and having a variety of excellencies 
emphasises them as activities of personal improvement. Activities that have 
intrinsic aims do not, at least not primarily, have explicit external reason for the 
improvement, for example winning/not losing. Also the process of improvement is 
not considered to be complete at any particular point in time, thus it is unending in 
scope. For example, an aim of improving moral decision-making skills, which can 
be an intrinsic aim for ethics education, could never be considered complete. There 
is always an opportunity to refine moral decision-making skills. One may choose 
not to try to improve these skills after a certain point, but there is no logical reason 
why one could not do so. 
A core element in intrinsic aims is that they refer to abilities and knowledge that 
can be considered 'good' for the learner regardless of the life-plan that person has. 
The term 'good' in the intrinsic statement of educational aims in naturally value-
laden. The theoretical and practical disagreement on the content of 'good' or the 
source of things 'good', does not necessarily threaten our description of intrinsic 
aims. As long as the description of 'good' remains a personally chosen value-laden 
attribute that describes the life one wishes to live, we can understand 'good' in 
general terms and our description of intrinsic aims is not tied to a particular moral 
theory. Further, the assumption is that there are some skills and abilities that would 
be considered good in most life plans and that education can have a role to play in 
encouraging the development of these skills and abilities in a fundamental way. 
Even though we may be able to discuss intrinsic aims without committing ourselves 
to a certain value-system, it is often important, if not necessary, to be able to 
provide further explanations why a certain aim is intrinsically good. I will use 
studying Latin as an example. One possible way of providing the required reasons 
is to suggest that to teach/study Latin is worthwhile because Latin is an important 
language in Western civilisation. Naturally this reason may be challenged further-
'there is no goodness in knowing a language that is important to Western 
civilisation'. One can then attempt to widen the understanding of goodness in order 
to reach an agreement - e.g.  'teaching/studying Latin is important because it is part 
of Western culture and by learning Latin one can better understand it and it is good 
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to understand one's own culture'. This can yet again be challenged - 'why is it good 
to understand one's culture?' Maybe an even more fundamental justification could 
be found, but the process of justification cannot continue indefinitely. Ultimately 
the chain of reasoning must seek to link back to assumptions which the challenger 
cannot consistently deny, to some sort of transcendental argument referring to the 
basic values of being a member of a society, individual moral agent or a 'good' 
person. 
Naturally there might never be an agreement on the core intrinsic aims, but in many 
cases the disagreement is sophistic rather than genuine. Also there might be great 
disagreement in how to succeed in fulfilling the core, and often very general, 
intrinsic aims, even when there is no disagreement about the aims themselves. This 
disagreement should not be confused with the true disagreement about the aims 
themselves. My assumption here is that it is possible in most cases to find shared 
values to support the intrinsic aims of education, at least within the limits of one 
culture, even one as multiple as Britain, when we might have strong and differing 
views on how to achieve them. 
2.2.1  Values and intrinsic aims 
Reference to intrinsic aims is most commonly a reference to a value-statement of 
something specific being good without any reference to its usage. For the purposes 
of defining ethics education clearly, I suggest that intrinsic aims make no reference 
to any particular value-system. 
This is not a statement that intrinsic aims are value-free, as no educational aims 
ever are. Educational aims are always dependant on the society in which they exist. 
What is pursued through education depends on the personality ideals accepted as 
valid in a society and/or its sub-groups. Also, from a societal point of view 
education can be perceived as a means to securing the continued existence of the 
society and its culture; passing on a basic set of common ideas and sentiments, its 
basic moral attitudes and dispositions to act, and the special knowledge, abilities 
and virtues needed for maintaining productivity, and efficiency in all specialised 
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work domains. From an individual point of view, the value of education depends on 
personal aspirations, the opportunities society has to offer and how they are linked 
to education, and personal values. Which ideas, sentiments, moral attitudes, 
abilities, and virtues are the most dominant is dependant on the time and place. 
It follows from this that the important elements within educational aims are 
established and valid independently of educators and their educational actions. 
Educators are neither creators of such ideals, nor are they free to arbitrarily choose 
among the theoretically possible ideals or set ideals actually found in the world 
(Brezinka, 1997). 
This does not indicate that educators have no place in the process of establishing 
the values affecting educational aims: quite the contrary. Justifying educational 
aims is an important role in the constant re-identification of social values. The 
value-dialogue is influenced by educational efforts and educational efforts are 
influenced by this dialogue. It is therefore important to support this dialogue and to 
understand its two-way influence on the larger values of society. 
In  1990' s Britain, the liberal values of freedom, equality and rationality underpin 
most institutions, including higher education. These ideals may not be fully 
implemented, but they enjoy wide support as the ideals that should prevail. 
According to Halstead (1996) these ideals are: 
1)  Freedom includes freedom of action and opinion, freedom of constraint 
in the pursuits of one's own needs and interests. This can mean 
Benthamite utilitarianism of freedom to satisfy one's desire, or to realise 
one's rationally determined interests or simply to be oneself by being 
free of physical constraint. The value of freedom excludes totalitarian 
emphasis on communal unity to an extent that it endangers individuality. 
2)  Equality is respect for all individuals within the structures and practices 
of the society i.e. non-discrimination on irrelevant grounds. The value of 
equality, whether in a sense of formal equality of opportunity (Rawls 
1972) or a more expanded idea of equalising life prospects or to 
distribute wealth and power (more) equitably. The value of equality 
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rejects slavery or classification of people according to race, gender or 
social status. 
3) Rationality means basing decisions and actions on logically consistent 
rational grounds. The value of rationality excludes arbitrariness, 
inconsistency, and the failure to take account of relevant factors. As a 
value it rules out the uncritical acceptance of dogma. 
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Support of these values can form the basis of intrinsic aims in education, not 
because they are self-evidently 'the good values', but because they are accepted as 
the basic values of our society. There is a consensus, if not unanimity, that we 
should support these values and that we do not believe them to be good just 
because of some psychological quirk of our own. We do believe in their goodness, 
not as the last and unchanging doctrine, but as the firm value base of our society. 
The research described in this thesis is set within this value structure. The 
parameters of this value system are not static and the educational system is not 
without an opportunity to influence the cultural ideals within which it functions. 
The process of developing higher education is therefore partly a response to 
external demands and evolving ideals of personality and outlook of the world, but it 
also has a role in moulding these ideals and affecting their course. 
The teaching material resulting from this research has therefore two kinds of aims. 
First it is a clear response to the demands placed on higher education by society to 
encourage student development along these ideals. Second, it has an ideal of 
developing the skills of the current student generation towards the ideals and values 
held important within the teaching community. This new type of teaching is 
intended to influence how students approach their work and through that link 
influence values in society at large. 
2.3  Summary 
In this section I have concentrated on one aspect of aims, whether they are extrinsic 
. or intrinsic. This element of educational aims is important when we investigate the 
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justification for educational resources. Intrinsic and extrinsic aims function 
differently in justifying educational expenditure. Understanding their nature allows 
us to provide the most suitable justification for our educational efforts. 
Extrinsic aims of education have three main characteristics: 
1.  They are external to the actual educational activity. 
2.  Education is considered to be a neutral contributor to the set aims. 
3.  Education is an instrument for achieving particular aims, not a source of 
general good. 
In training, as described in section 1.1.1, most of the aims are extrinsic, because 
training as an activity seeks to develop skills and abilities for a particular purpose. 
Education in general can also be viewed as an instrument for an external set of 
aims, though that might reduce education to a role that is not wholly acceptable. 
Alternatively, intrinsic aims are fully involved with the educational activity itself. 
They are aims which are considered good in themselves, valuable for no particular 
external and explicit reason. It may be that achieving these intrinsic aims will 
produce quite significant positive (material) side-effects, but these are only 
contingent to the educational activity. Intrinsic aims concentrate on the person, not 
what that person can do. 
Based on the above description of aims, it is easy to see why the term 'educational 
aims' is so frequently used in assessing the justification of education or different 
educational practices. "What is the course for?"  and "What will the students learn" 
are most accurately answered by reference to intrinsic and extrinsic aims. These 
answers clarify the scope of our educational activities and whether the justification 
we can provide is either necessary, sufficient or conducive to the aims we have set 
for ourselves. Asking questions about the aims of education is a way of providing 
clarity and focus on what worthwhile aims are. 
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3.  Aims of Ethics Education 
One of the very first decisions to be made about an ethics course is to find an 
answer to the question 'why this course' or alternatively 'what are we trying to 
achieve with this course?'. The answer to these questions indicates whether the 
chosen aims are intrinsic or extrinsic. 
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In this chapter I will discuss the possible aims of an ethics curriculum. I will start 
with extrinsic aims in section 3.1  and continue with intrinsic ones in section 3.2. As 
will become clear, I believe that the aims of an ethics curriculum should be 
intrinsic. This is not to under-value the external benefits of such educational 
activities, which I believe to be considerable. The reason why I believe, and hope to 
show in this chapter, that the true aims of ethics education should be intrinsic is in 
its general approach to a person, respect for autonomy, and dignity. Also, the 
practical problems that arise from choosing extrinsic aims for teaching ethics 
indicate that they are unsuitable. 
3.1  Extrinsic aims of ethics education 
One of the core issues for extrinsic aims is that they should be clear and definable, 
often even measurable. The possible definable and measurable aims of an ethics 
curriculum are 1) possessing a certain opinion or value and an ability to 
demonstrate that value when requested, or 2)  'ethical behaviour' - a tendency to act 
in a certain way in response to a specific stimulus. Extrinsic aims are therefore 
directly involved in the behaviour of an individual or co-operation between 
individuals, and holding certain 'right' moral values. 
Most often, holding a correct view, value, or opinion is not sufficient, but the 
correct behaviour becomes the most essential element in extrinsic aims for an ethics 
curriculum. Behaviour is the external sign of mental processes and therefore also of 
the values held. Behaviour also has a direct impact on social functioning and 
altering social contacts. It is therefore sensible to discuss the extrinsic aims of 
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ethics education by including some aspects of behaviour, most notably how 
education affects behaviour and what type of behaviour is desired. Behaviour can 
be either actions in a particular situation or more general behavioural patterns 
applicable to a larger set of possible situations. The following analysis of extrinsic 
aims of ethics education concentrates thus on behaviour modification. 
Extrinsic aims for ethics education can be of three different overlapping types: 1) 
those concerning the individual, 2) those concerning morality or other phenomena 
generally assumed to be morally good, and 3) those concerning the good of society 
(Downie et ai.  1974). Extrinsic aims of ethics education concern dominantly the 
success of a student in both personal and work life. Such aims could be, for 
example, better income based on skills gained through ethics teaching. Aims 
concerning morality or other phenomena assumed to be morally good relate to 
activities of a community. Such aims could include speaking the truth or the ability 
to understand moral problems and to solve them in the best possible manner. The 
last type of aim - those concerning the good of society - relate to general views on a 
good society and how it can be best achieved. Such aims may include the ability to 
understand the moral grounds for the laws of the state and a desire to adhere to 
them. All these types are overlapping as the aims that are dominantly individual 
also contribute to the aims that are dominantly social or to those of general 
morality. The dominance refers to the most direct beneficiary of certain educational 
aims, while all types are inter-linked and advances in each promote goodness in the 
others as well. 
A call for moral education is often formulated as a need to teach students the 
difference between right and wrong, often in a sense that the students are then 
expected to carry this knowledge over to their actions. In other words, the aim is to 
produce individuals who know what is right and what is wrong and also behave 
according to this knowledge by doing what is right and avoiding what is wrong. 
This is a consideration of mainly general morality and socially beneficial aims. 
While the individual may benefit from the achievement of these aims via better 
adaptation to society, the benefits are not direct. 
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This type of moral behaviour education involves three tasks: 
1)  identification of the appropriate values. 
2)  the transmission of these values to students (Halstead, 1996), 
3)  ensuring behavioural patterns in students, identical to the transmitted values. 
The task of moral behaviour education proves problematic on several accounts. The 
first problem is the genuine lack of agreement over the definition of what is right 
and what is wrong, i.e. what are the appropriate values. There is no shortage of 
opinion of which values should be the most important, but little agreement between 
them. Even if people might be able to agree on general moral values - like the value 
of human life or the importance of justice - this consensus is often dispersed at the 
very moment someone tries to apply the value to an actual moral problem. 
Agreeing that justice is an important value is different from trying to decide what 
justice means when a doctor needs to choose between two patients for kidney 
dialysis - are we looking at a just method of choosing (first-in-first-served, roll of 
dice), which would then result in just allocation of scarce facilities or are we more 
concerned about the results of the selection. In other words, in trying to choose 
between an old man and a young woman - what criteria should we use in choosing? 
Would age, social status, medical prognosis, gender, or luck be the decisive factor? 
There are no easy rights or wrongs in most real-life situations. 
Therefore stating that 'teaching the students what is right and what is wrong is the 
aim of an ethics curriculum' is often not sensible in the situation of multiple 
interpretations of the same value. Stating that this course teaches the students what 
is right and what is wrong would be an ambiguous reference to a consensus that 
does not exist. Not only would it be undermining the plurality of value judgements, 
but it would also be creating false expectations of what the course contains. One 
could avoid the latter problem by going to the lengths of stating what are the rights 
and wrongs to be taught during that course - a difficult task in itself - but this would 
not give any guarantees that others would be willing to accept those value 
interpretations as the appropriate rights and wrongs to be taught. 
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The behaviour approach to education is further likely to fall into the problem of a 
static view of values. If  the aim statement has a right (wrong) value approach, the 
right and wrong may become fixed and rigid concepts, that are not open to 
redefinition in the face of a novel or difficult moral situation. This does not 
correspond with reality where right and wrong are re-defined and re-justified as a 
normal course of social change. Hence, developing an ethics curriculum with an 
aim of teaching students what is right and wrong, is an approach almost guaranteed 
to be one of great controversy and difficulty. 
But assuming that a list of values to be taught was agreed upon, the next difficulty 
would be encountered when trying to transfer these values to the students. Aiming 
to persuade people (or plainly force them) to adopt certain values is likely to be 
classified as indoctrination, which is in direct conflict with one of the basic values 
of liberal society, i.e. freedom of opinion. Indoctrination is not an appropriate 
educational aim, as was discussed in section 1.1.2. 
A further problem with the extrinsic approach to ethics education is the disparity 
between what one knows to be right and one's actions. It is not straightforward to 
believe that people always do the right thing as long as they know what the right 
action is. What people state as their values and how they actually behave seems to 
have only a loose correlation. Further, verbal agreement with general value 
statements does not necessarily indicate agreement with a policy statement intended 
to represent those values (Lockwood, 1976). 
A significant amount of research has been carried out in order to verify whether 
values and actions do or do not correlate. For example, moral development scores 
(Defining Issues Test scores, more of which in Part II section 4.3) and behaviour 
have a pattern of significant, but only moderate, relationship. This suggests that 
other variables also determine behaviour. Moral judgement scores are, rather, 
linked to behaviour from the perspective of different moral judgement representing 
variation in the ways people construe situations, which then leads to different 
actions (Thoma and Rest, 1986). 
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This problem has been well known from the start of Western philosophy. In ancient 
Greek philosophy it was called akrasia, meaning the weakness of will. Socrates 
famously denied the existence of akrasia:  'no one does wrong willingly' . Aristotle 
on the other hand commented that this statement is 'manifestly at odds with 
observed facts' . Aristotle continued his argument by stating that those of real 
knowledge do not do wrong, but only those whose knowledge is blurred by the 
seeking of pleasure and the like (Rowe 1995). If  Aristotle was right, intuitively, and 
by social observation, it seems that we all have only blurred knowledge! 
One of the possible explanations for this lack of strong positive correlation between 
moral judgement and moral action is that the making of moral judgements is not 
solely an intellectual activity. Weighing pros and cons is a cognitive process: the 
conclusions emerge on one side or the other whether we like it or not. These 
conclusions carry with them an attraction towards the type of action they approve 
or a repulsion against the type of action condemned by them. Therefore the 
cognitive weighing of alternatives falls short of an actual decision to act 
accordingly. To translate moral knowledge into action requires various qualities of 
character, depends on the circumstances, courage, self-control, perseverance, 
concern for others, love of justice, strength of will and so on (Downie et ai.  1974). 
An ethics course with an objective to build personal character, encourage concern 
for others, love of justice, strengthen personal will, as well as to teach the students 
what is right and wrong, how we should love justice (let alone understanding what 
justice is!) and so forth sounds more than an ethics course. If these are the aims, 
some truly good and honourable, it would be incredibly hard to imagine a course 
structure that could even hope to achieve most, if any, of these aims. 
A separate problem from adopting behaviour and/or character change as the aim of 
ethics education is, how to measure the success of such educational efforts. 
Measuring the effects is particularly important when the educational aims are 
extrinsic, because if aims are external and specific, there is likely to be a need to 
know how well these aims were achieved. Whether the need for justifying the 
success of the educational efforts comes from external pressure of funding bodies, 
from internal quality assurance, or just from an interest to know how well a course 
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did achieve its aims, it would be extremely difficult to provide evidence that an 
ethics curriculum has made a substantial impact on the moral behaviour of students. 
It might be possible to present students with moral choices and monitor their 
behaviour in a laboratory, but this is unlikely to be satisfactory if the aim was to 
change behaviour in general, in all situations and in the long term. Unfortunately, 
behavioural changes are difficult to measure in real life situations. It is impossible 
to follow students outside the classroom extensively enough to verify that the 
effects of ethics education on behaviour are permanent and substantial. This is not 
just due to the apparent practical problems of recording and evaluating magnitudes 
of behavioural situations, but there would be difficulties in classifying what is right 
and wrong behaviour in each situation. Also, we should be concerned with the 
implications that such large scale monitoring of student behaviour have for the 
rights of students to privacy and freedom of opinion. 
A further problem for an ethics curriculum of extrinsic aims arises if the aims are 
chosen mainly from the social point of view, to teach the students certain values 
and modes of behaviour because it is considered to be beneficial for the society or 
some members or groups in the society. This approach includes a risk of using 
education as a means to tum students into building blocks of a certain type for a 
society they have not chosen themselves. In other words, students might become 
the means to an end and cease to be ends in themselves. This is a Kantian notion of 
people not to be ever treated simply as means, but always as ends. Modifying a 
person's set of values and aiming to alter their behaviour for social benefits, is 
using the entire person for the good of something else than the person him/herself. 
This is far more than asking a person to do a particular deed for the common good. 
Aiming to influence a person permanently, to change and choose the values they 
hold and to expect them to behave according to some predefined pattern, is not 
compatible with what we normally understand when we talk about personal 
autonomy and integrity. 
In the literature, we can find moral educators supporting the above conclusion that 
changing student behaviour or values is not an appropriate approach to teaching 
ethics. Callahan (1980) concludes that: "A legitimate goal in the teaching of ethics 
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is to help students develop a means and a process for achieving their own moral 
judgements. If 'moral education' means something more than that - an education in 
specific moral rules, or specified traits of character - then it is illegitimate." (p. 71). 
Because of both value-based problems and problems in measuring the success of an 
ethics curriculum when the chosen aims are behavioural and/character 
modification, I will not use them in my set of aims for this project. This leads to 
exploring intrinsic aims as a justification for ethics education. 
3.2  Intrinsic aims of ethics education 
Intrinsic aims for an ethics curriculum take a sharp diversion from extrinsic aims by 
rejecting any particular set of values or moral behaviour as appropriate. These aims 
cannot be considered good in themselves - at least not in the sense described 
earlier. Through the analysis of extrinsic aims for ethics curriculum in section 2.1, 
it became clear that particular values are rarely agreed upon, at least beyond a very 
general description, and therefore they do not fulfil one of the basic criteria for 
intrinsic aims - common agreement on their goodness. Again, agreement may be 
possible regarding general value statements, and the impossibility of agreement 
refers to more detailed moral statements and interpretations of values. We could 
logically base intrinsic aims of an ethics curriculum on a general set of accepted 
values. Unfortunately the positive outcomes of such a course would be limited, as 
learning of general values per se would not differ significantly from any other 
cognitive learning of concepts and thus offers no other benefits than better 
understanding of conceptual intricacies. For these reasons the intrinsic aims of 
ethics education are poorly understood as the outcomes of cognitive pursuits. 
Instead of prescribed outcomes, an ethics education can (should?) concentrate on 
the process of moral decision-making. 
A possible, and here adopted, intrinsic aim of ethics teaching can be the process of 
moral decision-making - to encourage the moral development of the learners in 
making moral decisions, supporting them in developing tools to analyse and solve 
moral problems and creating opportunities to practice these skills. The emphasis 
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society, a 'good' person would be one who refrains from moral inquiry and 
decisions. Decisions regarding human interactions and public good would then be 
made by the leaders, without consultation or need for approval from the citizens 
involved. Such a society might be a well functioning and a pleasant society, but it 
would not be a democratic one. 
Naturally there are values involved here as no educational activity exists in a 
neutral, value-free, environment. The values supported here are respect for personal 
choice of values, freedom of opinion and the importance of self-chosen and 
rationally defensible values. These values are construct values, not content values, 
which makes them more defensible within our own social climate. Insofar as 
democracy means rule by the people, the self-directed choices of citizens should 
ultimately guide public life. If  this requirement is taken seriously, democracy 
presupposes citizens who are capable of forming authentic convictions -
convictions which the person can identify and be conscious of the process that led 
to that identification - which they can bring to the guidance of society. Therefore, 
citizens should become conscious of the processes that have affected their value-
choices, and develop the capacity for evaluating them as well as those prevailing in 
society as a whole. Because ability to form authentic convictions is not an inborn 
talent, the idea of democratic society presupposes an education which fosters 
independent reflection (Puolimatka 1997). The ethics education described in this 
thesis holds its place as part of the larger educational effort to encourage people to 
develop their skills as independent moral agents. 
3.2.1  Nature and measurement of moral development 
An inherent element in education is the aim to improve, to encourage progress and 
development - "[I]t would be a logical contradiction to say that a man has been 
educated, but that he had in no way changed for the better" (Peters 1970, p. 25). 
Moral education is no different. The aim is to create improvement and in the case 
of intrinsic aims, improvement in the abilities to make moral decisions - to 
encourage moral development. 
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The core of the moral decision-making process is how one perceives moral 
situations and the methodes) one uses to decide between the perceived courses of 
action. Particular skills are involved in each step of moral decision-making and 
moral development refers to the improvement in the use of these skills and abilities. 
The approach to moral development adopted here is based on the theories of 
Kohlberg (1976), Perry (1999) and Gilligan (1982). The fundamental feature of 
each theory is that moral development is viewed 1) as a linear process where moral 
abilities can be considered to exist in stages, and the development from one stage to 
the next is invariant - one can progress to a stage only by passing through the 
immediately previous one. 2) Development is not automatic - it is possible to delay 
progress to the next logical stage (even indefinitely) and to regress to a lower stage. 
3) This process is considered universal in the sense that the developmental 
structures of moral decision-making are not dependent on the actual moral 
decisions made, but on the tools, skills and approaches adopted at each stage. 
The theory of moral development is discussed here as a meta-theory - one that 
provides a framework to discuss the nature of moral development and theories 
within the discourse. The nature of moral development theory, and the nature of its 
practical applications, can be illustrated by comparing it with the theories and tests 
of IQ (Intelligence Quotient), which provides a good point of contrast despite its 
problematic nature. My comparative analysis follows that of Gibbs and Widaman 
(1982). 
1)  Items in IQ tests are chosen principally for their statistical properties and 
not for their structural or contextual qualities, while the test items in 
moral development are fundamentally concerned with the 
correspondence of the test items with the objective nature of moral 
development. 
2)  The aims of IQ and moral development tests are different. Where IQ tests 
seek constant variability of scores between individuals, moral 
development tests measure the maturity of a particular individual and in 
longitudinal studies, the moral development process of one individual. 
Large cross-sectional samples are typically used to establish 'normal' or 
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average intelligence, while in moral development tests, large samples are 
used in order to improve understanding of the process of development. 
3) An individual IQ score is defined and evaluated relative to average 
scores, which are often age-related in childhood and stable once in 
adulthood. IQ scores are also estimated to remain stable in adulthood 
when one's 'predetermined' IQ has been reached. In moral development, 
an individual 'score' is used to signify the stage of one's development, 
which is not hypothesised to be static or at least no concept of 
predetermined stage of moral development is hypothesised. The aim of 
IQ testing is, hence, to establish individual differences and moral 
development tests aim to establish the progress of one person within the 
individual's realm of development. 
The basic questions in moral development research are 1) what are the fundamental 
processes of moral decision-making, 2) whether there are better or worse ways to 
make moral decisions and whether we can describe moral development as a process 
where one rejects worse methods of moral decision-making and simultaneously 
accepts better ones, 3) can education improve the decision-making process, 
assuming improvement is logically possible? The last question is included in the 
research hypothesis of this thesis. I will return to the first question in Part III 
section 6.4, and concentrate here on the second question - is moral development a 
logically sensible discourse? 
The basic idea in most moral development theories is that a person passes through 
several moral stages in a particular order, and that not all will necessarily reach the 
highest stage, but can remain even on one of the lowest ones. This development is 
not simply a representation of learning a longer and more complicated list of rights 
and wrongs, but a matter of developing fundamentally more sophisticated 
conceptions of how moral reality is organised and how to make moral judgements 
within it. 
The three most influential theories of moral development can be seen to describe 
the same development from different perspectives. Kohlberg concentrates on the 
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understanding of fairness in hypothetical situations, considering the decision-maker 
as an independent moral agent. The conception of fairness translates to an 
understanding of rights and duties - their source and content. Kohlberg's theory 
deals with 'macro-morality' - questions of the morality of the society and its 
institutions - not with 'micro-morality' questions relating to everyday life face-to-
face situations (Rest et al.  1999a). 
Gilligan, whose theory was developed as a response to Kohlberg's, emphasises the 
contextual issues of moral decision-making, an individual within relationships. If 
the determinants of moral obligation for Kohlberg are principles of  justice, for 
Gilligan they are relationships. The moral conflict for Kohlberg is embedded in the 
rights of the moral agent and the rights of the other, while Gilligan explores the 
moral conflict between hurt and care - a reflection on inevitable moral choices that 
do not inflict only good, but pain as well. In philosophical literature we can find 
several other approaches/perspectives on moral development. 
Shapiro (1999) has developed a model, one he calls a moral spectrum, which 
describes different moral decision-making methods called prisms. Within this 
spectrum, Kohlberg's development of principled reasoning encompasses 
deontological, utilitarian and existential prisms. In other words, it uses a decision-
making formula not tied to self-benefit or relationships. The ego prism in Shapiro's 
model would be included in the lower level reasoning in the Kohlberg model. 
Gilligan's approach co-incides with prisms of ethics of care and communitarianism. 
The remaining prism, virtue ethics, is an alternative approach for which moral 
development models have not yet been developed, but with which character 
development aims coincide. 
Perry's approach, on the other hand, concentrates on the understanding of moral 
reality - the source of rights and duties, information and values. It is less concerned 
with the relationships between people (the core element for both Kohlberg and 
Gilligan), and more on the inner structuring of reality within one individual. The 
development in each approach entails an integration of rights and responsibilities. 
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Each moral development theory concentrates therefore on one aspect of moral 
decision-making - each describing a vital part of the process. Perry's model is an 
umbrella over the field of moral decision-making. The basic understanding of 
moral reality is often a pre-requisite for more specific aspects of moral 
development. 
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We encounter moral problems both in our private and public lives, and a different 
understanding of the problems is required. There is no logical reason why both 
personal (care orientation) and global (justice orientation) cannot be introduced, 
where relevant, into one and the same reasoning episode. It is possible to imagine a 
person who is both caring and perceptive of the needs of others and self, and who in 
addition has finely toned sensitivities for perceiving moral salience in a global 
sense and perceiving moral problems of great diversity (Flanagan and Jackson 
1993). 
The progression of moral development according to all three theories is very 
generally a move away from a dualistic world view, where things are 'black and 
white' and often where it is me (good) against others (bad). The lower levels in 
moral development are also characterised by dependency and the need for 
authoritative figures as the source of answers and values, and a limited scope for 
social effects - often only the immediate persons are considered. At the start of 
moral development, people are also incapable of dealing with multiplicity and 
relativism of facts and unforeseen consequences. Moral choices are based on very 
concrete indicators, like the likelihood of getting caught and an ability to win a 
physical encounter. The moral skills required in the lower stages are relatively 
basic. Only a limited amount of moral thinking is necessary when rules are 
accepted as given and only minimal implications are considered. 
In the middle stages the 'black and white' dualistic view is supplemented by a 
recognition of greys. Life is no longer as clear-cut, but the source of moral codes is 
still not considered to be the individual, but rather the society. One is part of a 
system and following rules is an important part of being a member. Even if there 
are no absolutes, authority is now considered an authority who chooses within the 
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relativistic reality. Also, the scope of moral stakeholders expands: one is able to see 
the wider consequences of moral actions and is interested in them. Often the 
balance changes dramatically from selfishness to the denial of personal needs and 
the value of personal desires. The system is, however, still rigid and personal moral 
commitment to self-chosen values is more or less lacking. The moral skills required 
are more demanding: one needs to observe and deal with multiplicity and 
relativism, seek to understand the wider consequences of moral actions and find 
reasons for moral rules other than immediate (physical) threat. 
In the last stages of moral development relativism and multiplicity are accepted as 
inseparable characteristics of the world, and the individual moral agent is as able as 
the authorities to make judgements in the moral sphere. One is interested in the 
wider consequences of moral actions, taking into account people both physically 
and temporally distant, and seeking to understand both indirect/direct effects of 
moral actions. The interests of self and others find a balance. The moral skills 
required are complex because one needs to be able to form and support individually 
acquired moral convictions and judgements. One needs to be personally able to 
form logical and coherent moral arguments, and have an ability to foresee several 
different types of moral consequences. 
Not all agree with the idea that Kohlberg, Gilligan and Perry describe essentially 
different aspects of moral development, but in general understanding, for the 
purposes of designing an ethics curriculum, I believe this simplification and 
unification is both defensible and sensible. For further discussion on how these 
theories overlap, please refer to Appendix II: One Theory. 
3.2.1.1  Problems with moral development 
One of the problems with this description is that moral development includes 
aspects of improvement, not wholly a neutral cognitive development, but one that 
involves personal attributes as well - courage, will, and effort. An implication of 
this might be that a morally 'advanced' person, showing either faster development 
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through moral stages or holding an advanced position relative to those of his/her 
age becomes in a more general sense a 'better person' (Perry, 1999). 
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But we need not approach moral development by making a normative judgement on 
the goodness of a person according to their level of moral development. A person 
moving from a lower stage to a higher stage may be said to be developing not 
simply because the adopted assumptions are 'better' or more 'true', but because the 
forms of the later assumptions build upon the earlier ones in a coherent manner. 
This cannot be said in reverse. This is a skill-based approach. The basic assumption 
is that people can develop these skills, and that they are able to progress through 
the moral development stages: all we need to do is to give them opportunities to do 
so. A person's moral development stage does not, therefore, need to be a normative 
judgement, but an indication of the personal stage of development, information 
which can, and should, be used for the benefit of the person whose developmental 
stage has been recognised. Rest et ai.  (1999a) emphasise that there is not just a 
difference between schemas, but also a relative developmental advance in moral 
thinking, because one conception is a cognitive advance over another. 
We can call this movement through stages development in a skill-based sense for 
three reasons (Rest 1983): 
1.  Each stage in the sequence is progressively more differentiated and 
integrated. 
2.  Each new stage employs cognitive operations which are more diverse 
and equilibrated. 
3.  Each stage has a more encompassing view on society. 
Even if we appreciate a certain relativism of moral values as inevitable, it seems 
logical to believe that the moral decisions made by a person with an ability to 
perceive the wider implications of moral actions, and by one who is capable of self-
directed thought and of forming logical and coherent judgements, are better than 
those made by considering only immediate implications and believing in absolute 
authorities. In any sphere of human development, perceptual, intellectual, social, 
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emotional, moral and so forth, the implications of development suggest that it is 
better to grow than to arrest growth or to regress. 
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The assumption is that the values built into this scheme of moral development are 
commonly held to be significant. I would argue that it is better for each person to 
progress to more advanced levels of moral development, that it is better for each 
person to have a wider understanding of the moral implications of decisions, and 
better for others as well. Since there is no intention within this research to rank 
students according to their moral development, to make it a classificatory aspect 
within the educational establishment, the implications of developmental testing 
should not be negative on students. The basic assumption is that within the 
university student population there are very few individuals with capacity 
restrictions for reaching the highest levels of moral development, and the 
encouragement of moral development is aimed at the personal improvement of the 
individual student, not as a measure of effort or success. 
Therefore, if we can agree that the higher stages of moral development are 
preferable to the lower levels, we can also agree that the promotion of moral 
development is an acceptable and desirable aim of ethics education. 
If we accept encouraging moral decision-making abilities as the aim of an ethics 
curriculum, we need to look at the aspects of moral decision-making in more detail. 
There are two areas of interest, namely: 
1.  Moral Sensitivity - an ability to perceive the ethical implications of a 
situation. It is essential in any situation to be able to identify the moral 
aspects. Without the initial recognition of moral facts alongside scientific 
or 'hard' facts it is impossible to make any moral decisions. Moral 
sensitivity is also about an ability to understand the moral networks and 
implications of moral actions. Moral sensitivity is also called 'moral 
consciousness' . 
2.  Moral Competency - an ability to engage in sound moral reasoning and 
practical problem solving strategies. The person must be able to make a 
judgement about which course of action is morally right (or fair, just, 
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morally good, or adequate) and thus label one possible line of action as 
what a person ought (morally) to do in that situation. Moral competency 
is also called 'moral cognitive skills'. 
3.2.2  Moral sensitivity 
Moral sensitivity is the first step in moral decision-making. Without recognising the 
moral aspects of a situation, it is impossible to solve any moral problem, for 
without the initial recognition, no problem exists. Also without an analysis of the 
moral aspects, it is impossible to move onto making decisions, at least if the 
decisions are to be made with awareness of the magnitude of the problem and the 
effects of the decision. 
Moral sensitivity is a combination of two different abilities; moral imagination and 
recognition of ethical issues. Callahan (1980) has described these two aspects in the 
following way: 
1.  Moral imagination is an ability to perceive a 'moral point of view' - to 
understand that 1) human beings live in a network of moral relationships, 2) 
consequences of moral rules can be either happiness or suffering, 3) moral 
dimensions of life can be hidden or visible, and 4) moral choices are in most 
cases inevitable and difficult. Moral imagination is thus an ability to see the 
moral side of the story and an ability to project on the moral consequences of 
actions. It is like imagination, because it requires one to  'see' something that is 
not real in a sense that we could touch it, but something that is real in our minds 
and within our social existence. This level of understanding can be considered as 
a pre-requisite level for any moral discourse. It is necessary, but not sufficient. 
Without moral imagination we are not able to engage in discussions on ethical 
problems. But to have only imagination is like being able to see, but not to act or 
speak, to be only a passive perceiver of things, but not an active player within 
the moral network one can see. Therefore, just to have an ability to perceive 
moral problems is insufficient for making moral decisions, while it is an 
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essential part of that process. In order to solve moral problems one also needs an 
ability for conceptual and logical analysis. 
2.  Recognition of  ethical issues is closely linked with moral imagination - it is 
moral imagination put into action. If  moral imagination is an ability, recognition 
of ethical issues is the application of that ability. It is an attempt to analyse what 
has been seen, to recognise the value of moral aspects in a particular situation. 
Recognition of ethical issues is to distinguish between emotional responses to 
situations and appraisal of facts, moral or scientific. This type of recognition 
requires an examination of concepts, moral statements, and ethical and moral 
rules. To be able to recognise ethical issues in this way, one needs to be aware of 
the moral categories, of the aspects that can be classified as moral and to be able 
to evaluate their importance to a particular situation. 
To be able to imagine and recognise moral problems one needs an ability to accept 
and recognise multiplicity of the moral reality. The development of moral 
sensitivity is linked to the developmental positions described by Perry (see 
Appendix III - Perry's Scheme). The Perry Position 5 is a pre-requisite for 
appreciating the variety of moral reality, though the ability to do so does not 
guarantee that one will apply the skills in practice. 
After implementing both the skills of moral imagination and recognition of ethical 
issues, a person should be aware of various courses of action and what are the 
consequences of each action. This is an acquired ability, not an inborn talent. 
People may differ in their natural sensitivity to moral problems, but in general 
moral sensitivity is acquired by exposure to moral problems. Because moral 
sensitivity is not an inborn talent, it is possible to cultivate it and improve one's 
ability to understand the moral aspects of a problem in increasing adequacy and 
precision. Moral sensitivity is an important skill and the difficulties in interpreting a 
situation as moral and in understanding the implications of moral actions should not 
be underestimated. 
While moral sensitivity has a strong cognitive component, it is not only an 
intellectual faculty. Recognition and interpretation of moral aspects are also 
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dependent on situational clues, personal attributes, and affective responses. Rest 
(1986) provides the following list of the aspects interfering with a rational and clear 
perception of moral aspects in context: 
1.  First, people may block from their consciousness certain aspects because the 
cues in the situation are ambiguous and it becomes difficult to interpret them. 
Inability to interpret social situations in terms of realising how one's actions 
influence others is not necessarily defensive, but rather a psychological 
mechanism to deal with difficult and ambiguous information. 
2.  Second, research shows that there are distinct individual differences in 
sensitivity to needs and welfare. For some, blood needs to flow before they 
recognise the plight of another person, while the other extreme is an 
oversensitive person for whom every grimace and word takes on momentous 
moral implications. 
3.  Third, research has shown that there can be a strong affective response before 
extensive cognitive encoding. We can have instantaneous dislike for someone or 
empathy towards another, before we have had any opportunity to analyse the 
situation. These feelings are not independent of cognition, but they are more 
primitive cognitions and their accompanying feelings can proceed without 
waiting for considered reflective judgement and careful weighing of facts. It is 
important that these first impressions are clearly recognised and that they may 
not be the most appropriate affective moral reactions in given situations. 
Moral sensitivity thus involves identifying what we can do in a particular situation, 
understanding the consequences to all parties of each line of action, and identifying 
and trying to understand our own gut feelings on the matter. 
Taking into consideration these psychological aspects of recognising and analysing 
moral situations, an ethics curriculum can proceed to support student development 
in learning to confront these situations with more reflective thought and control of 
their initial emotive responses. I will look at the most appropriate methods in Part 
II. 
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3.2.3  Moral competency 
Making moral choices is not a matter of pick and choose what seems to suit our 
aspirations in each situation. If  we are interested in proper moral arguments and 
high levels of moral development we cannot use ethical arguments to support our 
own preferences or opinions unless they coincide with coherent and rational moral 
argumentation and decision-making models. If we are to take moral reasoning 
seriously, we cannot allow ignorance of relevant facts, or illogical use of 
arguments. 
As I have discussed before, to be good at morality does not refer to holding the 
right views. This is similar to being a good scientist, which does not mean that the 
results and hypotheses of good scientists are always right, but that they observe the 
physical world closely and patiently, frame hypotheses intelligently and submit 
them to experimental tests, and are prepared to abide with relevant evidence. 
Similarly being good at morality is about the procedures one follows in making a 
moral judgement. 
Coherence and consistency are minimal requirements, both in the analysis of 
ethical propositions and their justification. How deeply these matters of analytical 
skills are considered in an ethics course is dependent on the situation, the maturity 
of the students, time available and the overall goal of the course. In any case, 
something must be said about the importance and nature of these skills (Callahan, 
1980). 
Ethical enquiry has its own procedures and rules not unlike those in natural 
sciences. We have a fairly good idea of what rules and criteria govern the activity 
of science and how scientific arguments and justifications are supposed to work 
(see for example Resnik, 1998). This does not mean that all scientists follow these 
rules, only that they exist and that we expect scientists to understand them. In a 
similar way, it is possible to construct rules and criteria of moral inquiry. The most 
familiar and fundamental rules of moral argument are shared with other activities, 
like science (Wilson, 1990): 
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1)  We should adhere to the laws of logic. 
2) We should use language correctly. 
3) We should attend to the facts. 
Adhering to the principles of moral inquiry does not mean that the moral judgement 
produced after following the rules of moral decision-making will necessarily be 
correct. The same applies to science; following the rules of science does not 
guarantee that results would be necessarily true. We may have overlooked some 
vital fact, or our instruments may not be good enough, and so on. 
The fundamental rules of moral decision-making include special skills: 
1)  one needs to learn to recognise illogical and logical moral arguments. 
The elements are similar to those of scientific arguments, but not 
identical. One needs to learn to evaluate moral premises and the thought 
processes that follow. 
2) one needs to learn to separate moral elements from emotional responses 
and from scientific facts. 
3) one needs to be able to evaluate premises and foresee how different 
logical arguments can be formed by the choice of different premises. 
If we believed that moral decision-making is mainly learning a logical problem-
solving syllogism and applying that to each case, then we would teach in our ethics 
curriculum the structure and usage of the syllogism and how to find the necessary 
facts to apply the syllogism to. This does not seem like a reasonable assumption, if 
only because such a syllogism has not yet been found, regardless of how hard it has 
been sought. The basic understanding of logic and knowledge of the facts is 
therefore important for an ethics course, but pure logic is not enough for proper 
ethical reasoning. 
The most complex skill in moral decision-making is an ability to combine the moral 
point of view with the limitations of reality and to tolerate the ambiguity of moral 
situations. One is often forced to choose between two morally unsatisfying options, 
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to compromise between some basic values, or to accept harm in the presence of 
greater good. If  moral choices were always choices between good and bad, the 
importance of moral education would be in analysing what is good/right and what 
is bad/wrong and assist the development of commitment for doing what is 
good/right. But because reality is more complex, the essential skills need to include 
an ability to weigh different alternatives, to understand personal values and form 
logical reasoning steps which provide answers compatible with reality and 
supporting basic values. 
The issue of commitment is part of moral competency. This is commitment to a 
personal reasoning process which entails acceptance of responsibility for moral 
choices. This is, according to Perry's scheme of development, the last stage - the 
recognition of moral relativism is succeeded by a realisation that commitment is an 
ongoing process of identification with certain values. In the context of this research, 
this is not a reference to an affective commitment to certain values, but an 
appreciation of the implications of value choices - freedom to choose is paired with 
a responsibility for one's choices. 
3.2.4  From ability to action 
The aspects of moral development described above - moral sensitivity and moral 
competency - are the first two components of moral decision-making in real-life 
situations, where actions need to be taken regarding moral problems. The other two 
components are:  1) the person must give priority to moral values above other 
personal values - desire to advance career, love, art etc. - such that a decision is 
made to intend to do what is morally right even when there is a conflict between 
moral and other personal values, and 2) the person must have sufficient 
perseverance, ego strength, and implementation skills to be able to follow through 
on the personal intention to behave morally (Rest, 1986). In other words, in 
addition to being able to recognise moral problems and decide what is morally the 
best solution to a problem, one needs to have motivation and ability to implement 
the results of moral reasoning. A person who demonstrates great ability in one 
component may not show great ability in another. The components are therefore 
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independent - ability in one does not indicate ability in another. This independence 
does not indicate isolation of these components, quite the contrary - each 
component influences another: the links between them are various and strong, but 
they are not automatic or identical. 
Encouraging motivation to do what is morally right may sound like an appropriate 
educational aim, at least as long as we hold onto the importance of self-chosen 
values and thus avoid criticism of indoctrination. Still in this research moral 
motivation is not included in the aims of ethics education. The lack of consensus on 
what accounts for the motivation to prioritise moral values over others is one of the 
reasons for the exclusion. At least eight different perspectives can be identified in 
the literature (Rest 1986): 
1.  evolution has bred altruism, 
2.  there is no special motivation and people merely respond to social 
reinforcement, 
3.  shame, guilt and fear motivate morality, 
4.  empathy is the basis of altruistic motivation, 
5.  experience of living in loving and caring relationship leads to moral 
commitment, 
6.  understanding the interactions in the society motivates an individual to 
act morally in order to enhance an ideal society, 
7.  sense of awe and self-subjugation to something greater than oneself 
motivates moral actions, and 
8.  concern for self-integrity and identity as a moral agent motivates moral 
action. 
Seeking an educational approach to encourage moral motivation would therefore be 
plagued with theoretical problems of choosing one, or a combination of, 
motivational theories - how to justify the choice, and how to interpret the results. 
Also, aiming to influence a personal aspect like motivation - a motivation to do 
what is morally right instead of what might otherwise be preferable, even when 
moral rightness is self-chosen - may be a questionable aim in a multicultural 
university. Lack of agreement on what encourages such motivation is one problem 
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and aiming to influence something so personal and something that has clear 
external implications, is moving again towards extrinsic aims, which were rejected 
as appropriate in section 3.1. 
Similar reasons apply to rejecting the inclusion of the last component into the aims 
of ethics education. As was also discussed in section 3.1, good intentions are often 
a long way from good deeds and psychological and religious theories are abundant 
in explaining this incongruence. Again, an attempt to influence ego strength, or 
whatever we wish to call it, is prone to the same criticism as influencing 
motivation. 
Still, we may agree that it would be desirable if people were both motivated to act 
morally and had the personal strength do so and because of this agreement, we 
might be justified in including them in the intrinsic aims of ethics education. This is 
not done here because of the practical problems of forming an educational approach 
to elicit moral motivation and ego strength and the problems of evaluating the 
success of such educational efforts. 
3.3  Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I have looked at two types of aims for ethics curricula, extrinsic and 
intrinsic. Because of the basic nature of extrinsic aims as external to the educational 
process and specific for a certain purpose, the extrinsic aims of an ethics course 
would have to have a direct application in mind. The most obvious application 
would be 'right' or 'correct' behaviour or moral convictions in general, or within a 
limited context. The practical problems with this view relate to the difficulties of 
defining what are the correct values, how to transfer them to the students, and how 
to ensure that the adopted values influence behaviour in a desired manner. Further, 
and more substantially, the problem is the limited perspective on an individual as a 
means to a certain type of result, as unable to choose his/her own values, and that it 
is undesirable to do so. Because of both the practical problems and because of the 
view on an individual as a moral agent, I came to the conclusion that it is not 
~cceptable to choose extrinsic aims for an ethics curriculum. 
Henriikka Clarkebul7l, June 2000 m  Part I - Education and Ethics  60 
Intrinsic aims relate to an individual learner and have no direct need of application. 
From this point of view, an ethics curriculum concentrates on the processes of a 
person in making moral decisions, rather than on the end results of that process. 
The value statement inherent in this approach is that it is desirable for a person to 
act as a moral agent, to choose personal values, and learn to support them. 
The view on moral development illuminated here includes two basic components; 
moral sensitivity and moral competency. Moral sensitivity refers to an ability to 
understand moral networks, the implications of moral actions, and what moral 
aspects a particular situation contains. Moral competency, on the other hand, is an 
ability to form logical arguments that combine the restrictions of the reality with 
the moral aspects. Apart from the skills of being able to appreciate moral premises 
and understanding forms of logical thought, one of the key skills is an ability to 
tolerate ambiguity. 
Moral development is a course of learning and growing as a moral agent. The early 
stages are dominated by clear-cut views and limited personal involvement in the 
moral decision making. From here a person proceeds to appreciate and tolerate 
relativism and multiplicity and to an increasing extent become an independent and 
responsible moral agent. If we accept that this type of moral development is good in 
itself for the person in question and for the society at large, then we should aim at 
teaching ethics to support that development, to encourage it to take place, and for 
people to reach higher levels. 
In the following chapters I will look at the process of moral decision-making in 
more detail and at the possible approaches we can take to support this process. 
What I hope to have done here is to have provided a substantial case for founding 
the ethics curriculum on the aim of encouraging moral development. 
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Part II - Assessing Moral Development 
The need to legitimise public expenditure is increasingly pressing within academia. 
Seeking funds for higher education is confronted with similar difficulties to securing 
funds for research. One response to these pressures is to justify the expenditure by 
pointing to useful products that will result. This instrumentalist justification has 
become accepted as a norm in scientific research and educational research is now 
expected to follow the trend. External requirements, however, are not the only source 
of pressure to study outcomes of educational innovations. Administrators within the 
university also require some methods to evaluate curricular innovations that satisfy 
internal Quality Assurance (Caplan 1980). 
The science curriculum cannot include all areas of science, or even a comprehensive 
coverage of a specialised area. This requires us to choose what is included and what 
can be excluded to maintain levels of academic excellence and to meet external 
pressures from employers and public bodies. Competition for student time within and 
between departments is intense and proposals for new courses or programmes are 
likely to meet a less than enthusiastic reception from staff members concerned with 
obtaining an adequate time for their own areas of expertise. This is further exacerbated 
by competition for scarce teaching resources. Further, it would not be acceptable to 
provide students with low quality education. They have rights to expect academic 
excellence in the area of teaching. For these reasons, new inclusions in the curriculum 
are often required to satisfy both the criteria of adequate aims and effectiveness before 
their inclusion. 
The question whether ethics deserves greater emphasis in the undergraduate science 
curriculum has not received unequivocal support from students or staff, while most do 
support the inclusion of ethics on an abstract level (see Downie and Alexander 1989, 
Downie 1993). An ability to show that teaching ethics has a significant positive impact 
might be useful in paving the way for further inclusion of ethics within the curriculum. 
Also, the diversity of teaching methods for achieving the aims of ethics education 
almost guarantees passionate debate and disagreement. In this situation the need for 
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impartial, quantifiable, and objective standards of evaluation becomes ever more 
urgent. 
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The evaluation process described in this thesis assesses the changes in students' moral 
sensitivity and moral competency during one academic year. It is a comparative study 
of one group of students participating in structured ethics exercises and another group 
following an otherwise identical academic programme. The aim is to identify whether 
ethics teaching makes a significant difference in the key ethical skills chosen as the 
aims of ethics education. 
Part II is divided into two main chapters. Chapter 4 - "Assessing moral development -
the state of the art" - describes the so far achieved elements in assessing moral 
development. The concentration is on the testing of Kohlberg's moral developmental 
stages by the use of Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interviews (MJI) (Kohlberg, 1976) 
and Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1986), which are both well-established 
moral development tools. Assessing moral sensitivity is also discussed by reviewing 
work by Muriel Bebeau in developing the Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test (DEST) 
(Bebeau et al., 1985) and work carried out in testing student development on the Perry 
Scheme (Finster, 1989 and 1991; Gray, 1997). 
Chapter, 5 - "Assessment procedure", outlines the assessment method adopted in the 
research described in this thesis. The first section 5.1 considers the importance and 
formulation of a control group. Second, section 5 .2, is a discussion on the inclusion of 
existing assessment tools for moral competence (DIT and MJI). 
Measuring moral sensitivity required development of novel test items, because neither 
of the previously used methods were suitable for the purposes of this research. A two-
prong approach was adopted:  1) development of open ended responses to a non-
structured moral problem, and 2) a tick-a-box test according to the Perry Scheme. The 
development process is explained in section 5.3. 
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A third assessment type is the course evaluation given to all students participating in 
the ethics teaching. The design of the evaluation form is described in section 5.4. The 
chapter finishes with a short summary. 
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4.  Assessing moral development - the state of the art 
The choice of aims drives the assessment of any educational initiative. One of the 
major concerns is validity - is the assessment tool actually measuring what it is 
designed to measure. In the case of ethics education, a valid test needs to measure the 
elements of moral development chosen as the aims of the ethics teaching. More 
specifically it should measure these elements and no other factors. 
The key aspects of moral development that were chosen in Part I as the aims of ethics 
education - moral sensitivity and moral decision-making skills - are not simple 
concepts with unambiguous descriptions. We are able to give general descriptions of 
what moral development is and of different levels of that development. Even quite 
detailed descriptions can be given for moral problem solving methods and abilities in 
each level. But translating these descriptions into an assessment method that would 
score the actual and true moral development reliably and with great validity has 
proved problematic to many moral development theorists. 
The first section (4.1) of this chapter describes the basic assessment methods and 
provides reasons for not including behavioural assessment as part of the testing of 
moral development in the context of this research. Section 4.2 describes the Moral 
Judgement Interviews (MJI) developed by Kohlberg to evaluate the moral 
development stage. Section 4.3 follows on the same theme by outlining the moral 
development tool developed by Rest to test the moral development stage according to 
Kohlberg's theory. Rest's main aim was to make testing moral development quicker, 
easier and cheaper. The scoring of Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) is given a 
detailed account in sub-section 4.3.3. The neutrality and universality of both 
Kohlberg's and Rest's test tools are assessed in more detail in sub-sections 4.3.4 -
4.3.5. Section 4.4 describes the two moral sensitivity testing methods devised and 
found in the literature; Bebeau's DEST and McNeel et at.'s (1994) moral sensitivity 
test. The last section outlines the Perry (1999) scheme and testing work that has been 
carried out to measure the intellectual development side of the scheme, as there is no 
literature on ethical development testing according to this scheme. There is a short 
.  summary at the end of the chapter. 
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4.1  Basic assessment methods and behaviour as an option 
Most moral development measures are based on either verbal or written accounts of 
the moral decision making process, either in tick-a-box or open questions in a paper 
based evaluation or interviews in verbal ones. Interviews can be of two basic types: 
they can be open ended where the subjects are allowed to tell their story uninterrupted 
or undirected with only minimal guidance or requests for clarification by the 
interviewer. Alternatively interviews can be structured where subjects are presented 
with particular questions for which answers are sought. Interviewing subjects or 
asking written open ended responses produces large amounts of qualitative data, for 
which a scoring system can then be applied in order to quantify the data. Qualitative 
methods are often the most appropriate format at the developmental stages of a new 
theory for moral growth and progress, while quantified methods are often more 
applicable for justifying certain theories and practices, or when assessing moral 
development for a particular purpose - here, in investigating the benefits of ethics 
teaching. 
An alternative to these is behavioural assessment. Even if behavioural change per se 
may not an appropriate pedagogical objective in ethics teaching, it is logically possible 
that behavioural change may serve as evidence to measure other plausible goals of 
moral instruction - moral sensitivity and moral decision-making skills (Caplan, 1980). 
Without disputing the possible link between moral development and behavioural 
change, there are serious practical and methodological problems associated with this 
approach: 
1.  Validity of observations. Behavioural change needs to be recorded in a 
laboratory setting as extensive real-life evaluations of moral behaviour are 
both impractical to conduct and/or they pose problems regarding the 
subject's right to privacy. A significant problem with this approach is that 
hypothetical moral dilemmas presented in a laboratory situation can shed 
only limited light on the future behaviour of the subjects in real life 
situations. Because we are already making inferences from behaviour to 
moral decision-making skills, adding an inference from a laboratory setting 
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to actual moral behaviour complicates the interpretation and considerably 
reduces the explanatory power of this method. 
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2.  Validity of the method. Evaluating behaviour focuses attention on the 
outcome and effects of moral decision making, not the process. If  the aims 
of an ethics curriculum are process-based, then we need to assess them, not 
the changes in outcome which are possible subsequent outcomes. As we 
cannot establish an unambiguous link between moral reasoning and moral 
behaviour - research evidence supports a moderate, but consistent and 
pervasive relationship between moral judgement scores and moral 
behaviour (typically correlations in the 0.3 range, which implies a low 
correlation; Blasi, 1994) - it seems methodologically unwarranted to draw 
conclusions about moral decision-making skills based on purely behavioural 
observations. A more warranted method would include reflective interviews 
following the behavioural part of the experiment, where insights on the 
moral reasoning process could be gained. 
3.  Practical problems. Behavioural experiments are labour intensive and 
require highly skilled persons to carry them out. For these reasons, 
behavioural observations are often an unsuitable method due to limited 
funds and personnel to carry out the research. 
Due to the problems in both assessing behaviour and to the only moderate link 
between moral behaviour and moral decision-making skills and abilities, behaviour is 
not considered any further as a possible method to measure the success of an ethics 
curriculum which aims at eliciting moral development. 
I will instead look at two different approaches to evaluating the development of moral 
competence: 1) Kohlberg's original interview method, and 2) Rest's Defining Issues 
Test (DIT); and two approaches to evaluating development of moral sensitivity: 1) 
Bebeau's DEST and McNeel et al. 's moral sensitivity test, and 2) Perry's meta-ethical 
theory. These are here considered as possible methods for evaluating the impact of 
ethics education in the undergraduate science curriculum. 
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4.2  Kohlberg 
Kohlberg's moral development theory developed from interview research in the 
1950's. In these interviews, the subject was introduced to a moral dilemma in which 
the moral agent has two choices of action, and the research subjects are asked to 
choose the more appropriate action and to justify their choice. After the initial 
research, Kohlberg and his colleagues used the same method for assessing the moral 
development stage of their research sUbjects. The responses are classified by trained 
judges (clinical interviewers) according to whether the answer is oriented toward 
avoidance of punishment and deference to authority (stage 1), toward prudent and 
purely self-centred concerns (stage 2) and so on (See Appendix II: One Theory, for a 
more detailed description of Kohlberg's moral developmental stages). Kohlberg's 
method of data gathering was open-ended. In response to Kohlberg's multifaceted 
stories, a subject may choose to discuss any number of aspects. The interviewer will 
not ask any probing questions or interject any form of thinking different from the 
subject's spontaneous views during the interview (Kohlberg 1994). 
The open question interviews pose a problem in setting up a reliable scoring system, 
and the scoring system of Kohlberg's interviews has undergone several 
transformations in the past decades. Rest (1983) identified five distinct problems with 
setting up a scoring system: 
1.  Establishing a unit of analysis is not straight forward. The options are either 
using sentences, completed thought patterns, or single utterances as the 
units of analysis. Using sentences as a scoring unit produced dominantly 
word-related and repetitive data. Small utterances, on the other hand, 
produced data that were difficult to analyse as subjects said some things that 
seemed to reflect one stage of moral development and others that seemed to 
reflect a different one, while complete thought patterns may omit some less 
developed ideas or less well presented thoughts completely. 
2.  In open ended interviews, different subjects bring up different topics and 
touch on different aspects of the dilemma and these elements may not be 
comparable. 
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3.  How explicitly must the subjects state an idea to be credited with 'having' 
it? 
4.  How to decide what is content and what is structure - how formalistic, deep, 
or abstract should the analysis be. 
5.  How to combine conflicting cues from various parts of the interview over 
several dilemmas into a single summary score that describes the subject in 
general. 
One of the scoring methods is a four tier classification system: the interview material 
for each dilemma is first separated into issues (2 for each dilemma), then into norms 
(12 for each issue) and finally into elements (17 possible ones for each norm) (Rest, 
1983). An alternative method is a two-dimensional scoring grid of 125 elements (25 
elements for each 6 stages) (Rest, 1976). Obviously a system of 125 or 428 scoring 
possibilities for each dilemma is demanding in its use and the scorer will need 
extensive training to become confident in the procedure. One of the difficulties with 
the open-ended data gathering system is the requirements it places on the scorer when 
the answers are not decisive or complete enough for the scorer to decide clearly how 
the response should be classified. When the subjects have not given sufficient cues to 
apply a scoring guide, or when the subject's responses do not seem to fit very well into 
any of the scoring categories, there is not much a scorer can do but guess. It may also 
happen that the subjects do not report all the thoughts available to them, but only a 
selection of them. Also, the test results may vary from one scorer to the next. The 
reliability data for the four-tier system shows that reliability is not a serious threat to 
the evaluation procedure, as test-retest correlation has been >0.96, which indicates a 
very robust testing protocol only slightly dependent on the scorer. The most recent 
scoring system comprises an 800+ page manual (Rest, 1994). 
In the current test procedure based on Kohlberg's initial interview approach, any trace 
of Stage 5 thinking is extremely rare even among adults and Stage 6 practically non-
existent. This makes the post-conventional stage in development almost redundant 
(Schlaefli et al.  1985). This reduces the power of the tool as the developmental steps 
become less refined, with only three stages readily available for adult subjects (stage 1 
is extremely rare with adult subjects). It will be harder to detect developmental 
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changes if the tool can only produce very broad descriptions of the moral reasoning 
stage and when most adult subjects are classified within two or three stages. 
Due to its labour intensiveness and high requirements for training of skilled 
interviewers, and the broadness of the evaluation tool, Kohlberg's moral judgement 
interviews are not considered further as a viable option for measuring the impact of 
moral education in the undergraduate science curriculum 
4.3  Dlr/Rest 
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James Rest began developing his Defining Issues Test (DIT) as an attempt to make 
assessing Kohlberg's moral stages easier. DIT is based on ratings and rankings of 
stage prototypical statements in a pen and paper questionnaire. This method involved 
writing statements which exemplify various ways of thinking about a moral issue -
that is, statements which represent a moral judgement stage - and then asking the 
subjects to react to the statements instead of asking them to give their own views 
directly. 
The technical issue of devising a measuring tool like DIT is the ability to devise 
statements that accurately represent the moral stages. It cannot be automatically 
assumed that a statement designed to exemplify some distinctive characteristic of 
moral judgement does clearly convey the intended ideas to the reader. Rest (1976), 
however, provides research results that support the reliability of DIT in 
correspondence with Kohlberg's stage descriptions. 
The chief advantages are, however, that it allows the subjects to focus their attention 
on specific moral judgements and that it systematically studies subjects' reactions to a 
standardised set of stimuli statements. Also DIT is far less labour intensive than 
Kohlberg's original interview technique and thus cheaper and simpler to administer. 
DIT has been widely used in assessing the moral development of students in different 
subject areas in higher education. The most traditional area of use has been medical 
subjects - medicine, dentistry, nursing, and veterinary medicine (Baldwin et al.  1991; 
. Frisch 1987; Krawczyk, 1997; Bebeau and Brabeck 1987; Self et al.  1989). Lately, 
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DIT has been applied to a wider range of fields including engineering (Self and 
Ellison, 1998), humanities/social sciences, and sport (Bredemeier and Shields, 1994). 
So far, I have been unable to locate any DIT studies targeting science students. 
Traditionally DIT contains 6 dilemmas, though a 3 dilemma shortened version is also 
used. The choice of dilemmas was based on interview responses to original stories and 
on the possibility of creating short and distinct DIT items based on them. In DIT, 
subjects are asked to read a description of a moral dilemma, to state what they believe 
should be done and consider 12 statements and then rate on a five-point (most 
important, much, some, little and no importance) scale how important each of these 
statements is in making a decision about what ought to be done in the dilemma. After 
rating the items for each dilemma, subjects are asked to rank the four most important 
items from the set of 12 (Rest, 1983). See Appendix IV - Moral Development 
Questionnaire for more details and examples. 
4.3.1  Assessment of moral development by use of prototypic statements 
The basic idea with DIT is that people at different developmental stages construe 
moral problems differently - particularly what they see as the core element of the 
moral problem and what considerations they subsequently consider most important in 
making their decision. Different cognitive structures are called schemas in DIT 
literature. DIT recognises three structures: 1) Personal Interest schema (derived from 
Kohlberg's stages 2 and 3 - S23), Maintaining Norms schema (derived from 
Kohlberg's stage 4 - S4), and Postconventional schema (derived from Kohlberg's 
stages 5 and 6 - S56). The functions of the schemas is essential to human 
understanding as they facilitate information processing. DIT is designed to activate 
schemas and record their use. The prototypic statements in the DIT are fragments of 
lines of reasoning, each representing a particular schema. The assumption is that 
people working through the DIT will bring to the task those schemas that structure and 
guide their moral thinking in general. As the participant reads an item that both makes 
sense and activates a preferred schema, that item is given a high ranking or chosen as 
of high importance. Alternatively, when the participant encounters an item that seems 
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too simplistic or does not make sense, the preferred schema is not activated and the 
item receives low ranking or rating (Rest et at.,  1999a). 
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Prototypic statement methods can measure different levels of idea acquisition. People 
can recognise and discriminate and thus prefer an idea before they can paraphrase it or 
before they can spontaneously produce the idea in a response to a dilemma. Thus, 
using different methods is likely to locate the same subject at different stages. The 
developmental hierarchy, in ascending order of difficulty, thus appears to be: 
preference, comprehension and spontaneous use (Rest 1976). Therefore the structure 
of the moral development test may influence the results, if the different aspects are not 
considered when the test is designed. DIT scores preference measures, which elevate 
DIT scores in comparison with Kohlberg's interview scores (Schlaefli, et at., 1985). 
Theoretically, the DIT differs from Kohlberg's test not only in the comprehension 
aspect, but also in the core concept of defining the stages. Although both methods 
focus on the concept of justice, Kohlberg defined the stages primarily in formalistic 
terms of reversability, universalisability, prescriptivity etc., relating purely to the 
structures of the stages. DIT, on the other hand, characterises justice at each stage as 
following from different concepts of how social co-operation can be organised. 
Therefore it has more content-related descriptions. In other words, Kohlberg's stage 
differentiators are more abstract than the DIT equivalents. Correlations between 
Kohlberg's test (MJI) and DIT generally range from 0.3 to 0.7, depending on the 
homogeneity of samples (Schlaefli et al.  1985). 
4.3.2  Validity of DIT 
The three most serious threats to the internal and external validity of DIT according to 
Rest (1983) are: 
1.  subjects may check off responses randomly without even reading the items, 
dilemmas or instructions; 
2.  subjects may pick out items that seem complex and sophisticated, even 
when they do not understand their meaning; and 
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3.  subjects may try to fake upwards on a recognition task because they do not 
have to discuss or justify their answers. 
Special features have been built into DIT to counteract these problems. One has been 
the inclusion of M items - items written to sound impressive and sophisticated, but 
which do not mean anything (e.g. 'whether the essence of living is more encompassing 
than the termination of dying, socially and individually'). These are used to identify 
subjects with a tendency to base their choices on the complexity of the item rather than 
its content. A raw M-score (sum of M item rankings) of more than 8 results in the 
participant being suspect of not taking proper interest in the test and in most cases the 
protocol should be discarded from further analysis (Rest, 1986). The M-score seems 
also to identify individuals who try to fake their answers to be something that they do 
not really believe in (Rest 1983). 
A second internal check is the consistency check. It is carried out by comparing the 
subject's ratings and rankings. If  a subject ranks an item 1  st,  then the rating for that 
item should be highest or equal to the highest of all rated items. Similarly the 2
nd 
ranked item should be the second highest rated item, or equal to the highest ranked 
item. The protocol is considered to be inconsistent if a participant rates items higher 
than those they rank first or second. This can be due to either a) careless responding, 
b) random responding, c) misunderstanding of instructions, or d) changing one's mind 
about an item etc. Inconsistency raises questions about the reliability of the subject's 
whole protocol, although slight inconsistency is acceptable and understandable. The 
general rule is to discard protocols that have inconsistencies in more than two stories, 
or if the number of inconsistencies on any protocol exceeds 8 instances. Also if there 
is little discrimination in the ratings (all rated 'some importance', for example) there 
must be a suspicion that the subject may not have taken the test seriously. The rule of 
thumb suggested is to discard a protocol if two stories have more than 9 items rated 
the same (Rest, 1986). 
In published DIT research approximately 10-15% of the tested participants fail one 
reliability check or another (Rest et al., 1997). 
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Further, the underlying structure of the moral stages is emphasised, so that higher-
stage statements appear stark and abstract and do not lend themselves to being 
interpreted as fancier ways of stating the lower stage ideas - e.g. instead of a 
statement: 'the value of life is more important than property', the statement is:  'what 
values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other' . 
Care has also been taken to match each item on word length, complexity of syntax and 
use of technical/unusual terms. All items are short fragments which do not highlight 
the action choice aspect (Rest et al., 1997). Furthermore, subjects are able to choose 
from several items representing their moral stage and thus are not forced to choose a 
statement of another stage in case one example of a stage's orientation is not suitable 
(Rest, 1976). 
DIT has been validated through four types of studies: 
1.  Cross-sectional studies to assess whether DIT detects expected longitudinal 
changes in moral development scores. Moral judgement has been measured 
by DIT in different age- and educational groups. The older, presumably 
more advanced groups, show higher scores than the younger, presumably 
less advanced groups. Longitudinal studies over 10 years have followed the 
same subjects and re-testing them gives results of increasingly higher 
scores. Sequential analysis shows that the upward movement is not 
attributable to cohort effects or to re-testing benefits (i.e. improved scores 
due to learning benefits gained by sequential testing) (Schlaefli et al.  1985). 
2.  Correlational studies to assess whether moral development correlates with 
general cognitive development as hypothesised. Correlational studies show 
that upward movement in moral judgement is related to increasing 
comprehension of higher stage concepts (Schlaefli et al.,  1985). DIT is also 
related to other measures of cognitive development, but it is independent of 
them (King et al., 1989). Higher stages of cognitive development seem also 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the attainment of moral development 
(Rholes et al.  1982). 
3.  Non-reducibility studies to assess whether moral development measured 
with DIT can be attributed to a) any other type of development or b) to 
attitudes and/or political values. a) Multiple regression studies have shown 
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that when ethics education increases DIT scores, there is no significant 
improvement in logic scores and vice versa: logic education improves logic 
scores, but not DIT scores (Schlaefli et al.,  1985). This indicates the 
independence of moral development form other variables (here logical 
development) and that DIT is measuring moral development and no other 
variable. b) Some results from correlational studies suggest that DIT is not 
reducible to political attitudes either (Barnett et al., 1995). 
This has been contested by Emler et al.  (1983), who asked subjects first 
to state their political affiliation (politically conservative, liberal or radical), 
then complete DIT as themselves, and then again from the perspective of an 
alternative political view. Political conservatives who obtained relatively 
low P-scores (the most popular DIT score representing a choice of post-
conventional statements: full description in section 4.3.3 below) under 
normal test conditions, elevated their scores when instructed to respond 
from the radical perspective. Political liberals, on the other hand, obtained 
relatively high initial P-scores, and their scores decreased when instructed to 
respond from a conservative perspective. The latter result is consistent with 
the view that a subject can fake downwards, because these are forms of 
thinking that the subject once used and discarded because they are now seen 
as simplistic. On the other hand, a subject should not be able to fake 
upwards because the concepts that the subject is using represent the 
subject's best notion of moral ideals, thus the 'faking upwards' results are 
more problematic. Emler et al.  concluded from these results that moral 
judgement, as measured by DIT, and political attitudes, substantially 
overlap and therefore that DIT is not a good developmental measure: for 
Emler et al.  DIT scores are best explained by variance of political 
affiliations. 
However, several other tests with DIT have shown the contrary 
evidence that people are not able to fake their results upwards, even when 
induced to do so (Hau, 1990; McGeorge, 1975; Page and Bode, 1979). A 
weakness in Emler et al. 's study is that they did not demonstrate that 
politically conservative subjects actually understood those DIT elements 
that accounted for their higher P-scores when they responded as radicals. 
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Also, regression analysis has shown that DIT score is related to 
liberal/conservative views, but that DIT is not empirically reducible to 
political attitudes alone (Barnett et ai.  1995). Further, when Emler et ai. 
asked conservative subjects to fake their DIT scores as radicals the strongest 
effect was an increase in A-scores (anti-establishment scores) and only 
secondarily in P-scores. When asked to fake DIT as radicals, the subjects 
rejected Stage 4 items because they were the ones they endorsed themselves 
in the normal test situation: choosing lower stage items was not attractive, 
because they were viewed as simplistic, and therefore the shift in P-scores 
could have been due to elimination of lower level items for conservatives 
faking the scores as radicals. This hypothesis is supported by Barnett et ai. 
(1995). 
4.3.3  Scoring and analysing DIT results 
A variety of scores can be derived from the ratings and rankings of items in DIT. One 
of the older and more basic ones is the Moral Maturity Quotient (MMQ). It is a 
weighted average calculated by taking the percentage of stage 1 usage and multiplying 
it by 1, stage 2 percentage multiplied by 2 etc, and then adding the six products 
together. A subject that is 100% stage 2 would have MMQ of 200, a subject 90% stage 
2 and 10% stage 3 would have MMQ of 210 etc. One of the problems with MMQ is 
that it can produce results that do not allow clear stage allocation for research subjects. 
For example, a MMQ 225 could indicate advanced stage two, but looking at the 
details of the result it can turn out to be a result of 10% at stage 4,25% at stage 3, 40% 
at stage 2, and 15% at stage 1, which is not best described as stage 2. A more pressing 
problem with MMQ is that it may fail to recognise true moral development. For 
example, a MMQ of 375 can be a result of 70% stage 4 usage, 15% stage 3 usage and 
5% stage 2 usage. A similar quotient of 415 can in turn be a result of 20% usage of 
stage 5, 60% usage of stage 4 and 10% usage of stage 3. The MMQ difference is a 
relatively moderate 40, but in this example it signifies a major shift in inclusion of 
post-conventional thinking. A person with a MMQ of 415 would be classified at stage 
4, while the stage 4 usage is already in decline and stage 5 usage has emerged. MMQ 
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would be a very useful scoring method only if the development through stages could 
be assumed to be a symmetrical step-by-step process (Rest, 1976). 
Indexing is a more developed way of analysing DIT data. An index is an overall score 
by which a participant is characterised (Rest et al., 1997). For the past 20 years, the 
most widely used index has been the P-index - the relative importance that a subject 
gives to stage 5 and 6 items, where the P stands for 'Principled moral thinking'. 
Operationally the P-index is a percentage of top rankings given to stage 5 and 6 items. 
The P-score is calculated by considering only the items written to represent Stages 5 
and 6. In each story, when a P-item is chosen as the most important consideration it is 
assigned 4 points; if a P-item is chosen as the second most important consideration it 
is assigned 3 points; third most important, 2 points; and fourth most important, 1 point. 
All points are then added together with a maximum sum of 9 per story as there are 
only three stage 5 and 6 items in the choice of 12 statements. The sum is converted to 
a percentage by dividing the total P score by 0.6 (if the test included 6 stories, by 0.3 if 
the test included only 3 etc.) - resulting in a score between 0 and 95% (Rest, 1976). 
Missing data leads to adjusting the P-score on the responses given: for example if a 
participant leaves out the third rank on one story, the P-score is re-calculated on the 
basis of 58 points instead of full 60 points, i.e. total P-score converted to percentage 
by division by 0.58 instead of 0.6 (Rest et al., 1997). The P-index produces the 
consistently strong trends expected of moral development (Schlaefli et al.,1985). 
The difficulty with the P-score is that it only recognises statements representing the 
post-conventional stages. It can then happen that a subject choosing coherently 
conventional items representing level 4 is given a P-score of O. This person might have 
chosen statements representing moral reasoning of stages 2 and 3 a year earlier, and 
this development would not be captured by calculating a P-score. The use of the P-
score is best justified when testing young adults, who can be expected to view moral 
problems at least partially in post-conventional terms, or are expected to approach that 
stage in their development in the near future. 
The limitations of P-index have led to research to design an alternative index. One of 
the big shifts has been to replace a stage-focused by a type-based approach. Types are 
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based on an understanding that people use a variety of stages in their thinking 
dependent on the situational requirements. The analysis of DIT data should therefore 
likewise concentrate on identifying under what conditions does a person manifest 
particular stages of thinking. In this approach, development means that people over 
time come to use higher stages more and lower stages less. Development is thus a 
gradual shifting of distributions of stages rather than dramatic moves from one stage to 
another (Rest et al., 1997). 
Rest et al.  (1997) have developed N2, an index which hopes both to reduce the waste 
of data built into the P-index and to offer a way to study stage distributions. An N2 
score has two parts: the degree to which P items are prioritised (closely related to P-
index) and the degree to which the lower stages are rated lower and the higher stages 
higher. Thus N2 uses both ranking and rating data. N2 calculation consists of three 
parts: 
1.  P-items are calculated like P-scores, but no adjustments are made for omitted 
rankings, though leaving out rankings for a whole dilemma will be adjusted by 
basing the total score on n-1 dilemmas. 
2.  The second part of N2 is calculated from the rating data. Discrimination 
between lower and higher items is calculated by subtracting the average rating 
given to items representing stages 2 and 3 from the average ratings given to 
items representing stages 5 and 6. Average ratings are then standardised by 
dividing this difference by the participant's standard deviation of stages 
2+3+5+6. Occasional missing rates are supplied by filling in the average 
ratings for the story. If rates are missing for an entire dilemma the scores base 
is adjusted to n-1. 
3.  N2 is then calculated as a combination score per participant by adding the P-
score to the rating data weighted by three. N2 produces similar longitudinal 
and cross-sectional data to the P-index and it is found to be more sensitive in 
most instances, for example to measure the impact of educational interventions 
(Rest et al., 1997). 
A second new approach to analysing DIT has been a Type-approach. It is possible for 
two participants to have the same N2 score with very different mixes of schemas. That 
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begs the questions: how to describe participants' predominant schema and their 
schema mix so that they characterise 1) developmentally ordered types, 2) that we can 
see advances of different types in relation to information processing, and 3) relations 
to different decision-making. A type-model of 6 different types has been constructed 
to fulfil these criteria (Rest et al., 1999a). 
Types are defined by 1) which schema is predominant, and 2) in terms of the extent of 
schema mix - consolidated in one schema or a transitional mixture of all the schema in 
which no one schema predominates (CDIT). 
1.  The predominant schema is determined by calculating average ratings for each 
3 clusters of schema items (pre-keyed in the DIT) and the highest average is 
designated as the predominant one. 
2.  The extent of the schema mix is determined in terms of the ratio of variance 
within schemas and between schemas (Rest et al.,1999a). 
A detailed guide on how to calculate the schema mix can be found in Appendix V -
Computing C -scores from DIT Data (Rest et al., 1997). 
Participants are described as consolidated if their CDIT scores are greater than 15.705 
and transitional if CDIT is less than that. This is a somewhat arbitrary classification 
criterion chosen by Rest et al.  (1999a). Theoretically CDIT can vary between 0 and 
100, but in their sample of 505 participants Rest et al.  (1999a) found a range of .004 to 
47.066 with a mean of 11.89 and standard deviation of 9.09. 
When these two elements are combined we get six different Types (Rest et al., 1999a): 
Type 1  Consolidated  S23 
Type 2  Transitional  S23 
Type 3  Transitional  S4 
Type 4  Consolidated  S4 
Type 5  Transitional  S56 
Type 6  Consolidated  S56 
Figure 1: DIT Types 
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In their samples of 505 and 44,564, Rest et al.  (1999a) found 95% of the subjects to 
fall into types 3 and 5, and only very few subjects to Types 1 and 2. The low number 
of types 1 and 2 is explained by the sample consisting of subjects in their teens or 
older, who are expected to have progressed beyond Types 1 and 2. If  DIT is 
administered to children, you would expect a higher percentage of lower Types. The 
mean schema ratings in types change from a dominant S23 in type 1 use to dominant 
S56 use in type 6 via dominant S4. What Rest et al.  (1999a) have also found is that 
types are developmentally ordered in terms of educational level and age. The 
correlations between types and age/educationallevel are weaker than those with N2, 
but still significant. 
The types have also been found to correspond with the ease of information processing, 
with consolidated types having less trouble than the transitional ones. There is also 
evidence that the schemas guide the actual decision-making as well. People who use 
dominantly the same schema also choose similar moral actions (Rest et al., 1999a). 
A further DIT score is the U-score, which represents the extent by which subjects 
utilise the justice-framework in their answering patterns. This was created as a 
response to the low correspondence of P- and N2 scores to moral action choices 
(correlation in the low .30s) (Thoma et al.  1991). For example, in Heinz's dilemma, if 
a subject rates an item 'Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld' as high, 
we would expect this person who focuses on maintaining the law to advocate 'not 
steal' as an action choice. In contrast, if a person rates high an item 'Isn't it only 
natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?', we would 
logically expect that person to choose 'should steal' as an action choice (Rest et al. 
1999a). U-score measures the correspondence between these actual and implied 
choices and is high when a subject selects as important those DIT items which support 
their initial action choice, and rate as least important those items which imply 
alternative choice. U-scores have a potential range of -1  (low utilisation) to + I (high 
utilisation). However, large sample estimates of utilisation suggest an actual range of -
.40 to .77 (Thoma and Rest 1999). 
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A lack of consistency between ratings and action choice (low U score) implies the use 
of multiple moral frameworks, one to determine the decision, and the second to 
evaluate the stage-based DIT items. U-scores are found to relate to 
consolidation/transition of subjects. The more coherent the schema (lower C-score) the 
higher the U-score. Theoretically, people with a predominant, coherent schema are 
presumed to show greater integrity between item ratings and their choice of action. 
Presumably, weaker schemas (higher C-scores) cause subjects to change schemas 
between action choice and rating of items (Rest et ai.  1999a). 
All DIT scores represent the basic interpretative framework that people naturally and 
spontaneously bring to moral problem solving - the default schema. A low P-, or N2-
score, or lower type means that the person is predominantly not able to conceptualise 
moral problems by determining what is morally right from the perspective of a society 
that balances the interests of its participants, optimises the stake of each participant in 
supporting that society, and eliminates arbitrary advantages and/or influences. 
Students with low scores are also unlikely to appreciate the insights of ethics 
professionals and discussions: rather they seem superfluous solutions for problems 
neither foreseen nor recognised. These students have likewise trouble in extending the 
principles beyond a discussed case, and they are genuinely confused when ideals 
conflict. In real life situations they are likely to oversimplify, and although they might 
have good technical skills and generally good intentions, they are vulnerable to 
finding themselves involved in ethical problems over their heads (Rest and Narvaez, 
1994). 
Since the start of this research an alternative DIT (DIT2) has become available. It 
updates dilemmas and items, shortens the test time, and purges fewer participants for 
doubtful response reliability (Rest et ai., 1999b). Unfortunately the decision to 
purchase of DITI was made prior to the availability of DIT2 and thus it was 
impossible to benefit from the improvements made to the test tool. 
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4.3.4  Gender variance 
Strong claims have been made that moral development methods, in particular 
Kohlberg's interview method and DIT, are gender-biased. Carol Gilligan has been one 
of the most dominant figures in advocating that women generally score lower on the 
Kohlberg moral dilemmas and that this is due to these dilemmas measuring only one 
type of morality - the rights and justice approach - which is not the dominant moral 
framework for women (Gilligan, 1982). Some research supports this claim. Bakken 
and Ellsworth (1990) claim that women show similar age-related moral development 
to men, but that at each age group, women score consistently lower in the Moral 
Judgement Interview. Further, they found that women's moral development levels off 
at stage 3, which is consistent with Gilligan's theory that women prefer to consider 
contextual and personal effects in moral problems compared with male orientation 
towards more abstract and generalised rights-based effects. Gilligan's argument is not 
an acceptance of lesser ability of women's moral reasoning, but a proposition that 
moral reasoning at a contextual level does not essentially refer to lower moral abilities, 
but to a different approach. Gilligan's argument is discussed in more detail in 
Appendix II: One Theory. 
The results of Bakken and Ellsworth have not been supported by other research. 
Thoma's (1984) meta-analysis of 56 studies consisting of over 6000 male and female 
subjects, yielded no significant gender differences in DIT scores. Education, for 
example, was found to be 500 times more powerful in predicting moral judgement 
scores than gender. This could be interpreted as disputing Gilligan's argument of 
special female moral schema. But it is not necessary to read Thoma's results as 
evidence against Gilligan's theory. Alternatively, they can be interpreted as evidence 
simply that women are not disadvantaged in their development towards principled 
moral judgement, while they may also entertain alternative moral schema, possibly 
similar to the one Gilligan has put forward. 
Some researchers go even further and suggest that women actually score higher in 
DIT. Baldwin et al.  (1991) tested medical students on four levels of their medical 
course, and found that women scored higher in DIT at all levels, and their 
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development continued strongly throughout the course, while the development of their 
male counterparts plateaued after the third year. A possible explanation, provided by 
Baldwin et al., is that women in medicine and in other high achiever professions do 
not follow the traditional gender patterns, and therefore display male patterns of moral 
development, and because they have had to solve the conflicting obligations of their 
gender role identity, they are more prepared to handle the contradictions inherent at 
higher levels of moral reasoning. 
The results of Baldwin et al.  (1991) do not therefore necessarily suggest female-bias 
in DIT, but that female medical students have, on average, a higher capacity and 
interest in moral development. This is not explained in deterministic terms as a 
biological feature, but as a result of social pressures experienced by professional 
women in a still largely male-dominant academic culture. 
These results give some confidence in the gender-neutrality of DIT. Any gender-
biased results, in the light of Thoma's analysis, should not be interpreted as in-built 
structural biases in the test tool. Gender-biased results should be interpreted as 
genuine reflections of the research design. In the case of educational research, reasons 
for gender bias in the post-test results could, for example, be attributed to teaching 
methods which favoured interactions preferred by female/male students and thus 
accelerated their moral development more than their male/female counterparts. 
4.3.5  Cultural variance 
It seems almost axiomatic that different people have different moral values. From this 
it is tempting to infer that moral development as described above may be culturally 
dependent and claims of its universality flawed. But both Kohlberg and Rest have 
argued that certain considerations are so fundamental to human interaction in groups 
that they are relevant regardless of one's particular culture. Examples of fundamental 
considerations include: issues of life versus law, conscience versus punishment, and 
contract versus authority. The specific morals of cultures may be ever-changing, but 
beneath the surface, structural conceptions remain unchanged (Rest, 1994). 
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Snarey (1985) has argued that for moral development, as Kohlberg has described it 
and Rest further incorporated into DIT, to be truly culturally independent and 
universal, satisfactory proof of four contentions is required: 
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1.  That persons in all cultures inquire about the moral domain and in doing so, 
ask the same basic questions, or resort to the same basic issues. 
2.  That in all cultures individuals are found to be upwardly invariant in 
sequence of moral development without significant regression. 
3.  That the full range of stages, including the highest, can be found in all types 
of cultures. 
4.  That all instances of moral reasoning in all cultures correspond to one of the 
modes or stages - in other words all moral responses can be scored 
according to the standardised scoring guides. 
In order to prove that all these contentions are correct, moral development has to be 
studied in a sufficiently wide range of cultures - including different religions, and 
types of social structure - urban and agricultural, stable and nomadic. Also the 
research needs to adjust to the culture in order to make the moral problems relevant to 
the research subject - or at the very least translate the moral dilemmas into the native 
language of the subjects. Snarey (1985) quotes research using Kohlberg's interview 
technique in 27 different countries and Rest (1994) the use of DIT in over forty 
countries. Both sets of research include a wide variety of social, religious and 
economic structures. 
In his review Snarey (1985) found that research supports the first three of the 
contentions presented above - all cultures ask similar moral questions; moral 
development progresses in a similar invariant manner; and all stages can be found in 
all cultures. What seems to emerge from this research is also that the further the 
culture is from a middle-class Western one, the less the researchers are able to detect 
higher stages of moral reasoning. Snarey attributes this to a lack of support for the last 
assumption that all types of principled moral reasoning could be coded using 
Kohlberg's developmental model. The more sophisticated levels of moral reasoning 
of, for example, Hinduism or Buddhism, may not be included in the examples of the 
scoring guide and therefore such responses are not coded and the scores remain low. 
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DIT research supports the basic assumptions stated by Snarey, and finds less problems 
with identifying higher stages. This can be explained by DIT using prototypic 
statements, which give it additional cultural neutrality as there is no room for 
misinterpreting the higher stage reasoning of other cultures which prevails when moral 
development is determined through interviews. 
The issue of cultural universality is only partially relevant to the current study. The 
University of Glasgow is a multi-cultural university with students coming from varied 
social, religious and linguistic backgrounds, but the majority have grown-up in and are 
from a Western cultural setting and all have a good command of English. Against this 
background and the research results on the cultural neutrality of DIT, the moral 
assessment can be considered not to carry any cultural bias. 
4.4  Moral sensitivity testing 
Moral sensitivity refers to an ability to recognise moral problems in a situation where 
they are present, but not necessarily apparent. It is also an ability to consider the moral 
implications of actions not just to oneself or those immediately involved, but in a 
wider perspective, recognising the impact of moral choices on unidentified 
individuals. 
Research has shown that scores in moral competence (DIT) and moral sensitivity 
correlate only modestly (in the 0.2-0.5 range) (Bebeau and Brabeck, 1987). It is 
possible for a person to be skilled at interpreting the ethical issues in a situation, but 
unskilled at working out a balanced view of a moral solution, and vice versa, to be 
unable to recognise the issues personally while being skilled in solving these 
problems. Therefore if moral development is understood as development in both moral 
sensitivity and moral competence, it is necessary to have separate test tools for both 
aspects, as development in one area cannot be taken to indicate development in the 
other. 
Previous research on moral sensitivity is limited. Attention on moral development has 
been focused on moral competence measures. Literature provides two, quite similar, 
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approaches to testing moral sensitivity: the Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test (DEST) and 
moral sensitivity testing by McNeel. 
DEST was created by Bebeau et al.  (1985) to measure dental students' ability to 
identify and interpret typical ethical problems arising in dental practice. DEST 
comprises four recorded dramatised dialogues that might occur in a dental office. The 
subjects are first asked to listen to the dialogues and later enter the dialogue and 
assume the role of the dentist and carry on as if he or she were actually in that 
position. The responses are recorded and later the students are interviewed about their 
assumptions and perspectives underlying their responses. These interviews are 
likewise taped. The interviews are transcribed and scored to measure the degree of 
sensitivity to the responsibilities of the dentist. Seven sensitivity criteria are described 
for each dilemma and students are scored on a scale from one to three indicating their 
degree of recognition. The scoring criteria were developed in collaboration with 
practising dentists and moral philosophers. DEST has proved to be reliable with inter-
rater agreement averaging 0.87 and test-retest correlation averaging 0.68 (Bebeau and 
Brabeck, 1987). The correlation between DEST scores and DIT was found to be 0.2 to 
0.5. 
DEST is very specific for measuring moral sensitivity in a professional context. The 
research literature does not entertain considerations of whether professional moral 
sensitivity can be understood as general moral sensitivity or whether moral sensitivity 
can develop in relative isolation in different areas of life, and thus one should not 
extrapolate these results to measures of general moral sensitivity. Further, this 
approach is only applicable to professions where moral considerations are situated in 
personal interactions, as in medicine, teaching and law, and to a certain extent in 
science (fraud, whistle blowing): but this is a less suitable approach for measuring 
moral sensitivity in a situation where personal interaction is limited (ethics of genetic 
research, for example). 
A similar moral sensitivity test was designed by McNeel (1994). In this research, 
college students were played four recorded drama situations containing moral 
problems frequently confronted by students - a) cheating, learning problems, and 
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racism; b) pressure for sex, date rape, depression, and co-dependency; c) grieving for 
parent's death, autonomy, career decisions, and parental pressure; and d) alcohol 
abuse and its consequences, irresponsibility, and broken trust. Before hearing the 
drama, students were informed that the researchers were interested in what the 
students noticed and what they paid attention to. After hearing the drama, students 
took the role of the central character's best friend and spoke into a tape recorder as 
though they were speaking directly to their friend. Non-directive follow-up probes 
were used to help the students to express themselves on all the relevant issues they had 
noticed in the situation. Coding manuals were devised to allow reliable and valid 
scoring of transcriptions. McNeel found gender differences in the results, but only in 
some issues. He also found that perception of some moral problems was significantly 
low - in particular in the date-rape and pressure for sex drama. No comparison 
between DIT scores and moral sensitivity was presented for the data. 
The test approach of McNeel is less tied to professional moral sensitivity, while the 
approach is similar to Bebeau et at. 's DEST in providing scenarios for individual 
involvement and direct contact with the problem. The results of McNeel also indicate 
that moral sensitivity is case-dependent, which supports the possibility that moral 
sensitivity in professional issues may not indicate moral sensitivity in other areas of 
life. 
4.5  Perry scheme 
Perry's theory of ethical development (Perry, 1999), developed in the 1950's and 60's, 
concentrates strongly on the basic conceptions of morality; what are the sources of 
moral answers, whether there are absolute moral answers, and how one is to commit 
oneself to different moral values. In the Perry scheme moral development follows the 
same pattern as intellectual development, though their progress may not be 
synchronised. Perry's conception of moral development is a pre-requisite for higher 
levels of moral competence and even moral sensitivity as students who do not accept 
the possibility of multiplicity and relativity in moral answers cannot successfully 
consider moral options in their complexity and extent. 
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Perry's scheme has been dominantly used to measure intellectual development and 
attitudes towards learning and studying (Gray, 1997; Katung et ai., 1999). The 
approach to measure intellectual development on the Perry scheme is applicable for 
measuring ethical development as well. Therefore, I will here describe the approach to 
intellectual development measures, in the absence of any research data on measuring 
ethical development as Perry has described it. 
According to Selepeng (1999), the measures of intellectual and attitudinal 
development towards studying concentrate on four elements in the Perry model: 
A.  Students' perception of their role as learners 
1.  A type student: Passive receptor 
2.  B type student: Recognises some responsibility for learning, 
but is confused on what and how 
3.  C type student: Sees him/herself as a source of learning 
B.  Students' perception of teachers' role 
1.  A type student: teacher is authority and source of facts and 
know-how 
2.  B type student: teacher is an authority, and in disputes he/she 
seeks to find out what the teacher favours 
3.  C type student: teacher is authority among authorities, source 
of expertise 
C.  Students' view of knowledge 
1.  A type student: knowledge is black and white, factual, non-
controversial 
2.  B type student: knowledge no longer black and white, which 
causes insecurity 
3.  C type student: knowledge is contextual 
D.  Students' perception of exams 
1.  A type student: exams require regurgitation of facts, hard work 
is rewarded 
2.  B type student: quantity> quality, important to display 
maximum knowledge 
3.  C type student: quality> quantity, wants room for expression 
The assessment of students' development on the Perry scheme has been mainly done 
with pen and paper measures where students have been asked to agree or disagree (on 
a five- or six -point Likert scale) with statements that are designed to represent one of 
the three Perry types. The questionnaires have been validated by experts indicating 
which statements would different Perry types agree and disagree with; statements with 
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high inter-rater correlation are included in the final assessment method (Harvey, 
1994). 
Gray (1997) describes two alternative methods for evaluating Likert-scale Perry 
questionnaires: the Success index (SI) and the Perry index (PI). 
SI =  Tc+  TB-TA 
Tc+TB+TA 
PI =  Tc - TA 
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ITcl  +  ITAI  T  c = total of agreements with C statements 
T  B= total of agreements with B statements 
TA = total of agreements with A statements 
These two methods have high correlation, which indicates that whatever a Perry 
questionnaire is measuring, it is a relatively robust tool and several alternative 
methods of quantifying the answers can be used. 
Alternatively, Perry development can be measured by use of a grid-based test, where 
students are asked to choose one of three statement that best describes them in each of 
the four elements in attitude change described above (Katung et al., 1999). The 
answers are analysed by categorising students in six categories - at least three As = 
dualism; mix of As and Bs = early multiplism; minimum of three Bs = multiplism; 
minimum of two Cs = early relativism; and minimum of three Cs = relativism -
according to how many times they agreed with A, B, or C statements on the grid. 
Changes in distribution can then be analysed further to discover whether there have 
been changes in Perry positions. 
A third measurement uses an Osgood scale. In this method Perry A and C statements 
are placed on opposite ends of a scale and students are asked to either agree with one 
of them or to be neutral in the middle. For example: 
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I believe it is the  The duty of the 
job of the lecturer  strongly agree - agree - neutral - agree - strongly agree  lecturer is not to 
to supply me with  teach me 
all the knowledge I  everything, but to 
need  stimulate my own 
thinking 
(Selepeng 1999) 
One of the advantages of the Osgood scale is that students are encouraged to consider 
carefully their position along the scale by making them aware of both opposite views. 
Also in the Likert scale it has been difficult to detect B-types, because C type builds 
upon the growth already achieved in B: therefore C type students may wish to agree 
with B statements as well as C statements. In the Osgood scale, Bs will sit close to the 
middle, choosing dominantly neutrality over strong agreements with either A or C 
statements and will thus form a unique B-pattern. A further advantage of the Osgood 
scale is improved detection of As and Cs, as disagreement with B statements in the 
Likert scale is open to two interpretations - either A or C, while in the Osgood scale, 
such confusion does not arise. 
Research using Perry's scheme has produced strong evidence of developmental 
change during university years. Typically, large number of first year students are type 
A, while after the first year the percentage of type A students has fallen significantly 
and the percentage of students in the C positions has taken a respective rise (Katung et 
at.,  1999). Movement along the Perry scale is dominantly positive: students progress 
towards the C position, but there are also notable numbers of students who do not 
progress and a small number of students that display regressive movement towards 
position A. 
A Perry based questionnaire for moral development should measure two distinctive 
elements in moral development - recognition of moral multiplicity and an ability to 
cope with moral relativity. I will discuss the methods of developing an ethical Perry 
questionnaire in section 5.3.1. 
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4.6  Summary 
Kohlberg's theory of development in moral competence was originally combined with 
Moral Judgement Interviews (MJIs) as the test tool. MJIs are lengthy, require skilled 
staff and have very complicated scoring guides. For these reasons MJIs are not 
included in moral development assessment in the research described in this thesis. 
Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) measures the same developmental theory as MJI, 
but is a pen and paper test, which can be computer scored. In DIT, which consists of 
responses to moral dilemmas, the most common measures are the P- and N2-index, 
and Types, which indicate the usage of different moral decision-making schemas. 
Research shows that DIT is a very stable and reliable test tool with large numbers of 
studies indicating high test-retest reliability and applicability to people in different 
cultures and of both genders. The drawback of DIT is its narrow scope of measuring 
only justice and rights oriented moral judgement skills, where universalised judgement 
is per se considered as the highest form of moral decision-making. 
The moral sensitivity testing described in this chapter is based on student responses to 
recorded interviews (DEST) (Bebeau et al., 1985) or recorded stories containing a 
moral element (McNeel, 1994). The student responses are scored according to the 
level of recognition of the moral issues. 
In the Perry scheme, plenty of research has been carried out to measure intellectual 
development and attitudes towards stUdying, while no publications could be found on 
the use of the Perry scheme in moral development, even though that was the other 
element Perry originally designed his scheme to represent. The review here therefore 
concentrated on methods of testing intellectual development, with the assumption that 
the methods are equally applicable to measuring ethical development. Most methods 
rely on pen- and paper questionnaires using either Likert or Osgood scales and relying 
on student responses to Perry-typical statements to represent their own Perry position. 
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5.  Assessment procedure 
The choice of assessment method for the IBLS ethics teaching was strongly influenced 
by time and resource restrictions. With a sample size of over 400 students all to be 
tested twice, it was impractical to plan an assessment method producing large 
quantities of qualitative data, or to adopt assessment methods which are laborious 
and/or expensive to carry out. The time and resource requirements for analysing 
interview transcriptions, for example, were beyond the budget of this research. Such 
methods may produce more intricate data, but because of the volume, the assessment 
method for this research had to rely on pen and paper methods that can easily be 
quantified. 
This chapter will start with considerations over a control group - why it is important 
and what alternatives there are. This is followed by, in section 5.2, deliberations on 
including an existing moral competence measure into the moral development 
assessment tool used to measure the impact of ethics teaching in the research 
described in this thesis. The following section 5.3 is on the development of novel 
testing methods to measure moral sensitivity. A two-prong approach is adopted and 
the first sub-section 5.3.1 describes the development procedures and preliminary 
results from a tick-a-box assessment questionnaire based on the Perry scheme of 
ethical development. The second sub-section 5.3.2 describes the development and 
scoring methods for the open-ended questions targeting moral sensitivity. The last 
section of the chapter outlines additional testing methods, using a course evaluation to 
collect more detailed data about students' own perceptions on the benefits of ethics 
teaching. 
5.1  Issue of  control group 
This is comparative research. The aim is to investigate whether teaching ethics as part 
of the biological sciences curriculum will support students' moral development 
significantly better than teaching science without any specifically designed ethics 
components. 
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Previous research has shown that formal education is one of the strongest and most 
consistent correlates with moral development (Rest and Deemer, 1986). Also, there is 
strong longitudinal data that shows moral development throughout the years in higher 
education (McNeel, 1994, Rest et al., 1999a). Therefore we can expect moral 
development of students as they pass through the levels of university education. In 
wanting to measure the effects of a series of bioethics exercises on the moral 
development of students, it is essential to have a control group to be able to 
differentiate between spontaneous moral development and the effect of ethics teaching 
on moral development. An alternative would be longitudinal studies of students in 
different (consecutive) years, where one year goes through an ethics curriculum and 
one does not. Unfortunately the limited time-scale of this research did not allow for 
such a research set-up. 
The control group should be compatible in biographical features (most importantly age 
and gender) and in academic qualifications and aspirations with the test group. All 
these features are hypothesised to introduce variation in moral development scores. 
Most importantly the control groups should have, during the period of interest, very 
similar academic experiences apart from the ethics teaching. Great variation in the 
general academic experience would result in considerable interpretation difficulties in 
extracting the source of change in the moral development scores. 
5.1.1  Options for control groups 
The three options for a control group to be used to identify the benefits of ethics 
teaching on IBLS students were: other IBLS students; other science students from the 
University of Glasgow; or from another university. I will consider these options in 
turn. 
IBLS students. The most obvious and suitable control group is created by dividing the 
IBLS student body into two groups. One of these groups would follow the science 
curriculum without the ethics components and the other group the same teaching with 
the only difference being participation in the bioethics exercises. This method would 
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secure comparable academic experiences between the test and control groups. Also, 
allocation into the two groups within a large student body (700-800 on each level) 
should secure satisfactory compatibility of biographical features between control and 
test groups. 
A more pressing practical problem is to keep up two separate tutorial and laboratory 
programmes throughout the year, and to provide novel alternative teaching for the 
non-ethics group. This requires extra labour on the part of teachers and demonstrators, 
time and resources which may not be easily available. This problem can be largely 
solved by the extra teaching on bioethics being provided by the primary researcher. 
The theoretical/ethical problem of dividing IBLS students into those participating in 
ethics teaching and into those that do not, is the disparity of their learning experience, 
which may not be acceptable. The content of teaching can affect students in both 
groups either positively or negatively, depending on how successful the ethics 
components are. Either the students in the 'ethics group' will be in an advantageous 
situation because they receive new and beneficial learning opportunities or they may 
be disadvantaged for spending their time and dedicating their effort onto something 
that is not beneficial and thus having less time to devote to material that is being 
assessed. It will be known only at the end of this research, which of these scenarios is 
correct. Even though we cannot know the effects of the ethics teaching, we can 
anticipate at the start of the research that the students participating in ethics teaching 
are likely to benefit from it. From this expectation a moral question arises: namely, is 
it right to withhold teaching that is expected to be beneficial to the students in the 
name of research? The problem is not dissimilar to medical research situations, when 
treatment estimated to be highly beneficial is not provided to all patients and some are 
given placebos instead of the drug, that might, if not save their lives, provide them 
with alleviation of pain or discomfort. But in medicine, as in this research, the effects 
of the treatment may not be advantageous, but even hazardous, and those belonging to 
the placebo/control groups may turn out to be the ones 'benefiting' from the research. 
The difference between the medical example and the ethics education example is that 
the patients in the medical trials give informed consent to the researchers, and by that 
consent accept the possibility of being allocated to either group. Informed consent 
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removes most of the problems relating to autonomous decision-making and a possible 
right to best possible treatment. But in the ethics teaching case, which is of interest 
here, acquiring consent is somewhat complicated, but not impossible. 
Allowing students to choose which student group they wish to join is likely to distort 
the results. Research by Spickelmier (Rest and Deemer, 1986) shows that moral 
development scores correlate positively with students' approach to their work. More 
precisely, higher moral development scores (using DIT) correlated positively with 
high motivation towards studies, involvement in university life, clear academic goals, 
enjoyment of studies, keen approach to new ideas, and participation in the activities of 
reading and discussing. Therefore we can assume that students with high motivation, 
and hence those who are more likely to have already accelerated moral development 
prospects, would be the ones opting for the ethics curriculum, which might be seen as 
novel, more participatory and challenging. Those who are less motivated and with a 
lower starting point on moral development would most likely choose the traditional 
curriculum. Because of this potential bias, the results could be distorted and 
interpretation difficult. 
On the other hand, students could be divided into the groups randomly and informed 
of the reasons for this division. This could by-pass the ethical problem as long as 
students strongly objecting to their allocation were allowed to change groups. This 
presumes that most students would be satisfied with their original allocation. The 
problem with this is that the students' approach to the ethics components within the 
curriculum may change as they are told about the untested value of that form of 
teaching, which in turn may influence the effects the teaching will have on the 
students. By the same token, it should be possible to maintain student autonomy and 
reduce any adverse emotional reactions by giving the students information about the 
research, and outlining its benefits, without jeopardising the clarity of the results. 
A way to avoid most of these problems is to form test/control groups within each 
degree course and teach the test groups in term 1 and the control groups in term 2 with 
the post test administered in between. This way neither student group is disadvantaged 
in having/missing a teaching element. It would still be necessary to make sure that the 
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students are informed of the research nature of the teaching and that they are given an 
opportunity not to participate in the questionnaire part of the research, if they object to 
doing so. 
Other science students. An alternative to the use of IBLS students as both the test and 
control group is to use an external control. The external control groups could be of two 
types, either biology students from another university or other science students from 
the University of Glasgow. If  the external control group was chosen from another 
university, care would have to be taken that the students in both groups were 
compatible in all important biographical and academic aspects. Also the university 
experience would have to be sufficiently similar to enable comparison of the results. 
Controlling both the biographical and academic variables would not pose an 
impossible task, while standardising the academic experience in order to enable 
comparison of the data is extremely complicated. These difficulties are likely to 
undermine the usefulness of a group from another university as a control group i.e. 
they would not be a proper control group, but in the relevant aspects a different 
population. Therefore the use of an external 'control group' formed of students from 
another university threatens the results of the entire research. Because of this threat, 
the use of an external control group from another university is not considered further. 
Considering other science students from the University of Glasgow, the first issue is 
whether there is some element in the students choosing different disciplines that 
influences their moral development, which would not be apparent when judging 
compatibility of academic and biographical variables. If  both groups scored similarly 
in the pre-test (at the start of the academic year), the worry would be removed. 
Alternatively if the pre-test results were significantly different between the control and 
test group, analysing the results of the post-test (at the end of the academic year) 
would be open to a large variety of interpretations, which is not desirable. Therefore 
information about the compatibility of the biology students and the control group of 
other science students in reference to their moral sensitivity and moral reasoning skills 
is required before the start of the academic year of research interest in order to decide 
on the acceptability of the control group. 
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The second issue is incompatible university experience. Different disciplines present 
students with different types of problems, stimulate their thinking differently and 
provide them with different extra-curricular activities. All of this may influence their 
moral development, either positively or negatively. Therefore, even if the pre-test 
results are similar, in the case of only small differences between the control and test 
group in the post-test, it would be plausible to locate the source of difference in the 
incomparable academic experience. This possibility could undermine the entire 
research set-up. There would be a risk of this research becoming academically 
insignificant, producing ambiguous results which would not stand up to stringent peer 
review. 
5.1.2  Decision on the control group 
To be able to produce results on the effects of an ethics curriculum on the moral 
development of biomedical and life sciences students, it is vital to have a control 
group that matches the test group both in biographical aspects and in academic 
experience. This compatibility can be best secured by forming both the control and 
test groups out of the same student body so that both groups participate in an identical 
curriculum structure apart from the ethics components. This compatibility secures 
unambiguous interpretation of the test results and provides a true opportunity to assess 
the effects of ethics teaching. 
Forming the control group from students from other faculties or departments would 
increase the difficulty of drawing conclusions from the results and produce a risk of 
the research becoming insignificant. Therefore such an approach was not undertaken. 
The issue of unfairness resulting from differing academic experience was minimised 
by three elements: 1) students were given an opportunity to choose their group if they 
were unhappy with the original random allocation into ethics or non-ethics group. 2) 
Most groups were formed along naturally existing group lines within different 
degrees. For example, within the degree of Parasitology and Microbiology the students 
were naturally divided into groups emphasising either parasitology or microbiology 
and ethics was introduced to one of these groups. The students already had non-
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identical academic experiences due to different staff and some different courses. 
Introduction of ethics also corresponded with teaching of other transferable skills for 
the non-ethics group. 3) When a natural divide did not exist, the control group 
received identical ethics teaching after the post-test had been administered. 
5.2  Moral competence 
Moral competence reflects students' skills in moral reasoning, an ability to consider 
the perceived moral problem rationally and logically, an ability to take into 
consideration all relevant facts and prioritise between them in cases of conflicting 
principles and values. Moral reasoning skills can be assessed using the Defining Issues 
Test (DIT). Extensive literature supports its use, including the reliability and validity 
studies discussed in section 4.3.2. Previous research usage provides statistical 
information on the scores that can be expected for undergraduate science students and 
assistance in interpreting the gains due to educational efforts. DIT is also efficient and 
a low cost measuring tool because it can be group administered; it only takes 30 
minutes to complete and it can be computer scored. 
Despite the very satisfactory track record in validity and reliability of DIT and its 
economic use in terms of both time and money, it is not self-evident that it is suitable 
for measuring moral development in every context. Kohlberg's moral development 
theory and DIT are strongly related to the conception of justice and rights. The 
measure of moral development is tied to an ability to judge moral issues from a neutral 
and universal point of view. In the assessment of moral development, this narrow 
scope of DIT needs to be recognised and the results from DIT tests interpreted in the 
light of their only assessing one element of moral decision-making skills - an ability to 
interpret moral problems in universal terms (Rest et ai., 1999a). 
One of the issues the DIT approach to considering moral development ignores 
completely is intentions and emotions of love and care. For example in the Heinz drug 
dilemma (Appendix IV - Moral Development Questionnaire) statement 'Whether 
Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else' is classified as 
a stage 3 item, and in the Newspaper story a statement 'Whether Fred was using the 
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newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent' is similarly classified as a stage 3 item. If 
you are not a proponent of a totally consequentalist moral system, the intentions of 
moral agents should make a difference in your appreciation and analysis of the moral 
dilemma. Mature emotions towards caring for people one is close to should not be 
considered incompatible with moral competence, but in DIT, caring emotions are not 
included in the high scoring items. 
DIT measures an ability to consider a wide range of issues in each of the presented 
moral problems. But because DIT is not an outcome measure - the choice of action 
does not effect the score - it does not rule out elements like compassion and care in 
moral action. In the four-component model described by Rest (1986), DIT measures 
elements in component 2 - an ability to make a moral judgement - not components 3 or 
4 which relate to moral action - an ability to give priority to moral consideration and 
ability to behave accordingly. 
In their professional life, scientists are required to think rather in terms of  justice than 
compassion and an ability to consider wider consequences is an essential skill. DIT is 
designed to measure that element in moral development, and as that type of moral 
development is a core aim of ethics teaching in life sciences, DIT provides a valid and 
reliable measurement tool. The lack of importance placed on caring or intention, 
however, is worth noting at all times when DIT results are discussed, especially when 
it comes to more biomedical issues and working with animals. 
The main draw-back of using DIT for measuring the benefits of short term educational 
interventions is its design to measure longitudinal change in moral development skills. 
These changes are rather broad-gauged alterations in thinking over an entire life span 
and are intended to represent fundamental, underlying structures of social thought 
rather than fine-grained descriptions of specific concepts and ideas, or detailed and 
refined changes (Schlaefli et al.  1985). Short term educational efforts are more likely 
to result in small scale changes, which thus may not be captured by DIT. The change 
after specific intervention is often only 1/10 or 1120 of the effective range of DIT -
changes within one stage rather than movement between stages (Baldwin et al., 1991; 
Schlaefli et al., 1985; Frisch, 1987). On the other hand, research has shown that these 
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gains are both retained and cumulative. The advances in moral development have a 
tendency to extrapolate to new situations and pervade the students' thinking in 
circumstances outside the classroom. Therefore, if an educational programme can 
show that it has produced gains in moral judgement - even if the gains are moderate or 
even small- then those changes may be worthwhile and the programme may claim to 
have had an effect upon life beyond the course itself (Rest, 1982). 
A complicating issue with DIT is its culture and time dependent design. With the 
approval of Darcia Narvaez, who is one of the co-creators of DIT, I changed the 
vocabulary of DIT slightly to suit British students. The change of American English to 
British English was carried out in the following stories: 
•  Heinz: The word 'druggist' was changed to  'pharmacist'; $-signs were 
changed into £-signs . 
•  Newspaper: The word 'mimeographed' was removed in front of 
'newspaper' . 
A further discussion with Darcia Narvaez considered the change of 'Vietnam war' to 
just 'war'. Dr. Narvaez considered this to influence the DIT results to an extent where 
maintaining their direct comparability with previous studies could be compromised 
and the word Vietnam was not removed. 
Taking into consideration the reliability and validity of DIT, the adjustments carried 
out to suit British students and the down-side of relatively small changes expected to 
result, I included a 3-story DIT as my measure for assessing the effects of the ethics 
curriculum on students' moral reasoning skills. Course coordinators provided stringent 
time-pressures to keep the testing as short as possible. For this reason it was not 
possible to include the complete 6-story DIT. 
5.3  Novel testing methods 
Moral sensitivity has been of lesser interest in moral development assessment in 
comparison to moral competence measures. Therefore, the choice of reliable and valid 
.assessment methods is relatively limited. The only reported measures imitate in 
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structure the DEST (Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test) developed by Rest and Bebeau 
for measuring the moral sensitivity of dental students. DEST is not only laborious and 
time-consuming to administer, but also designed to measure moral sensitivity in 
professional students entering a profession with a defined moral code, appreciating 
patient autonomy, confidentiality, and beneficence. Science as a profession does not 
have a similar recognised value-base for students to adopt. Attempts to develop such  a 
code have been made (The Institute for Social Inventions proposed one in 1987, and 
Rotblat (1999) called for one) but no code has been generally accepted. Also, the 
moral problems in dentistry, and more generally in other health care related subjects, 
are situated in personal encounters between the professionals and their patients. The 
moral problems involved have immediacy and intimacy in both their recognition and 
in the impact of the resolutions. In science, on the other hand, moral problems are 
more abstract and the consequences more distant and therefore it is often a matter of 
making a moral decision regarding one's personal conduct in isolation from the direct 
consequences. These differences in the nature of moral problems in health care and 
science reduce even further the applicability of DEST type measures to assess the 
moral sensitivity of science students. 
In the absence of a suitable assessment method for the development of moral 
sensitivity, novel methods needed to be created for the purposes of this research. The 
core elements of moral sensitivity are the ability to recognise moral issues in problems 
that contain other - often prominent - elements, and an ability to tolerate moral 
relativism and ambiguity and to act as a moral agent. 
A decision was made to develop a two-prong approach. One element in the moral 
development questionnaire would test the students stage of moral development on the 
Perry scale and another element would concentrate on a more straightforward 
recognition of moral elements in a potential moral problem. 
5.3.1  Perry's theory of ethical development 
Perry's theory of ethical development describes developmental change in moral 
sensitivity on the meta-level - the process of coming to realise and accept moral 
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uncertainty and acquiring skills to deal with it. Perry's developmental methods have 
previously concentrated on measuring intellectual development and attitudes towards 
learning and teaching, but the methods of measuring this type of change seems 
applicable to assessing moral development as well. 
The first task was devising descriptions of moral development positions according to 
Perry's theory. A detailed description of Perry positions can be found in Appendix III 
- Perry's Scheme, but in short the nine original positions are the following: 
1.  Basic Duality 
2.  Multiplicity pre-legitimate 
3.  Multiplicity sub-ordinate 
4.  MUltiplicity correlate or relativism subordinate 
5.  Relativism correlate, competing, diffuse 
6.  Commitment foreseen 
7.  Initial commitment 
8.  Orientation in implications of commitment 
9.  Developing commitment 
Instead of devising descriptions of all nine positions individually, I adopted the 
approach used frequently in assessing intellectual and attitude change employing three 
Perry types; A, B, and C. The grouping of nine positions into three main types 
simplifies the use of Perry's scheme in pen and paper tests. To identify students using 
the nine-position approach seems feasible only when qualitative research methods are 
employed. As discussed earlier qualitative methods are labour-intensive and thus not 
suitable for large scale projects with limited resources. The 3-type approach will not 
have the intricacy of the nine-position approach, but it does capture the essence of 
development described by Perry. 
Type A is formed of Perry Positions 1,2&3 and can be labelled as  'Safety in Dualism'. 
Perry A students perceive the world in either purely dual terms of 'we-right-good' vs. 
'other-wrong-bad', or with diversity as an unwarranted confusion regarding poorly 
qualified authorities. The right answers to everything exist in the absolute and they are 
known to the authority whose role is to mediate (teach) them. The only role for 
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discussing moral questions in class is because the authority (teacher) wants the 
students to learn and find the right answers themselves. There is no doubt about the 
existence of the right answer in moral questions and there are only right or wrong 
answers to moral questions, no better or worse ones. Students either do not doubt that 
authority knows the right answers to all moral questions or they accept that 
uncertainty is unavoidable at present, and the authorities will find the rights answers in 
time. The problem then arises of the legitimacy of the authority to judge the students' 
answers if they do not yet know the right answers themselves. The student's own role 
and level of personal responsibility consists of obedience, and the responsibility of the 
authorities is to teach them what is right and what is wrong - even when the students 
have doubts whether the authorities can actually fulfil their role. Students may feel 
hostility towards the vagueness of moral answers. Alternatively students may accept 
moral discussions as mere exercises without strong emotional response or 
involvement. 
Perry type B is a combination of Positions 4, 5 & 6 and can be described as  'Distress 
in Relativism'. Type B students have accepted the multiplicity and relativism of moral 
questions, though sometimes reluctantly. Multiplicity is possibly accepted in some 
areas only, and confusion remains over what is legitimate multiplicity and what is not. 
Some students come to accept multiplicity, because they believe the authority to want 
it. True relativism - that knowledge and the appreciation of values (including 
authority'S) are relative and contextual and absolute right/wrong choices are 
exceptions to the rule - once accepted, threatens the student with loss of identity and 
disorientation. The student has three ways to deal with the threat 1) to deny any 
meaning beyond one's immediate passive responses; 2) to exploit the situation 
deliberately by becoming an active opportunist of the relative reality; and 3) to 
acknowledge the need for commitment, though not yet making any. 
Perry Type C is a combination of Positions 7,8&9, and best described as 'Comfort in 
Commitment'. The Perry C student resolves the threat of identity loss and 
disorientation by making commitments to moral values. This process will originate 
with commitment in one defined area - like choosing one's career - and from there is 
taken to further and further areas in life. Commitment is soon paired up with 
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responsibility for the chosen values and how to fulfil them. Commitment will lead to 
affirmation of identity among multiple responsibilities and to the realisation that 
commitment is an ongoing process through which the students can express their lives. 
The Perry-scheme is open to criticism in being too soft on relativism. If  it is 
interpreted as saying that all values are relative, the criticism seems well-placed. 
Alternatively, if relativism is interpreted as a characteristic of applying values it seems 
more robust. People are rarely absolutely sure that they have made the only possible 
right choice in a moral dilemma. We acknowledge alternatives and their potential 
value. Still we make decisions and commit ourselves to the value application we have 
chosen. In the particular sorts of moral and ethical questions scientists face as 
professionals, relativism in the application of core values is often inevitable. 
5.3.1.1  Perry Questionnaire design 
In order to assess students' progress within the Perry scheme according to the type 
descriptions collated, in the first instance I generated 68 statements to describe Perry 
positions - 15 for Perry A, 33 for Perry B, and 20 for Perry C. For each Perry type, the 
questions covered the five elements significant in moral development according to the 
Perry Scheme : 
1.  Source and type of moral answers 
2.  Role of authority 
3.  Nature of multiplicity 
4.  Personal responsibility and relationship with multiplicity 
5.  Purpose of moral discussions (see Appendix III - Perry's Scheme for full 
descriptions) 
In order to improve the quality of the statements and to compose a list of statements 
where all types were equally represented, the number of statements was further 
reduced to 30 (10 of each type). These statements were put together in a random order 
and sent, together with the descriptions of the Perry scheme, to 8 independent judges 
(see Appendix VI - Perry Judges for details). Five of the 8 judges were familiar with 
the Perry scheme before they were asked to evaluate the statements and three had not 
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previously worked with the Perry scheme, though they had experience in other ethical 
development theories. 
For each statement, the judges were asked to identify which Perry type would strongly 
agree and which strongly disagree with it. The results from the judges were decisive 
(inter-rater consistency >0.8) on 16 statements out of which 12 were statements 
designed to represent either Perry-type A or C. The remaining 8 A and C statements, 
which did not produce conclusive agreement by the judges, were re-phrased to provide 
a better match with the type descriptions and sent to four new Perry judges familiar 
with the Perry Scheme, whose judgement resulted in an agreement over the re-phrased 
statements. 
Because the Perry questionnaire was to be designed with computer-scoring in mind, 
the possible alternative formats were to ask students to respond to Perry statements 
using either Likert- or Osgood-scales. 
In the Likert-scale questionnaire, students are asked to state whether they agree or 
disagree with a given statement, often on a 3-, 5-, or 6-point scale. The hypothesis for 
using Likert-scales to measure development on the Perry Scheme, is that type A 
students would agree with the statements depicting A-type views on moral questions 
and disagree with C statements - the same goes for C students agreeing with C-type 
statements and disagreeing with A-type statements. For example a statement 'Moral 
questions have absolutely right answers just like scientific ones' which is designed to 
describe the thought pattern of a Perry A-type student, would attract A-type students 
to agree or agree strongly with the statement and C-type students to state 
disagreement. Likert scales provide straightforward assessment of A- and C-
statements, while B-statement analysis is more complicated. 
In the Perry scheme of moral development, the major shift is identified by 
transformation between A and B types. For this reason, when students reflect on type 
B statements and indicate acceptance of multiplicity in moral problems they have 
taken a major step from dualism to multiplicity. For this reason the analysis of B-type 
statements should not be neglected. Development into Perry C type builds upon this 
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realisation: it is not as dramatic a change as between A and B, but a more subtle 
growth in accepting responsibility and finding confidence in relativism. This structural 
element creates difficulties in designing a Likert-scale Perry questionnaire. If  Perry C 
students build on the foundations of Perry B, it is likely that C-type students are going 
to agree with the B statements as well as the C statements, as B statements are in 
accordance with their basic understanding of the moral world - i.e. moral answers are 
relative and uncertainty is an inseparable element of morality. On the other hand, type 
B students should not agree with type C statements, which could be used as an 
analytical approach to finding whether students are B or C. A further problem is with 
analysing disagreement with a B-type statement, which can be interpreted either as A 
orC. 
To reduce this problem, it is possible to phrase the type B statements so that they 
emphasise discomfort with moral relativism and the novelty of its recognition, to 
avoid C-type students agreeing with them. Doing this runs the risk of B-statements 
being phrased in a negative light, which may deter students genuinely at stage B from 
agreeing with them. Even though B-stage is a transitional stage towards C, it should 
not be described in the negative terms of lack of commitment or moral hijacking. 
Alternatively it is possible to ignore the B-statements in the final analysis, as 
suggested by Gray (1997) and use the Perry Index (PI) (see section 4.5) as an 
analytical tool. This raises the issue of how sensible it is to include B-statements in a 
questionnaire if they are not providing any further information in the final analysis. 
The only justification for the inclusion of B-statements when they are not analysed 
would be to offer B-type students statements they can agree with, to avoid discomfort 
in the testing situation. 
An alternative to the Likert scale, is the Osgood scale described in section 4.5. In the 
Osgood scale, students are presented with opposite statements (A and C types) and 
asked to indicate on a scale from strongly agree, agree, neutral, agree, to strongly 
agree, their preference on the stretch of two polar views. This approach removes the 
problem of C type students agreeing also with B statements, as no B statements are 
used. B students are identified as students who choose to be neutral between the poles. 
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As a result of this analysis, I decided to use the Osgood scale for the Perry analysis 
(see Appendix VII - Preliminary Perry Questionnaire). Altogether ten A and C 
statements, which had all been rated at minimum 80% agreement among the external 
judges on their validity in representing the designated Perry type, were included in the 
questionnaire. Three of the questions related to the source and type of moral answers 
(questions 2, 4 and 7), one (question 3) related to the role of authority in judging moral 
answers, two questions represented different perceptions on the role of moral 
discussions (questions 1 and 6) and three questions described the different approaches 
to personal responsibility and relationship with multiplicity (questions 8, 9,  10). The A 
and C statements were randomly allocated on either the left or right hand side of the 
Osgood scale. The extreme ends of the scales were labelled as  'Definitely my opinion' 
(A or C), the next ones 'More or less what I believe' (Ab or Cb), and the middle one 
as  'I can't decide' (B). 
5.3.1.2  Preliminary results with the Perry-Questionnaire 
The Preliminary Perry Questionnaire was piloted with 70 L3 students from four 
different honours courses (Genetics and Molecular Biology, Pharmacology, 
Physiology, and Zoology) and with 60 Ll students in May 1999 during the last week 
of teaching in Term 3. Students were given an option not to participate in the trial, but 
only very few students chose to do so. Unfortunately the attendance during the last 
week of teaching was relatively low in L3, which may have affected the preliminary 
results as the group was self-selected. 
In the trial of the Perry questionnaire, when including all ten Perry statements in the 
analysis, both Ll and L3 student responses were dominantly C or Cb. 
A  Ab  B  Cb  C 
··L1···(n·~6·2)·········1·····3oi;··(1·7}····r·····5o/~··(~iS)······l···1·8°;~··(·1··05)····[···3·io;~···(21·7y··r···3·S%··{22·6)··· 
··L3··(n·~i2)·········1·····2oi;··(1·3)·····1······6o;~··(43)·······[·····1·3·olc;··(8·i)·····[···3·9°;~··(2·6i)···r··40o;~··{2i9)··· 
Table 1: Perry response distribution frequencies 
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The statistical difference between the Ll and L3 results was tested using chi-square, 
and was significant at p<O.005. The highly significant statistical difference should be 
interpreted in the light of the general trends of both Ll and L3 students having very 
similar answering patterns with a strong dominance at the C end of the scale. This 
indicates that most students have reached at least partially the highest level of Perry 
moral development. 
The results were then broken down into the different elements in Perry moral 
development, which revealed more diverse developmental patterns in the response 
frequencies (the results are presented as percentages). 
L  1  .  A  i  Ab  .  B  .  Cb  i  C  i' .. So·u·rce  .. iiii·cj"·type··of··morai··answe·rs··  .. ·!····  .. ·  .... 2··········r  .... ·j····  .. ·T  .. ·····1·4··· .. ·  .. r  .. ·····4"f·····r  .... ··40'·  .. ···· 
,(q?!..q4.'  ...  ~~~!..q?L  ................................................ l..  ...................... L  ................. ..l. ................... L  .................. .l.. .................. . 
II Role of Authority (03)  i  12  i  8  i  12  i  37  i  32  i'i·i  ..  ~.j"aiu·re·o(m·u·iii·p.ijc·i·iy. ·(05j"  .... ·  ................ ·t·  ...... ·2  .......... r  ........ 3·  .. ·  .. ·  .. t  ........ i  ........ t  .... ·  .. 44  .... ·  .. ·t ...... ·44  ...... .. 
i\TPersona'j'·resp·o·;;·s·ibi·iity  .. aii·(j  ........ ·  .......... T  .......... 2  .......... r  .. ·  .... S  ........ r  .... ·  36  .. ·  .. ·  .. r  ...... ·  3'1"""" r  .. ·  .. 24"""" 
relationship with multiplicity  j  j  j  j  j 
,(q~.!  ..  q~.!  ..  ~~g  .. qJ .  .QJ ............................................... l... ..................... l... ................. .L ................... .l. .................. ..L ................... . 
V Purpose of moral discussions  i  2  i  2  i  7  i  34  i  55 
1(01, and 06)  iii  i  i 
b~  ........................................................................................  +  .......... A  .......... +  ......  /:\~  ................ !?  ......... l  .......  9.~  ................ g  ........ . 
I Source and type of moral answers iii  6  i  11  i  39  i  43 
.(q?.!..q4.!  .. ~~g  .. q?.L ................................................ L  ..................... L. ................. L  ................. ..l .................... L  .................. . 
II Role of Authority (03)  i  7  1  6  i  7  i  36  i  43 
i·i·i··r~j'at·u·re·o(m·u·it·ip.ifC"i·iy. ·(05)···  .. ····· .... ···· .. ·· .. 1···········1·····  .. ·  .. ·1·········6·  .. ······t····· .. ··g···  .. ···r·  .... 36·  .... ···t·······4S···· ... . 
i'V  .. ·Pe·rsona'j'·re·s·p·onsibj·iity·aii·(j  .................. ·T  .. ·  ...... 2  .......... r  ......  1·0  .. ·  ....  ·1· ...... 25  ...... T  ...... 3·8  .. ·  ....  ·1 ...... ·25  ...... .. 
relationship with multiplicity  j  j  j  j  j 
,(q~.!  ..  q~.'  ...  ~~g  ..  9.~.9L  ............................................. l... ..................... l.. ................... l. ................... L  ................... l.  ................... . 
V Purpose of moral discussions  i  0  i  2  i  7  i  41  i  51 
(01  and 06)  iii  i  i 
Table 2: Perry elements 
First it is noticeable that Ll students chose consistently (apart from element V) more 
Cb statements than C statements, while the trend is opposite with L3 students (apart 
from element IV). This can be interpreted as an increased confidence in personal 
views regarding moral issues gained by two years of formal teaching. 
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Second, element IV (Personal responsibility and relationship with mUltiplicity) 
produced a significantly different answering pattern to all other elements. Both L1  and 
L3 students responded to element IV items more from a B-type view point than to any 
other element. This trend was stronger in L1  responses. This result is not surprising 
considering that the highest levels of development concern issues of responsibility and 
commitment above all others. The C positions build upon the realisations of 
multiplicity and relativity gained during the B-positions, and deepen the understanding 
in particular towards personal commitment and personal acceptance of moral 
multiplicity. This indicates that while students have reached an understanding of moral 
issues typical of the C-stage, they are still in the process of forming personal 
commitment to relative moral values and finding a balance between freedom and 
responsibility. 
Third, it is worth noting the high frequency of pure A choices in element II. This 
indicates that students otherwise viewing the world from a dominantly type- C-
viewpoint, find that mode of thinking less suitable in the context of assessment. A 
similar trend of retreat to more elementary methods regarding assessment has been 
found by Gray (1997). 
Finally, attention should be drawn to element V, which shows the positive attitudinal 
capability of students to discuss moral issues during ethics courses. There seems to be 
no barrier to engagement in a moral discussion which will not lead to a definitive 
answer. The two discussion questions also provide a consistency check in the 
questionnaire, as both questions query the same element with different wording. In 
both levels, the consistency check provides confidence that students answer the 
questions reflectively and sincerely. 
The Perry Index (PI) and Success Index (SI) discussed in section 4.5 provide less 
useful ways of analysing the Perry questionnaire using an Osgood scale. 
The difficulty with the use of these indexes is their emphasis on Perry A statements 
and their grouping of Cb and C statements together. In the preliminary Perry results, 
23 students out of 41  for whom an SI score was calculated had an SI score of one, 
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indicating that they did not choose any type A statements. The SI scores not equal to 
one ranged from 0.43 to 0.8. A result of 0.8 indicates 9 choices of type C statements 
and one choice of type A statements; the lower scores indicate different combinations 
of all A and C type responses. Because of the low frequency of A statements chosen 
by the L1  and L3 students, the Success Index is not a functional measurement of their 
developmental stage or developmental advances. 
In need of an alternative method to SI and PI, to calculate a Perry score, I developed a 
Personal Perry Score (PPS 1). PPS is calculated by assigning each statement choice a 
representative value: these are then added together for a Personal Perry Score. As 
these numbers only represent a certain point on the Perry developmental scale, no 
arithmetic can be performed with them, but they can be taken to represent a certain 
level of Perry development and averages can be calculated for the group. A simple 
approach to calculating a PPS is to assign single step values to the five alternative 
statements on the Osgood scale: the point closest to the A type statement is given a 
value of 1, the next closest a value of two, the middle option a value of 3, the second 
closest to type C statement a value of 4 and the closest to the C statement a value of 5. 
Using this method 79 (36 L1) Perry questionnaires were analysed and the absolute 
score was divided by ten to give an average score for one statement: 
Average PPS 1  4.04  sd 0.397  range 3.2-4.9 
Average PPS1 for L1  4.06  sd 0.405 
Average PPS 1 for L3  4.02  sd 0.389 
Table 3: PPSI 
The scores indicate that L1 students have a slightly higher developmental score than 
L3 students. This result is not supported by the previous frequency analysis, where L1 
students were shown to choose lower level items in greater frequency than L3 
students. The standard deviation is marginally higher for L1, which indicates slightly 
more spread out answering patterns for the L1 students. 
An alternative Personal Perry Score (PPS2) was calculated by raising the values given 
to the responses in PPS 1 to power two. This was done to increase the weight of C and 
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Cb responses over the A, Ab, and B responses. The developmental jump from A to B 
is dramatic and significant, while the developmental tasks beyond B are more subtle, 
but often require more emotional and psychological labour to achieve. To represent 
this increased requirement of emotional labour, the higher levels on the Perry scheme 
were allocated a higher score, giving students who have reached the Cb and C levels 
'credit' for their achievement. The new values attached to each response in PPS2 are: 
A=1, Ab=4, B=9, Cb=16, and C=25. The score was then divided by 10 (the number of 
questions) to get a question average. The same 79 responses were re-scored using 
PPS2 and the results were: 
Average PPS2  17.2  sd=3.07  range 10.6-24.1 
Average PPS2 for L1  17.2  sd=3.16  range 10.6-24.1 
Average PPS2 for L3  17.3  sd=2.91  range 10.6-21.6 
Table 4: PPS2 
Changing the values attached to the different Perry choices did not change the 
significance of the results. Again the difference between L1  and L3 students are 
insignificant (p>O.05) and the standard deviations indicate similar answering ranges 
for both groups. 
PPS can also be calculated for the different Perry elements separately. For the 79 
responses PPS2 was calculated for element IV 'Personal responsibility and 
relationship with multiplicity': 
Average PPS2 for element IV  15.12  sd=3.56  range 7-25 
Average PPS2 for L1 for element IV  14.91  sd=3.79  range 7-25 
Average PPS2 for L3 for element IV  15.64  sd=2.87  range 12-22 
Table 5: PPS2 for element IV 
These question averages show the difference detected between the answering pattern 
of L1  and L3 students in the frequency analysis given before. The L1  student 
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answering pattern also has the higher standard deviation, which indicates larger 
developmental differences amongst L1  students. 
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These results indicate that PPS 1 and PPS2 for all Perry elements are not useful scoring 
methods for comparing L1  and L3 groups as PPS does not pick up the differences in 
answering patterns seen in the frequency analysis. PPS1 or PPS2 may on the other 
hand, provide a tool to measure personal development during the academic year. 
Measuring PPS2 for particular elements produces results concordant with those found 
in the frequency analysis and thus is a useful tool for providing numeric data on those 
aspects of the Perry questionnaire. 
The preliminary study with the Perry questionnaire suggests that the tool does measure 
developmental differences between students, but that it is not a particularly sensitive 
measure for a student population which dominantly views moral problems from the C 
position. At the same time the differences between student answers and between L1 
and L3 students as groups supports the use of the method as a developmental 
indicator. 
The preliminary study also suggests the need for minor changes to the questionnaire. 
1.  The questions representing each element should be more randomly 
distributed to avoid a cluster of personal responsibility questions at the end 
of the questionnaire. 
2.  The key to the response types should be changed for the B type from 'I 
can't decide' into 'Neither of the statements represents my view'. This 
change was initiated by the students, who indicated a problem with deciding 
which box to tick,  when their difficulty was not that they could not decide 
between the two polar statements, but that they believed neither of the polar 
statements represented their view. This re-phrased key is also better related 
to the Osgood-scale hypothesis that B type students find neither of the 
statements represent their views on the issue. 
Henriikka Clarkeburn, June 2000 m  Part II - Assessing Moral Development  112 
5.3.2  Recognition of moral issues 
The test of moral sensitivity should measure the recognition of the moral elements and 
appreciation of them in the decision-making procedure, not the abilities to use higher 
level moral considerations as the basis for decision-making. Therefore the test 
elements for moral competence (DIT) are not sufficient for measuring moral 
sensitivity. Neither will the Perry questions target the interpretative element in moral 
reasoning, as the Perry questions target meta-understanding of the nature of morality, 
not moral sensitivity. 
To assess the interpretative phase of moral decision making (ethical sensitivity as 
defined in Part II 3.2.2) it is necessary to use "unstructured problems." A moral 
problem is unstructured when it does not directly indicate the moral issues involved, 
either by describing them in the problem narrative, or by giving moral statements to 
choose as possible solutions or considerations for arriving at a solution. The problems 
used in DIT are 'structured' moral problems, because the narrative structure describes 
a particular moral dilemma (e.g. Heinz should steal and save his wife, or should not 
steal and not save his wife) and the considerations for the decision are all part of the 
moral deliberation process. An 'unstructured' moral problem is thus a problem 
scenario which has moral components, but where these components are not self-
evidently apparent, and a solution to the problem can be arrived at without ethical 
considerations. 
It is impossible to measure moral sensitivity with a 'tick-a-box' method. Any such 
method would have to include some level of pre-established moral analysis, which 
would have taken place before any statements to choose from could have been 
produced. For example, a test protocol, which gives students an unstructured moral 
problem and then offers several ethical and non-ethical elements to choose to include 
in their deliberation, would not test the recognition of moral issues, but the importance 
students place on these issues. As was discussed earlier in section 4.4, people can 
recognise and discriminate and thus prefer an idea before they can paraphrase it or 
before they can spontaneously produce the idea in a response to a story dilemma. 
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Moral sensitivity is precisely the measure of the spontaneous recognition of moral 
issues, the interpretation of a situation in moral terms. 
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It is important to remember that moral sensitivity is not a measure of moral decision-
making methods. High scores on moral sensitivity tests do not indicate that one would 
necessarily have sophisticated methods of solving the problem with appreciation for 
the moral elements one has recognised. Also the four-component theory of moral 
action and moral development described in Part II, section 3.2.1 does not demand the 
abilities of moral sensitivity and moral competence to be highly correlated. Research 
has shown (Bebeau and Brabeck, 1987) that the correlation between DIT and moral 
sensitivity tests (DEST) has been consistent, but very moderate at 0.2 -0.3. 
Therefore, the nature of moral sensitivity requires the test of moral sensitivity to be 
qualitative, to allow students to respond to an unstructured problem with only minimal 
guidelines or pre-established thought-patterns. This type of qualitative data can be 
collected either verbally in an interview or in a written form. DEST used both 
methods, which provided equally valid and reliable date (Bebeau et al., 1985), while 
the interview scores yielded higher estimates of moral sensitivity, as judges felt they 
had a better opportunity to confirm their judgement from verbal responses. Interviews 
may produce more data, but they are more laborious to administer. The large student 
population at Glasgow University dictated the choice of a written test-format. 
5.3.2.1  Pilot stUdies on moral sensitivity 
In the first trial, 17 (one response was removed the from analysis due to illegible hand-
writing) Zoology students were asked to respond to the following scenario: 
The local health board is planning a pre-natal screening programme for cystic 
fibrosis (CF).  CF is caused by a mutation in chromosome 7.  The gene is long 
consisting of  1,480 base pairs, while most of  the mutations are restricted to a 
relatively small area, more than 200 mutations have been found through-out 
the gene. The faulty allele ( AF508) that is responsible for 70-80% of  CF cases 
is missing three base pairs, coding for one amino acid in the protein. The rest 
are caused by different mutant alleles in the same gene.  There could be 
thousands of  mutant alleles not yet identified. Approximately one in 20 to 25 in 
the Caucasian population is a carrier, which means that in about 1 in 625 
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couples both partners are carriers and they therefore have a 1 in 4 risk to have 
a child with CF. 
In general there are two types of  CF,  one that affects lungs and pancreas and 
another that affects just lungs; about 90% have pancreatic insufficiency. 
Although symptoms range in severity, many patients suffer a prolonged period 
of  increasingly severe handicap. Life expectancy of  CF patients in the UK is 
forty years. 
CF test can be carried out by a simple spit test, where the test subject provides 
a small amount of  saliva on a test dish. 
Please list below ALL the issues you think should be considered in making the 
decision on whether to start a programme of  pre-natal screening for CF. 
Students recognised zero to ten issues based on this scenario, the average being 4.9 
issues per response. The difficulty with analysing the responses to this scenario was 
largely due to the multitude of ethical issues involved in pre-natal screening, in 
particular screening for a disease like CF which allows the sufferers to lead a 
relatively long life before succumbing to the disease. 
The students picked up the following issues in their responses (if the same issue was 
mentioned twice in the same response that was counted as one response): 
1.  Cost of the programme (7) 
2.  Certainty of the diagnosis (5) 
3.  Frequency of CF in the area (1) 
4.  What age can CF be detected (1) 
5.  Safety of screening procedures to the mother and child (1) 
6.  Family history (1) 
7.  Alternative (better) use of the resources (2) 
8.  Abortion -> should it be an option?, would it increase? (8) 
9.  Rights of the child (to life) (9) 
10. Parents' right to know (1) 
11. Need of counselling (5) 
12. Increased opportunity for parents to choose (3) 
13. Increased parental stress (5) 
14. Is this messing with the gene-pool, with the survival of the fittest? (2) 
15. Will the test provide alternative information which requires parental 
decision (1) 
16. Compatibility with religious and other beliefs (3) 
17. Is this Playing God? (3) 
18. Quality of life for the child, parents or siblings (6) 
19. Will this lead to screening for other diseases (1) 
20. Do people have to suffer debilitating diseases? (1) 
21. Care available for CF children (1) 
22. Feelings of staff (1) 
23. Benefits of early detection to the welfare of CF sufferer (1) 
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The first six could be interpreted as non-ethical considerations, while the rest are most 
naturally viewed with at least some attention paid to ethical and moral consequences, 
though it is possible to view, for example, parental stress in purely factual terms 
without attaching any moral value to that stress. The students seemed to view the 
issues from an ethical point of view, though at times this could not be conclusively 
inferred as the responses were very short (one or two words). In the preliminary 
analysis, benefit of the doubt was given to consider even these short responses as 
ethical considerations. 
Students recognised an average of 3.1 moral issues, with individual scores ranging 
from 0 to 6. The sophistication of the answers varied greatly from short remarks such 
as  'Playing God?' to well-worded and thorough responses such as 'Pre-natal screening 
in general - if it is done for one condition, and becomes accepted, then it may spread to 
other conditions - risk of parents 'selecting' their children on the basis of traits they 
believe are important.' In the preliminary analysis, no importance was based on the 
quality of responses, but it became obvious that a scoring guide which takes into 
account the sophistication of the answer needed to be developed. 
Because of the multitude of ethical problems in the pre-natal screening story, a 
decision was made to develop unstructured scenarios which would not have such large 
numbers of ethical problems present, to provide a more valid and reliable platform for 
scoring the responses. At the second stage of the pilot study, three stories were given 
to both L1  and L3 students at the same time as the Perry questionnaire in May 1999. 
At this second stage, students were asked to list no more than five issues they believed 
should be considered in making the decision regarding the issues presented in the 
story. A grid with five boxes was placed below the scenario to indicate the length of 
the responses expected. Students were also asked in all three scenarios what they 
believed should have been done (Yes, No or I don't know), and which of the issues 
they listed should be the most predominant one in the decision-making procedure. 
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Story 1 - Research laboratory 
One of the stories was developed to highlight the problems with making decisions 
regarding developing preliminary research findings. 17 Ll students and 18 L3 students 
responded to this story. 
A small research laboratOlY has made a break-through in discovering a gene 
defect that triggers acute childhood asthma together with environmental 
exposure. The research team has been funded through governmental research 
councils. The grant is due to run out in a few months time and there are no 
guarantees offuturefunding. A large pharmaceutical company has made a bidfor 
the lab, promising to employ the scientists as long as they will sell the patent 
rights to the company. This would mean a move to a new location and not being 
able to continue with the current support staff. There is an alternative opportunity 
to gain further funding from the research council which would allow for the 
laboratory to stay independent and possibly expand its facilities, but for now 
there are no guarantees whether such funding will be made available. 
Should the research laboratory accept the offer? 
All the L3 students gave at least one issue they believed important in making the 
decision, while five Ll students returned the paper with no issues listed, though three 
of them had responded to the question whether the laboratory should accept the offer. 
The three that responded to the question were included in the further analysis, while 
the other two were disregarded from further data, because it was not clear whether 
they had even considered answering the question. The same exclusion criterion was 
applied to all three stories. 
The L3 students listed on average 3.5 issues, while the Ll students' average was 2.2. 
The distribution of responses according to the number of issues stated was the 
following: 
no issues  1 issue  2 issues  3 issues  4 issues  5 issues 
L1  20%  13%  20%  27%  13%  7% 
L3  0%  22%  11%  28%  17%  22% 
Table 6: Story 1 response rates 
Hellriikka ClarkeburIl, JUlie 2000 m  Part II - Assessing Moral Development 
In advance I hypothesised that the following moral elements exist in the scenario: 
1.  How will the support staff be employed in the future? 
2.  Who decides on the research topics in the future? 
3.  Whether future research findings are classified information? 
4.  How can the research findings be used to benefit those suffering from 
asthma? 
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5.  What is the role of animal testing in the development of the discovery into 
a drug? 
6.  Who will get access to the patent? 
7.  Whether the discovery should be patented? 
In  13 student responses, the issue of support staff employment was mentioned and a 
further six believed the security of employment of the academic staff was an issue to 
consider. Two students raised the issue of who decides the research topics in the future 
and only one student was explicit about the issue of classified information. On the 
other hand, the topic of benefits to asthma sufferers was raised in the student responses 
13 times. Some elaborated the issue to include the importance of getting the research 
done as paramount; others worried about access to the drug ("would the 
pharmaceutical company be the best option to guarantee access for all?") and who 
would profit from subsequent research, asthma sufferers or the company. A further 
three students pondered on the rights of the commercial company to exploit this type 
of research and another two considered the general benefits of such research ("Is it 
beneficial to public healthT'). None of the students perceived animal testing as an 
issue to be considered in the decision-making procedure. Eight students raised the 
issue of patent rights, while only one referred to general considerations of whether 
patents should be allowed or not. 
The students raised a further seven issues that were not considered in the design of the 
scenario. Seven students considered alternative sources of funding, which might 
secure the research, but would not have the negative effects of pharmaceutical 
company take-over. Five students raised the issue of credit: who would be praised for 
the discovery of a possible drug, the research team or the company who buys them 
out? A further two students considered whether this research advances science per se. 
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Finally the following three issues appeared once each in the responses: where is the 
new location, how convenient would the move be, and whether the research would 
succeed. 
Table 7 summarises the data: 
Employment of support staff  13  Who decides on the research  2 
Benefits to asthma sufferers  13  Benefits of research in general  2 
Patent rights  8  Advances science?  2 
Other alternatives  7  New location  1 
Employment of academic staff  6  Convenience of the move  1 
Who gets the credit  5  Facilities in the new laboratory  1 
Rights of the company to exploit  3  Animal testing  -
the research results 
Table 7: Story 1 distribution of responses according to themes 
Story 2 - Pharmaceutical milk 
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The other two stories were adaptations from case-studies found in Bruce and Bruce 
(1998). This first story describes a research scenario for genetically modifying a cow 
to produce pharmaceutical milk, described by Wilmut (1998). 
A research group is planning a project on creating a cow that would produce 
milk containing a protein that could be used to treat patients with cystic 
fibrosis.  Other pharmaceutical methods to produce this protein have not been 
successful or they have been very expensive. The plan is to introduce a new 
gene from another animal into the genetic sequence of  the cow that directs the 
production of  the mammary gland to change it from producing normal milk 
into producing a pharmaceutical milk containing the desired proteins. The new 
gene will be introduced by nuclear transfer, a technique also used in cloning. 
The group hopes to develop its research findings into a commercial product. 
Do you think the research should go ahead? 
This story was given to 23 Ll students and 21  L3 students (three empty Ll response 
were removed from further analysis). Ll students gave an average of 2.1  issues to the 
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story, while the average for L3 students was 4.0. The distribution of responses 
according to issues considered was: 
No issues  1 issue  2 issues  3 issues  4 issues  5 issues 
L1  25%  5%  25%  30%  15%  0% 
L3  0%  5%  14%  14%  14%  53% 
Table 8: Story 2 response rates 
The main ethical issues presented by Wilmut (1998) regarding this type of research 
are: 
1.  Mixing genes between species - is there a fundamental (deontological) 
reason why mixing of genes from different species should not be done, even 
when there is no harm to the host animal and medical benefits from doing 
so? 
2.  Risks to humans - risks to both patients and general population if there are 
infectious agents in the pharmaceutical milk or possible side affects due to 
slightly different protein structure; could the milk or the carcass of the 
animal be used as food (legal and labelling issues) 
3.  Environmental impact - mixing of modified and unmodified animals, ability 
to destroy modified live-stock problems arise. 
4.  Animal welfare - the research requires surgery on several animals to obtain 
each founder animal, which causes anxiety and pain to the animals; the 
protein may leak from the mammary gland and become active in the 
producing female, which may cause adverse reactions, even death, in the 
animal. 
In their responses students raised all of these issues. The dominant concerns related to 
risks to humans and animal welfare. The risk to humans was most often perceived in 
the form of side affects of pharmaceutical milk to non CF sufferers (19 responses), 
while one student recognised as an issue the right to refuse treatment, which led the 
student to consider issues of labelling. The responses (20 responses) which could be 
classified as considering animal welfare mainly considered the possible discomfort of 
the host animal, while a few responses included concern for the care of research 
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animals from a more general perspective, and one student raised the question of 
whether the milk would need to be tested on animals before it could be released as a 
pharmaceutical product. The possible ethical issue of mixing genes was recognised by 
nine students, out of whom eight considered the basic question whether it is right to do 
so, and one pointed out the issue of safety related to the technique. A further six 
students recognised the problems of possible mixing of genes as an environmental 
hazard. 
The students also listed issues they considered important in a further four general 
categories, not proposed by Wilmut. These were: 
1.  Public opinion - would the public accept this research, and how much 
education would they require to understand it. This issue was raised by five 
students. 
2.  Scientific viability of the research - would CF patients have access to the 
treatment and would the treatment work i.e. improve their quality of life. 
These issues were discussed in 10 different responses. The responses ranged 
from 'will it work?' to 'Will drinking this pharmaceutical milk actually 
benefit the sufferers of Cystic Fibrosis'. 
3.  Costs and benefits - this consideration ranged from a very basic cost-benefit 
idea to considering alternative costs and profit making motives of the 
companies developing this treatment. Students also considered alternatives 
to this research in providing the same medical advancement to CF sufferers. 
30 issues relating to this theme could be identified in the student responses. 
The response types varied from 'cost', to 'Who would benefit more: the 
patient who will be receiving the same treatment or the company who will 
be getting better profits from cheaper production'. 
4.  Advancement of science - whether this research would advance scientific 
knowledge per se and if so, we should do it. Two students considered these 
issues in their response. 
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Table 9 summarises the frequency of issues raised in the student responses: 
Cost and benefits  30  Ethics of mixing genes/cloning  8 
Animal Welfare  20  Environmental impact of cross-breeding  6 
Risks to humans  19  Public opinion  5 
Scientific viability  10  Advancement of science  2 
Table 9: Story 2 response rates according to themes 
Not all the responses could be classified as ethical, in particular within the cost-benefit 
and scientific viability categories many responses did not raise any ethical 
considerations relating to these issues. The scoring guide would have to be able to 
discriminate between ethical and non-ethical responses within all categories, as well as 
distinguish between different levels of sophistication in the responses. 
Story 3 - Plant virus 
A second story adapted from Bruce and Bruce (1998) describes a research situation 
involving the introduction of genetically modified plant viruses to enhance the 
nutritional value of the host plant as described by Wilson (1998). 
A research group is considering a project on developing more nutritious plants 
by using plant viruses. The aim is to genetically modify these viruses so that 
when they act on the plants, the plant tissue will produce high levels of  novel 
proteins which will increase the essential dietary value of  the plant. Over 900 
natural plant viruses have been described by scientists. The viruses studied so 
far are pathogens in the plant only and humans digest and handle them 
continuously with no ill effect.  The genetic material of  natural viruses has not 
been found to interact with the genes of  the host plant. The researchers hope 
that the new plant varieties could be used in developing countries. 
Do you think the research should go ahead? 
34 L3 students and 23 L1  students responded to this story. Two empty L3 responses 
were removed from the analysis. The response rate varied between zero and five. The 
L1  response rate averaged 3.1. and L3 averaged 3.6. The distribution of response rates 
was the following: 
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No issues  1 issue  2 issues  3 issues  4 issues  5 issues 
L1  13%  9%  4%  31%  17%  26% 
L3  9%  3%  19%  6%  13%  50% 
Table 10: Story 3 response rates 
Wilson approaches this technology from the point of view of opportunities, while in 
turn each opportunity fosters potential harms. Eight pairs of harm-benefit 
opportunities can be identified: 
1.  Environmental risk - what are the risks and consequences of the modified 
virus spreading to wild species. 
2.  Animal welfare - opportunities to produce cheaper veterinary products, but 
also potential risks to animals feeding on the plants. 
3.  Developing country issues - opportunities for more nutritious and healthy 
products for developing countries with a potential problem of developing 
country farmers not being able to afford them or becoming dependent on 
one seed provider. 
4.  Food safety - plant viruses have not been found to infect humans who 
consume them, but theoretical potential exists. 
5.  Commercial driving force - opportunity to high profit margins, which opens 
a possibility of abuse. 
6.  Land-use - the cultivation of these crops may increase the pressure on land 
use for food. 
7.  Will it work - is this a worthwhile research cause. 
8.  Ethics of abandoning the technology - would it be ethically right to abandon 
a technology with great potential because of possible risks. 
The students raised all but one of these issues in their responses, only the 
consideration of NOT doing this research was not explicitly touched on in any of the 
student responses. Environmental risk was recognised in 31  responses. Some students 
considered the issue more widely with inclusion of threats to biodiversity and how the 
virus may affect other genes in the host plant. The issue of animal welfare was raised 
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in 6 responses. The developing country issues were raised by 25 students, out of which 
five considered the technical suitability of these plants for tropical/arid environments. 
The responses ranged from 'Whether third world farmers can afford to buy this GM 
crop - ethically nice to develop it, but the farmers can't pay enough to recoup the R&D 
costs' to  'Developing countries need help'. A further 30 responses recognised the food 
safety issue. The responses ranged from 'Is it safe?' to  'I feel there is a safety issue -
do we really know enough about what we are doing to be carrying out such a project'. 
Problems with the commercial driving force became apparent in many of the 
developing country issues, while only one response raised the issue independently; 
similarly the land use issue was raised in only one response. The issue of 'will it work' 
was recognised in 36 responses. The students responses relating to this theme covered 
a wider perspective than just scientific viability, including considerations of 
alternative costs of resources used in this type research (other ways to get the same 
benefits) - a better title to represent these responses would be 'Is it worth it?'. The 
responses ranged from 'Consider the benefit of increasing the nutritional content [of 
the plant], is it very marked? Is it necessary, or justified?, to 'benefits?' 
The students also raised the basic issue of genetic engineering - whether there would 
be inherent reasons to reject this type of research (3 responses), or doubts about the 
safety of the technology (one response). Five students also recognised the issue of 
research safety in dealing with viruses i.e. how to make sure the researchers are not 
harmed and that the virus will not escape. 21  students likewise considered the source 
of funding and the cost of research in relation to profits, while five students raised the 
issue of public acceptance of this type of research. 
Table 11  summarises the distribution of responses: 
Is it worth it?  36  Animal welfare  6 
Environmental risk  31  Issues of research safety  5 
Food safety  30  Public perception  5 
Developing country  25  Issues of genetic engineering  4 
Cost and funding  21  Land use  1 
Commercial driving force  1 
Ethics of abandoning the technology  -
Table 11: Story 3 distribution of responses according to themes 
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Similar to story 2, the responses included both ethical and non-ethical ones, and varied 
greatly in their depth and sophistication. 
The table containing the preliminary data from all three stories can be found in 
Appendix VI 'Moral Sensitivity - preliminary results'. 
At this point a decision was made not to use story 1 further. The decision was based 
on the number of issues it raised, a characteristic which would provide a complicated 
platform for developing a scoring guide. This characteristic was considered more 
significant than the distributional pattern of the number of issues students raised - a 
pattern which provided good scope for development as a majority of students in L1 
listed less items than L3 students, and the frequencies were more evenly distributed 
between different number of responses than with the other two stories. 
The decision between using story 2 or 3 in the final moral development questionnaire 
was a trade-off between a more concise list of elements (story 2) and a more even 
distribution of issue frequencies in the responses (story 3). The total lack of L1 
responses with five identified issues for story 2 was a reason for concern as the L1 
students had completed a lab discussion on cloning, which included considerations of 
creating mammals to produce pharmaceuticals in their milk, immediately prior to 
completing the questionnaire. In the other stories L1  students returned responses with 
five identified issues at rates of 7% and 26%. Also the frequency of L1 responses with 
no issues identified was highest for story 2, though the no-issue frequency was of 
similar calibre to that of story 1. 
The significance of distribution of issues raised by L1  students for story 2 needs to be 
viewed from the perspective of their having completed a class discussion on the issues 
prior to completing the questionnaire. The higher number of no-issue responses may 
be explained as student fatigue to discuss these issues again, in particular as they had 
just finished a class exam for the module. However, it seems difficult to find a logical 
explanation for the lack of five-issue responses in the same group, other than the L1 
students not perceiving the moral issues in story 2, despite their exposure to the issues 
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in the preceding class discussion. The frequency of L3'  s listing all five issues supports 
the idea of the issues being recognisable to students. 
A preliminary criterion was then applied to make sure that the L3 responses 
represented a rise in ethical considerations and not only in technical ones. One 
question was asked for all statements: 'Can you answer this question (only 9 
statements out of 100 were not either questions or statements that could be 
transformed into questions by adding a question word at the beginning or changing the 
word order) by reference to scientific/technical/financial data alone?' If  the answer 
was yes, the issue was classified as non-ethical. Certain words also classified the issue 
as ethical. These were: necessary, safe, risk, certainty, worth and benefit. 
Story 3 describing research on plant viruses produced a lower rate of ethical 
responses. From all the issues raised, 56% for L3 and 43% for Ll were classified as 
ethical. The respective figures for story 2 concerning pharmaceutical milk were 64% 
for L3 and 70% for Ll. Also, the distinction between ethical and non-ethical responses 
was harder to draw in story 3, as many students raised issues regarding cross-breeding 
and other forms of spreading, without specifically raising the issues of safety or risks. 
Further effort to gain knowledge on the suitability of the stories was completed with a 
preliminary classification of responses into levels, according to their depth and 
sophistication. A three-tier system was hypothesised to exist, with the lowest level 
representing a brief and very general recognition of the issue, the second level 
detailing the issues concerned and a third level showing wider and more extensive 
appreciation of the problems involved. Responses to Story 3 (plant virus) were again 
harder to classify and in some of the thematic categories there were either no issues 
that could be classified in the lowest recognition or the full recognition tier. A table of 
sample responses in each category can be found in Appendix IX - Plant Virus - sample 
responses'. Story 2 (pharmaceutical milk) produced more varied data with responses 
in most thematic categories and in all levels of recognition. 
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All these results lead to a decision to concentrate further efforts into developing a 
scoring guide for story 2 (pharmaceutical milk), as it was found to produce the more 
varied data which had the quality of clear and uncomplicated scoring. 
5.3.2.2  Scoring method 
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The preliminary scoring method of three tiers was chosen as the framework for the 
scoring protocol for the moral sensitivity responses. The 44 responses from L1  and L3 
students were used as the basis for the scoring guide. All the responses were arranged 
according to their level of sophistication into four tiers:  1) non-ethical considerations, 
2) bare recognition of the ethical issue, 2) some details and implications of the issues 
recognised, and 4) in-depth and detailed appreciation of the issue. The choice of 
classification of responses was discussed in detail with two departmental members 
(Prof. R Downie and Dr R. Downie) to form an agreement on the rating protocol and 
characteristics that signify responses on each level. 
Each of the items was then submitted to pre-established tests of logic suggested by 
Bebeau et at.  (1985): Is a criterion logically independent of every other (i.e. could an 
individual score high in one, but not the other?) This test was carried out in order to 
limit the number of criteria used for the scoring. The eight original categories 
recognised for the story were: 
Costs and benefits  Ethics of mixing genes/cloning 
Animal Welfare  Environmental impact of cross-breeding 
Risks to humans  Public opinion 
Scientific viability  Advancement of science 
A logical dependence was found between 4 items. First 'environmental impact' and 
'animal welfare' were found to be logically dependent as long as environmental 
impact was described as an issue of cross-breeding and escape of the genes into non-
intended flocks. A second logical dependency was found between the categories of 
'scientific viability', and 'cost and benefits'. Scientific viability concerned the benefits 
to CF patients which can be logically interpreted under the more general heading of 
costs and benefits. 
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For practical reasons, the categories of 'advancement of science' and 'ethics of mixing 
genes/cloning' were combined to cover all theoreticallbasic values issues relating to 
the research proposal. 
In the end the scoring guide consisted of four items: 
1.  Costs and benefits 
2.  Risks to humans and animals, including issues of animal welfare 
3.  Public opinion 
4.  Basic value issues 
Each item was broken into three levels of recognition where each level had several 
sub-sections to give a scoring key for all the horizontal elements within each category. 
The scoring guide can be found in the Appendix X - Scoring Guide. For scoring 
purposes, each level of recognition was assigned a score from 1 to 3 so that the first 
general recognition scored one point, the second more advanced recognition two 
points, and the most advanced category response three points. Non-ethical issues 
raised accrued zero points. 
The preliminary results from the 20 L1 students and 21  L3 students were scored using 
the scoring guide. The average score for the whole sample was 4.7 (L1 responses with 
zero issues raised were included in the scoring). The L3 average score was 6.0 and the 
L1 average score 3.4. When the responses not raising any issues, but indicating an 
opinion, were removed from the analysis, the L1  average was 4.8 and the overall 
average 5.4. The personal scores ranged in L3 from 11  to 1 and in L1  from 10 to 0, 
when the maximum score would be 15. 
Out of all the scored responses, L3 students had 17% classified as level 3 items, 47% 
as level 2 items and 36% as level 1 items. The L1  students had a smaller number of 
scored responses, but they had a higher percentage belonging to the level three 
category (22%), while 44% were classified as level 2 and 34% as level 1. 
The student responses on whether the research should go ahead varied greatly between 
Ll and L3. 
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L3 moral  L  1 moral sensitivity 
L3 Opinion  sensitivity  L  1 Opinion  average (range) 
average (range) 
L3 yes  29%  8 (3-12)  L  1 yes  80%  4.6 (1-9) 
L3 no  19%  5.8 (1-13)  L1  No  0% 
L3 I don't know  38%  7.5(2-14)  L  1 I don't know  20%  7.5 (2-13) 
L3 empty  14%  L  1 empty  0% 
Table 12: Sensitivity test pilot results - action choice 
In other words, 80% of L1 students believed the research should go on, only 29% of 
L3 students were of same opinion. Again while none of the L1  students were opposed 
to the research, 19% of L3 students were. A sense of uncertainty was entertained by 
20% of the L1  students, with the corresponding figure for L3 students being 38%. A 
further 14% of L3 students did not indicate their preference. 
Even though within L1  and L3 the students did not seem to have an opinion on the 
acceptability of the research programme related to their moral sensitivity scores, the 
difference between L1  students and L3 students as a group was very notable. 
5.3.3  Correlation of PPS2 and Moral Sensitivity score 
The Perry moral development scale and the moral sensitivity score are logically 
independent elements of moral development. Where the Perry questionnaire measures 
development in the meta-understanding of moral issues and personal relationship with 
commitment and responsibility, moral sensitivity measures an ability to interpret a 
situation in a moral respect. Developmental advances in one area will not necessarily 
indicate developmental advances in the other. Similar independence was found by 
Bebeau and Brabeck (1987) between moral competence (DIT) and moral sensitivity 
(DEST). 
The correlation between the scores for moral sensitivity and Perry for those students 
for whom moral sensitivity scores were calculated (responding to the story of 
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pharmaceutical milk) was found to be non-significant (p=O.1418, Pearson correlation 
coefficient), as can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Moral sensitivity and PPS2 correlation 
5.4  Course evaluation 
At the end of each moral teaching programme the students were asked to give 
feedback on their reactions to the course. A standard feedback form was filled in by all 
students. The students were asked three open-ended questions following the example 
of Bebeau and Thoma (1996): 
1.  What is your view is the most important issue in X? 
2.  What was the big point you learnt from the discussion today? 
3.  What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
The scoring of these responses is discussed in chapter 9. 
5.5  Summary 
A control group is essential for research on the effects moral education has on moral 
development. Without a control group, it is impossible to differentiate the impact of 
moral development that occurs naturally and moral development gained through ethics 
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teaching. The alternatives for control groups considered here were: a different cohort 
of science students at Glasgow University, science students in other universities, non-
science students at Glasgow University, and a control group formed from students 
within the same cohort at one university. The last option was chosen to produce the 
most accurate results possible, despite the organisational difficulties. 
A decision was made to include DIT as a measure of moral competence in the testing 
tool used for this research. Despite the theoretical misgivings of the tool, it provides a 
well tested and valid measure for certain types of moral development and the results 
would be comparable with other moral education courses, which is a true advantage. 
Also it will provide interesting studies of the results with comparison between moral 
sensitivity and moral competence and how they are promoted by ethics teaching. 
Perry's theory of moral development offers an opportunity to test students' perception 
of the nature of moral problems and how these perceptions change during the 
academic years. An Osgood scale questionnaire was devised to capture this part of 
students' moral development. Ten statements representing each of the Perry types 
were sent to independent judges who were asked to indicate which Perry type they 
believed would agree and disagree with each statement. The A and C statements 
which had higher than 0.8 inter-judge agreement were collected for a Perry 
Questionnaire comprising 10 statements. This questionnaire was piloted with 70 L3 
students and 60 Ll students in May 1999. The preliminary results indicated that 
students were already in Ll dominantly operating with Perry C type concepts when 
dealing with moral issues. The results were broken into five elements, out of which 
only one (Personal responsibility and relationship with multiplicity) showed 
significant differences between L1  and L3 students in the answering patterns. This 
difference could not be captured by using a Perry Index (PI), or by calculating 
Personal Perry Scores (PPS). PPS on the other hand, was believed to provide a useful 
tool for tracking personal developmental changes during the research project. 
For measuring moral sensitivity, a decision was made to create a story which required 
students to give open ended responses, which would be analysed to give a moral 
sensitivity score. The first attempted story was abandoned after it was piloted with 18 
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L3 students, because it generated too may different types of responses to allow for a 
reliable scoring system to be developed. In the next stage three new stories were 
piloted with both Ll and L3 students, approximately 20 for each level and each story. 
These stories were first analysed according to the number of issues they raised and the 
frequencies students' raised each issue, and how many issues out of the maximum five 
the students raised. After this stage one story was abandoned after it produced a 
scattered response pattern. The other two were further analysed according to whether 
the responses were ethical or not. One of the stories came out of this stage with 
considerably easier scoring patterns and this story, revolving around genetically 
engineered pharmaceutical milk, was chosen as the story to be used in the moral 
assessment tool. This story was further analysed to create a scoring guide which 
allowed each of the issues to be scored according to the level of recognition. 
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Part III - Teaching Ethics 
Can ethics be taught? The issue is an old one. Doubts of whether ethics can be 
taught often find resonance with those who support the behavioural aims of ethics 
education - teaching people to be 'good' and to do the 'right' thing. The question 
is also prominent when the aims of ethics education involve building character 
and adopting virtues. But the question is less prevalent if ethics education is 
approached from the direction of skills and abilities. If ethics consists of skills and 
abilities to recognise, analyse and solve moral problems there is no reason to 
believe such abilities and skills could not be taught equally as well as other types 
of skills and abilities. We do not doubt whether we can teach students the skills 
required in mathematics, analysing literature, or understanding biochemical 
reactions - similarly we should not doubt whether we can teach the skills of moral 
decision-making. Teaching skills of moral decision-making may require particular 
approaches in order to be effective, it may not be easy and quick, but these 
problems should not cloud the vision that it is possible to teach skills in moral 
decision-making - while it may be impossible to ensure that these skills are put to 
use outside the classroom. 
The way I have described the aims of ethics education in Part I is compatible with 
the view that ethics is not out of reach of education. After the methods developed 
in Part II for measuring the ,success of ethics teaching, Part III is an investigation 
into how to teach ethics. 
Even if teaching moral decision-making skills is perceived possible, it is not 
obvious what type of teaching would be most successful. This is an issue familiar 
to all disciplines. Successful ethics teaching is dependent on at least four 
elements: 1) the choice of timing - at what age/educational level ethics is 
introduced; 2) the duration of the ethics curriculum; 3) the choice of pedagogical 
approach; and 4) choice of topics. Part IV is divided into three chapters which 
cover all of these areas. 
Henriikka Clarkeburn, lune 2000 m  Part III - Teaching Ethics  133 
Moral development is not dependent on formal education alone and section 6.2 
provides a short overview of the influence other life-experiences have on moral 
development. This is followed by a detailed look into teaching set-ups that have 
been found to accelerate moral development - what are the criteria for good ethics 
teaching in method, duration, and timing and what are the pre-requisites for 
successful moral development. 
Chapter 7 concentrates on describing two teaching approaches which, in the light 
of the findings of the first chapter, incorporate the elements of successful ethics 
teaching programme. These are Problem-Based Learning (PBL) exercises and 
Structured Discussion Groups. The chapter starts off with consideration of what a 
student-centred teaching approach in ethics means for the teacher, who now needs 
to adopt the role of facilitator. This is followed by an analysis of moral decision-
making. A framework model is developed in this chapter to provide a platform for 
incorporating different teaching approaches into ethics teaching. This is followed 
by a discussion of how PBL and Structured discussion groups can be used to 
promote the Moral Decision-Making (MDM) model. 
Chapter 8 explains in detail how the research project described in this thesis has 
been structured and what are the links between the research set-up and the 
knowledge gained in the previous chapters. The latter part of the chapter describes 
the decision-making procedure applied to the choice of topics. 
At the end of Part III, a clear picture should have emerged on the opportunities for 
teaching ethics and how those opportunities have been seized in this research. 
This is highlighted in a short summary. 
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6.  Theories for teaching ethics 
This chapter focuses on the elements that research has found to encourage moral 
development. As a preliminary to the research review, section 6.1, starts by 
developing further the thoughts already discussed in Part I on the aims of ethics 
education. In this section the emphasis is on a detailed analysis of the differences 
between teaching ethics as skills in comparison with teaching ethics as rules. In 
theory both approaches are compatible with the intrinsic aims described 
previously in Part II, but I hope to prove that the skills-based approach has 
significant advantages over the rules-based one. This is followed by section 6.2, 
which is an overview of research carried out to identify how life experiences 
promote moral development. This creates a back-drop for the educational efforts 
discussed later in this chapter. This is followed by a review of research findings 
regarding four essential elements of ethics education: section 6.3.1 concentrates 
on the pre-requisites for moral development, section 6.3.2 on what is the best 
timing for an ethics course, section 6.3.3 on the most suitable duration of ethics 
courses, and section 6.3.4 on the most successful methods of ethics teaching. How 
we view moral decision-making has a major influence on the skills we perceive as 
necessary for successful moral development and how we believe moral education 
can best encourage them. To answer these questions, a Model of Moral Decision-
Making (MDM) is developed in section 6.4. This model provides a framework for 
discussing moral education practices. 
6.1  Skills vs. rules 
The aims of ethics education were set in Part I to be intrinsic. Intrinsic aims were 
described as aims to improve the students' ability to deal with moral problems for 
no particular and measurable future benefit. The teaching approach to achieve 
these aims could be both skill- or rule-based, though I hope to show here that the 
skill-based approach is superior to the rule-based one for several reasons. 
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The division into skill- and rule-based approaches to ethics education runs parallel 
with a traditional philosophical divide between those who claim that moral action 
should be governed by rules and those who believe it should be governed by skills 
in context. The rules view justifies particular norms and moral actions by latching 
them on to universal rules. The validity of these rules depends on the status of 
universal or transcendental moral principles justified by considerations from the 
point of view of all. The skills view, on the other hand, localises ethics by 
describing it as skills moral agents are able to exercise in everyday life. In the 
skill-based approach rigid rules are dispensed with and replaced by the 
competence of moral agents to analyse and resolve moral problems within their 
context. 
The role of ethics teaching from the rule-based perspective is to teach 
children/young adults universal ethical norms and rules, which the students can 
then apply to the moral problems they encounter in life. I considered some of the 
problems with this approach in section 3.1  - the difficulties in choosing a set of 
principles acceptable to all, or even most; the difficulty of applying universal rules 
to complex real-life moral problems; and the inconsistent and insufficient links 
between teaching rules and changing actual behaviour. The rule based approach is 
further weakened by the fact that actual moral problems are poorly solved if the 
only consideration is whether a moral action satisfies a rule. The rule-based 
approach is contrasted by one genuinely progressing to master the difficult 
relationships between moral values (rules), and the intricacies of the situation, and 
to master a combination of habits, attitudes, and feelings. Quoting L0vlie (1997): 
"[Moral] Judgement is dependent upon sorting out the threads of the moral web, 
taking both social, psychological and moral facts into consideration ... justifying 
action by appeal to principles does not add significantly to the solution of 
particular moral problems." (p. 410). 
The skills approach to moral education emphasises the faculties of the students. 
The aim is to enhance students' abilities to recognise, analyse and solve moral 
problems, not by direct application of a set of moral rules and principles, but by 
careful independent reflection on the situation and consideration for those 
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involved. The skills view can be considered a more sophisticated guide to moral 
actions than rules, as it requires personal involvement, judgement made by the 
agent, rather than an impartial and unreflective application of rules. This is not to 
say that moral rules are redundant, for they are not. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
describe rules important for novices in any particular field, an importance which 
decreases proportionately with an increased personal competence. Their example 
is from driving - where a novice driver performs according to explicit rules - how 
to handle the gears, when to look at the mirror, etc. - an expert driver makes 
immediate and often sub-conscious adaptations to traffic patterns. The same can 
be applied to moral situations. In novel and complex situations, we need to rely on 
some rules to start with, but as we become more accustomed to moral problems, 
we are both more able to make our own decisions and more intuitively follow 
adequate decision-making patterns. 
The ethics education described here will follow the skill-based approach with 
recognition of the importance of moral principles and decision-making rules to 
students who are not yet experts in moral decision-making but rather taking their 
early steps as independent moral agents. 
6.2  How life experiences affect moral development 
Moral development is not dependent on formal ethics teaching. It can occur in the 
absence of formal moral education and the role of moral education is rather an 
acceleration and encouragement of moral development that is inherent in personal 
development per se. Therefore, before studying the specific elements in moral 
education that have been found to accelerate moral development I will briefly 
discuss other elements affecting moral development, which create the back-drop 
for moral education. 
In a search for life experiences that correlate with development in moral 
judgement, formal education was found to be one of the strongest and most 
consistent correlates (Rest and Deemer, 1986). DIT has been the most commonly 
. used method of tracking down the sources of moral development and the results 
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show a strong trend of increasing scores with increasing years of formal 
education. When an average DIT P-score for adults is 40, adults with only high 
school education score an average of 28.2, while practising medical physicians 
score 49.5 and those with doctoral degrees in philosophy or social sciences score 
65.2 (Rest 1982). This evidence shows a trend of increasing P-scores with 
increasing years of formal education, but it does not provide answers to what 
years of formal education actually represent in terms of experiences, subject 
activity, or processes. In other words we need to analyse why formal education 
fosters moral development. 
Rest and Deemer (1986) entertain five alternative explanations: 
1.  The environment in higher education socialises certain attitudes and 
forms of verbalisation (This presupposes that DIT measures, at least 
partially, attitudes and their verbal expression). 
2.  Some particular skill or piece of knowledge is taught in higher 
education and the upward trend of moral reasoning scores reflects more 
students learning these skills over time. (This explanation assumes that 
DIT scores reflect some particular skill or piece of special knowledge.) 
3.  Higher education indirectly imbues students with a general perspective 
or world view. (This presupposes that the DIT scores reflect some 
particular world view dominant in higher education.) 
4.  Higher education provides a generally stimulating environment in 
which individua:Is work out their own ideas about morality. This view 
does not presume that the higher education environment is promoting 
any particular ideology (as is assumed in the alternatives 1 and 3), but 
rather promotes reflection and self-discovery. (This alternative assumes 
that self-constructed development in moral judgement inevitably leads 
to more principled thinking i.e. higher P-scores.) 
5.  It is not the higher education as such that makes the difference, but 
rather correlation between moral reasoning scores and formal education 
indicates something about the people who seek extended education. 
Perhaps, according to this alternative, the people who choose higher 
education are those who are predisposed to be more reflective, who 
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seek intellectual stimulation, and who are self-motivated to develop 
cognitively. 
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Logically any of these explanations (or a combinations of them) could account for 
the empirical findings that development of moral judgement is related to years in 
formal education. The critical experience that fosters growth could be talks at tea 
breaks, course readings, extracurricular activities, life style of students, the formal 
ethics teaching, or the reflective personalities of higher education students. 
Research in the 1970's (reviewed by Rest and Deemer, 1986) tried to locate 
which element of the higher education experience explains the correlation with 
years in formal education and the upward curve of moral reasoning scores. One 
type of study was to link certain activities, interests and life styles with moral 
judgement. In general these studies indicate that subjects with higher moral 
judgement scores tended to be better read, more knowledgeable and active both 
academically and socially. Nevertheless, the power of the trends using these 
experience-measures was not much higher than the correlations with the more 
simple variable, years of formal education. Another type of study was carried out 
to find if there was a linkage between certain types of personal experiences (e.g. 
'attending a course which presented material from different perspectives', 
'experiencing brutality or suffering' or ' experiencing a significant decision 
involving a family member') and moral reasoning scores. The results yielded 
inconsistent results or low levels of significance. Yet another type of research was 
direct interviews asking the subjects what, in their own view, had influenced their 
development in moral thinking. The responses were identified with categories like 
'new real world experiences', 'formal instruction, reading and study', or 
'involvement in community affairs'. Again the results were inconsistent and weak 
in explanatory power. 
After this type of research failed to pinpoint any particular experience in formal 
education that correlated with increasing moral reasoning scores, another 
approach was constructed by Spickelmier at the University of Minnesota in 
collaboration with Rest (Rest and Deemer, 1986; Spickelmier's original work is 
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an unpublished manuscript). It was a set of structured interviews that included 
questions on a wide range of experiences that were hypothesised to influence 
development. The topics of the interviews included the following: living situation; 
peer relations; relationships with faculty; academic involvement; learning 
preferences; extracurricular activities; exercising responsibility; relationships with 
the opposite sex, family; occupational goals; personal goals and values; 
experiences of trauma or crises; and post-college experiences. Questions were of 
the following type: 1)  'Describe a typical evening in each of your college living 
situations?', 'What did you or your roommates tend to be doing?', 'What did you 
talk about?'; 2) Give me the first names of some of your friends in college. 
Describe them to me. Compare your friends with other students in your school; 3) 
Can you tell me about a book, a lecture, a particular intellectual problem that 
impressed you during college?'; and 4) How dependent were you on your parents 
for financial support and how did that change over the college years?'. A coding 
guide was then developed for a dozen dimensions. The three academic ones, 
which also were most predictive of moral judgement development, were: 
1.  Socialising Environment. This code characterised how fully the student 
was immersed and involved in the college milieu versus simply 
attending college and being influenced strongly by non-college 
socialising forces. 
2.  Academic Success. This code was to differentiate those who had 
formulated a clear academic goal, did well in academic work, and made 
normal progress toward their academic goals, in contrast to those 
students who did not have clear goals and were frustrated in achieving 
them. 
3.  Educational Orientation. This code represents the degree to which the 
students worked hard at their studies, enjoyed academic life and the 
world of ideas and activities of reading and discussing, and chose 
friends who where similarly serious students. 
Spickelmier's study was small and non-random (students from one institution 
only), so the results do not carry a strong generalising power, but they are still 
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interesting. First, moral judgement scores seemed to correlate with life style, i.e. 
those who had high DIT scores in the first year tended to be higher also in the 
academic variables. Second, certain life experiences correlated with the moral 
judgement scores: in other words, students who scored higher on these life 
experience variables showed greater gains in moral judgement scores between the 
test scores of first year and two years after college. Spickelmier's results support 
explanations 4 and 5 above. This indicates that moral development does not 
depend on some skills or attitudes fostered in higher education, but rather that 
moral development is more dependent on personal orientation towards learning 
and development in general. If this is true, the correlation with higher education 
may be only contingent in the sense that higher education attracts people more 
likely to make moral development, not that higher education itself creates the 
developmental advantages. On the other hand, it can be viewed that higher 
education encourages the inherent abilities for moral development and only those 
with the opportunity/desire to participate in higher education receive these 
benefits. Deborah Deemer's research follows this line of thought. 
Deemer (Rest and Deemer, 1986) picked on the questions raised by Spickelmier's 
research. Deemer conducted a study involving over 100 subjects tested over 10 
years, from a diversity of backgrounds. The subjects were first tested at high 
school in the early 1970s with DIT and then again ten years later with another 
DIT test and a structured interview. The sample consisted of subjects of various 
educational levels, family situations and located in both cities, countryside and 
semi-urban areas. The interview questions were adapted from those used by 
Spickelmier to accommodate non-college subjects. Deemer and Rest concluded 
from these interviews that moral judgement appears to be a by-product of general 
social development, not a special result of particular moral courses, moral crises, 
or moral leaders. The most important life experiences that correlated positively 
with moral judgement scores were: 
I.  High School codes: 
A.  Academic Orientation. Subjects that studied hard, made good 
grades, enjoyed reading, and took challenging courses where 
scored 'high' on this code. 
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B.  Further Education Encouragement. A high code represents 
encouragement by parents and/or school personnel to continue with 
higher education. 
II.  Interim Period: 
A.  Educational/Career Orientation. A high score is given to students 
who work hard at their studies, enjoy learning and engaging in 
ideas, work toward academic goals, and choose friends who are 
serious about their studies. 
B.  Continued Intellectual Stimulation. This is a code for 
characterising the extent of intellectual stimulation provided by 
one's environment over the ten-year period of the study. High 
scores are given to those who hold a secure and challenging job or 
whose community involvement is rich, friends or spouse are 
enlivening or who have made family life particularly stimulating. 
III.  Young Adulthood codes: 
A.  Career Fulfilment. A high score is given to subjects who find their 
jobs challenging and meaningful, who are committed to their 
careers, and have chosen their own career path. 
B.  Civic Responsibility. This code measures the extent to which a 
subject is concerned about the community and actively contributing 
to the welfare of the community. High scores reflect leadership 
roles, intermediate codes of acting on request and low scores an 
opposition to civic participation. 
C.  Political Awareness. This code reflects the extent a subject is 
interested, informed and articulate about macro issues in society. 
High scores are given to those who read several sources of 
information and participate frequently in political discussions, 
medium scores to those who watch the news on TV, read some 
newspapers and participate occasionally in political discussions, 
and low scores to those who seldom read about political issues and 
take little interest in them. 
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In sum, the moral judgement scores of young adults correspond with career or 
education encouragement, interest in studies and career, involvement in 
community life and political awareness. 
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An important characteristic of Deemer's study is that some of the codes 
emphasise personal characteristics and some environmental ones. All codes 
presuppose a complex, reciprocal interaction between the individual and the 
environment. It is hypothesised that people, to a greater or lesser degree, help to 
make their own environments and often self-select themselves into situations of 
challenge and opportunity, while at the same time in order to develop, people 
need certain environmental support and advantages. Development proceeds most 
when the person seeks development and the environment supports and fosters it. 
No unidirectional or simple causal relationship between personal characteristics 
or environment is presupposed; events do not themselves cause development and 
personal characteristics do not cause certain situations. Rather, there are mutual 
influences of individual characteristics interacting with the environment -
situational opportunities and difficulties. 
The aim of my research relates to these issues directly. Formal education provides 
a good base for moral development which is shown by research to produce 
significant advances in moral cognitive skills. Regardless of how we view this 
advantage to come about - as primarily from the greater potential of students 
proceeding with higher education or as higher education itself creating an 
atmosphere of learning and encouragement - ethics teaching can have a role as a 
further catalyst of moral development. It can provide an opportunity and source of 
encouragement for interaction with moral issues and thoughts of others which 
could spark intellectual interest, involvement and skills to go on and develop 
one's moral agency independent of formal teaching. This research is designed to 
find out to what extent certain forms of moral education can provide this 
opportunity for accelerated moral development, a stepping stone on which to 
accumulate further development. 
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6.3  How education encourages moral development 
It would be very bold indeed to assume that all educational approaches relating to 
ethics would actually encourage moral development. Worse still, it is logically 
possible to have ethics education that discourages, or even regresses, moral 
development. Ethics programmes with negative effects would not promote 
students' own decision-making skills or recognition of moral aspects, but would 
reduce their freedom in making decisions in a manner not dissimilar to 
indoctrination. 
For an ethics education programme to be successful, it has to get four elements 
right. First, it is necessary to design the course to meet students at the general 
developmental stage they are at. A programme is unlikely to be successful if it 
either grossly over- or under-estimates the students' logical, verbal or intellectual 
abilities. These issues will be discussed in section 6.3.1. Second, people are more 
open to moral development at certain stages in life, and moral education should 
try to utilise the already existing eagerness and readiness by offering the 
educational programme for people most likely to take an interest in it. Previous 
research has also shown that moral development does continue into adult years 
(Rest, 1982), which increases the opportunities of moral education. These issues 
will be discussed in section 6.3.2. Third, the length of a moral education 
programme has been found to influence the results the programme has. The right 
length is a balance between too little and too much. These parameters are 
discussed in section 6.3.3. Finally the teaching methods used in moral education 
have a direct impact on moral development gains. The key element that emerges 
from reviews of previous educational programmes is the importance of nurturing 
students' personal moral agency. Successful pedagogical programmes are 
reviewed in section 6.3.4. 
6.3.1  Pre-requisites for moral development 
Moral development is not an independent variable, but associated with other 
forms of personal development. There are thresholds in development which 
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require one to have passed a certain level in one area before further development 
can be gained in another. For moral development these threshold skills are 
cognitive. Without basic cognitive skills one is not able to recognise, analyse and 
judge a moral situation. Therefore cognitive development facilitates moral 
development, but is not sufficient for it. Alternatively, absence of basic cognitive 
skills can explain the limits of moral reasoning. 
One of the most basic pre-requisites for moral development is logical reasoning. 
According to Piaget (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) there are three major 
developmental stages of logical reasoning: the intuitive, the concrete operational, 
and formal operational. At the level of concrete operational, entered around the 
age of 7, children can make logical inferences, classify things, and handle 
quantitative relations about concrete things. Most, but not all, will enter the 
formal operational stage in adolescence, at which they can reason abstractly -
consider all possibilities and relations between elements in a system, form 
hypotheses, deduce implications from the hypotheses and test them against 
reality. Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning 
depends upon advanced logical reasoning. One cannot, for example, reach post-
conventional stages of Kohlbergian moral development before one has reached 
the stage of formal operational logic. 
In addition to logical development, one needs other personal abilities to be able to 
recognise, analyse and judge moral problems. The pre-requisite social ability is 
role-taking. It can be described as a stage-like development parallel to moral 
development, which progresses in stages of social perception or social 
perspective. Corresponding to the three levels of moral judgement, Kohlberg 
(1976) postulates three levels of social perspective as follows: 
1.  Concrete individual perspective (corresponding with Kohlberg's pre-
conventional stage) 
2.  Member-of-society perspective (corresponding with Kohlberg's 
conventional stage) 
3.  Prior-to-society perspective (corresponding with Kohlberg's post-
conventional stage). 
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These role-taking stages describe the level at which the person sees other people, 
interprets their thoughts and feelings, and sees their role and place in society. 
These stages are very closely related to moral stages, but are more general, since 
they do not deal with just moral issues, but with all social interactions. Also, to 
make a moral judgement at a certain level is more difficult than simply seeing the 
world at that level. But seeing the problem is necessary before any decisions can 
be made and therefore one needs to reach the corresponding level of social 
perspective before one can reach the level of moral development. The social 
perspective stages are therefore necessary conditions for reaching a certain moral 
stage, but not sufficient. 
Apart from the cognitive pre-requisites for moral development, emotive elements 
are also crucial. For students to benefit from education, they need a desire to 
learn, motivation to develop, and self-discipline to work towards the 
developmental goals. This motivational pre-requisite can be partly induced, or at 
least encouraged, by the teacher or peers (Entwistle, 1998), but if a student is 
adamant about the decision not to learn, the efforts of others are easily wasted. 
6.3.2  Timing 
Because moral development is not an isolated strand of development, but deeply 
associated and dependent on other areas of development, it is important for 
successful moral education to be given in a form that corresponds with the 
abilities of the student and during periods when moral development most naturally 
occurs. Ethics education that disregards the natural conceptual frameworks of 
students and assumes either too much or too little cognitive and social capacity is 
likely to seem artificial and irrelevant to the students. Learning does not take root 
from such teaching efforts, the students development is not enhanced and in some 
situations it can even regress. 
Moral development tests invariably show an age trend when measured with DIT. 
Moral development is not restricted to childhood or adolescence, but continues 
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well into adulthood. Older subjects show higher stage responses when measured 
against Kohlberg's stage theory. A meta-analysis of 55 studies by Schlaefli et al. 
(1985) showed that older, and presumably more advanced, subjects show higher 
scores than younger, presumably less advanced subjects. Longitudinal studies 
over 10 years that followed the same subjects and re-tested them also showed 
increasingly higher scores. The average DIT P-score for junior high school 
students was 21.9, for senior high students 31.8 and average college students 42.3. 
All Perry's (1999) initial work on ethical development was done on university 
students and the scheme thus describes development in late adolescence and 
young adulthood. For Perry's scheme there are less accurate and widely tested 
data on the developmental stages of university students, but according to the 
interview data students arriving at university are predominantly at Perry types A 
and B, while they developed during their university years into being Bs and Cs. 
The same developmental trend along the Perry scheme has been identified by 
Gray (1997) and Katung et al. (1999). 
The evidence for moral development continuing in adulthood provides strong 
support to the claim that it is not too late to teach ethics in higher education. 
Students' moral skills are still developing and they are cognitively and socially 
apt to develop morally, possibly even more so than they were a few years earlier 
in high school. This claim is further supported by research findings on the gains of 
moral education programmes, where some of the largest gains have been achieved 
with participants in their 20s and 30s rather than with participants of school age 
(Rest, 1988). Meta-analyses by Thoma (1984) compared the effects of ethical 
education programmes in four different age groups: 13-14 year olds (junior high 
school), 15-16 year olds (senior high school), 18-23 year olds (university), and 
over 24 year olds - and found that educational efforts were most successful with 
the over 24 group, followed by university students and high school students, in 
that order. Thoma also pointed out that the difference might be partly explained 
not by more adaptable age, but because 
1.  most of the adult groups were exposed to Kohlberg's theory during the 
ethics teaching, or 
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2.  most adult subjects were volunteers, which might suggest a higher 
motivation to participate in the programme. 
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But Thoma also suggested that the difference might be due to adults being able to 
draw from a wider spectrum of experiences and thus attach greater personal 
meaning to topics which would lead to more accelerated moral development 
through role-taking. 
Knowledge of the moral, cognitive and social developmental stage of students is 
also an important element in successful course design. Individuals have a 
tendency to accept moral reasoning of one level higher than the one they are on 
themselves and reject the moral reasoning of the levels below their own. This has 
lead to the theory that exposure to higher level moral reasoning will encourage 
moral development (Kohlberg, 1976). But, importantly, students can only 
perceive and be attracted to moral reasoning immediately above their own level. 
Exposure to levels higher than immediately above one's own is not 
comprehensible to the student and thus does not encourage development, but only 
frustration or boredom (Finster, 1991). 
Moral education may also be hindered if it is introduced at a time when students 
are involved with other major developmental projects. For example, it may not be 
most beneficial to introduce ethics at the start of first year in university, when 
students are going through the major transition from pupil to student, with new 
freedom and responsibilities over personal learning, from dependent child in a 
family to an independent young adult, and socially gaining new ground with new 
friends and a new environment. Developmental capacity is limited and if it is 
taken up by other developmental processes, moral development may not be 
encouraged by ethics education. 
6.3.3  Duration 
The length of the moral education programme and the number of 
contact/independent study hours have a direct influence on the gains of the 
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programme. In their meta-analysis, Schlaefli et al. (1985) divided the studies 
using DIT as a measure of moral development into three groups according to their 
duration: short duration of 0-3 weeks, medium duration of 4-12 weeks, and long 
duration of 13-28 weeks or very intensive courses of 8 weeks and longer. 
Programmes of short duration show the smallest effect, long term ones the second 
largest and medium duration programmes the largest effect. Thus there was no 
linear relationship between effect and duration of the educational programme -
increased duration does not guarantee increased benefits in moral development. 
Three possible explanations can be given for the reduced impact of longer 
duration ethical education programmes (Schlaefli et al., 1985): 
1.  The longer lasting educational programmes have sacrificed quality for 
quantity and thus produce weaker impact per contact hour. 
2.  Students grow tired of moral education past 12 weeks and the impact of 
intervention falls off - this could possibly be counter-balanced by 
changing the educational approach dramatically after 10-12 weeks. 
3.  Artificial stimulation of moral decision-making is effective only for a 
limited period after which students need time to rest and consolidate the 
moral development achieved thus far. 
6.3.4  Methods 
All moral education programmes have unique features that depend on the 
circumstances, chosen aims, pedagogical approach, teacher characteristics, and 
how students interact with the each other, the teacher and the material. In their 
meta-analysis of moral education programmes Schlaefli et al. (1985) found three 
major core elements that capture the different types of moral education 
programmes: 
1.  Dilemma-based programmes that emphasise peer discussion of 
controversial moral problems where the teacher has a role as facilitator. 
This approach can provide concentrated practice in moral problem 
solving stimulated by interaction with peers - challenging one anothers' 
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thinking, re-examining assumptions, learning about different points of 
view and responding to counter-arguments. 
2.  Personality development programmes emphasise personal 
psychological development in general with an understanding that moral 
development is a major strand within it. Activities, which often involve 
direct interaction with others, have an objective of promoting reflection 
about the self and self in relation to others. Students can also be given 
formal instruction on developmental theories. 
3.  Academic courses emphasise the learning of the basic tenets of the 
academic discipline that has ethical components, which are discussed 
during the course. 
In their analysis Schlaefli et at.  found the dilemma-centred approach to produce 
the highest effect. Personality development programmes also produce significant 
moral development, while academic programmes have very small effect on moral 
development. The basic course design in this research is identifiable with the 
dilemma discussion programme approach described above. 
The dilemma discussion approach to moral education has three important 
elements: 
1.  The students are active participants in the discussion, they act as moral 
agents involved in the case as opposed to being passive recipients of 
information given by a teacher. In other words, dilemma discussions 
involve student-centred learning. The personal involvement allows 
students to reflect on their own views and study the view points of 
others participating in the discussion. The experience of moral agency 
can be enhanced by encouraging role-taking - actively adopting a view 
point other than one's own. Kohlberg (1976) emphasises role taking as 
one of the core elements in moral development. 
2.  In group discussions students can be exposed to (and the facilitator of 
the discussion should make sure they are!) moral reasoning more 
advanced than their own. This provides the students with an alternative 
model of moral decision-making and according to Kohlberg and Rest, 
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people are most drawn to decision-making that is immediately above 
their own level of ability. 
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3.  Students face a moral problem that does not have a simple 
straightforward answer and they are thus forced to consider several 
elements of the problem, evaluate the importance of different 
shareholders and often face cognitive dissonance, where simple 
methods, possibly adequate in other situations, no longer apply. 
Dilemma discussions can provide an opportunity to consider view-
points and roles not otherwise accessible to students: the issues 
discussed can be such that students would not otherwise take the time 
to think about them and the information associated with the dilemma 
can be new and exciting which encourages students to get more 
involved in thinking of the subject in their own time and make 
adjustment to how they view the world. When a new experience cannot 
be assimilated into existing categories of experience or when 
expectations are violated, people attempt to revise their categories and 
expectations so that experience will once again make sense and be 
predictable. The experience of cognitive disequilibrium can therefore 
provide a motivation for acceptance of new moral ideas (Rholes et aI., 
1982). Experiences of cognitive conflict can occur either through 
exposure to decision-making situations that arouse internal 
contradictions in one's moral reasoning structure, or through exposure 
to the moral reasoning of significant others which is discrepant in 
content or structure from one's own reasoning (Kohlberg 1976). Such 
re-organisations of the mental map involve considerable psychic energy 
in the labours of unlearning and relearning. The inner urge seems to be 
a compound of many motives:  1) sheer curiosity, 2) striving for 
competence in understanding the relations of the environment, 3) an 
urge to make order out of incongruities, dissonance and anomalies of 
experience; 4) a wish for authenticity in personal relationships; and 5) a 
wish to develop and affirm an identity. The counter-forces appear to 
consist of such tendencies as the wish to retain earlier satisfactions or 
securities, to wish to maintain community in family or hometown 
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values and ways of thinking, the reluctance to admit one has been in 
error, the doubt of one's competence to take on new uncertainties and 
responsibilities, and most importantly, the wish to maintain a self one 
has felt oneself to be. Thus, while there is an urge to develop and 
change, there is also an urge to conserve (Perry, 1999). 
6.3.5  Teaching skills 
Based on the research findings above, an ideal setting for ethics education would 
be the following: the course would last between 4-12 weeks with weekly meetings 
which would be student-led and problem-centred. The facilitator would be an 
expert in ethical matters as well as highly skilled in leading a discussion without 
controlling it. The students would have high motivation to participate in the 
discussion, they would have the preliminary logical and social abilities to develop 
morally, and they would have an interest in the moral matters. This ideal setting 
does not specify the actual pedagogical method used during the group sessions. 
Several alternatives prevail, while any pedagogical method should appreciate the 
three levels of moral decision-making described in section 6.4. 
One alternative is to adopt a direct approach to moral education. This means that 
the methods of teaching involve direct and transparent teaching of moral decision-
making methods as opposed to dilemma discussions alone where skills are 
nurtured without direct attention to their development. The direct approach can 
include dilemma discussions, but it would have a strong additional component in 
direct skill training. Wilson (1990) describes one form of direct ethics education, 
while Penn (1990) provides some research results to support the hypothesis that 
direct teaching of moral decision-making methods is beneficial to students' moral 
development. 
Penn builds his approach to ethics education on the premise that students can best 
develop skills in principled moral reasoning if those skills are directly modelled 
and applied to specific moral issues. Penn (1990) draws an analogy between 
. learning mathematics and ethics: 
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"Just as students are not likely to develop skills in higher mathematical or 
scientific reasoning without direct teaching and modelling, it is unlikely 
that students will develop skills in higher moral reasoning without direct 
teaching and modelling (p.126)." 
Penn's teaching method is unique in two features: 
1.  It targets directly and in tandem the fundamental moral reasoning skills 
(logic, role-taking, and concepts of  justice). 
2.  Students are given direct instruction and modelling of higher level 
cognitive skills including tuition on the stage typology of moral 
development and classic philosophical texts. 
Penn's statement on direct instruction should not be taken as being against 
student-centred problem-solving. He rather argues that students need not invent 
everything themselves. Students personal thinking can greatly benefit from 
didactically taught basic logical and philosophical elements before embarking on 
discussions of moral controversies (Rest and Narvaez, 1994). This view is at odds 
with most moral education courses that consist of discussions around moral 
problems without any formal tuition or attention to the structured skills of moral 
decision-making. 
Penn (1990) supports his approach by results. He divided students into five groups 
- one group being taught all four elements (below) and the other four lacking one 
or more of these elements, so that all groups received teaching at the very least in 
element four: 
1.  Study of formal logic - an ability to distinguish premises and 
conclusions of an argument, to understand the distinction between truth 
and validity of an argument, to uncover premises of an argument, to test 
hypotheses systematically, and differentiate between valid and invalid 
forms of argument. 
2.  Developmental theory and stage typology according to the moral 
development theory of Kohlberg. 
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3.  Philosophical methods of ethical analysis and their application to 
controversial social issues - reading included Socrates, Aquinas, 
Declaration of Independence (US), Rawls and Martin Luther King Jr. 
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4.  Application of generalised methods or theories to the analysis of social 
issues. 
Assessment of all five groups was carried out by using the DIT. The largest P-
score change between pre- and post-tests occurred in the group that had received 
all four elements of direct teaching (mean P-score change 15.16), the second 
highest score was with the group receiving no formal logic teaching, but all other 
elements (mean P-score change 12.74 for post-graduates and 11.91 for 
undergraduates), the third highest score was in the group that received teaching in 
developmental theory (2) and application of methods to social issues (4) (mean P-
score change 3.88) and the lowest score changes occurred with the group that had 
only received teaching on application of generalised methods to social issues 
(mean P-score change 3.02). The P-score gain of 11-15 points is a significant 
change, which normally represents four to six years of formal education. 
The results showed two consistent trends: 
1.  Students exposed to philosophical methods of ethical analysis (3) 
scored significantly higher in DIT than students not exposed to these 
methods, while inclusion of logic had a lesser positive effect. 
2.  Exposure to moral stage typology had a consistent, but moderate effect 
on DIT scores. 
The latter of the trends in more controversial. Moral development theorists have 
not been able to agree why the exposure to Kohlberg's stage typology increased 
DIT scores. This debate started well before Penn's research and Rest (1986b) 
suggests two possible explanations: 
1.  Reading the stage descriptions in effect instructs the subject how to 
perform in DIT and thus produces 'contaminated' results that no longer 
represent true moral development stages. 
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2.  Exposure to theory is a powerful educational tool for actually changing 
moral thinking. 
Penn (1990) asserts that exposure to Kohlbergian stage typology effects the 
subjects' thinking profoundly, rather than equipping students with the skills to 
fake DIT. He gives four reasons: 
1.  To believe that learning about Kohlbergian typology leads to 
contaminated results, requires one also to believe that students seek 
linguistic items in DIT that sound Stage Five or Six rather than choose 
items that correspond to their own point of view. This goes against 
general experience that students rather hold onto their own moral 
opinions. 
2.  The great effect-size in Penn's research group exposed to all four 
elements of moral reasoning, may not have been due to exposure to 
Kohlberg's theory alone, but to a combination of elements. 
3.  To assume that students learn to fake DIT after being exposed to 
Kohlbergian stage typology underestimates greatly the difficulty 
undergraduates have in understanding the Kohlbergian stages. 
4.  If  teaching Kohlbergian stages is focused on teaching mnemonic 
devices to identify stage structures, rather than on the analysis of the 
formal organising structure, then it is possible to be wary of 
contamination. But if the emphasis is on the latter, it should not be 
surprising that students exposed to this teaching show significant 
increases in the sophistication of their moral reasoning skills. 
The introduction of a formal skills approach to ethics education within this project 
will be further discussed in chapter 8. 
6.4  Moral Decision-Making Model 
The way in which we perceive moral decision-making has influenced ethics 
teaching directly. If we believe that moral decision-making is mainly learning a 
logical problem-solving syllogism which in then applied to each case, we would 
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teach the structure and usage of that syllogism and how to find the necessary facts 
to apply the syllogism to. On the other hand, if we believed in rules to guide us 
through moral problems, we would teach a list of rules. Therefore before 
proceeding to study different methods of teaching ethics, I will discuss a moral 
decision-making framework I have developed. This framework is not intended to 
provide answers to detailed questions on the process of moral decision-making, 
but to provide a general framework on which to build an approach to teaching 
ethics. 
This model is also an approach to moral decision-making that will allow 
description without identification with a particular ethical theory or set of moral 
values. This is not a value-free model, just as no model is, but the values it is 
based on - rational thinking and freedom of moral thought - can be associated 
with several ethical theories. They are structural values rather than values of 
content. One will find content elements in this model that resemble utilitarianism 
(the importance of contextual and consequential aspects), virtue theory 
(appreciation of personal/character ideals), or deontological theories (the 
recognition and appreciation of values). These elements are essential parts of this 
model, but none of them is presented as an overarching moral approach which 
would sub-ordinate the others. The moral decision-making model is applicable to 
several types of ethical theory and moral values, though a purely deontological 
approach is inappropriate because it excludes contextual elements as valid factors 
in moral decision-making. 
Moral decision-making, as I discussed in Part I, consists of four components - 1) 
recognition and analysis of the moral facts, 2) cognitive solution of the moral 
problem, 3) priority given to moral issues, and 4) personal abilities to implement 
the decision. Each of these components forms an essential part of moral decision-
making. The first two components describe the decision-making process and the 
latter two its implementation. The moral decision-making model I have developed 
describes the relationships between the first two components. 
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The decision-making components can also be described in terms of the process as 
three distinct elements: 1) ability to recognise and appreciate values, 2) ability to 
analyse and appropriately classify case particulars, and 3) ability to combine basic 
values and case particulars into a solution. These form three elements of moral 
decision-making: 
1.  Recognition and appreciation of basic values 
2.  Analysis of case particulars 
3.  Finding a solution that appreciates both case particulars and basic 
values. 
The process of moral decision-making works as an interactive network - the 
analysis of case particulars and the solution to the problem are both underpinned 
onto the basic personal values. The basic values influence, often unconsciously, 
the analysis of the case and the solution that is evaluated against them. If the 
solution contradicts the basic values, there are two options available: 1) to re-
adjust the importance of the basic values to conform with the solution, or 2) work 
through steps 2 and 3 again to find an alternative solution. 
The basic network of moral decision-making is therefore: 
Analysis of case 
particulars  B 
Solution to the 
moral problem 
Basic values 
Figure 3: Moral Decision-Making Model 
Moral decision-making is often carried out without incorporating all the elements; 
one can either move directly from basic values to the solutions (rule-based 
approach) or one can reduce the basic values to their bare minimum and work 
exclusively from case analysis to solution (this method is often identified with 
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utilitarian decision-making where the only basic value acknowledged is the 
maximisation of benefit). I strongly believe that moral decision-making is 
impaired if one of these elements or any of the dynamic links are ignored. Ethics 
teaching should thus work to create skills required in all parts of the decision-
making network. 
Moral decision-making is not an isolated form of decision-making, and therefore I 
wish to emphasise that moral decision-making needs to incorporate not only the 
specific elements of moral decision-making described above, but also to have a 
bed rock in basic decision-making rules. From Wilson (1990), they are: 
1.  Adherence to laws of logic. 
2.  Correct use of language. 
3.  Attendance to facts. 
I will describe each of the moral decision-making elements in more detail and 
illustrate the process with the following moral problem: 
The Draize Test 
The Draize eye test is used in cosmetics research to test the eye irritancy 
of  new products - cosmetics, shampoos and so on.  The substance to be 
tested is injected into the eyes of  rabbits - 0.1. mg is injected into the 
conjuctival sac of  one eye in each of  six rabbits with the other eye serving 
as a control. The lids are held together for one second and then the animal 
is released. The eyes are examined at 24, 48, and 72 hours to see if  there 
is corneal damage. No anaesthetics are used and the eyes are not washed. 
The large doses often result in permanent eye damage, but are used to 
provide a large margin of  safety in extrapolating for human response. 
Should companies test their new products in this way or not? 
6.4.1  Element 1 - basic values 
Recognition of basic values is a fundamental project, because basic values are the 
core of a personal view of life. It is an analysis of what is important to oneself and 
why. The process of recognising basic values is not a one-off procedure, which, 
once completed, would provide a solid and static basis for future moral decision-
making. On the contrary, the recognition of basic values, and learning to 
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appreciate their effect, may evolve during every time moral decisions need to be 
made. I am prepared to state an even stronger claim; a static set of moral values 
indicates ceased moral development which is at risk of degenerating to more 
unsophisticated moral decision-making methods. So I cannot over-emphasise the 
importance of keeping the interpretation of basic values open to re-evaluation. 
In solving moral problems or choosing between different alternatives, one needs 
to consider which sub-set of basic personal values is meaningful to the question in 
hand. Not all basic values are equally important in all decision-making situations, 
and the decision-making process is simplified if one is able identify which values 
are significant in each case. Also in most cases it is essential to be able to 
recognise which values are more fundamental than others, as all moral dilemmas, 
by definition, involve a conflict of two or more core values. 
At any point in time one can perform an inner search of basic values and attempt 
to rank them in order of importance - 'if I need to sacrifice one value, which one 
will I sacrifice first, second, third etc. '. The evaluation carried out without 
pressures of making a moral choice can produce an 'ideal' set of values. One can 
imagine, for the sake of an exercise only, that there are fundamentally right and 
wrong answers, some values which are always superior to others, and imagine a 
hierarchy that causes no problems. Appreciation and construction of imaginary 
value hierarchy will be beneficial in learning about one's own value system and 
providing a base-line to evaluate solutions against. Naturally it is important not to 
become a prisoner of one's own value appreciation, because the world is not ideal 
and rigid systems allow for a very limited ability to provide acceptable solutions 
to real moral problems. 
Using the Draize-test as an example, I will outline one possible approach to 
working through the moral decision-making model. Over the next several 
sections, text in italics is a possible working through of the moral decision-making 
process using the Draize-test as an example. The views expressed are not intended 
to represent a particular person's actual views: rather to give one possible and 
reasonable response to the case. 
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Without any particular order, some of  my basic values are: 
..  non-maleficence (not harming others) 
..  protecting the environment 
..  equality 
..  protecting the innocent and weak 
..  protecting my personal autonomy 
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..  having an opportunity to do what I enjoy (personal autonomy) 
..  safety (financial, mental and physical) 
In a case of  conflict, I believe that the last thing I would be ready to 
compromise is personal autonomy. I believe very strongly that everyone 
should be allowed to do what they want, make their own decisions without 
anyone else being allowed to inteifere. After autonomy the next most 
important value is protecting the environment, because ifwe do not 
protect nature, everything else will be pointless. The next most important 
value is safety, because I believe that living in fear would make life 
intolerable. Then is non-maleficence - I cannot stand the idea of  harming 
someone. These are followed by protecting the innocent and weak, having 
an opportunity to enjoy what I do,  and equality. So the hierarchical order 
of  my basic values is: 
1.  Personal autonomy 
2.  protecting the environment 
3.~ 
4.  non-maleficence 
5.  protecting the innocent and weak 
6.  having an opportunity to do what I enjoy 
7.  equality 
In forming an opinion about the Draize-test I envisage that the most 
influential values are non-maleficence, safety and protecting the innocent 
and weak (underlined above). 
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6.4.2  Element 2 - analysing the case 
Before any actual moral problem can be solved, it must first be analysed. The 
analysis includes a recognition and separation of facts from values, placing the 
problem in a wider context, and evaluating facts and values according to their 
importance in the particular case. 
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The key to any moral decision-making is the recognition of moral facts, for 
without recognition and proper separation of values and facts one cannot perceive 
moral problems, and without perception there cannot be solutions. The initial 
recognition of moral aspects in a situation is followed by placing both the 'hard' 
facts and moral facts within the wider context and evaluating their importance to 
the particular case. It is not enough to be able to recognise and analyse the values 
embedded in a particular situation alone, but one needs to become aware of the 
context within which the case exists. Moral philosophers may work with abstract 
problems and even argue that solutions to such problems are universal, but I 
believe such detachment to be a detrimental approach to applied ethics problems. 
Inability to appreciate the social context from which the moral problem arises, is 
equal to omitting contextual facts in a legal deliberation. Without contextual 
analysis, we are not able to evaluate which facts and values should take 
precedence in case of conflict. It is important also to realise that one will never be 
able to consider all the facts and that one's observations are inevitably influenced 
by personally held core values. 
Awareness of personal values can assist decision-makers in reducing the influence 
of personal point of view in a case analysis, but that influence can never be 
completely removed. An appreciation of the impossibility of being able to 
consider all the facts guides decision-makers in evaluating their decisions with an 
appropriate lack of supremacy. 
The contextual analysis moves the moral decision-maker away from the basic set 
of values of element 1 into an appreciation of the factual and moral context in 
order to be able to move onto making a decision with the best possible tools to 
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provide the most appropriate and acceptable solution to the moral problem in 
question. 
At  first sight the Draize-test constitutes the following factors: 
"  the test set-up (time,  animals used, testing on eyes, dosage) 
lIP  pain experienced by the animals 
lIP  damage to the animals 
lIP  the type of  products tested 
•  safety of  human users 
•  economical/financial situation of  the cosmetic industry 
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Most of  these factors contain both moral and  factual components. The test 
set-up as a description of  the Draize-test is purely factual. Pain 
experienced by animals is a scientific observation, though not an easy one, 
which can be also viewed as a moral problem - is it acceptable to inflict 
pain on animals? The type of  products tested can also be perceived as a 
factual list of  the products actually tested with the Draize-test. But the type 
of  products can also be given a moral evaluation - does it make a 
difference if  the test is carried out for cosmetics which are not 
'necessary'? And how do we define what is  'necessary'? Safety for human 
users is factual in a sense, that we can provide data on the risk factors or 
the type of  risks involved, but the actual risk assessment and judgement 
based on it all requires a value decision - what size of  risks are we ready 
to take? What are we ready to pay for reducing the risks? Risk assessment 
is a trade-off between these two factors. Damage to the animals is factual 
as we can provide evidence of  the damage cause by the Draize-test for 
each substance. The moral aspect of  damage is the acceptance of  damage 
and further,  what type of  damage is acceptable. 
These are aspects of  the actual case.  The furthe r contextual analysis 
includes thinking about the legislation regarding cosmetic products - what 
are the requirements for the cosmetics companies regarding product 
safety? Further, one is easily led to consider other types of  animal tests in 
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the pharmaceutical industry: are they acceptable? Also, one can view the 
use of  animals in other contexts -for food and clothing and the treatment 
of  animals in those situations. One should also look into alternatives to the 
Draize-test for product safety -Are there less painful methods available? 
And one can consider the dynamics of  the cosmetics industry in general -
whether they have a meaningful role to play in society that would support 
their research aims and if  some further social issues are embedded in the 
junctions of  that industry, e.g. the status of  women. 
6.4.3  Element 3 - finding a solution 
In the final step the moral decision-maker needs to combine the basic values with 
the contextual evaluation. In most cases forming the synthesis is not 
straightforward. One may need to look for further facts, balance several 
uncertainties, and compromise some of the basic values, when trying to find the 
best possible solution to the problem. Finding a solution is in many cases striking 
a balancing between benefits and harms. This does not indicate a utilitarian 
approach to solving moral problems, however, because one should include in the 
cost analysis both the cost of compromising basic values and the indirect costs to 
social structures. 
Not all decision-making methods are equally good. Good methods are grounded 
in reason and supported by rational arguments and contextual facts. So the first 
element of good reasoning is an ability to include and appreciate both the basic 
values and the contextual facts. Good moral reasoning is not possible without 
good groundwork - the proper analysis of both basic values and contextual facts. 
In analysing personal core values and contextual elements of the case one needs to 
become aware of these elements, while the decision-making process requires 
evaluating and combining these elements into one moral solution. 
Second, one must follow logic in presenting solutions, arguments or agreements 
in any issue. It is important to follow logical steps from premises to facts to 
conclusions. A typical deductive argument goes as follows: 
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Premise  if A, then B (If Spotty is a terrier, then he has four legs) 
FactlEvidence.  A (Spotty is a terrier) 
Supporting statements 
Conclusion  Therefore B (Therefore Spotty has four legs) 
Deductive arguments have truth-preserving quality which means that if the 
premises are sound/true and the argument is valid, then the conclusion must be 
true (Olen and Barry, 1996). 
We can approach moral problems with deductive logic, by starting with a moral 
premise and working logically from it to a solution. In purely abstract moral 
problems, we do not have supporting evidence, while the number of premises is 
often greater than one. For example: 
Premise!  It is wrong to harm. 
Premise2  Abortion harms the fetus. 
Conclusion  Therefore abortion is wrong. 
But because there is rarely a unanimous agreement on the moral premises, we can 
form an equally valid logical argument with entirely different conclusions by 
changing one premise and/or including an additional one into the logical 
sequence, for example: 
Premise!  It is wrong to harm a person. 
Premise2  Abortion harms the fetus. 
Premise3  The fetus is not a person. 
Conclusion  Therefore it is not wrong to have an abortion. 
The reasoning process is valid in both examples, but the conclusions are 
contradictory. Even though logic is important in solving a moral problem, these 
examples should highlight the point that logic alone will not be sufficient. One 
needs to scrutinise the premises of arguments. 
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In the abortion examples, the problematic premises are: 
1.  What are the grounds for stating that the fetus is not a person - what are 
the criteria for personhood? 
2.  Is it always wrong to harm - can we think of instances when some level 
of harming can be accepted for producing a greater good, for example 
self-defence? 
3.  Does abortion harm the fetus - what qualifies as harming? 
A lot of moral premises are intuitive and thus one cannot refer to facts to prove 
them to be true or false. They are often convictions based on core values, not on 
rational deliberation based on observable facts. Sometimes, they are a result of 
careful consideration of relevant facts while at times a conviction just strikes us as 
right, but all the same, in the end we cannot, in a logical sense, prove that our 
premises are true. Logic only provides a tool to test the argument, not the 
premises. So we often have to accept disagreement about premises, which 
inevitably results in disagreement about the conclusions as well. This acceptance 
does not free anyone from the importance of trying to explain one's moral 
intuitions, to re-assess them in the light of new evidence or experiences, or to 
evaluate any counter-arguments that may be presented against them. But in the 
end, people do disagree on moral premises. 
The deductive logic explained here is void of case particulars. It works on the 
premise that there are case-independent values, which can be used in these types 
of deductive syllogisms and a right answer is provided at the end. I hope that the 
examples above are enough to cast doubt on the sufficiency of approaching real 
moral problems in this manner. Besides logic, moral decision-making requires an 
ability to understand the relationships between facts and values, an ability to 
predict consequences of decisions, and a skill to weigh different elements against 
each other in order to arrive at the best possible solutions at that point in time. 
The description of the decision-making process is unavoidably fuzzy. There is no 
available formula into which to feed the basic values and situational information 
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and out pops the 'right' answer. Moral decision-making is a balancing act of 
competing values based on rational and logical reasoning. It cannot be learnt once 
and for all as it is a process that continues for a life time. Practice in making moral 
decisions gives one an ability to understand problems and solve them with skill 
and confidence. 
For example, returning to the Draize-test: 
The most important fact in this case to me is that animals are suffering 
without good cause. I believe strongly in safety (no 4 of  my basic values), 
but I do not believe that this is an acceptable way of  achieving product 
safety. I would like to see cosmetics tested in a way that would not cause 
suffering, which rules out the Draize-test. If  I am asked why I object to the 
suffering of  these animals, I would respond that I do not believe in causing 
harm. And I believe in that very strongly. I can imagine there could be 
cases where causing some harm is acceptable, maybe some types of  drug 
tests, but I would always want to make sure that the suffering is limited to 
its minimum and with the Draize-test, nothing is done to reduce the 
suffering of  these animals. 
Also, because cosmetics are luxury items and it is an industry that makes 
high profits and is wealthy, I believe it would be fair and just to require 
companies to make investments in developing alternative testing methods, 
which would not cause any suffering. Testing on tissue cultures could be 
an alternative. 
I realise that this case limits the rights of  the cosmetic companies to do 
what they want, their autonomy as companies. But I also believe that 
curbing their freedom is acceptable because no one should have the right 
to harm others without exceptional justification. So the freedom of  choice 
should always be a limited one, freedom to do what does not harm others. 
Therefore my conclusion is that cosmetics companies should not peifonn 
Draize-tests and that society should use legal powers to prevent these tests 
because they cause unnecessary pain. 
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6.4.4  Dynamic links 
None of these Moral Decision-Making elements exists in isolation and the links 
between them are not limited to one direction only. There are three dynamic links 
in the moral decision-making model: 
1.  The basic values influence the evaluation of contextual facts. 
2.  Previous solutions guide the analysis of contextual facts. 
3.  Most importantly, after the solution has been reached it is important to 
do a re-check on how that solution supports the originally held basic 
values. In case of serious discrepancy, the decision-maker has two 
options, either to re-evaluate the basic values or to work through the 
decision-making process again in order to find a solution that does 
support the basic values. In many cases both are necessary: re-tuning 
the understanding of basic values and adjusting the solution to the 
problem. 
In my solution I find that personal freedom is not unlimited and that I feel 
very strongly about not harming animals unnecessarily. Looking at my 
personal values as I viewed them before I was presented with this 
problem, I now feel that I need to make the following adjustments: 
1.  Personal autonomy needs to be supplemented with a statement 
that one has the freedom to do and choose as long the decisions 
do not cause harm to others. 
2.  I am even more serious about my commitment to the value of 
non-maleficence; I may not be ready to make it my first and 
most important value above personal autonomy, but I do find 
now that it is more important to me than safety. 
6.4.5  Sequence of elements in teaching 
It may not always be most productive to try to work through the moral decision-
making process starting with basic values, then moving onto contextual facts and 
finally reaching a solution. Starting with basic values may lack motivational 
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elements due to its quite abstract nature. Also, asking students to start with in-
depth analysis of their own values can prove detrimental as the students may feel 
inadequate and lost when asked to analyse values and iterate how their values 
reflect on reality, in particular in front of their peers. 
I believe that the most useful place for an ethics curriculum to begin is with 
analysis of contextual facts i.e. raising moral sensitivity. Analysing moral 
problems provides an opportunity to introduce students to forms of moral thinking 
without a need to provide any material on complex moral theories or to ask the 
students to make instant evaluations of their own value systems. Moral sensitivity 
exercises should present students with a problem situation and guide them through 
the analysis, supporting their own ability to recognise moral aspects in the 
situation and to provide them with further insight when their ability to reach 
further has been exhausted. 
Moral sensitivity exercises can be followed by two types of exercises. One 
approach is to deepen the moral analysis downwards into the basic values. This 
can be done by distilling from the moral problems found in the moral sensitivity 
exercise the basic values present in each moral aspect. An alternative approach is 
to move onto moral decision-making and seek a solution to the moral problem. 
After a tentative solution has been expressed, the process can work down to the 
basic values and examine what type of values the solution supports and whether 
these are the values that should be supported. 
6.5  Summary 
The premise for this chapter, and the entire research described in this thesis, is a 
view that moral development involves improvement in skills and abilities to 
recognise and solve moral problems. It follows from this that ethics education 
which aims to encourage moral development has to adopt a skill-based approach 
instead of a rule-based one. When moral education is approached as the learning 
of moral decision-making skills and practising moral recognition abilities, there 
should be no reason to believe ethics should be fundamentally different, from an 
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educational point of view, to other subjects and disciplines. Moral skills can be 
taught alongside and equally well as scientific skills. 
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But moral skills are not on a par with scientific skills in all aspects. One of the 
important differences is that moral development occurs without any educational 
intervention, while scientific development normally requires a conscious effort 
from both the teachers and learners. Naturally one can learn science without a 
teacher, but all the same, a conscious learning effort is required. In moral 
development, on the other hand, learning is more often 'hidden' within everyday 
experiences. And even more importantly, unlike science, moral development takes 
place more often than not outside the sphere of formal education. Therefore moral 
education cannot claim any monopoly in encouraging moral development. At the 
time of young adulthood and higher education research has found that general 
intellectual stimulation, and personal involvement in studies and leisure activities, 
predict a general rise in moral development scores without any overt educational 
intervention. 
But ethics education has an ability to accelerate the natural progress of moral 
development. Research has shown that an ideal arrangement for a moral education 
programme targets young adults who have developed their basic logical skills. 
The ideal programme would last between 4-12 weeks and have a student-centred 
structure that encourages students to get involved as independent moral agents. 
The Moral Decision-Making (MDM) model described has three elements: 1) 
Recognition and appreciation of core personal values, 2) skills in analysing the 
case and/or situation, and 3) skills in forming a solution that appreciates the two 
previous elements adequately. The three elements form dynamic links, where the 
core personal values influence the analysis and recognition of the case and 
situational particulars and where the decision is judged against the core values. 
This model provides a framework for understanding the different elements ethics 
teaching should incorporate. This incorporation does not take one possible route 
alone, but allows for great variation in teaching styles and methods. It is suggested 
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here that a best place to start is with the case/situation, from which the discussion 
can move to either personal core values or decision-making. 
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7.  Teaching approaches 
Teaching methods are at the core of moral education programmes, as was 
discovered by Schlaefli et al. 's (1985) meta-analysis discussed in section 6.3. The 
key elements described by Schlaefli et al.  related to increased support of student 
involvement and encouragement of participation as an independent moral agent. 
This chapter will look at the teaching methods that provide a setting for student 
involvement as moral agents. 
The chapter starts with a discussion on student-centred learning (section 7.1). The 
emphasis is on a review of what it means to say that an educational programme is 
student-centred and how such programmes differ from teacher-centred ones. 
Adoption of a student-centred approach has a major impact on the teacher's role, 
and how the student-centred approach in practice influences the role of the teacher 
is discussed in section 7.1.1. 
The last two sections in this chapter outline two pedagogical approaches which 
allow uncomplicated assimilation of the MDM into the teaching of ethics. These 
two approaches are Problem-Based Learning (PBL) and Structured Discussion 
Groups. Both methods have been used extensively in other subjects and they 
require only minor changes to become suitable methods for teaching ethics. The 
elements in these approaches will be discussed in sections 7.2 and 7.3 
respectively. The chapter ends in a short summary. 
7.1  Student centred learning 
The advances in moral development as a result of moral education discussed in 
chapter 6.3 indicate that the logical approach to moral education is student-
centred instead of a teacher-centred. Student- and teacher-centred approaches are 
two ends of a continuum, and a course can include elements from both extremes 
or work with methods that would be best located between the two extremes. In 
teacher-centred learning the teacher is solely responsible for what the student is 
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expected to learn - what information, by which methods, in what sequence, and at 
what pace. Traditional teacher-centred learning is in the form of lectures and 
structured laboratory work where teachers/lecturers dispense information, assign 
readings, choose learning criteria and test methods, and structure the learning 
process. Self-study modules can also be part of teacher-centred learning, as long 
as the teacher determines the resources to be studied, the sequence of study and 
the learning that is to be mastered and the only elements the student is allowed to 
influence are the pace and learning methods. 
Teacher-centred learning can be an ideal format from the teacher's point of view -
they can readily dispense their specialist knowledge in a compact form based on 
their previous teaching experience. They can formulate learning of complex issues 
into more easily digestible capsules, given the control they can exercise over the 
structure of the learning contact. The teacher can also be certain that the students 
will have been exposed to all the knowledge and concepts considered necessary 
for the level of learning in question. The teacher-centred approach likewise saves 
students from the agony, frustration, and time it would have taken them to work 
through the subject alone and gives them confidence of knowing what they are 
supposed to learn in each particular course. 
One down-side of the teacher-centred approach is that it does not take into 
consideration the heterogeneous student backgrounds. Students come to the 
course with different levels of knowledge, cognitive structures, and learning styles 
and abilities. In a teacher-centred learning situation all students meet the same 
information in an identical form when their learning might have been better 
supported by different methods or a different cognitive starting point. Even more 
importantly, students have a passive role as an acceptor of knowledge instead of 
an active processor, an element which has been shown to hinder learning leading 
to moral development (Hartwell 1995). 
Alternatively, education can adopt a student-centred learning approach. The key 
element in student-centred learning is that students learn to determine what they 
need to know. The students will eventually take full responsibility for their own 
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learning in respect of what, how, and why. This may require considerable input 
from teachers/facilitators at the beginning, but even at the early stages, the aim is 
to increase student responsibility and decrease teacher dominance. 
Since the learning is self-determined and acquired through the students' own 
study, the student becomes an active participant in the learning process, an 
autonomous agent. This responsibility can foster motivation as the rewards are 
internal - the desire to learn for personal or professional growth, not for teacher-
dispensed rewards (Albanese and Mitchell, 1993; Norman and Schmidt, 1992). 
According to Race (1998) successful learning is underpinned by five factors 
which influence motivation: 
1.  wanting to learn (intrinsic motivation) 
2.  needing to learn (extrinsic motivation) 
3.  learning-by-doing 
4.  learning from feed-back 
5.  making sense of what has been learnt. 
Wanting to learn is the most satisfactory state for students to be in - their 
motivation is not dependent on external changes and the rewards are equally 
independent. Student-centred learning, in particular in small groups, provides 
wonderful opportunities for the last three factors to support student learning. It is 
more difficult to design lectures to support these learning factors. Designing 
motivating ethics lectures for science students would be further hindered by the 
low levels of intrinsic motivation of science students to study ethics: they may not 
have thought that ethics should be part of their science training, though this view 
is not necessarily justified. 
Student-centred learning is not only a process of learning facts, but a process of 
learning to learn, which is an important asset in meeting a lifetime need to adapt 
to new knowledge, challenges and problems. This form of learning requires self-
discipline and an ability to organise one's own learning to fit personal learning 
styles and cognitive structures. At the early stages of student-centred programmes 
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learning to learn might even seem to dominate over learning facts and skills, but 
this should change with experience. In student-centred learning the value of the 
learning process becomes almost as equally valued as the content (Katz 1995). 
A student-centred learning approach is most suitable for an ethics education 
which has autonomy and skill-based aims, as in this project. The core of the aims 
is in the personal development of the students. Ethics education is successful if 
the students gain skills that they can effectively use in their personal lives. As the 
aim is to encourage skills applicable to personal life situations, it is logical to 
approach teaching those skills from a student-centred perspective. The students 
are then given an opportunity to define the scope and nature of ethical problems 
relevant to their personal lives and to practice the moral decision-making skills at 
the level they find comfortable and productive. Also, ethical skills are for personal 
benefit more than anything, and the motivation to learn them is most naturally 
nurtured within students rather than exposed from the outside. 
7.1.1  Role of the teacher/facilitator 
Adoption of student-centred learning should not lead anyone to believe that the 
teacher's role is reduced to that of a peripheral consultant who is only marginally 
necessary. Quite the contrary, effective facilitation is essential to successful 
student-centred learning. Teaching ethics is no exception to the rule. Even further, 
a good teacher is likely to be essential in sparking students' interest in ethics. 
Teachers have the power to nurture and even create enthusiasm towards a subject. 
This power of directing and coaching students' motivation and interest can also be 
used negatively, to kill inborn enthusiasm and dampen students' desire to learn. I 
believe that the role of the teacher in an ethics course is particularly important 
because ethics is a very personal subject which invites students to share their 
intimate beliefs about the world with the class. They are unlikely to do this if the 
teacher/facilitator has not managed to create a good learning environment and 
build a positive and encouraging relationship with the students. The success of an 
ethics course, in other words, depends heavily on the skills of the 
teacher/facilitator. 
Henriikka Clarkebllrfl, June 2000 m  Part III - Teaching Ethics  174 
The essence of facilitation is to create an environment for learning - for 
participants to define and advance their own learning goals. It is a process of 
helping students to learn to trust their own decision-making and problem-solving 
skills, and to foster the students' ability to think critically. The aim is thus not to 
transmit empirical data, but to assist in the integration of theory and practice - to 
support students to develop the required enquiry skills to identify what they need 
to know and how they may proceed to find the required knowledge (Katz, 1995). 
Facilitators need not necessarily be experts in the subject the group is working on. 
Research has shown advantages in both the facilitator being an expert and a non-
expert. Groups with expert facilitators have been found to be less likely to engage 
in student-directed discussions and collaborative learning (Silver and Wilkerson 
1991). A similar effect was found by Davis et al.  (1992), whose research showed 
a trend for expert facilitators to move towards using directive behaviour such as 
lecturing or giving advice that increased their influence over the group. But while 
expert facilitators may use less orthodox facilitation methods, the students from 
expert-led groups tend to score higher in the course final examination. Albanese 
and Mitchell (1993) suggest that while expert facilitators may be less facilitative, 
they appear to be better able to help students to identify relevant learning issues 
and correct gaps in knowledge and errors in processing. 
Based on these results and my personal experience as a facilitator, I support the 
use of expert facilitators in ethics teaching as long as they have the motivation to 
adhere to the facilitator role and skills to be able to support three elements of 
student-centred learning: 1) prepare good material, 2) facilitate appropriate 
cognitive learning, and 3) encourage group skills. But I hasten to add that simply 
being an expert does not make anyone a good facilitator. Just as expert knowledge 
alone does not tum anyone into a brilliant lecturer, experts are not necessarily 
good facilitators either. 
Ethicists do not claim to be morally wiser than the rest of us, but they have expert 
skills in the analysis of moral problems: to examine the consistency and 
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coherence of moral reasons by employing a more disinterested reflection on a 
wider range of experience (Smith and Boyd, 1991). These skills are beneficial in 
ethics teaching. One of the advantage of expert facilitators is their ability to 
recognise all the moral problems involved in a case, and thus be able to guide 
students in their own recognition process. Non-expert facilitators may overlook 
some ethical consideration and thus fail to encourage the students to look at all the 
relevant issues. Also, expert facilitators have a firmer grasp of ethical theory and 
moral decision-making procedures, which gives them an ability to clarify moral 
issues to the students if they were to find themselves faced with a moral dead-end. 
Further, expert facilitators in ethics may be more equipped to isolate their own 
moral judgements from the discussion and thus allow more room for the students 
to establish their own. An expert facilitator in a subject like bioethics, which 
contains elements from more than one academic discipline, would benefit from 
expertise in both sUbjects. But in my view, in the case of bioethics, the more 
important expertise in is in ethics, not in bio-science. 
My personal experience as a facilitator of bioethics courses with science students 
supports this view. The students often arrive at the discussion with only an inkling 
of the ethics issues relevant to the topic for discussion, despite the fact that they 
may have completed the preliminary reading. It was thus my task as a facilitator 
to both initiate recognition of the main ethical themes and systematically analyse 
with the students the views they held of the subject. I felt it was essential that I 
could draw from a strong knowledge-base in philosophy and not be caught in 
hesitation or confusion born out of lack of competence. From my experience I can 
only imagine how difficult good ethics facilitation would be if the facilitator could 
not rely on a background knowledge in ethical theories and have experience in 
dealing with bioethical issues. 
There is no single template for an ideal small group facilitator, expert or non-
expert, while there seems to be certain characteristics that most capable small-
group facilitators share (Westberg and Jason, 1996): 
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1.  Enthusiasm: not only enthusiasm for the subject matter, but also for the 
processes of learning and teaching. Enthusiastic facilitators enjoy 
teaching and contact with students. 
2.  Caring for learners as people: effective educators care about their 
students as people and are able to convey these feelings - they enjoy 
nurturing others and watching them grow. 
3.  Capacity to put oneself in the learners' shoes: it is vital that the 
facilitator has an ability to understand the students' reactions from the 
inside and to be sensitive and aware of the ways the students perceive 
their learning. 
4.  Trust in the group: effective small-group facilitators respect the 
intelligence and experience of their students and convey this faith in 
their teaching. 
5.  Comfort with empowering learners: this is an ability to let go and 
retreat to the side-lines when the group learns to lead itself. 
6.  Commitment to personal learning: a desire to maintain a personal 
learning curve, eagerness to improve and active pursuing of new 
challenges and knowledge. 
7.  Flexibility, adaptability and inventiveness: effective educators adapt to, 
and even welcome, the surprises of small-group teaching - they can 
make moment-to-moment adaptations and continuously reshape the 
instructions. 
7.1.1.1  Preparation 
Just as in traditional teacher-centred teaching, preparation by the facilitator is 
essential to successful student-centred learning of ethics. One of the elementary 
preparatory tasks is to become aware of one's group: how large is it going to be, 
how diverse will it be in age, cultural backgrounds and educational experiences, 
and what they have learnt of 'your' subject before. Familiarity with these and 
some basic resource limitations (time, room, equipment) will allow the facilitator 
to approach the planning with realistic aims and methods in mind. 
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An important part of the preparation is to find out how familiar the students are 
with the chosen teaching approach. If  the group is new to the student-centred 
teaching approach, time needs to be allocated to introduce the concept and the 
first tasks should cater for the need to learn the process as well as the cognitive 
content. Poor understanding of students familiarity with the teaching approach can 
be detrimental to learning as poor preparation can easily lead to confused and 
frustrated students. This might be particularly true with teaching ethics to science 
students, when the students are not only introduced to a new academic discipline, 
which requires them to develop new modes of thinking, but also to a new form of 
teaching. I will discuss in more detail the skills involved in coaching students to 
use the new teaching approach effectively in section 7.1.1.3. 
Facilitators in bioethics groups are always leaders in the sense that they choose 
the topic and the time scale for the exercise, while facilitating the actual exercise 
lends itself to group leadership and one of the essential tasks of facilitators is to 
encourage students to share the leader role. The facilitator is responsible for 
fostering and encouraging leadership skills and behaviours among the students. 
But before effective group-leadership can be supported, students require good 
learning material. The quality of learning is dependent on the quality of materials 
used, and it is the facilitator's task to choose materials that are deep, interesting, 
and worthy of discussion and further research. No matter how well the group 
dynamics work and how motivated the students are, poor material will hinder the 
group in reaching its learning potential. The facilitator needs also to be clear 
before the group sets to work about what alternative resources may be needed, 
and to sort out any possible access difficulties to these resources (Barrows, 1992). 
For this reason, if the facilitators themselves are not experts in the academic 
subject the students are investigating, they should seek expert support in the 
preparation of the material. In ethics, having personal opinions in moral matters 
does not qualify one as expert in preparing material for an ethics course, whether 
it is PBL or a discussion group. To teach ethics effectively, the material needs to 
provide a platform to discuss ethical issues in a structured manner and to prepare 
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ethical expertise. 
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The facilitator should also be very clear on what sorts of activities the learning 
group will be involved with. I will examine below two alternative methods for 
ethics teaching: PBL (Problem-Based Learning), and learning through structured 
discussion. The choice of activities will lead to decisions to clarify the schedule to 
ensure that all activities can be completed within the time scale with sufficient 
time for independent study and breaks. 
Teachers should prepare, similarly to teacher-centred learning,  what they feel are 
the appropriate learning objectives, learning resources and evaluation material 
based on their own particular experience and knowledge. In student-centred 
learning, these objectives and resources serve as guidelines to the students, to be 
adapted and used as they feel appropriate. Facilitators are better equipped to assist 
the group in framing questions and focusing their thoughts on the essentials, 
rather than getting fixed on minor details, when they have a clear picture of the 
learning objectives and methods of achieving them. Without assistance, groups 
may become overwhelmed by the task of selecting questions which will assist 
their understanding of the subject and forward their learning. Again, discipline-
specific expertise will guide the facilitator to choose the aims and objectives, 
which in tum will provide the students with a better starting point in accepting or 
modifying them. In setting the learning goals, facilitators, experts or not, need to 
ask themselves the following questions (Westberg and Jason, 1996): 
1.  Are the goals sufficiently specific? 
2.  Are the goals clear and understandable? 
3.  Are the goals appropriate to the learners' stages of development? 
4.  Can the goals be achieved with the available resources and the time 
allotted? 
5.  Are the goals worthwhile? 
6.  Are the goals consistent with the overall goals of the school or 
programme? 
7.  Should the goals and objectives be in writing? 
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7.1.1.2  Facilitating cognitive learning 
In advancing the cognitive learning process in student-centred learning, the 
facilitator's role is to guide students through the enquiry and decision-making 
process, question the rationale of their judgements, and challenge their 
assumptions. In other words, facilitators have a task to probe students' knowledge 
deeply. 
This role is important because students are often not aware that they are making 
assumptions when they speculate on factors they are not familiar with. The 
facilitator's role is not generally to give answers, but to ask the right questions, to 
ignite new thoughts and ways of looking at things the students would otherwise 
have ignored or disregarded. The facilitator advances the learning process by 
presenting alternative interpretations of what has been analysed and by relating 
the particular learning content to the wider social and political world. This is also 
where expert facilitators have the advantage as they know what is important and 
can thus encourage learning in appropriate directions. Teaching ethics to science 
students may require a lot of facilitator guidance and questioning because: 1) 
ethics is a subject open to multiple interpretations, 2) defining terms is an 
important part of an ethical inquiry, 3) ethical issues are inter-linked with social, 
political, and economic policy, and 4) students are relatively unfamiliar with the 
methods of ethical inquiry. 
To do this, according to Barrows (1992), the facilitator must constantly ask 
'why?', 'what do you mean?', 'why do you think it is true?'. The facilitator needs 
to ask these questions again and again until the students have got down to the 
depth of understanding and knowledge expected of them, and until they have 
explored all they know. Facilitators must never let ideas, terms, and explanations 
go undefined. Only by fulfilling this role can a facilitator have any guarantees that 
the depth of learning in small groups is adequate. 
Barrows (1992) also emphasises that it is the facilitator's responsibility to 
continually monitor the educational process of each student in the group. 
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Facilitators need to be alert to detect any difficulties in reasoning, understanding 
or finding information so that these problems can be brought to the group's 
attention for early intervention and help. As facilitators monitor students' 
learning, they also have a responsibility to make sure that students do not embark 
on research within the exercise that is too unwieldy. 
7.1.1.3  Facilitating group skills 
Even though students should have control over their own learning process, in 
particular at the early stages of introducing students to this type of learning, the 
role of the facilitator is important in guiding the process and providing support 
and materials when needed. Learners tend to need direction when their 
competence and confidence are - or feel - low. At the same time, the facilitator 
should not always interfere when problems occur or students feel insecure, as 
learning benefits can be derived from learners struggling to figure things out for 
themselves. It is often most beneficial to make decisions regarding facilitator 
participation together with the students. Facilitation is not a one-off process, but 
an on-going one. Thus the decision regarding facilitator participation needs to be 
re-considered from time to time (Westberg and Jason, 1996). 
In a sense, facilitators are group-trainers. They will train students in the process of 
working in groups, whether that is around a PBL exercise or a discussion group. 
At first, students are unfamiliar with the process and it is the facilitator's task to 
train them in the process skills and support them during the early practising of 
these new skills. 
The facilitator may also assume the role of a chairperson by reminding students to 
listen to one another and to provide suggestions impartially and objectively. There 
is a fine line to tread in controlling the learning situation and providing assistance 
where it is needed and when it can assist the students in their learning. One sign 
of successful facilitation of group processes is that the facilitator's role as a 
chairperson will increasingly be taken up by other members in the group. 
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Learning inter-personal and communication skills are significant learning tasks in 
group work - to learn to give and receive positive feed-back, active listening, 
understanding and awareness of body language, the dynamics of communication 
and confidence in presenting one's point of view. The level of group members' 
inter-personal skills will significantly affect the facilitator's role in the group 
process - every group situation needs to be assessed independently and facilitators 
need to adjust their role to suit the group and the situation it is in. In some 
situations facilitators are quite clearly leaders, while in others less definitely so 
and yet in others definitely not. 
7.1.2  Learning in groups 
In groups, knowledge is created by expressing ideas and perspectives, by trying to 
make sense of information, by engaging in collective inquiry, by hearing the 
perspectives of others, by reflecting on new information and challenges, and by 
constructively challenging one's own and each other's assumptions and thought 
processes. The learners give and take - they teach and learn - simultaneously. It is 
also hypothesised (De VoIder et al.  1985) that students might learn better from 
their peers than from faculty members because of the greater congruence between 
the semantic network representations between peers than between students and 
faculty members. The group members, in other words, engage actively in doing 
what is needed for meaningful and lasting learning (Westberg and Jason, 1996). 
Ideally a learning group should comprise 5-15 students. Katz (1995) suggests lO-
IS for PBL groups, while Westberg and Jason (1996) recommend 5-8 for other 
types of small groups. Personal experience contradicts Katz's recommendation to 
some extent as groups of 15 students seem very large for PBL and the ideal 
number seems to be closer to ten. Larger groups are less successful because the 
more verbal or assertive members tend to dominate the discussion and groups 
smaller than 6 have a problem with lack of diversity, viewpoints, and ideas, 
despite the increased potential for interaction. The actual group size is naturally 
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influenced by external factors of class size, teaching facilities, and resources, but 
it should also reflect the task at hand. 
Learning in groups is based on interactions between the group members and in the 
independent study completed before, during, or after the group work. Group 
interaction can either encourage or hinder learning. The personalities of group 
members are given and cannot be changed by facilitation styles or by other group 
preparatory measures. But dysfunctional personality traits are not necessarily a 
recipe for a dysfunctional group. Even students that come across as difficult, have 
personal properties that might be useful for the group and it is the task of the 
facilitator and other group members to learn about each other in order to use the 
expertise of each group member in the best possible way. In Appendix XI - Group 
Personalities, I have briefly looked at group personality theories. 
7.2  Problem-based learning 
The idea of problem-based learning (PBL) is nothing new, but rather a very old 
approach to learning. It has a starting point in a problem, a query or a puzzle, 
which the learner wishes to solve (Boud, 1985). It is an instructional method 
characterised by the use of problems as a context for students to learn problem-
solving skills and acquire knowledge (Albanese and Mitchell, 1993). As in the 
real world, the problems can be complex and multi-faceted and not confined to the 
often artificial boundaries of a single discipline. This is particularly true for 
science ethics. 
PBL exercises have been most commonly used in medical education, where 
clinical situations are presented to students who then proceed to make a diagnosis 
and suggest treatment. PBL as a method in medical education originates from 
McMaster University in Canada, where it was established over 40 years ago. In 
medical schools PBL based curricula were adopted due to dissatisfaction with 
traditional curricula. PBL has been considered a way to provide an exciting and 
motivating way for students to learn (Barrows 1980). 
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PBL can be used to help learners at all levels and in all fields of professional 
education while PBL can take many forms depending on the subject and of the 
particular goals of the programme. Many universities have chosen to convert 
some subjects completely to PBL, e.g. the University of Glasgow medical faculty, 
but it is also possible to introduce PBL into a curriculum which maintains 
elements of traditional didactic teaching. 
Typically, PBL exercises consist of six basic elements (Barrows and Tamblyn, 
1980): 
The problem: 
1.  The problem is encountered first in the learning sequence, before any 
preparation or study has occurred. 
2.  The problem situation is presented to the students in the way it would 
present itself in reality. 
The challenge and learning needs 
3.  The students work with the problem in a manner that will permit their 
ability to reason and apply knowledge to be challenged and evaluated. 
4.  Learning needs are identified in the process of work with the problem 
and as a guide to individualised study. 
Learning results and application 
5.  The skills and knowledge acquired by study are applied back to the 
problem, to evaluate effectiveness of learning and to reinforce it. 
6.  The learning that has occurred working with the problem is summarised 
and integrated into the students' 'knowledge and skills'. 
7.2.1  What characterises a good PBL case? 
In a well-designed PBL the ways the learners approach and solve problems, and 
the ways they acquire and organise knowledge, parallel what they will need to do 
as professionals in their discipline. These activities give them practice in 
approaching and solving problems, being self-directed, and participating in the 
process of collaborative learning (Norman and Schmidt, 1992). 
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The problems are primary and all learning is directed at solving the problem, 
reaching an agreement, or presenting a recommendation. In some professional 
studies it is easy to provide students with realistic problem-situations they are 
likely to confront in their professional lives - in medical schools they can be 
presented with simulated patients manifesting particular symptoms, in engineering 
a problem requiring students to design a structure to fulfil a given purpose, and in 
law, ask students to advise a hypothetical client. In all cases the students should 
have access to all the information a real practitioner would have access to -
students can ask for results of certain medical tests, the performance requirements 
of the engineering device, or copies of the legal contracts. In science ethics PBL 
exercises, the problem can similarly represent a problem the students are likely to 
meet in their professional lives, but the problems are often less concrete and direct 
and may require students to adopt the hypothetical roles of decision-makers. The 
problems can range from a situation of personal judgement on the use of animals 
in research to deciding on the ethical acceptability of certain corporate activities. 
In designing a PBL scenario Prideaux and Farmer (1994) suggest that you 
remember to make your case: 
1.  Relevant: the problem should illustrate a problem, which is realistic to 
the students, with which they can identify. 
2.  Multifaceted: the problem should provide more than a narrow view of a 
situation, but provide a holistic view of the entire field. 
3.  Integrated: the case should link with other studies the students are 
working on in other parts of their course, to increase its relevance and 
usefulness. 
4.  Consistent: the case should be consistent with the general course-
requirements and other forms of teaching to create the best possible 
learning outcome and significance to the students. 
5.  Motivating: the problem should attract the students to find a solution 
because they see its relevance, find it intriguing intellectually, and see a 
chance of success at the end. 
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The degree of difficulty of a PBL exercise needs to be carefully weighed. The 
problem should be challenging enough to provide an opportunity to extend 
students' thinking and levels of knowledge, but not too challenging for the 
students' ability to complete it successfully. PBL exercises providing 
insurmountable challenges are less likely to be positive learning experiences: even 
though learning may occur, it is gained via negative emotions and feelings of 
inadequacy. 
A good PBL case, according to Barrows (1994), presents the students with a 
problem: 
1.  In which more information is needed for understanding the problem 
than is immediately available. 
2.  There is no one right way to get this information. 
3.  The understanding of the problem evolves and changes as new 
information is acquired. 
4.  The problem solver cannot be sure that the analysis of the problem, or 
its solution, is definitely the correct one. 
Moral questions are naturally of this kind, as they are rarely simple, information is 
often difficult to acquire, the view of the problem frequently changes during 
investigation and there is hardly ever guarantees of having arrived at the one and 
only correct answer to the problem. In many ethics PBL exercises, students are 
able to choose their own level of approach and tackle the problem according to 
their capabilities - all ethical problem can be presented in a way that students can 
comprehend and get started on, while at the same time no ethical problem is too 
trivial or easy when enough depth and rigour is applied to its analysis. Because of 
this extendible quality of ethical problems and the multitude of possible 
approaches of both kind and depth available, the presentation of the problem and 
the role of the facilitator are important for the success of the exercise. 
7.2.2  Steps in PBL 
From the students' perspective PBL consists of seven steps: 
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1.  Clarify terms and concepts not readily comprehensible 
2.  Define the problem 
3.  Analyse the problem 
4.  Draw systematic inventory of the explanations inferred from step 3 
5.  Formulate learning goals 
6.  Collect additional information outside the group 
7.  Synthesise and test newly acquired information (Matthew, 1999). 
Bransford and Stein (1993) compressed these into five steps with the acronym 
IDEAL: 
1.  Identify 
2.  Define 
3.  Examine 
4.  Act 
5.  Look 
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Even though Bransford and Stein approach problem-solving from a very practical 
and application/invention view point, their model of problem-based decision-
making is a suitable format for ethics PBLs. The description of the IDEAL 
components here differ in many places from the description given by Bransford 
and Stein, as I have adapted the original structure to suit moral problem-solving. 
The first activity in relation to any problem is the clarification of the terms and 
concepts not understood at first sight. This identification step involves finding the 
standard meanings of the terms involved in the problem scenario, either by 
discussing them with the group or consulting a dictionary. For example, if the 
PBL exercise starts with the following problem formulation: "You are a team 
working on vaccines. You have two options for future research: either the 
development of a vaccine for Meningitis or Leprosy. Present your choice with 
supportive arguments." - the students may wish to check what is meant by vaccine 
(dictionary definition: any agent used for inoculation and immunisation), 
meningitis (inflammation of the of the three membranes that envelop the brain and 
spinal cord owing to an infection) and leprosy (a chronic contagious bacterial 
.disease, usually characterised by the formation of tubercles or of painful inflamed 
Henriikka Clarkebunl, June 2000 m  Part III - Teaching Ethics  187 
nodules beneath the skin, thickening of the skin, loss of feeling, and ulceration 
and necrosis of the affected parts.) Other problems may include value-terms like 
'good' or 'fair', which require conceptual analysis in order to agree on a working 
definition for the following group discussion. 
The second step is to produce an exact definition of the problem. The key element 
is to decide, as a group, which interrelated phenomena should be explained. Many 
PBL exercises do not present difficulties in this respect, but in ethics PBL 
exercises this is possibly the most important aspect of the process. Ethical issues 
are more often than not hidden, and this requires students to investigate the 
problem deeper than the surface level before the ethical issues can be discovered. 
Ethics PBL exercises can be phrased to emphasise one particular ethical problem, 
but in most cases that is not the most realistic presentation of an ethical problem 
and more importantly, if the ethical problem is very apparent, students will not 
gain the learning experience of recognising the moral issues, which was defined in 
Part I section 3.2.1 as one of the core elements of moral development. The role of 
the facilitator in this stage is very delicate. On the one hand, facilitators should 
restrict their input to the minimum, allowing the students to determine the 
recognition process, while at the same time the facilitators need to be able to ask 
appropriate probing questions if the students either find it difficult to get started or 
if they have ignored a fundamental element in the definition of the problem. 
The definition of the problem is probably most successfully carried out as a brain-
storming session - either in the whole group together or in the group divided into 
smaller sub-groups whose results are then collected for the entire group. The 
problem definition substantially consists of recapitulation of group members' 
opinions, actual knowledge and ideas about the underlying processes, 
mechanisms, and value structures. Analysis can be a free association-round where 
students verbalise both their previous knowledge (I've read somewhere that. .. ') 
and try to formulate relevant hypotheses by reasoning (,Could it work like 
this ... '). 
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After the definition of the problem students need to examine various explanations 
to their problem. In ethics PBL exercises this means looking at possible elements 
in the ethical analysis and how to investigate them further and possibly also a 
discussion on the decision-making methodology the group is going to apply once 
they feel they have learnt enough of the different issues. An ethical problem 
consists mainly of the two elements, understanding the value-related elements of 
the problem and choosing a method of deciding between competing values in 
cases where any solution is at odds with one or more values. 
Actions taken by students involve studying the material available to them on the 
problem, discussions with each other on progress and deciding on the division of 
labour, use of methods, and time-scale. At the end of the action phase the students 
need to agree on a solution to the given problem. In many cases this is the crunch 
time for the students - they need to pull together all the information they have 
collected and compare that with their basic values and agree on a decision as a 
group. The task is multi-faceted and demanding. 
The last and important step of an ethics PBL is to return to the problem, look back 
to the analysis and make a judgement on how well the group have answered the 
questions, how satisfied they are with their work and its results. 
7.2.3  Facilitating PBL 
Through engagement with the problem students are expected to identify the kinds 
of knowledge and information they require in order to find a solution. The 
facilitator can be helpful in this process both in assisting the students to ask the 
right questions and as a source of reading material or access to other information 
sources. 
Asking the right questions is of paramount importance in ethics PBLs. The 
analysis of the problem is more crucial and difficult in many ethics PBL exercises 
in comparison to more concrete PBL exercises and the success of the exercise will 
largely depend on a well conducted initial analysis of the problem, agreed usage 
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of terminology and shared understanding of key concepts and the shareholders. 
An expert facilitator is best able to judge when the group has sufficiently analysed 
the case and should be encouraged to move forward. 
How extensively the students should be expected to find their own resources is 
highly dependable on their previous skills and on the time constraints of the 
exercise. In a pure PBL model, students are responsible for all resource 
acquisition and the facilitator is there to help with questions, but not to directly 
offer material. When time is more restricted the facilitator can act as a material 
source more directly, either providing detailed guidance on how to find it or 
providing necessary information upon request. In some cases it might also be 
necessary to provide students with a resource base (a collection of books, articles 
or other material), which should be adequate to solve the problem. The students' 
task is then to use this material to their best ability, but they are not required 
(though allowed) to request further information. In general, all the facilitator skills 
described in section 7.1.1 are applicable to facilitating ethics PBL exercises 
successfully. 
In the process of a PBL exercise students, while working in groups, may also get 
involved in a considerable amount of individual study. In many cases this may not 
differ significantly from the study a student might undertake in any course, except 
in so far as it is focused on finding answers to particular questions the student 
regards as significant to the problem. 
7.2.4  Assessing PBL 
Assessment of students performance in PBL exercises should measure student 
ability to apply the knowledge and skills learned through group and individual 
study in the problem situation. At first developing the skills of goal-setting and 
self-assessment can be very demanding, but should require less effort the more 
PBL exercises the students participate in. The assessment should reflect the 
evolving learning tasks for the students. Applying traditional exams to PBL 
exercises may be detrimental, as students would be given contradictory signals on 
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how, and for what to study. The core idea of PBL is for students to choose their 
own learning goals, while traditional exams propose those goals and measure their 
attainment according to external criteria, not against the students own learning 
goals and starting points (Barrows 1980). 
Dr Bob Matthew suggested in a private discussion that a suitable assessment for 
PBL would be a PBL-exam, where the group is asked to solve a similar problem 
within a limited time, where both their skills in finding information and working 
as a group would be measured alongside factual information. 
Another alternative would a learning log, where students would be asked to record 
their progress during the PBL exercise. This diary would be handed in at the end 
of the exercise and checked by the facilitator to make sure all group members 
participated and learnt something new. The log would be evidence of students' 
thinking and work. I heard of this approach in an informal meeting at the 
Teaching and Learning Service, University of Glasgow, and developed it further 
to be used as assessment in this project. 
7.3  Structured group discussions 
Learning through discussion should be a student-centred learning activity. The 
students are to learn from interaction with each other - and to learn not only facts 
about the subject, but also the skills of being a group member, how to 
communicate, how to lead and how to differentiate essential from noise. 
Too often discussion groups are a source of frustration and provide poor learning 
environments because they do not cover the material intended, they spend too 
much time on one aspect to the detriment of all other, get side-tracked to other 
topics, topics arise haphazardly, contributions are dominated by a few members, 
and in general lack direction and worth. But it does not have to be so: discussions 
can be wonderful learning tools in all areas of learning. Ethics in particular is 
conducive to learning through discussion as the aim of ethics teaching is to 
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encourage recognition and analysis of moral problems and where to do it better 
than in discussion with your peers. 
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Not all groups talking together form a structured discussion group in the 
educational sense. Ross (1994) suggests a continuum of discussion types that 
ranges from raw debate to polite discussion, to skilful discussion and finally to 
dialogue. The further the group moves towards dialogue the more attention is paid 
to revealing and examining the assumptions and values behind the words that are 
spoken. In Ross's analysis the primary difference between skilful discussion and 
dialogue is intention - in skilful discussion the group intends to reach some sort of 
closure (make a decision, achieve agreement, identify priorities etc.) while in 
dialogue the group's intention is exploration, discovery, insight and a richer grasp 
of complex issues. Dialogue may result in an agreement, but that is not its primary 
purpose. The ethics discussions conducted in this research fall into both the 
categories of skilful discussion and dialogue. Sometimes it helps students to focus 
on a particular task, while in others, it is possible to hold their interest with pure 
dialogues. Exercises devised for this research involved both skilful discussions 
and dialogues. In many cases the same group will be encouraged to do both, either 
in the same session or in consecutive sessions. Therefore for the sake of simplicity 
I will below use the term discussion to cover both skilful discussion and dialogue. 
A good ethics discussion topic is similar to a good PBL one: 
1.  it provides a cognitive challenge to the students, 
2.  there are clearly more than one possible answer to the ethical dilemma, 
3.  the topic can be adequately approached using different ethical theories, 
and 
4.  it has relevance to students' own experiences. 
Bioethical topics, like the use of animals in research, or development of 
genetically modified (OM) organisms for commercial use, provide excellent 
topics for successful ethics discussions. They are challenging both cognitively and 
ethically: the scientific issues are complex and the ethical problems relating to 
these issues are debated in public and general agreement does not prevail. These 
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bioethical dilemmas can also be 'solved' using different ethical theories: for 
example, we can consider the animal testing issue from a utilitarian point of view 
(minimising harm and maximising benefit) or from a deontological angle (what 
rights do animals have?). Bioscience students also have immediate personal 
experiences with animal testing, and their science careers are intimately tied to 
difficult research questions, such as GM crops. 
Discussions are usually most effective when they are provoked by external events 
(panel discussions, visits etc.) or internal events (reading, videos, role plays etc.). 
The use of narratives has provided a good starting point for many discussion 
groups as they can provide a safe access to very personal fears and emotions. 
Reading stories means participating imaginatively in other lives. This encourages 
readers to construct their own stories in relation to the reading and consequently 
the readers come to know themselves better (Weisberg and Duffin, 1995). These 
events generate interest, focus attention, and create a relevant context. In the 
discussion exercises created for this research the discussion was provoked by 
internal events, mainly reading before the session. Most reading was academic in 
order to maximise cognitive learning within a very limited framework. Fictitious 
material could have been included if more time had been available. 
7.3.1  Structure of a discussion 
Rabow et ai.  (1994) provide a procedural tool that outlines an orderly sequence a 
group can follow in order to learn from discussion. The approach is based on a 
group having done reading prior to the discussion. The procedure has eight steps: 
1.  Checking in  (2-4 minutes) 
2.  Vocabulary 
3.  General statements of author's message 
4.  Identification and discussion of major themes 
(3-4 minutes) 
(5-6 minutes) 
(10-12 minutes) 
(15-16 minutes) 
(10-12 minutes) 
(3-4 minutes) 
5.  Application of material to other works 
6.  Application of material to self 
7.  Evaluation of author's presentation 
8.  Evaluation of group and individual performance  (7-8 minutes) 
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Checking in.  Checking in is not a feature of the first meeting alone, when all 
members get to know each other, but a feature of all discussion sessions. It allows 
students to greet one another and express feelings related to the group discussion. 
This will help to establish a good working environment by showing concern and 
interest in what everyone thinks and has to say. This should be kept brief though! 
Vocabulary. The act of defining terms is not only helpful for the further 
discussion, but is also learning in itself. In philosophical texts the vocabulary 
check is not only clarifying the dictionary meaning of an unfamiliar word, but it 
should also include discussion on how certain words are going to be used in the 
discussion. Philosophers can spend endless hours on deciding what is meant by 
basic moral concepts like fairness, or goodness and while students are not 
encouraged to engage in such in-depth analysis of terminology, they should be 
encouraged to think of alternative ways of using the value-terms and to agree on 
some basic ground rules for their discussion regarding word usage. An often heard 
question in philosophical discussion is  'what to do mean by benefit in this 
context?' or 'Define useful' - this is essential and vocabulary issues should be 
revisited later in the discussion if (and when) confusion arises. 
General statement of  author's message. The purpose of this step is to form an 
overall understanding of the assigned reading. In some cases this is very easy as 
the author might have provided a purpose statement or the title of the reading will 
clarify the issue beyond much doubt. But even when the task is simple, students 
should attempt to state the meaning in their own words, and when this is well 
done it launches the group into the next step. It may be beneficial to ask all 
students to prepare a short, one paragraph, statement on the author's intent before 
the session in order to get the maximum benefit from this element. 
Identification and discussion of  major themes. Reading material can be broken 
down into several important themes and SUb-topics. For the sake of time 
management, a discussion group should not identify more than three or four 
topics. If  more than four themes emerge, the group may have to decide which are 
Henriikka Clarkeburn, June 2000 ~  Part III - Teaching Ethics  194 
most significant or decide to continue the discussion in the next session when 
possible. In philosophical texts, identification of themes is of major importance as 
themes often represent different ethical problems that need to be discussed in 
order to gain full understanding of the ethical elements in a particular dilemma. 
Identification of themes as a group is likely to create more diverse understanding 
of ethical problems and encourage students to learn from each other on the type of 
issues that can be recognised in an ethical problem. Therefore this step is essential 
in encouraging better recognition of ethical elements, which was chosen as one of 
the key aims of ethics teaching. Again, students should be prompted to consider 
these elements in advance. 
The learning through discussion method should place greater emphasis on 
determining what the author has to say on a particular topic than on the opinions 
of the students. To a large extent that is important for ethics discussions as well, 
for learning the skills of recognition and analysis is often best achieved by 
analysing the text first before launching into discussions on personal views and 
opinions. Students often have very strong ideas of moral problems while they 
have read very little on the subject. If personal views are discussed before the 
author's, less learning is likely to take place as the discussion may become more a 
platform to strengthen personal views than an opportunity to learn something new 
which mayor may not influence personal opinions. Also, groups starting the 
discussion with personal opinion may never get to discuss the author's message. 
So identification of major themes should not concentrate on the students' personal 
views, while time needs to be allocated for that as well in order to give the 
students an opportunity to exercise commitment to values. 
Application of  Material to Other Works.  To counteract an often prominent feature 
of learning - its fragmentation with isolated facts out of context - discussion 
groups put aside time to make a conscious effort to relate the reading to previous 
learning situations. This allows the group to be able to evaluate the relevance of 
what is being said. The purpose of an application is to take the arguments of one 
author and either refute or support them by cross-referencing them with another 
expert point of view. 
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In ethics discussions, science students are not likely to have many reference points 
on philosophical theory to draw from and to compare different expert opinions. 
What they have, on the other hand, is plentiful experience - either direct or 
indirect - of similar moral issues and of different ways of approaching and solving 
them. This would be the time to let students explore the level of identification 
between different moral issues they are aware of and to create a mental map of 
where the discussed problem touches on other similar problems and how these 
issues are possibly linked. 
Application of  the material to the self. Self-application encourages students to 
make the discussion personal. This is likely to increase the significance of the 
learning as long as the topic has some value to the students: it can deepen and 
challenge their understanding of themselves, their relationships, and the 
collectives to which they belong. The aim is not only to state one's personal 
opinions on moral issues, but to seek a contact point of the moral issues to one's 
personal life. If, for example, the issue is animal welfare in research, the students 
can reflect back to laboratory work they have carried out involving animals. 
Evaluation of  the author's presentation. This is an opportunity for the group to 
express their reaction to the reading - whether they felt frustrated, excited, bored 
or bewildered. The purpose of this part of the discussion is not fully served unless 
the students provide reasons for their feelings - 'I felt frustrated because the text 
had no structure, it was a lot easier after I wrote down the main points and then 
tried to read it again'. Emotional unloading is important, but it is even more 
important to rise above that and provide a well-considered appraisal of the theory, 
the logic, the method, and the conclusions of the author. 
Evaluation of  group and individual peliormances. This step is essential, but 
possibly the one that meets most resistance - the task of evaluating one's own 
performance and that of others. The facilitator of the group can assist the 
evaluation by asking questions (modified from Rabow et al., 1994, p. 21): 
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1.  How well do you feel we covered the subject? 
2.  What areas did we as a group agree upon? What did we disagree upon? 
Do you feel everyone was heard and understood? 
3.  Were there questions that would have needed further clarification? 
4.  What areas of disagreement did we find that we could not agree upon in 
the end? 
5.  Who contributed greatly to the discussion? If  you feel you did not 
contribute that well today, why do you think that is? 
These questions should help students to express who and what helped them, who 
and what was constructive and who and what inhibited the discussion. It will be 
hard to confront non-functional and disruptive behaviour in the group, but that 
must be done during the evaluation in order for the group to improve their ability 
to work together. Likewise, supportive and co-operative behaviour should be 
applauded and encouraged. One of the ground rules I set for the evaluation was 
that students could directly criticise only themselves or me (the facilitator). This 
was to pre-empt any possibility of personal attacks that would have been 
detrimental to the group's future work. 
According to Rabow et at.  (1994) the times given for each step are better adhered 
to quite strictly in the early stages of a discussion group. If  this is done, all steps 
will become part of the group members' expectations of the discussion. Later, 
when all members have internalised the structure, the group will have more 
freedom to alter the structure to cater for specific texts or the needs of the group. 
7.4  Summary 
Supporting student participation as independent moral agents requires a student-
centred approach to both teaching and learning. This means that the students have 
an increasing responsibility for their learning together with increasing rights to 
make decisions regarding their learning aims, methods and schedule. Student-
centred learning does not mean teacher-free learning, but it does change the 
teacher's role from a fact-giver to a facilitator of student learning. Good 
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facilitators are not necessarily specialists in the subject, but they need to have 
enthusiasm and skill to ask questions that encourage student learning, know-how 
on resources and a desire to promote learning. Being a specialist gives the 
facilitator additional skills, because an expert facilitator is more able to ask the 
right questions and make sure that no important element has been dismissed by 
the students. 
Two approaches to teaching ethics are discussed in this chapter; problem based 
learning (PBL), and structured discussion groups. A successful PBL exercise has 
a problem that catches students' interest, offers an opportunity to discuss and 
study all the issues relating to the case and is not be too broad to overwhelm or 
discourage the students. PBL offers a excellent approach to studying ethics. 
Structured discussion groups can be organised around a problem similar to PBLs, 
but they also offer an opportunity for a more focused study of particular moral 
issues, for example animal rights. Discussion groups are not meant to be free-
flowing exchanges of opinions, but structured assessment and analysis of the 
issues, usually based on reading completed before the session. 
The teaching approaches considered in this chapter indicate that there are several 
interactive methods for teaching ethics, which should fall into the category of 
successful teaching approaches by allowing a strong student-centred approach and 
involvement of students as moral agents. 
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8.  Teaching strategy 
There are several different ways of introducing ethics into the science curriculum 
and the one detailed in this chapter is just one of many. The University Survey 
(see Appendix I - University Survey) carried out at the start of this research 
described three main approaches: 
1.  Module/course devoted to ethics, either as an option or a compulsory 
course. 
2.  Incorporation of ethics material into the subject matter of a science 
course i.e. ethics as integral rather than 'other'. 
3.  Informal discussions (tutorials). 
The last of these options relies on the staff members' interest in ethics and usually 
no attempt is made to monitor the effectiveness of ethics discussions nor is ethics 
assessed. The second option has more structure and provides an opportunity to 
assess ethics as part of exam questions. The benefit of this approach is the close 
interaction between science and ethics which can highlight the role of ethics in 
good scientific practice. The difficulty of this approach is lack of ethical training 
of scientific staff and possible down-playing of ethics in comparison to the 
scientific content of the courses. The first option, an ethics course, provides an 
opportunity to approach ethics in a more structured fashion, but may not be as 
effective in highlighting the interaction of ethics and science for students. Ethics 
can remain as an isolated and disconnected element in the curriculum. 
In IBLS, students are introduced to ethical thinking in several different ways. In 
level I, all biological sciences students participate in two exercises which require 
them to consider scientific practices from the point of view of ethics: The Alien 
Squirrel exercise and the Cloning debate. The Alien Squirrel exercise has been 
found to have a significant impact on students values in environmental decision-
making and to improve their self-reported group skills (Clarkeburn et at.,  2000). 
In level 2, one of the options is a module in  'Science Communication', which 
covers in detail areas of scientific misconduct and integrity. Ethics is also 
discussed in tutorials. 
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This chapter outlines the research arrangement for teaching ethics to science 
undergraduates at the University of Glasgow during the 1999-2000 academic 
session. It provides a description of the practical arrangements for integration of 
ethics into the science curriculum. Three elements are considered in detail: 1) how 
time restrictions influence the choice of teaching styles, 2) how the ethics courses 
could be included in the general assessment, and why in most cases they weren't, 
and 3) how topics were chosen. This is followed by a description of the course 
contents. The chapter ends with a summary. 
8.1  Time constraints and ethics in fBLS 
In reality external factors limit the opportunities to create an ideal teaching 
approach to encourage moral development. Time is the greatest limiting factor in 
the design of an integrated undergraduate science ethics course. The time within 
the existing curriculum has been allocated before the introduction of ethics, and 
the introduction of ethics requires something else to be removed in order to make 
room for the new teaching. Very few elements in the current curriculum can be 
judged irrelevant or unessential (they have been included based on their 
importance) and the teaching staff is understandably reluctant to cut down on the 
current contact hours dedicated to their courses. Ideally then, ethics should be 
integrated into science curricula simultaneously with other major changes. 
General restructuring of the curriculum would allow ethics to be integrated 
without the laborious negotiations and compromises required when it is 
introduced into an already existing curriculum. 
In the University of Glasgow's Institute of Biomedical and Life Sciences (IBLS), 
where this research took place, a decision was made to introduce ethics into the 
third year curriculum (L3). The reasons for choosing L3 as the research 
population were dominantly negative i.e. other levels were unsuitable for the 
following reasons: 
1.  L1  biology modules have a student population of 800+ and the smallest 
group teaching takes place in laboratories groups of 50 students. 
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Further the course structure was very rigid and provided only very 
limited opportunities to introduce even a minimal ethics component. 
2.  L2 contains a selection of core modules and elective modules, which 
form a structure where it would have been impracticable to maintain 
control and test groups. 
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3.  In L4 students are partly involved with their research projects which do 
not provide access to them as a group, and partly with highly structured 
option courses where control and test groups could not have been 
established. 
L3 students are divided between 14 different honours courses
l  studying more or 
less independently of each other. The choice was then made to treat each honours 
course as an independent component and design the ethics intervention for each 
course individually. Four of the L3 courses - Anatomy, Biochemistry and Medical 
Biochemistry, Neuroscience, and Biotechnology - were unable or unwilling to 
take part in the research. 
Out of the remaining 10 courses 8 had ethics introduced as part of their existing 
tutorial scheme, while the remaining two (Parasitology and Microbiology, and 
Sport Science) were in a process of major curriculum changes, which allowed an 
introduction of a more extensive ethics course using the PBL format. 
The PBL ethics courses consisted of 14 (Sport Science) to 30 (Parasitology and 
Microbiology) hours of study, out of which 4 and 10 respectively were contact 
hours. The tutorial scheme ethics teaching had an average of 5-10 hours of study 
out of which 3-6 were contact time. If  more time had been available across the 
courses each course would have had either an ethics PBL or a more extensive 
discussion programme with a minimum of 5 meetings each including at least an 
hour of independent study. Unfortunately this was untenable with the restricted 
opportunities to arrange contact hours with the students and due to limitations set 
I These course are: Anatomy, Aquatic Bioscience, Biochemistry and Medical Biochemistry, 
Biomedical Sciences, Biotechnology, Botany, Genetics and Molecular Biology, Immunology, 
Neuroscience, Parasitology and Microbiology, Pharmacology, Physiology, Sport Science, and 
Zoology. 
Henriikka Clarkebul'll, June 2000 m  Part III - Teaching Ethics  201 
by the course co-ordinators on the amount of hours the students could be expected 
to study ethical issues independently. Even though ethics was considered 
important by all course co-ordinators, it was still in most cases considered a threat 
to the time students spent on studying science. This attitude was in part because 
the new ethics course was at this stage experimental and unlikely in most cases to 
form part of the assessment. Thus only limited time was made available for ethics 
teaching. 
Alternative points for contact of ethics were significantly reduced by the decision 
to have control groups within each course, as ethics could not be introduced in 
small snippets into existing laboratory work, which could have otherwise offered 
an optional entry for ethics into the science curriculum. This might be a preferable 
introduction method if ethics is introduced without additional research 
requirements. 
The time available for the ethics teaching was less than what was aimed for, based 
on previous research which indicates that in order to produce significant 
acceleration and gain in moral development, the teaching programme should be 
no shorter than 4 weeks and no longer than12. The teaching within the tutorial 
schemes falls short of these guidelines, while the PBL courses were within the 
medium length programme limits which was found to produce the highest moral 
development gains (Schlaefli et al., 1985). 
The lack of contact time in the tutorial scheme was partly compensated by giving 
students reading before every contact session, which increases the time they spend 
on actively considering ethical issues and extended the time period when ethical 
issues are part of their study programme. For similar purposes the tutorial sessions 
were held on average two weeks apart, in some cases even in different terms to 
increase the time period when students are expected to keep ethical issues in their 
minds. 
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8.2  Programme design in IBLS 
The three session tutorial discussions were organised so that the discussion in the 
first session concentrated on moral sensitivity issues by presenting the students 
with a situation containing plentiful moral aspects and encouraging them to 
identify these. The second session concentrated on moral decision-making tools 
and the third session on personal moral values and how they affect the entire 
decision-making process. The details of time allocation and themes in each L3 
course are given in Appendix XII - L3 Structured Discussion Programme'. 
In the PBL programmes, students were given problems that have several ethical 
elements, though these elements were not apparent in the problem outline. The 
problems were designed so that successful solution cannot be found without 
ethical considerations. The PBL exercises therefore required students to exercise 
their moral sensitivity skills as well as reflect on their personal values. See 
Appendix XIII - PBL for a detailed account on these exercises. 
One of the problems in motivating students to take an interest in ethics is the lack 
of opportunities to assess the introduced ethics components. Based on anecdotal 
evidence, students seem to have a tendency to take an interest only in the course 
elements that directly contribute towards their final marks. All other elements are 
considered less important and removed from the priority list first. The lack of 
assessment limits the external motivation for students to study ethics. This can be 
viewed as an opportunity as well as a problem. When students discuss ethics 
without assessment pressures, the interest thus sparked is internal and possibly 
better retained in the future. The problem remains that possibly only small 
numbers of students gain a personal interest in the subject. The lack of assessment 
also has further negative implications. Teaching without assessment fails to 
highlight the importance of ethics as an important part of the curriculum and of 
being a scientist. Without assessment ethics is easily viewed as an additional, not 
integral, part of the curriculum, something that is not really important. 
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Assessment could not be introduced for most of the L3 ethics sessions, at least in 
this research, for several reasons. The three main ones were: 
1.  Lack of time to carry out internal quality assurance procedures for 
assessing a new piece of teaching. 
2.  Problem with equality if different assessment methods were created for 
students participating in the ethics teaching and those who didn't. This 
might have caused unacceptable inequality between students. 
3.  Tutorial schemes are a non-assessed part of the curriculum, at least in 
some degree courses. 
As a result, Immunology was the only course with a discussion programme which 
included assessment, in the form of an optional question in the term 2 class test. 
The PBL based ethics courses on the other hand were included in the assessment, 
which was purely skill-based so that the same assessment could apply to both the 
research and test groups (Details in Appendix XIII - PBL). 
8.3  Facilitator 
In both PBL and structured discussions the facilitator can influence the learning 
process greatly - both positively and negatively. For research purposes all ethics 
teaching for this research was carried out by a single facilitator (myself) with co-
facilitators for assisting with large groups. This resulted in a very substantial work 
load, but also a wonderful opportunity to experience the learning process first 
hand. 
8.4  Choice of topics 
One of the important elements in ethics teaching is to choose the study material so 
that it provides the students with the most relevant moral problems, which are 
focused and structured to provide a good opportunity for learning and discussion. 
One of the core assumptions in this research is that ethics should be integrated as 
far as possible with the existing science curriculum so that ethics does not stand 
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out as a separate issue from science, but links with it at as many points as 
possible. These links are assumed to provide a useful parallel for future 
recognition of moral problems in science and thus increase the usefulness of the 
ethics teaching, as well as providing motivation for students to study them in the 
first place. 
The topics for each L3 course were chosen in collaboration with the course co-
ordinators. As a starting point, the co-ordinators were given a list of three possible 
categories of moral problems within which the most relevant teaching was 
assumed to fall. These categories were: 
1.  Research and Professional Ethics 
..  Applied science - distribution of benefits, control and 
responsibility 
•  Values in science - are there issues we should not study? Is 
science really neutral? 
•  Fraud and scientific integrity. 
411  Animals in research 
•  Research design and testing hypotheses - risk assessment, 
autonomy of research subjects and benefits of research 
2.  Environmental Ethics 
•  Importance of diversity/natural environment 
411  Ecology vs. Economy - whose interests? 
3.  Genetic Ethics 
411  Genetic engineering - nature vs. nurture, risk assessment, 
distribution of benefits 
•  genetic testing/screening - what, who and when? 
..  changes in the gene-pool - whose duties and rights? 
Based on this list I met with each course co-ordinator to discuss both the 
possibility of introducing ethics to their L3 course and to find out what were the 
topics they believed to be the most important in their field and which they 
subsequently believed the students to both have interest in and to benefit most 
from. In these discussions, all course co-ordinators suggested moral issues 
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relating to their scientific discipline from more than one category, while all 
suggested at least one moral theme from the first category of research and 
professional ethics. 
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The themes were then further discussed with the L3 students in spring 1999. The 
issue of animal use in research rose above all others in student discussions. This 
interest and other student suggestions were included in the list of topics. The 
students interests were very similar to those of their course co-ordinators and the 
student discussions gave further support that the chosen topics would provide the 
learning base they were designed to provide - genuine interest and scientific 
relevance for the L3 students. 
The course material development that followed involved two main tasks: 
finding/writing suitable reading material to accompany the sessions and design of 
the course outline. Using pre-existing material from a variety of sources was 
preferred to writing material specifically for the ethics courses in order to 
maintain as wide a perspective on the ethical issues as possible, and to highlight 
the interdependent links between ethics and science. The preliminary materials 
were then discussed again with the course co-ordinators and some of them were 
tried out with volunteer student groups. Student hand-outs were developed in the 
last stage of course development. 
8.5  Summary 
The restrictions placed on ethics teaching by both structural and organisational 
matters reduced the ethics teaching to less than it ideally should be. To 
compensate for this lack of contact time the exercises had independent study time 
included. This independent study increased the active time ethical issues were 
considered and with spacing the contact and independent study periods 
appropriately the ethics teaching extended to match the lower limits of successful 
ethics programme design. The organisation and structural restrictions also dictated 
the choice of teaching approaches. With limited hours for both contact and 
independent study PBLs were not even an option for most L3 courses. 
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The guideline for choosing discussion and PBL topics for the ethics teaching was 
their relevance and ethical complexity. During the choosing process students and 
staff members were widely consulted. 
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PART IV - Results 
The previous Parts and chapters have described the theory behind and 
preparation for the ethics intervention at Glasgow University in 1999-2000. This 
Part details the outcomes and results of that intervention. 
There are three main types of results: 
1.  Students' self-reported learning gains and benefits of ethics teaching. 
2.  Analyses of learning logs. 
3.  Results from the Moral Development Questionnaire. 
It is important to look at all of these outcome types in context. Whether or not we 
can objectively say that students have 'learnt' something during the ethics 
teaching, it is important for two reasons to find out what they themselves believe 
they have learnt. First, the Moral Development Questionnaire may not detect all 
types of learning and benefits students gain from ethics teaching. The students' 
self-reported learning can thus provide an important insight into the learning 
experience. Second, student experience is an important factor in motivation, 
which in turn influences learning. If  the students find ethics teaching exciting, 
challenging, and rewarding, they are more likely to develop a growing interest in 
ethics, which facilitates their moral development in the longer term. 
The first chapter in Part IV describes the use of the teaching material developed 
for the ethics courses and analyses the student responses collected in conjunction 
with the teaching. Chapter 10 details the analyses carried out on students' 
learning logs. 
The results from the Moral Development Questionnaire can stand to support the 
teaching approach chosen. They can provide objective data about students' moral 
development. The Moral Development Questionnaire has three distinct parts, 
which are in chapter 11  analysed separately first and then comparisons between 
the parts are made. 
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The Moral Development Questionnaire as a measure may not be able to detect 
the smallest of changes in moral development due to two factors: 
1.  The Questionnaire (in particular DIT) is developed to measure long-
term development and the small changes resulting from a minimal 
ethics intervention may not be detectable, even though they may 
function as a starting point for further development. 
2.  The changes to be expected are relatively small, and they may be 
masked by the general noise in the results. 
Chapter 11  describes the Moral Development Questionnaire results in the same 
order as the different elements appeared in the questionnaire itself: 
1.  Moral Sensitivity 
2.  DIT 
3.  Perry 
4.  Comparisons between parts 
In this research, even though it was not possible to introduce ethics into the 
Levell biology curriculum, LI students filled in the Moral Development 
Questionnaire at the start of the academic year. These data provide us with an 
opportunity to study natural moral development during the early academic years. 
These results are discussed in chapter 12. 
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9.  Course material and student responses 
The application of the Moral Development Questionnaire gives out of context 
appraisal on the impact of ethics exercises. It measures how students' thinking in 
general is affected by this new teaching element. Another way to look at the 
success of ethics exercises is to ask the students themselves what they have 
learnt and how they see the benefits of ethics teaching. 
In order to collect this information, I asked students to write answers to three 
questions at each ethics exercise session. The first one was to gauge their views -
partially at least - based on the pre-exercise reading. An additional benefit was to 
focus student attention on the subject of each exercise at the start of the session. 
This was done before any discussion had taken place. Then, right at the end of 
each session students were asked to write what they thought was the main 
learning gain of that exercise, and what was still unclear. These answers could 
then be compared with the set learning objectives for each exercise and the 
inherent components of each ethical theme discussed. 
These written responses were collected anonymously. This was done to 
encourage honesty in the student responses. When asked, the students did say 
that having to put their name on the paper most possibly would have changed 
what they wrote. The down-side of anonymous responses is the inability to 
compare individual students' responses to different exercises, and whether 
enthusiasm towards the exercises is reflected in the moral development scores. 
So honesty was the trade-off for some research benefits. Was I to do this again, I 
would probably encourage students to write their names on the forms, though 
emphasising that they should not do so, if they would answer any differently 
because of it. 
The student hand-outs can be found in the appendices (XIV  -XX). All the reading 
material was photocopied for the students and the material was in most cases 
given approximately a week in advance. All that students knew about the 
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sessions was written on the introductory page of their hand-out. They were thus 
not given a list of objectives for each course, but rather a set of general aims. 
This chapter consists of seven sections, each describing one discussion exercise. 
In each section, the motivation for the exercise is discussed first, and that is 
followed by a brief outline of how the discussions progressed and were 
facilitated. The second half of each section is an analysis of the written 
responses. Each question is looked at separately and a short appraisal of the 
results is given. Each section has got its own short summary, and the material 
and student responses are in general summarised at the end of this chapter. 
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9.1  Animals in scientific research 
18 groups of 8-14 L3 students participated in the 2-hour 'Animals in scientific 
research' exercise during first and second term in the academic year of 1999-
2000. This was the first session in all ethics programmes, with the exception of 
Botany. I chose to start with this theme for two reasons: 
1.  The ethical issues are apparent. 
2.  Most students have views on the subject and it has direct implications 
on their life as students and their career choices in life sciences. 
For these reasons the 'Animals in scientific research' exercise has direct 
relevance to the students and getting started with the discussion is not dependent 
on highly developed moral sensitivity. 
Prior to the session students were given two short readings; an introductory text 
on moral theories (see appendix 'Animals in scientific research') and either an 
extract from Katz's (1997) book on 'Nature as subject' which gives a 
controversial view on animal testing or a short descriptive paper on the issues for 
and against animal testing which I prepared specifically for this purpose. I also 
prepared the introductory text mainly as reference material for students reading 
Katz's paper, which for most of them was their first attempt to understand 
philosophical writing. The purpose of this paper later evolved to be a short 
introduction to different decision-making methods students have at their 
disposal. Though the paper provides insight into two quite complicated 
philosophical decision-making methods (deontological and utilitarian), the 
students reacted to it positively. My impression was that they had only in very 
limited terms ever previously considered the methods they use in moral decision-
making and the explicit explanation of two alternative, and often conflicting, 
methods functioned as a catalyst for exploring further alternatives. The more 
experience I had with this exercise the more thoroughly I tried to challenge the 
students to consider the usefulness of these theories and to explore alternative 
ones. 
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Katz's text was not only controversial (suggesting that animals are human 
artefacts and thus we do not need to care about the pain we cause them) but also 
demanding in its use of philosophical terminology and writing style. It was 
chosen because it covered all the elements in the debate and provided a good 
starting point for a discussion by not shying away from making a point. But 
students found it sometimes too demanding and discouraging to read. I believe in 
challenging the students, but I realise that the message is wasted if the students 
as a result do not complete the reading. So as a response to student criticism I 
wrote a simpler, shorter and less controversial text covering the same issues. 
Students were less frustrated with the modified text, but also less enthused to 
discuss the issues. Were I to start again now, I would probably either keep the 
Katz paper or write a new one which includes the controversial element of Katz's 
paper, but one addressing the issues in a less complicated format. Despite the 
change of reading material, the session outline remained the same, though more 
was required of the facilitator when the material did not in itself provoke student 
reaction. 
Each session started with students writing a brief (maximum 2 minutes) answer 
to the question: 'What do you think is the most important issue of  animal rights 
and animal welfare?'. There were two reasons for this:  1) to focus student 
attention on the subject at the start of the session, and 2) to collect data on-their 
priorities regarding animal rights and welfare. Later in the session, when 
different points were considered, students were encouraged to share their 
viewpoints with the group. 
Short introductions followed the written task. Students were asked to give their 
name and say how they felt about the reading. I encouraged honesty in stating 
their feelings, and honesty I got. Students were straightforward with their 
frustration, boredom and/or interest in the text. Katz's paper unsurprisingly 
provoked more frustration in both his style and the views he put forward, but 
most students had still found it interesting. The tailor-made paper received a lot 
less emotional response, though the level of interest was maintained. 
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The introductions were an important ice-breaker in the first of the ethics 
sessions. They set an informal and open atmosphere, where students' views were 
appreciated and participation encouraged. At least that is my interpretation of 
their impact. 
The vocabulary clarifications which followed were an opportunity to bring up 
some of the philosophical issues. For Katz's paper, students wanted clarifications 
of the following terms: normative ethics, intrinsic, empirical, reductio ad 
absurdum, holism, utilitarianism, and deontological. In most groups, students 
themselves asked for further clarification for deontological theory and 
utilitarianism, and if they didn't I asked them to explain in their words how they 
had understood them. More often than I would have liked, I found myself 
lecturing at this point, students shying away from the discussion. Not all groups 
joined the discussion, but with the groups that actively contributed to the 
vocabulary clarification, the discussion resulted in very fruitful exchanges and 
student enthusiasm was palpable. 
Vocabulary out of the way, the group listed all the main issues they had found in 
the text: speciesism, pain and animal welfare, and when can we justify pain. 
Speciesism involves a complex argument about our inability to differentiate 
humans and non-human animals. The core of the argument is that if we cannot 
define humanity in any other terms than our genetic make-up, we are making 
moral judgements based on irrelevant characteristics not dissimilar to racism and 
sexism. First the students were asked to suggest ways to describe humans in 
order to distinguish humans from other animals. Their answers were along the 
lines of intelligence, consciousness, and communications skills. Then we 
explored whether other animals would have these skills, and in most cases the 
agreement was that some of them do, at least to a degree. The line was blurred 
further when the discussion turned to find out whether all humans possess these 
qualities and the agreement arose that not all do. The students had a strong 
intuitive feeling that people are more important than animals, but struggled to 
find reasons why. We then looked at the issue from another perspective by 
asking ourselves what would happen if DNA was allowed to be a decisive 
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characteristic when making moral judgements. Most groups quickly identified 
problems of sexism and racism to follow from this, though on many an occasion 
the consequences of accepting this type of reasoning needed to be outlined to 
them. At this point many groups discussed the importance of consistency of 
moral rules. The agreement was that this is a strong argument against use of 
animals in testing for safety and efficacy of new compounds, though it went 
against their intuitive judgement for the higher importance of humans. During 
several sessions that strength of the intuitive feeling for the superiority of 
humans persisted despite an inability to support it. The discussion that followed 
was in many groups partly undermined with the inner-feeling 'that humans are 
always more important'. 
The groups then discussed the role and importance of pain. Most groups quickly 
established that animals can feel pain and that not all pain is bad. Good pain was 
described as something that protects the individual and/or teaches something 
valuable. Almost as quickly they agreed that pain endured by a laboratory animal 
is rarely, if ever, good pain from the point of view of that animal, though the pain 
might benefit other individuals. All groups also agreed that pain experienced by 
animals counts for 'something'. At this point I often encouraged the students to 
try to establish a cut-off point for which animals are included in their moral 
considerations. To illustrate my point I would ask how they would react if 
someone pulled the tail of a cat really hard for no apparent reason. Most thought 
it would be wrong and they would try to stop it. Then I suggested that they'd see 
someone poke a mouse with a hot iron, again for no apparent reason. Same 
response. Further, what if someone pulled the wings off a lady bug, and again 
students objected. Further I suggested putting needles into a tapeworm and 
students agreed that that should not be done for fun and entertainment. This then 
established that there is a default schema of not hurting and that we need special 
justification for performing painful tests on animals. 
The natural progression from here was to discuss in what circumstances we 
could justify animal experiments. Most groups came up with the division 
between cosmetics and medical research first. Use of animals in cosmetic 
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research was condemned because make-up is not essential or necessary. To 
further define 'essential' or 'necessary' I encouraged the students to consider 
whether it would make a difference if 1) the number of people that would benefit 
would be 2 or 10 000, 2) whether the condition was fatal and a cure could be 
found, or whether successful research would 'only' improve quality of life, and 
3) whether the research would improve quality of life or survival chances by 1  % 
or 50%. In all groups students needed to be explicitly encouraged to consider 
different sources of criteria, but once the issues were on the table the discussion 
flowed freely and enthusiastically. The common trend was to start with a very 
limited definition of 'necessary' which then was broadened as students explored 
their feelings by applying the situation to themselves, 'what if that one person 
was my mum?' or 'what if it was my quality of life?'. 
At this point I introduced utilitarian calculus again, and asked them to think of 
this decision-making as an exercise in finding a positive balance between the 
level of harm and the level of benefit a particular animal experiment would 
produce. At this point the group was clear on the side of benefits and needed to 
think of what would need to be considered on the side of harm. Students 
discussed whether it mattered what animals were used: often they thought it did -
it was harder to imagine an acceptable test with primates than with flies. Number 
of animals was included on the side of harm together with the level of pain the 
animals would have to endure. The latter point often raised questions on our 
ability to know in how much pain the animals are. Further, many groups included 
the harm that would result if we did not carry out the experiment. 
In evaluating the strength of the elements in the harm and benefit calculus I often 
asked the students to consider how they would determine their confidence in the 
chances of the research and how that would influence their evaluation of the 
elements. First they listed things that would give them confidence: previous 
research and previous experiments. Then they considered if different confidence 
levels (e.g. 20% or 80%) that an experiment would be successful (would result in 
a cure for example) would influence their decision how 'necessary' particular 
research is. Again most students were more stringent first but the more they 
Henriikka Clarkeblll'll, JUlie 2000 m  Part IV - Results  216 
thought about it, the less important high confidence levels became. 
Unsurprisingly none of the groups came up with a definite formula they would 
follow, but that was not the aim of the exercise. Regardless of the confidence 
levels or the balance of benefits and harms, most groups agreed that research 
should always be designed to involve the least amount of animals possible; that 
animals should be well cared for, and that animals should not be used unless that 
was the only way to get the results. 
To tie the theoretical discussion together with reality, students were then asked to 
offer their personal views on animal testing, how they had felt about the use of 
animals during their course, how much these issues would influence their future 
career choices, and whether they consider animal research issues when making 
consumer choices. Discussions on the use of animals in teaching were in most 
instances lively, with some students rejecting them strongly and others defending 
their inclusion for learning benefits. Also students had strong views on whether 
they would be ready to do animal research themselves even if they accepted it 
and saw the possible hypocrisy embedded in their conclusions. 
The sessions were wrapped up by asking all students to briefly describe what 
they had learnt during the session, if anything, and how they would improve the 
sessions in the future. Only a negligible number of students said they had not 
learnt anything or that they found the sessions uninteresting. Improvement 
suggestions were of two kinds; practical and self-critical. Practical suggestions 
often included a round table to sit around, a warmer room or having the reading 
earlier. Self-critical comments pointed out the importance of reading the material 
next time, or to participate more/less. In cases when it was possible to change the 
session according to students' comments, it was always done. Before leaving, the 
students were asked to write down answers to two further questions:  'What is the 
big point you learned from the discussion today?' and 'What is the main 
unanswered question you leave the discussion with today?'. Further, students 
were asked to give themselves, the group and the facilitator a score out of five. 
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I was very happy with the session. It allowed students to discover and discuss 
important ethical issues in context. Still, I can think of at least two ways of 
improving the session. 
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1.  It would be helpful to have some visual aids at your disposal during the 
sessions, in particular when encouraging the students to define what animals 
are included in their realm of moral consideration and how to balance benefit 
and harm. Black/white board or OHP would suffice. 
2.  With quiet groups short case studies that could be quickly completed in pairs 
or small groups could provide a method of overcoming shyness. 
9.1.1  Analysing student responses to 'Animals in scientific research 
exercise' - qualitative material 
QI What do you think is the most important issue of  animal rights and animal 
welfare? 
There were three themes in the students' answers: pain and suffering, moral 
status of animals, and testing protocols. In all three themes, a further three sub-
themes can be found: opinions/statements, questions, and deliberations. To some 
extent these three sub-themes can be placed in a developmental order where the 
lowest level would be opinions, then questions, and deliberations as the highest 
level. This is similar to the qualitative analysis structure of the moral 
development questionnaire (see section 5.3.2.2). 
A breakdown of student responses is shown in Table 13. 
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Suffering 
Moral status of 
animals 
Testing protocols 
Opinions/Statements  Questions 
2 
.  Whether animal is in 
Unnecessary pam and  .  d  t  th 
ff 
.  pam  ue  0  e 
su  enng  . 
expenments? 
43% 
4 
Animals have rights 
3% 
7 
e exploitation of 
animals for profit 
9% 
16% 
Are there alternatives 
to animal testing? 
12% 
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Deliberation 
Table 13: Animals in scientific research, Question One 
The percentages in the table are based on the percentage of students identifying 
each element and as some students identified more than one element, the sum of 
the figures is more than 100. The analysis is based on 146 student responses. In 
addition to these, there were three responses that did not fit into the qualitative 
key, all of which stated personal views unrelated to animal testing and these were 
removed from the analysis. 
Pain was most commonly cited as the most important element with 78% of 
students including considerations of suffering in their response. I interpret this as 
a positive sign of student sensitivity to animal pain, which in turn can be 
interpreted as evidence of empathy. The 17% of students referring to the status of 
animals is best understood as evidence that students have read the material and it 
has given them food for thought. Statements and questions regarding testing 
Henriikka Clarkebul'll, June 2000 m  Part IV - Results 
protocols are the least cohesive group in the analysis, though again the student 
responses show clear awareness of relevant ethical issues. 
The shaded boxes indicate sophisticated ethical questions. Having 38% of 
students asking these questions before the sessions is a good start to an ethical 
discussion. It can also be taken as some evidence that the reading facilitates 
student thinking. 
Q2 What is the big point you learned from the discussion today? 
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In the student responses I could identify four distinct categories: elaborations on 
personal relationship with the session content, interest in and benefits from the 
group discussions, views on moral answers and animal testing, and factual 
statements of different kinds. All four categories could be roughly divided into 
three different sub-groups: stating an experience, evaluating the learning or 
asking questions, and projecting the learning further and often taking a strong 
stance. This was then worked into the 4x3 table below (Table 14). 
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Experience/statements  Evaluation/Questions  Projection 
1  2  3 
Need to think more, to 
My view 
Realisation of the 
can/can't justify 
have an open mind. 
complexity  New methods. Sense 
of ability. 
35%  5%  20% 
4  5  6 
Interest and  Good to talk. Hearing 
Awareness promotion, 
We need to be able to 
involvement  views of others 
learnt something from 
justify our views. 
views of others 
20%  11%  4% 
7  8  9 
Morals of animal  no moral right or wrong: a) 
What gives us a right to 
is does not equal 
choose? Alternatives 
testing  strong; b) weak 
must be sought. 
'ought'. 
a) 9% b)  13%  6%  7% 
10  11  12 
Factual  My view 
When can we justify  How do you know that 
pain?  an animal is in pain? 
3%  2%  2% 
Table 14: Animals in scientific research, Question Two 
Again the percentages in the table represent the percentage of students reporting 
a particular element and as some students listed more than one learning element, 
the percentages do not add up to one hundred. Some students had to leave the 
session before completing the form for other commitments and some left the 
question unanswered, and thus the number of responses was only 123. 
My objectives for this session were: 
1.  To increase students' understanding in and sensitivity to the ethical problems 
in using animals in research. 
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2.  To encourage them to develop and use their moral decision-making skills in 
general and in particular in relation to the animal testing issue. 
The lighter grey squares (1  and 5) represent student responses where their self-
stated learning fulfils my first objective and darker grey squares (2, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 
11) represent my second learning objective. These data are very encouraging as 
46% of students have learnt what was stated in the first objective and 36% of 
students fitted their responses with the second objective. Altogether, 101  students 
(82%) reported learning in at least one of the objectives. Only one student 
reported to have learnt nothing. This is a highly satisfactory outcome and a 
promising sign that the session design suits the subject matter and supports 
students' moral development. A further 20% of the students explicitly report 
their satisfaction in the discussion-style of the session (response 4). 
Problems with relativism recurred time after time in the sessions. Either students 
felt frustrated with the lack of clear-cut answers or they felt that it justified their 
lack of care and interest in the subject. Therefore it was not surprising to have 
22% of students stating relativism in their response forms. The weak form 
("Perhaps there is no right or wrong.") can be identified with the realisation of 
reality in this situation, while the strong relativistic stance ("You cannot moralise 
using animals for research at all.") is better understood as a protective shield 
against the need to make decisions or have involvement. The strong form of 
relativism is in accordance with the Perry theory and the results found in the 
Perry questionnaire. Some students are still in Perry B level (see Appendix III for 
Perry scheme and chapter 12.3 for the results), while most have progressed 
beyond escapist relativism. 
Q3 What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
The motivation to ask this question was to collect data on the students' view on 
the main unanswered questions, which would reflect both whether the session 
had omitted some crucial element and what thoughts the students left the 
sessions with. Three distinct categories of responses could be found:  1) students 
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queried the rights to use animals in research, 2) they were still unsure how to 
define the status of animals, and 3) they elaborated on the decision-making issues 
relating to animal testing. These three categories could then be divided further 
into three sub-groups: 1) questions, often in a form 'should we ... ', 2) search for 
justification of actions, and 3) projecting their thoughts into future actions. 
Questions, should 
Justification 
Projection, who 
we?  should 
1  2  3 
Should we use  Can we justify our  Who should decide 
animals?  use of animals?  what we can do? 
What are our rights? 
1  b personal account  2b personal account 
a) 20% b)  6%  a)  16% b) 5%  5% 
4  5  6 
What is the status of 
Status of animals? 
animals? Marginal  How can we define 
humans? Where do  the status of animals? 
we draw the line? 
23%  6% 
7  8  9 
We can't solve this! 
Our actions  Who decides? Law?  How people decide? 
Are there any 
fundamental rights or 
wrongs? 
4%  11%  6% 
Table 15: Animals in scientific research, Question Three 
138 students responded to this last question and again the percentages represent 
the number of students raising each element and as some students raised more 
than one element, the percentages do not add up to 100. The motivation for this 
question was to find out what sorts of questions students are left with. The result 
is interpreted as positive if the students are left asking central and complex 
questions about the discussion theme. In the response matrix I consider questions 
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1-5 to fulfil this criterion. This means that 80% of the students left the discussion 
with an important question to consider. This is promising as it indicates that 
student learning may not end together with the session. 
Students also gave a score for themselves, the group and the facilitator on how 
well they thought each had done during the session. The students' self-
assessment average was 2.9, their group appreciation 3.8 and the facilitator 
average of 4.3; all out of five. 
9.1.2  Summary 
The'  Animals in scientific research' session was successful. The sessions 
provided students with a relevant discussion topic that invited both philosophical 
and personal considerations. The qualitative analysis of the results gives 
confidence that the students are learning the issues the exercise was designed to 
teach and that their learning is not confined to the session alone, but that they 
leave the session with important and challenging questions. 
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9.2  Ecological decision-making - DDT/Malaria 
This teaching unit was prepared with Zoology and Aquatic Bioscience students 
in mind. The Zoology and Aquatic Bioscience degree courses not only 
concentrate on animal morphology and physiology, but also on the interaction 
between animals, humans and the environment. Conservation issues are naturally 
included in the curriculum and ethical issues are inherent in many of these 
concerns. The attempt was to design an ethics exercise around a topic that would 
link directly with these conservation questions addressed in other parts of the 
course. 
The use of DDT in malaria control provided a good case. DDT has been found 
harmful to the environment (or has it, as the paper suggests), but it is 
successfully used in warmer climates as an affordable malaria control. In making 
their decision on whether DDT should in fact be banned in 2003, as suggested by 
the UN, the students need to consider several ethical arid scientific issues: What 
is adequate scientific evidence, what is  'safe' decision-making concerning the 
environment and human welfare, what risks are we ready to accept and for what 
returns; who has a right to make decisions, and what is our responsibility to help 
other people? The issues are fundamental, complex, and interesting. 
In term 43 (four groups) Zoology and Aquatic Bioscience students took part in 
the exercise. In my view, this was the most difficult exercise in the course 
package I developed. None of the problems seemed apparent to the students. 
They failed to see the ethical concerns in this issue and thus they were not 
forthcoming in the discussion. After the first laborious group session, I was 
better prepared for the last three. The discussions improved significantly as long 
as I was able to guide students to recognise the issues. The description of the 
session I present here is the one I devised after the first session and thus 
incorporates my learning experience from the less successful first attempt. 
The pre-session reading was Curtis (1994) - a scientific paper with a significant 
section of scientific data, but also clear considerations on alternatives and the 
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social/ethical issues involved in DDT use as a malaria control. The session 
started with a short written comment on the paper and then a quick round with all 
students having an opportunity to express their feelings and thoughts about the 
paper. The article had been well received: many students had struggled with the 
statistical information, but all in all, they seemed pleased as the paper had been 
informative and it tied in with other knowledge they already had. During the 
vocabulary clarification the students mainly queried scientific terms: 
anophelines, lachrymation, paraesthesia, latency, corroboration, excito-
repellency, and exophilic. The scientific dictionary was put to good use! I then 
asked what they thought was 'safe' as one of the key points in the paper was the 
consideration of safety in DDT use. Students suggested the extent of damage that 
results if things went wrong, how permanent that damage would be, what is the 
risk of damage taking place, how prone is it to human error, etc. The group then 
applied these criteria to controlled DDT use in malaria areas. The evidence they 
could find was not convincing either way. I then emphasised that in very few 
instances will scientific data provide decision-makers with data that beyond-
doubt would state that something was 'safe', but in fact most safety related 
decisions are social/ethical judgements on the acceptable levels of risk. 
The group then moved to discuss alternatives to DDT, with a hope of finding a 
suitable and more safe one to replace DDT which has a doubtful safety record. 
The only viable one they agreed upon, after considering anti-malarial drugs, 
vaccines, improved sanitation, and air-conditioning, was the use of pyrethroid 
impregnated bed-nets. The won'y with pyrethroids was evidence of resistance 
development in malaria vectors and high starting cost with the purchase of bed-
nets. Students also stressed the importance of research for a malarial vaccine, but 
realised that it could not solve the immediate problem of malaria control. Costs 
of both control-methods and of research was thus introduced to the discussion. 
Students discussed in length their role as scientists in the future and whether they 
could have power to influence decision-making. Quite sadly, most groups ended 
up by concluding that they had no power. They also discussed how much we 
could expect people in Britain to devote public money in search for a cure for a 
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disease that does not affect the local population. This also included personal 
reflection on how much they would be willing to pay to see malaria control 
improved. 
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The discussion then progressed to consider who are the people who should (in an 
ideal situation) make decisions on banning DDT, or on the use of resources to 
find or fund alternatives. One of the crucial questions was whether Western 
countries have a right to ban DDT use as a malarial control, if its use cannot be 
proven to have a negative influence and it has a positive impact on the health of 
the people in developing countries. An analogy was drawn that if we have a right 
to do that, then we might have to grant the developing countries a right to curb 
our consumer choices that have global effects. 
We finished the session with a vote on how many students would, knowing what 
they know now, be ready to ban all use of DDT in 2003. For the two groups that 
I collected the data, 14 voted for no ban, 1 voted to ban and 6 were non-
committal. 
This session was not easy, neither for the facilitator nor for the students. The 
issues were demanding, requiring the facilitator to take a more definite role in 
leading the discussion and poor preparation resulted in a very poor session. It 
would be important for the facilitator to start the sessions with a clear discussion 
format in mind, one that could be abandoned if students found an alternative 
issue of interest. I would be ready even to suggest that the discussion questions 
were given to the students more explicitly before-hand. The student hand-out 
(Appendix XV - Ecological decision-making - DDT/Malaria) does propose some 
questions, but they are probably too broad to truly guide students to consider the 
deeper issues when reading the article. I am still happy with the use of the 
scientific article, as it provides an additional benefit for students finding 
themselves able to form opinions about scientific data independently and 
discussing them in groups. 
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The positive experiences with the later groups actively participating in the 
discussions and most clearly finding them challenging gives me confidence to 
suggest that this exercise in its current form was a successful one. 
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9.2.1  Student responses to 'DDT/Malaria' exercise - qualitative material 
Before the group had discussed anything, they were asked to write a short answer 
to the following question: 
Ql What do you think is the most difficult issue in Malaria control? 
There were two reasons for this question. First, to help the students focus on the 
subject right from the start. Many of them took the reading material out and had 
a look back before answering the question. Second, I was interested to find out 
what the students had picked up from the reading, to get an idea how much it 
provoked their thinking. 
Two basic categories emerged from the students' answers: damage control and 
how to balance harm and benefit. Both of these categories could be further 
divided into three sub-categories: questions, problems with data, and 
deliberations on the data. The deliberations where clearly more sophisticated 
than the other two sub-category types. The percentages in the table below 
represent the percentage of students (n=43) who raised a particular issue, and 
because some students contributed to more than one category, the percentages do 
not add up to one hundred. There were no responses (n=44) that could not be 
fitted into the scoring key. 
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How and what?  Problems with Data  Deliberation 
1  2  3 
How to kill vectors with 
Should we cause 
Damage control  no damage to 
The lack of data to  damage to environment 
make a good decision.  when trying to control 
environment? 
malaria? 
44%  16%  12% 
4  5  6 
Weighing up cost and 
Are the side-effects 
Balancing risks and  potential harm OR  Do we  know enough to 
worth facing? What is 
harm  balancing cost and  make a decision? 
more important? 
benefit. 
16%  2%  12% 
Table 16: DDTlMalaria, Question One 
Already the fact that all students raised one of these points as their most difficult 
issue indicates that they actually perceive some of the problem. This is an 
important indication that the reading does address the issues it was chosen to 
address and that students do recognise them while reading the text. Naturally it is 
also possible that students had formed their problem-web on the DDT/malaria 
case before this exercise. Judging from the anecdotal evidence from students, 
most students were in fact new to the issue and the reading had been a revelation 
to them. It is thus surprising that during the discussions they seemed so oblivious 
to these ethical concerns. One interpretation of this discrepancy is that the 
students recognised one or another ethical element, but this did not provoke them 
to truly investigate the big picture, but that they quickly moved on to make their 
own judgement on the matter, based on the information they had. This is 
supported by the discussion experience, where students from early on offered 
their solution to the problem (ban/no ban) and explicitly indicated that they had 
really only considered the issue from one point of view. Thus reading seems to 
offer a good starting point to the discussion, but on its own, it would not provide 
sufficient provocation for students to consider the issue from several angles. 
After the session was over, students wrote short answers to two questions. The 
first one was: 
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Q2 What was the main point you learned from the discussion today? 
The main reason for asking this question was to get student feed-back on the 
learning gains from the session. I had one main objective in mind when 
designing the exercise: to raise student awareness on the complexities in 
ecological decision-making. 
The student responses could be divided into three main categories: 
1.  Straight-forward decision-making considerations. 
2.  Reflections on the discussion. 
3.  Factual issues and questions about DDT. 
These could be further divided into three sub-categories: 
1.  Describing the cunent state of affairs, or asking questions. 
2.  Reflecting on the complexity of the issue. 
3.  Explicit accounts of learning. 
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In the table below the percentages are again percentages of students reporting 
any of the learning gains and as some students (n=43) reported more than one 
learning element, the percentages do not add up to one hundred. All responses 
(n= 48) could be analysed by using this key. To clarify the issues, the table 
includes short sample answers for each category. 
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Current state of affairs  Complexity  Learning 
Decision-making 
Discussion and 
Opinions 
DDT 
21% 
4 
Describing reality -
'sometimes we are 
more concerned with 
our environment rather 
than people dying, who 
we don't know and 
never wilL' 
14% 
7 
Should DDT be 
banned? 
2% 
Table 17: DDT/malaria Question Two 
2  3 
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40%  12% 
5  6 
Reflecting on the 
Describing the nature of  importance of discussion 
discussion - 'to be aware  -'my knowledge was 
of other people's point of  poor before and now I 
view'.  have actually changed 
my mind.' 
9%  2% 
8  9 
How good are the 
Factual learning -
alternatives? - 'complete 
ban would not be ideal.  'evidence suggests that 
unless suitable 
alternatives were 
available'. 
9% 
DDT has not caused as 
much damage as 
originally thought'. 
2% 
The highlighted squares indicate a match between the set objectives and 
students' self-reported learning gains. Altogether 26 students out of 43 (60%) 
indicated at least one of these as their main learning gain. The students reporting 
learning in relation to the discussion (categories 5 and 6) is also interpreted 
positively because they fulfil part of the overall aims of the curriculum: to 
provide an opportunity for discussion and learning that will support moral 
development. 
I interpret this result as encouraging, particularly when keeping in mind how 
difficult the students found the topic during the discussion. The directly reported 
student-learning gains may be less than in some other exercises (animals in 
scientific research for example), but they are still high. Also, it is worth noting 
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that no student stated a learning gain that would have been irrelevant to the 
discussion or its objectives, though not all of them corresponded as accurately 
with the stated objectives. 
The final question answered by the students was: 
231 
Q3 What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
Most complex moral issues do not have singular right answers, and further, the 
group could not find anyone particular answer that they would have been 
confident with. Asking students what is the question in their mind as they leave 
the session is therefore a way to gauge their ability to identify the key element 
that could not be answered during the session and which possibly could not be 
truly answered at all. Students asking important and fundamental questions 
would be a positive indication that the session has set their minds in motion. 
Two main themes, both with three sub-themes, emerged from the student 
responses. The main themes were: 
1.  Decision-making - who and how. 
2.  Questions (often factual) about DDT and its usage. 
The table below summarises the student responses. Once again the percentages 
reflect students (n=43) asking a particular question, and as some students asked 
more than one, the percentages do not add up to 100. All responses (n=47) fit the 
designed key. 
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Action  Complexity  Methods 
1  2  3 
Who should make the 
How to deal with  What are the 
Decision-making 
decisions? 
conflicting  appropriate decision-
information?  making methods? 
28%  9%  23% 
4  5  6 
DDT  Should it be banned? 
Are the alternatives  Factual and scientific 
really viable?  questions. 
16%  25%  7% 
Table 18: DDTlMalaria, Question Three 
The questions about decision-making are without a doubt important and 
fundamental in conservation. 26 (60%) students indicated at least one of these as 
their main unanswered question. Question 4, whether DDT should be banned, 
seems like an obvious question, as most students were unsure at the end of the 
session about fundamental issues in deciding on the matter. This is further 
reflected in question 5 about the alternatives. This question indicates that 
students are not happy to ban DDT unless alternatives are available, i.e. they are 
concerned about malaria control, possibly even more than the risks of DDT 
polluting the environment: 
This is a positive result with 60% of the students explicitly recognising one of 
the key ethical issues in the discussion. Also students asking questions 4 & 5 
have elements in their questions that relate to the fundamental ones. 
Students also gave a score for themselves, the group and the facilitator on how 
well they thought each had done during the session. The students' self-
assessment average was 2.9, their group appreciation 4.1  and the facilitator 
average of 4.3; all out of five. 
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9.2.2  Summary 
Ecological decision making - DDT and Malaria is not an easy exercise. It can be 
successful, but it requires the facilitator to have a clear idea of the core issues and 
skill to lead the discussion so that the students are encouraged to recognise the 
underlying moral issues. The demanding scientific reading is hypothesised to 
have encouraged students to think, but only on a quite limited scale in relation to 
the complex problem. 60% of the students reporting learning gains 
corresponding with the set objectives is a good result, in particular when a 
further 21 % of the students report learning gains corresponding to the general 
learning aims for the course. A majority of the students left the session with a 
clear understanding of what are the important, but still unanswered, questions. 
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9.3  Moral implications of genetic screening 
This research started with an intention to teach genetic ethics as it was reflected 
in the original title 'Coping with genetic knowledge'. The theme was later 
greatly extended, but some elements of the original theme survived, this exercise 
being one of them. The idea had been to encourage students to think of their 
personal roles as both generators and consumers of genetic knowledge; to prompt 
them to make decisions on what information they wish to have of themselves or 
their future children, and in what sort of projects they want to participate 
professionally. The expansion of genetic knowledge is philosophically intriguing 
and complex, and the desire was to give students a window into an alternative 
way of considering genetic knowledge. 
An exercise on the moral implications of genetic screening was generated to 
fulfil these aims. The most natural target-group of students for genetic ethics was 
Genetics and Molecular Cell Biology (MCB) students. A decision was made to 
introduce ethics to the Genetics curriculum and to use MCB students as a 
control. The genetics students were then given a choice on whether they wished 
to do this topic or embryo research (see section 9.4) during their second ethics 
session. Two groups (15 students) chose this topic, where genetic screening is 
examined through a case example of cancer with additional consideration on 
whether screening could be used to eliminate disease. The remaining two groups 
chose embryo research. 
The topic being complex made facilitation crucial. Without a strict focus on the 
issue, the discussion easily branches out to other issues and the overall benefits 
of the session are less obvious and concrete. I had two different experiences. 
With the first group I let the discussion progress without enough guidance and 
the session was enthusiastic, but unfocused to a point that I don't believe 
students gained the maximum benefits from it. With the second group I kept 
more stringently to the guideline notes I had prepared and the session was 
superb. The students were active, the discussion progressed logically and the 
students seemed very pleased with themselves and the group at the end of the 
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session. Students were asked to give marks to themselves, the group and the 
facilitator and in all cases the second group gave marks which averaged 0.5 
higher than the first group (myself 2.7/3.2; group 3.9/4.3, and facilitator 4.1/4.7). 
The session progress I describe here represents the session I had with the second 
group, with whom I followed my pre-prepared guidelines. 
The pre-session reading was Ponder (1997), who discusses the use of genetic 
testing for cancer susceptibility from scientific, social and ethical viewpoints. 
The session started with a short written answer to a question on the topic. The 
aim was, as in all sessions, to focus student attention on the subject and to collect 
information on how students had perceived the given reading. After this we had 
an informal check-in, where students were given a chance to give their personal 
feelings and views on the reading. This was to encourage honesty and 
friendliness within the group. This time there were no major problems with the 
paper, students had found it interesting and challenging in a good way. This was 
followed by a vocabulary check, and the students queried a few medical terms 
like endoscopy. We then proceeded to identify the main message in the text. 
Students raised three types of central concerns: how to interpret the results, how 
the information can be misused, and whether screening is truly cost-effective. 
They also recognised two possible benefits that they wished to add to the central 
message: genetic screening could reduce other types of medical screening and 
negative results could reduce anxiety. The group then spent 15 minutes going 
through the views found in the paper on these issues in order to create a shared 
understanding on them. 
After this the students were encouraged to widen their perspective from cancer 
screening to screening in general. They were prompted to think of screening 
possibilities that they would consider to be without problems and ones that they 
would think should not be allowed. The white-board was used to draw a 
continuum between absolute good ones and absolutely bad ones. Later the same 
continuum was used when the students attempted to draw a line between those 
they believed the health care system should adopt and those to reject. Among the 
definite rejects were screening for external features like eye colour and among 
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the accepts were pre-symptomatic testing for preventable genetic conditions. The 
group debated long and hard on the middle-ground possibilities, including in 
their considerations the scientific problems, resource allocation issues, and 
emotional impact of genetic knowledge. Quite naturally, no decision was 
reached, but neither were the students frustrated by this. 
The group was then asked their personal judgement on how much these 
considerations would influence their choices in future employment. Two polar 
answers emerged, greatly or not at all. Those saying not at all supported their 
view by the need of general advancement of science, which was considered 
inherently good, and on the division between knowledge and its application. For 
a moment the discussion was very lively as people holding different views 
actively challenged that of the others. The session ended in short comments from 
all students on how happy they were with the session and what they would do to 
improve it next time. Most students in both groups were happy with the session 
and the main improvement suggestions were personal: to prepare better and talk 
less/more. 
In my view the session was a success, at least as long as it was properly 
facilitated. The issues seemed highly relevant to the students, they enjoyed the 
discussion and on many instances I could observe real learning taking place with 
students having revelations on how things are connected and what influences 
what. 
9.3.1  Student responses to 'Genetic screening' exercise - qualitative 
material 
The short written question at the start of the session was: 
Q  1  What in your view is the most influential issue when deciding on genetic 
testing? 
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All 15 students answered this question and all responses (n=16) were analysable 
using the key developed. There were only two main kinds of consideration: how 
beneficial is it to know genetic information, and how reliable are the tests. The 
first concem about benefits could be divided into three sub-categories: is it worth 
it?, do we really understand, and the importance of counselling. One student 
wrote down two issues (2 and 3), so the percentages don't add up to one hundred, 
but represent the percentage of students (n=15) recognising each issue. 
1  2  3 
Knowing  benefits - is it worth it? 
Do we understand the 
Counselling? 
info/ramifications 
67%  27%  7% 
4 
Test  Are they reliable? 
7% 
Table 19: Genetic Screening, Question One 
The student responses are very positive as the majority of students are asking one 
of the core ethical questions - is it worth it? This is a good start to the discussion 
and a positive indication that the text chosen has supported the students' 
perceptions of the important issues. 
At the end of the session, students answered two short questions in writing. The 
first one was: 
Q2 What is the main point you learned ji'om the discussion today? 
This question serves as a check on the main learning gains the students 
themselves perceive. My set objectives for this session were to encourage the 
students to consider their personal role as both generators and consumers of 
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genetic knowledge, to gain understanding on the different aspects of genetic 
screening and to allow them an opportunity to practice their skills in making 
difficult decisions. 
The student responses all belonged to one category; the complexity of the issue. 
This could be further divided into three sub-categories: 1) recognition, 2) 
statements and views, and 3) deliberations. All student responses (n=lS) fitted 
into this key and as three students gave an answer (n=18) that had more than one 
element, the percentages do not add up to one hundred. The quotes are from the 
student responses and represent typical answers in each category. 
Recognition  Statements  Deliberations 
1  2  3 
"(Nothing is as clear as 
it first seems, element  "We need to establish 
Conflict and  "These issues are really 
1), lots and lots of  guidelines - what is a 
research may help, but  disease? Where next? 
complexity  complex ." 
all situations need to be  Counselling is 
considered  essential." 
individually." 
60%  13%  47% 
Table 20: Genetic Screening, Question Two 
All the responses match the set learning objectives. I am particularly pleased 
with the number of students who wrote down sophisticated deliberations rather 
than just short answers. This corresponds with my experience during the 
sessions; students were keen, they discussed the issues enthusiastically and the 
learning gains were substantial. 
The final question students answered at the end of the session was: 
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Q3 What issue do you find most confusing after this session? 
Answers to the question can provide two types of information; have the students 
recognised the dilemmas in this subject, and whether the session design left some 
simpler issues unclear. 
The responses could be divided into three categories: questions about decision-
making, questions about testing itself, and elements in opinion. These could be 
further divided two sub-categories: straight questions and methodological 
questions. One student answered 'nothing', and was given a category all on its 
own. Thirteen students answered this question and all stated only one element, so 
this time the percentages add up to 100 and represent both the percentage of 
students asking a particular question and the proportional popularity of each 
response. 
Straight questions  Methodological questions 
2 
Decision-making 
Testing 
5  6 
Elements in opinion  Unsure of my opinion  Nothing 
8%  8% 
Table 21: Genetic Screening, Question Three 
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These responses represent very good recognition of the central issues, with the 
core questions (shaded boxes) asked by all but two of the students. Also the 
student questioning hislher own opinion seems to have been prompted to ask 
very crucial questions. The student who stated nothing is less encouraging, as the 
session discussed issues for which answers are at this stage very tentative. 
9.3.2  Summary 
The exercise on genetic screening has potential to be a wonderful one, but only 
when facilitation is carefully planned and quite strictly adhered to. The given 
reading has supported students' recognition of the main issues and the students 
report having learnt what the exercise was designed to teach. Also, the vast 
majority of students left the discussion with important questions in mind. The 
small student number to some extent reduces the confidence in the conclusions, 
but nevertheless, the results are encouraging. 
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9.4  Embryo research 
In the original plan, the discussion programme with Genetics students was to 
consist of five sessions, and 'Embryo Research' was designed together with 
'Genetic Screening' to highlight both methodological and theoretical issues in 
genetic research. With the final programme of only three sessions, each of the 
four groups was given an opportunity to choose between these two exercises, and 
two groups (15 students) chose 'Embryo Research'(understood as human 
embryos). 
The use of embryos invites one to consider when the methods of science may 
become unjustifiable, regardless of the potential benefits. Use of animals in 
research raises similar issues. Embryo research is a high-tech method used for 
very specific research purposes. The core concerns are the potential devaluation 
of human life, and opportunities to create 'super humans'. Religious appreciation 
of embryos is part of the problem. During this exercise I made a conscious 
choice not to discuss religious judgements per se. If  a student brought religious 
aspects to the discussion, they would have been considered, but in general I tried 
to create a discussion where the issue of embryo use was considered on as 
neutral and scientific grounds as possible. Both groups had Catholic and 
Protestant students (they volunteered the information at the start of the sessions), 
but religious considerations never spontaneously entered the discussion. 
The pre-session reading was Eisenberg and Schenker (1997), which describes the 
potential benefits from embryo research, the sources of embryos, and the ethical 
considerations. The authors are scientists and the coverage of the issues is 
concise and from a philosophical point of view sometimes even simplistic. 
The session started with a short written answer to a question about embryo 
research to focus student attention on the topic and than a quick check-in to get a 
feeling for what people thought about the issue. It was obvious from the 
beginning that the topic had sparked the students to think and the sessions were 
lively, sometimes almost too lively, with students eager to contribute. The 
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vocabulary of the text was not hard and the words queried were mainly scientific: 
e.g. resr (Intra-cytoplasmic Sperm Injection), and Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. The 
recognition of the main themes in the text was likewise quick, as the text was 
clearly indexed and titled. 
The group first got down to discuss potential benefits of embryo research, mainly 
improved fertility treatment, but also better understanding on basic biology, 
human disease, and possible future gene therapy. Both groups ruled 
improvement of infertility treatment as a non-essential scientific goal. They went 
even further by stating that the use of infertility treatment was in fact immoral. 
When asked why, they first reflected on over-population. The students said that 
the world is already so over-populated that we should not assist anyone to have 
any more children. The counter-question r asked was;  'why limit the 
reproductive rights of  just infertile couples and not all couples?'. To answer this 
question they provided an evolutionary reason: if you are infertile, you are not 
meant to reproduce and you would be passing on  'bad genes'. r questioned this 
by asking, would they apply the same criteria to people who are otherwise 
'imperfect'; should they be allowed to die, as they are not in an evolutionary 
sense 'meant to thrive', or should their reproductive rights be limited, as they 
also would be passing on 'bad genes'. To some extent they saw the fallibility of 
their argument, but they still believed there was an inherent difference that could 
be captured. The third suggestion they made was to say that wanting to 
reproduce is such a 'want-thing' and people just cannot get all they want. My 
counter-question was: why is this want the one you cannot have, and who makes 
the decision which wants are 'allowed' and which are not? Again, the students 
could follow the argument, but were not convinced that it effectively discredited 
their view that fertility treatments are immoral. They did not bring into the 
question whether infertility treatment should be provided by the public health 
care system, or that they were worried of consequential issues of donated 
gametes, for example. Even when unable to find a good argument why infertility 
treatment is immoral, they persisted that it was so. 
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The students' reaction to infertility treatment truly puzzled me. The only sensible 
interpretation I could think of was that they are still very young (approx. 20) and 
that they have not ever seriously considered having children of their own, and 
thus are incapable of perceiving the issues involved. This alone does not explain 
their view though. It would, if they had protested against public money being 
used for infertility treatment, but not when they point-blank classified it as 
immoral. 
They further discussed the use of embryo research to gain greater understanding 
of human development, which they agreed was a 'good' aim. They were more 
concerned about the increasing opportunities to manipulate the human genome, 
branding that undesirable, at least as long as the aims were not related to 
alleviating pain and disease. The group then briefly tried to agree where to draw 
the line of what pain relief is; whether, for example, compromised appearance or 
intelligence could be considered as a 'source of pain'. 
The group then proceeded to discuss the status of embryos and whether it makes 
a difference how research embryos are collected. Three alternatives were 
considered: embryos are persons from conception, or they are a collection of 
cells until point X when they become human, or they are potential humans and 
thus require respect, but not full rights. The intuitive feeling in both groups was 
that an embryo cannot be a person from conception. The groups then tried to 
define when an embryo would gain enough human-qualities to gain at least some 
human rights. The white board was used to mark potential cut-off points; 
primitive streak, brain-activity, viability, and birth. The groups could not agree 
how to make the decision or where to draw the line and reluctantly agreed that 
conception seems like the most logical point of difference. Still, they wanted to 
give embryo research an opportunity and not draw equation marks between 
embryos and humans, thus granting embryos full human rights and effectively 
making embryo research impossible. 
When prompted to think, the students did wish to use some sort of harm/benefit 
calculus to decide when to use embryos for research. The underlying assumption 
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was that embryos are something 'special' so we cannot use them as any other 
collection of cells, while at the same time, they are more disposable than fetuses, 
infants, and/or adults. 
The students were then invited to consider their personal view; would they be 
happy to work with embryos? The groups were divided, with approximately 2/3 
believing they would have no problem with it and 1/3 not wishing to participate. 
The session was finished with the traditional quick questions; did you learn 
anything today and how would you improve for next time. The students were 
enthusiastic about their learning and enjoyment during the session and the 
improvement suggestions were once again very limited, mainly suggesting that 
they themselves talked less or more next time. 
I was pleased with the exercise. It encouraged student participation, provided 
good material to consider important issues, and allowed students to discover new 
areas. The facilitation of this session was rather to control student enthusiasm, 
than to try to create it. It was important to direct the discussion quite strongly, 
because the emotional elements were so apparent, that the group needed to be 
kept on the topic by external guidance. 
9.4.1  Student responses to 'Embryo research' exercise - qualitative 
material 
At the start of the session, before any issues were discussed, the students were 
asked to write a short answer to the following question: 
QI What do you think is the most difficult issue in deciding whether to do 
embryo research? 
By asking this question I hoped to focus student attention on the subject from the 
start of the session, and I was also interested in the influence of the article and 
the students' views on the subject in general. Three main issues emerged from 
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student responses: whether an embryo is human or just tissue, can we justify it by 
benefits, and personal views. Two students (n=15) wrote a response that had 
elements from more than one category, so percentages that represent the 
percentage of students stating each element and add up to more than one 
hundred. All responses fitted the designed key. 
1  2  3 
Is an embryo a human,  Benefits and harms of 
where do we draw the  research - can we  That it is potential life. 
line?  justify it? 
73%  27%  13% 
Table 22: Embryo Research, Question One 
Most of the students raised important points and used ethical language, which 
indicates that the reading was provocative and influential. This was a good start 
to the discussion. 
As a last thing during the sessions, students were asked to answer two questions. 
The first one was: 
Q2 What is the main point you learned from the discussion today? 
The set objectives for the exercise were: to create understanding of all the 
elements that influence our choices to use embryos in research, to encourage 
consideration of the status of human embryos, and to support decision-making 
that uses a harm/benefit approach. This question was designed to collect data on 
how well these objectives were met. 
Practically all the responses reflected on the difficulty of making decisions on 
this issue. Students either state the fact that it is a complex issue, that it is 
possible/impossible to agree, that science must/always does progress, and that 
they now have to reconsider their own view on the subject. 
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There was one response that did not fit the key:  'Embryo research - great 
argument starter.' The student actually came forward afterwards and apologised 
for his comment (after receiving the e-mail summary), as he agreed that the 
session actually proved that discussions about embryo research do not need to 
turn into arguments. In this case all students stated only one learning gain, so the 
percentages represent both the percentage of students choosing a particular 
category, and the proportional representation of each category. 
1  2  3  4  5 
These issues are 
It is hard (if not 
Consensus is  You cannot stop  I realised I cannot 
really complex 
impossible) to agree 
possible.  science.  justify my view. 
on this issue. 
21%  7%  21%  21%  29% 
Table 23: Embryo Research, Question Two 
Having 29% of the students explicitly state that they need to re-consider their 
view is promising as a sign that the exercise has provided something new and 
fundamental about the subject. The students in category one (21 %), stating that 
the issue is more complex than they had thought could be similarly read as a 
positive indication on the impact of the exercise on students' appreciation of the 
topic. From elements 2 and 3 it is obvious that the difficulty of decision-making 
on these issues is appreciated by the students, some being more positive than 
others on the future success of our attempts to make them. Element 4 is the most 
wOlTying one from an ethical viewpoint: students explicitly stating that science 
cannot be stopped. It is possible to interpret this as the students saying that we 
have no power to make decisions about the methods and aims of science. If this 
is the case, it could be a sign of passive acceptance of all decisions in science or 
believing in actively pursuing all opportunities in science as there are no grounds 
for limiting scientific pursuits. It could also be interpreted as a reaction to the 
discussion which explicitly focused on the needs to limit science, and thus rather 
as a view that science should not be limited. This reflects a common attitude that 
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says: if anything is possible in science, it will be done by someone, so imposing 
limits is worthless. 
The second question students answered at the end was: 
Q3 What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
Again, the question was asked in order to get an understanding of what questions 
the students leave the discussion with, which indicates the issues they will spend 
more time thinking about. 
The student responses were of two main types: queries and views on decision-
making, and straight questions about the acceptability of embryo research. All 
students who answered this question (n=13) identified only one unanswered 
question, so the percentages reflect both students asking each question and the 
proportional popularity of each question asked. All responses fitted the key. 
1  2  3 
Where to draw the line? 
Can we choose to stop 
Decision-making 
Where should we stop? 
and who should  Can we ever agree? 
decide? 
53%  20%  7% 
4  5 
Questions  Is it right or wrong? 
What is the balance of 
harm and benefit? 
7%  13% 
Table 24: Embryo Research, Question Three 
73% of the students asked important and fundamental questions (elements 1 & 
2). Decision-making is crucial in scientific methods and it is encouraging that the 
.  majority of the students have recognised these questions and highlight their 
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importance. Element 3 reflects the doubts already apparent in the above question. 
Also, the question asked, is it right or wrong, and balancing harms and benefits 
are important questions. Students asking them are forced to consider some of the 
fundamental issues in the subject, which is positive. 
Students also gave a score for themselves, the group and the facilitator on how 
well they thought each had done during the session. The students' self-
assessment average was 3.2, their group appreciation 4.2 and the facilitator 
average of 4.2; all out of five. 
9.4.2  Summary 
I am moderately happy with the session. The learning gains were not as good as 
in some other courses and the session was not easy to facilitate. The strong view 
the students put across about the immorality of infertility treatment was also 
unexpected. Developmental biology students, for example, have not expressed 
similar strong attitudes (personal correspondence with Dr J.R. Downie). More 
research might be interesting to study the popularity of this view and the possible 
changes during the next few years in university. Regardless of the complexities 
in the exercise, it did create enthusiasm and the students left with different 
important questions from what they arrived with, which can be interpreted as a 
sign of learning during the session. 
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9.5  Genetically modified organisms 
This is the second of the original exercises dedicated to explore recent advances 
in genetic research. The aim of the session was to introduce students to the social 
and ethical aspects of genetic modification, in particular in food crops. The 
session was designed to allow students an opportunity to practice their own 
decision-making skills while they were learning more about the issues. 
In the end only Botany students (n=12) participated in this exercise. It was 
considered important and interesting by other course-co-ordinators as well, but 
when the sessions in many instances were limited to three, other subjects took 
precedence. 
With the Botany students this exercise was divided into two parts; the first 
looking into the basic ethical principles relevant to the evaluation of OM 
technology and the second into issues of justice and consumer choice. The 
sessions were held three weeks apart. I will discuss here both sessions together. I 
have also can-ied out the qualitative analysis of student responses for both 
sessions together. 
The pre-session reading was the introductory chapter of The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics Report on OM Food (1999) and three case studies (see Appendix 
XVIII - OM crops). The reading was chosen to give a concise presentation of all 
the relevant ethical issues in OM crops. The material was demanding, but well-
written and clear. Both sessions started with a short written question to focus 
attention on the issues to be discussed. Then the group was given a chance to 
state their views and feelings about the reading. The students found the text 
interesting, but challenging, because of its unfamiliar content and philosophical 
vocabulary. The vocabulary clarification that was carried out after the 
introductions included the following: definition of science, intrinsically wrong, 
welfare of citizens, hubris, and Pareto-optimality. Thus in this case, the group 
spent time discussing more than just dictionary descriptions of words - what they 
really mean and how they are used in the text and in general language. The group 
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was very quiet and shy during these discussions and views had to be directly 
asked before the students participated in the discussion. 
250 
The group was then guided to identify the main issues in the dedicated section of 
the reading. For the first session, these were the first two of the five ethical 
principles discussed in the text: general welfare, and rights of people. The group 
went through them one at a time, clarifying their meaning and discussing their 
importance. These seemed completely plausible and sensible ethical principles to 
the students and they found no difficulty in discussing them in relation to GM 
crops. During the second session the main themes were justice, ethical status of 
nature, and rights of the environment. The meaning of justice was discussed first. 
The group considered utilitarian approach to securing justice and used Pareto-
optimality as a special tool. The other two issues, rights of nature and what is 
unnatural, were more difficult to elucidate. The concepts seemed foreign to the 
students and the discussion dried up very soon if the students were not prompted 
with further questions or alternative ways to look at the issue. 
After the basic issues, in both sessions the students applied the concepts to the 
case-studies provided with the preliminary reading (see Appendix XIII - GM 
Crops). In the first session the students first considered issues of safety as a 
variant to the principle of general welfare. It was emphasised that safety is rarely 
a scientific result, but a judgement we make based on our evaluation of risks and 
benefits. The students were more participatory when they had a chance to look at 
a real case with real data and when given an opportunity to apply their own 
judgement to it. The second case during the first session was on labelling and it 
was designed to highlight problems with rights and GM crops - do consumers 
have a right to know, or producers a right not to tell, and who pays for the extra 
cost of labelling? Again discussion flowed freely and students were keen to 
exchange views on the issue. During the second session, the case study was on 
international justice and the development of GM crops. Once again the students 
were more forthcoming in the discussion when a clear starting point was 
provided by the case study. 
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When students were asked their personal view on GM crops at the end of each 
session, the responses were ones of hesitation. This was somewhat surprising 
considering they were Botany students and very likely to be working on GM 
related projects in the future. On the other hand, the hesitation can also be 
interpreted as a positive sign that the students do not have a strong pre-chosen 
view on the subject and are thus more open to new information to influence their 
choices. 
Both sessions ended in short responses from all students to re-cap what they had 
learnt and how to improve for the next time. During the first session, the main 
improvement suggestion was a better location - we had been squeezed into a 
narrow space between lab-benches, which definitely was not ideal. After the 
second session, most students criticised themselves for either poor preparation or 
participation in the discussion. As a last thing the students were asked to write 
short answers to two questions. 
I was happy with the exercise. The sessions were quite different. The first one 
was quiet and a lot of facilitation was required in order to encourage student 
participation, while the second one was wonderful and the students truly took 
part and came up with really sophisticated and complex thoughts. At least two 
things might have contributed to the difference between sessions:  1) the first 
session was held in a lab, where students could not see each other well and the 
discussion between students was thus relayed via the facilitator, 2) the first 
session was during week 2 in term 1 and the students did not know each other at 
that point. The material worked well by providing a suitable challenge and good 
coverage of the area. 
9.5.1  Student responses to 'GM Crops' exercise - qualitative material 
Once again, before anything else, the students wrote a short answer to the 
following questions in sessions 1 and 2: 
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Session 1: Ql What do you think is the most important issue of  rights and 
general welfare in relation to GM crops? 
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Session 2: Ql What do you think is the most important issue of  justice in relation 
to GMOs? 
In both sessions issues of consumer rights and division of benefits could be 
identified as a theme. In the first session responses of safety could be identified 
as a further theme. All student responses (n=8) could be categorised within these 
themes and as all students raised only one issue, the percentages represent both 
the proportion of students raising a particular point and the frequency of each 
theme raised. 
1  2  3 
Session 1 
Consumer 
Safety  Who benefits? 
autonomy 
37.5%  37.5%  25% 
1  2 
Session 2 
Consumer 
Who benefits? 
autonomy 
12.5%  87.5% 
Table 25: GM crops, Question One 
The student responses indicate that the reading raised very specific points and 
that students have taken these to be important. Also all the issues raised are 
relevant to the ethical analysis of GM technology, which prepared the students 
well for the discussion. 
At the end of the session students first answered the question: 
Q2 What is the big point you learned  fr0111  the discussion today? 
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The aim of the exercise had been to give students better understanding about the 
complexity and issues involved in the development of GM crops and to prepare 
an opportunity for them to practice decision-making on the issue. 
The student responses from both sessions spread relatively equally between three 
categories: 
1.  Conflict and complexity 
2.  Insufficient data 
3.  Views and learning skills 
One student stated more than one learning gain, so the percentages here represent 
the percentage of students (n=9 in both sessions) recognising each issue rather 
than the proportional popularity of each theme. All responses (n=19) could be 
analysed according to this key. 
Conflict and 
complexity 
1 
"Who is really going 
Insufficient data benefits - big 
companies?" 
Views and 
learning skills 
11% 
5 
"There seems to be 
no one solution that 
everyone will agree 
with." 
11% 
2 
".Risks ,associ~ted  with 
this need~to  be ; • 
weighed~upagainsC 
the, benefits of  doing,  it 
for the populatioD,ot ' 
th,e  World;n~"; ,::>7' 
"  ···:i1%>'~··· 
6 
"Better prepared next 
time, to think more for 
myself and rely less 
on others' opinions," 
11% 
Table 26: GM Crops, Question Two 
Henriikka Clarkeburn, June 2000 ~  Part IV - Results  254 
The highlighted themes correspond directly with the set learning aims for this 
exercise. This means that 69% (13) of students report having gained the designed 
learning. This is very encouraging. Further, the stated learning gains in 4 and 6 
are in accordance with the general aims of ethics teaching, though not directly 
corresponding with the session objectives. Category 5, on the other hand, 
corresponds only minimally with the chosen objectives. 
The second question at the end of the session was: 
Q3 What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
Again, the hope was to gauge whether the students had recognised any of the 
genuinely difficult to answer questions and had left the session with those in 
mind for further consideration and thought. 
The student responses were of two main types: questions about decision-making 
and straight questions about GM crops themselves. All responses (n=17) fitted 
into the key and all students presented just one question, so the percentages 
represent both the proportion of students asking a particular question, and the 
proportional popularity of each theme. 
1  2 
Decision- Do benefits outweigh  No definite answers, 
making  the risks?  insufficient data 
35%  24% 
3  4  5 
Yes/no? I still don't 
Worry about 
GMOs  know whether we  Natural/unnatural 
should go ahead. 
environment 
24%  5%  12% 
Table 27: GM Crops, Question Three 
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Categories 1 and 4 are best interpreted as questions resulting from the discussion 
and reading material directly as they use language most students were introduced 
to during this exercise and one which they struggled to use at the beginning. This 
is a positive sign with 41 % of students having recognised one of the key 
questions in the GM debate. Also category 2 and 5 can be interpreted to stem at 
least partially from the discussion on the definition of safety and how they are 
always issues of judgement rather than results of scientific research. Category 3 
is a personal reflection on the issue, which as such is very positive showing that 
students are interested in forming their individual response to the situation. This 
will always require thinking, which is definitely to be encouraged. 
Students also gave a score for themselves, the group and the facilitator on how 
well they thought each had done during the session. The students' self-
assessment average was 2.6, their group appreciation 3.8 and the facilitator 
average of 4.4; all out of five. 
9.5.2  Summary 
The exercise on GM crops proved to be an interesting and stimulating one with 
students participating actively. The learning gains of this exercise have been 
positive and a majority of the students left the exercise with important questions 
in mind. The length and the complexity of the exercise supported its 
implementation in two separate sessions, which could both also be used as stand-
alone sessions. 
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9.6  Clinical trials in developing countries 
Pharmaceutical research is often ethically complex, in particular when we 
consider the practicalities for setting up clinical trials. The medical professionals 
have for a long time recognised the importance of informed consent, the 
problems with placebo trials, and patient autonomy. More general problems with 
drug trials include how to decide when a trial has been a success. Pharmacology 
students are likely to be involved in clinical trials, though their role is not the 
same as medical professionals. This exercise was designed to give these students 
an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the ethical concerns of drug trials, 
in particular with those carried out in developing countries. The exercise was 
intended to raise their moral sensitivity towards these issues and encourage them 
to improve and develop their ability to make decisions in complex trial 
situations. 
The exercise outline was strongly influenced by practical requirements. The 
Pharmacology students were to attend the exercise in a group of 20 students, 
which made a discussion approach unsuitable. As an alternative, the exercise was 
designed as a mini PBL where the student worked in groups of 6-8 on a problem 
(see "Appendix XIX - Clinical trials in developing countries"), which was then 
briefly discussed with the entire group. This approach was also suitable for the 
pharmacology students in particular, who, according to other members of staff, 
were reluctant to take part in general discussions. 
The pre-session reading was Lurie and Wolfe (1997), which looks at the ethical 
problems in HIV drug trials in developing countries. The article describes basic 
ethical guidelines for developing-country trials, the role of placebo-trials and the 
adequacy of data analysis in this particular case. It was chosen as it describes 
ethical issues in context. Students were also given a copy of the World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki on biomedical research. 
The session started with students writing a short answer to a question on clinical 
trials. Many students referred to the reading before answering the question, 
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which improved its impact as a method of focusing student attention on the 
discussion issues. This was followed by a brief round on how students had 
perceived the reading. Most had not found it too difficult, though the science had 
been complex in places. The general view was that the reading had been 
interesting and relevant. The students, who were already sitting in groups (the 
room was set out so that they had chosen a seat around one of the tables as they 
entered the room), were than given the brief hand-out on a suggested trial 
protocol for a Malaria vaccine trial to be carried out in Botswana. They were 
given an explicit task to complete and thus set out to work. The small groups had 
difficulty getting started and it was important that the facilitator actively asked 
them questions and guided their attention to the problem. This needed to be 
continued through-out the short group-work session, as the groups tended to get 
distracted and discuss irrelevant issues of malaria (personal experiences) or other 
private matters. The groups were not particularly motivated, but in the end they 
did work through the required steps and the general discussion could begin. 
It became apparent that in their own groups, the students had considered most 
issues from very limited view-points. The general discussion thus introduced 
several new issues into the discussion. This indicates that reading a text and 
discussing it with peers, may not be enough to stimulate moral sensitivity in 
students. Active and direct external encouragement seems to be necessary before 
new aspects are perceived and considered. In the end the students agreed on a 
revised protocol. 
The session ended with a brief round which clarified what the students had learnt 
and how they would improve the sessions for the future. It was clear that they 
had enjoyed working in groups, as opposed to being asked to have a general 
discussion (method in the previous session). They also said that they had learnt a 
lot and that the topic had been interesting. This enthusiasm and learning was less 
apparent to the facilitator, so some level of doubt exists whether the students 
genuinely meant what they said, or said it because they believed it was the 'right 
thing' to say. 
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The experience with this exercise was not the most encouraging. I believe the 
design to be good and the reading relevant, but this particular group of students 
was not easy to motivate and thus the session was laborious from the facilitator's 
point of view. The group was also reluctant to discuss issues during the other two 
sessions, which indicates that there wasn't necessarily anything wrong in the 
session as such, but rather the students were less active than most of their peers. 
9.6.1  Student responses to 'Clinical trials' exercise- qualitative material 
At the start of the session, students were asked to write a short answer to the 
following question: 
QI What do you think is the main ethical concern when testing drugs in 
developing countries? 
The reason for this question was to highlight the theme of the session and to 
collect data on the impact of the reading on recognition of ethical themes. 
The student responses all related to the treatment of subjects and could be 
classified within three main categories: informed consent, equality between 
research subjects in developing and developed countries, and whether poverty is 
used against participants' interests. All 16 students responded with one concern, 
so the percentages below represent both the students who chose each issue and 
the proportional popularity of each theme. All responses were included in the 
analysis. 
1  2  3 
Equality between 
Autonomy and  research subjects in  Whether poverty is used 
informed consent.  developing and  against their interests. 
developed countries. 
25%  62%  13% 
Table 28: Clinical Trials, Question One 
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The use of philosophical language in category one is possibly a result of students 
adopting new elements from the reading. Most of them said that they had never 
before reading this paper considered ethical concerns and thus would have been 
unfamiliar with the vocabulary involved. The other two categories involve 
considerations of fairness, which are both important ethical considerations in 
clinical trials. These comments should have provided a good starting point for 
the discussion, as all students had recognised important ethical concerns. 
At the end of the session, students were asked to write short answers to two 
questions. The first one was: 
Q2 What was the big point you learnt from today'  s session? 
The learning objectives for the session were to increase students' awareness of 
ethical issues in clinical trials, and to give them an opportunity to practice their 
own decision-making skills in a complex moral problem. The responses to this 
question would indicate how well the exercise meets the learning objectives. 
The student responses belonged to two main categories: ethical dilemmas and 
considerations about third world countries and drug trials. These could then be 
further divided into three sub-categories: recognition, deliberation and questions. 
There were more identifiable responses (n=21) than students (n=18), and the 
percentages here represent the percentage of students stating a particular learning 
gain, rather than the proportional popularity of each category. All responses fit 
this key. 
Henriikka Clarkebunl, June 2000 m  Part IV - Results 
Recognition 
Ethical dilemma 
Third world countries  It is easier to exploit 
people in developing 
and drug trials  countries. 
11% 
Table 29: Clinical Trials, Question Two 
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Deliberations  Questions 
2  3 
It)SQftel1qifflcylttq  Should we test in 
~~!9nce§9fe.pc~Ci9~d  developing countries, 
ethicsin>res~arcbh  . if the benefits are to 
e~hip$ijeed~  ti~e"  go elsewhere? 
considered.  .'  . 
.... ·"<'330/0  6% 
5  6 
Education is difficult 
but essential when 
What is a successful 
desigining drug trials 
trial design? 
in developing 
countries. 
17%  33% 
Sub-categories 1 and 2 correspond directly with the chosen learning objectives 
for the exercise. This means that 9 students (50%) have learnt exactly what the 
exercise was designed to teach. The other learning gains reported are also 
important ethical questions embedded in the exercise structure, though not as 
such included in the exercise objectives. All the reported learning gains are 
essential ethical issues. Thus, even though the percentage of students reporting 
learning gains directly corresponding with the chosen objectives for the exercise 
is relatively low, the response is overall very positive. 
The second question students answered at the end of the exercise was: 
Q3 What is the main unanswered question you leave the discussion with today? 
This question was asked in order to find out whether the session had left some 
essential issues unanswered and also whether to students had recognised what 
the important ethical issues in clinical trials are. 
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The student responses belonged to three main categories: what is a successful 
trial design, what is a successful outcome of a trial, and how to educate 
participants in clinical trials. Two students asked more than one question and the 
percentages below represent the percentage of students (n=12) asking a particular 
question rather than the proportional popularity of each question. For this reason 
the percentages add up to more than one hundred. All responses fitted this key. 
1  2  3 
What is a successful 
What is a successful 
drug trial design - who 
outcome - vaccine  How do you educate 
to include, how to 
protects 50% or  people to ensure 
help those that get 
100%? Who makes  informed consent? 
sick, use of placebos 
the decision? 
etc.? 
42%  58%  17% 
Table 30: Clinical Trials, Question Three 
All students asked questions essential to a good clinical trial design. In the first 
two categories the questions were in most cases very broad and fundamental to 
clinical trials, while the third category represents a more detailed question within 
this framework. This is a positive outcome, with all students leaving the session 
with a clear idea about the problematic questions. 
Students also gave a score for themselves, the group and the facilitator on how 
well they thought each had done during the session. The students' self-
assessment average was 3.6, their group appreciation 4.4 and the facilitator 
average of 4.6; all out of five. 
9.6.2  Summary 
The exercise on clinical trials in developing countries was based on a short 
problem which students were encouraged to solve during the session with the 
information they had gained from the given reading. The session was only run 
once and with this group, enthusiasm was not high and facilitation needed to be 
active. The student responses to the questions at the end of the session indicate 
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that despite the lack of participation during the session, students had picked upon 
the important issues in the clinical trial questions. Thus the exercise has promise 
to be successful with other groups as well. 
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9.7  Scientific misconduct and integrity 
Scientific misconduct is often what people have in mind when science ethics is 
discussed - the ethical implications of scientists fabricating/falsifying their 
results or plagiarising each others work. These are important elements in being a 
'good scientist' and thus it would be difficult to justify a science ethics course 
without including these considerations. But being a good scientist is a lot more 
than just following the rules laid down in basic scientific methodology. It means 
also integrity in the choice of research aims and methods. While the rules against 
falsification, fabrication and plagiarism are clearly stated, integrity is based on an 
ethical appreciation and understanding of the meaning and purpose of science 
and relationships between researchers, human subjects, animals and the 
environment. Therefore questions of misconduct and integrity are different, even 
though they are both elements in being a good scientist. 
In the original plan, these two elements were to be addressed in two separate 
exercises. When the maximum number of ethics exercises was set to two or three 
by all course-coordinators, they were merged into one exercise. All students who 
participated in the ethics discussion group programme took part in this exercise, 
which was always the last exercise in the series. The aim of the exercise was to 
clarify what is considered scientific misconduct, what scientific integrity is, and 
to invite students to reflect on their personal role as future scientists in relation to 
these two themes. 
The pre-session reading was a short paper (see Appendix XX- Scientific 
misconduct and integrity') prepared specifically for this purpose. It had brief 
descriptions of misconduct and integrity plus three short case studies to highlight 
the issues. Students were asked to prepare responses to all case studies before the 
session. I chose to write the reading for this exercise after being unable to find a 
suitable short summary in literature. 
This exercise was one of the best ones. Students found the issues relevant and the 
case-studies provided a good starting point for interaction in the group. 
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Each session started with a short written reply to a question. After learning that 
students' self-evaluations in the previous sessions had been a lot harder than their 
evaluation of others and the facilitator, I was interested to find out the criteria 
:,tudents used to evaluate themselves. With the later groups, the question yueried 
when students had been tempted by misconduct themselves. When the question 
was about self-evaluation, the group then briefly discussed the given responses 
and tried to agree on evaluation criteria. Many students could never consider 
giving themselves 5 out of 5, because they did not think they would ever be 
perfect. Also, students indicated that modesty is a highly regarded value, and no 
one wanted to seem boastful. They were then encouraged to 'consider 'moving 
targets' i.e. that they could reach one goal and give themselves SIS  and then give 
themselves a new target to thrive for. They seemed genuinely puzzled with the 
thought of changing criteria of 'perfection'. With the groups who had been asked 
to consider when they would bel had been tempted by misconduct themselves, 
the session started with sharing those thoughts. Both questions focused students' 
attention on themselves and how they fit into a network of assessment or 
misconduct. This was important as this exercise hoped to promote personal 
reflection on professional standards. 
The groups were then asked to briefly describe how they understood 
falsification, fabrication and plagiarism. Then the focus was nan-owed to 
falsification and fabrication and the students were prompted to consider reasons 
why scientists would resort to these methods and whether they could ever justify 
such a choice. Reasons they came up with included pressure from superiors, 
desire to make moneylmeet deadlines, desire to be known for a great discovery, 
and laziness. No one could justify misconduct, especially after the group 
explicitly considered the repercussions of such actions. 
Case 1 was designed to highlight falsification. Most groups (but not all) were 
unanimous that the students depicted in the case could not remove the out-lying 
observations from their graph because 'they do not know if they are the 'right' 
observations'. It was mostly suggested that the students should repeat the 
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experiment if possible to find out if their hypothesis about the temperature 
controls was correct. If  they could not repeat, then they would have to explain 
their problems and as a result they should have less confidence in their results. 
The discussion got more interesting when the students were asked how they 
would punish this sort of behaviour if these students were in level 4 and this was 
an important part of their Honours project. The initial reactions were to either do 
nothing or to kick them out. Each group then considered why they should be 
punished (to learn not to do it again, possibly to protect people who would 
follow up their research) and what in the end would be a reasonable reprimand 
for their actions. Most commonly groups chose to reduce marks and make it 
public without mentioning names, so that other students would learn from their 
mistakes. They also said that none of them had ever discussed the rules of 
science explicitly (apart from those who had chosen to take the L2 course 
'Science Communication') with members of staff and many even said that they 
had been openly encouraged to falsify and plagiarise during laboratory work. 
The emphasis was then placed on staff to lay down clear rules and punishment 
that would follow if rules were broken. 
The second case-study concentrated on plagiarism and the mentor-student 
relationship. Plagiarism was first discussed in general terms. Everyone could 
imagine being tempted and many thought that they had at least unwittingly 
plagiarised as well. The case study asked students to make a judgement on who 
should receive credit for a scientific discovery. All groups started with a view 
that the professor/supervisor was the one who should have the credit for a 
student's work. There were two main reasons: she wrote the paper, and she had 
designed the machine. The groups were then invited to consider what it is in a 
scientific discovery that is special. Most groups needed specific examples before 
they arrived at the realisation that it is the intellectual input, not necessarily who 
has done most work, that counts as something special and worthy of recognition. 
Still most groups believed that the professor was the originator and thus should 
get the credit. It was then suggested that the professor had already got credit for 
the methodology and whether that would change the situation. For most groups it 
did, but not for all. The students were than asked to describe what the students in 
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the case example had done and they all came up with the student building a 
hypothesis and the professor only helping to confirm it, and thus the student 
would be the main contributor to the discovery. It was then discussed what the 
student could do in a situation where the professor had written up the student's 
work as her own. Students considered the pros and cons for both parties in the 
dilemma and in most cases they were ready to encourage the student in the case 
study to fight for her rights by first seeing the professor and if she would not 
agree, then going to the head of department or the university senate to gain the 
credit she deserved. This case-study was a great revelation to many students in 
the sense that they realised that they themselves could be originators of scientific 
discoveries even as under-graduates. 
The groups were then asked to describe how they understood scientific integrity. 
They recognised the difference between misconduct and integrity after some 
prompting and then the discussion focused for a short while on the integrity of 
scientific methods. Students were invited to think of situations where the aims of 
a project would be acceptable to them, but the methods would not - i.e. when the 
ends do not justify the means. Animal research was always recognised as a 
potential problem, but other examples were hard to find. With quite explicit 
prompting they recognised possible problems with large-scale field trials of GM 
crops (aiming to find out the safety of GM crops), human embryo research, and 
the use of human subjects. Because animal research had been discussed in the 
first session, the discussion focus was then moved on to the integrity of choosing 
research aims. 
Aims and integrity were approached through a third case study, which describes 
a research proposal for intelligence-gene research. The students were explicitly 
encouraged to first consider the pro/cons of this research by using a harm/benefit 
calculus. Most of them thought that benefits were very few (they could be 
achieved by other, less controversial methods) and the potential harm significant. 
They were than asked whether they thought this was enough of a reason to stop 
this type of research from taking place and whether they would be ready to call a 
piece of knowledge 'bad' in itself, rather than its application. Students did not 
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outright reject the idea that in theory there could be pieces of information for 
which no good application could be construed and for which harmful uses were 
plentiful, but could not come up with any examples. The genetic research in the 
case did not qualify for the criteria. They were then encouraged to consider the 
responsibilities scientists have over the application of knowledge they produce. It 
was considered ludicrous to hold scientists responsible for all applications (one 
student said that it would be like blaming Henry Ford for all car accidents - a 
very fitting analogy). The students disagreed over whether scientists have any 
responsibility to consider potential uses of the knowledge they are producing and 
whether they should not proceed with the research plan if they see the balance to 
be negative. There seemed to be a gender difference here, with female students 
more strongly requiring moral responsibility from scientists, but I collected no 
evidence to back this up. As a last point the students were encouraged to think 
how much it would matter to them what the research they were involved in was 
aimed to do. Again, there were clear differences between students, some 
considering this to be of great importance and others saying that all information 
is neutral and that they would rather go and do what paid well and was 
interesting, rather than considering the further implications of their research 
choice. 
I truly enjoyed facilitating this session. It was easy to get started as students 
could see the immediate relevance of the topic, and the case studied provided 
good ways to focus the discussion. With some groups I tried short role-plays to 
bring the case-studies to life. These worked fantastically and this teaching 
method is something I would like to develop further in the future. 
9.7.1  Student responses to 'Scientific misconduct and integrity' exercise -
qualitative material 
Two different questions were used at the start of the session to focus student 
attention on the subject and more specifically on their own personal relationship 
with the issues. The first nine groups answered the following question: 
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Ql a) How would you have to participate to give yourself  515? 
The student responses formed three distinct categories: having a view of one's 
own, abilities to listen and contribute, and preparation and projection of learning. 
In all of these, three sub-categories could be also identified. 58 students from 
three different degree courses (Genetics (n=26), Physiology (n=4), and 
Zoology/Aquatic Bioscience (n=28)) answered this question and most student 
responses had elements that belonged to more than one category increasing the 
number of identified responses to  123. There were three responses (all from 
genetics students) that could not be fitted into the key: 
1.  If everyone agreed with me unreservedly 
2.  Very well indeed 
3.  Dunno 
The percentages presented represent the proportion of students giving each 
response and because most of them gave at least two, the percentages do not add 
up to  100. I have also given group specific percentages for a) Genetics and b) 
Zoology/Aquatic Bioscience in the second category as there were interesting 
differences in their response patterns. 
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My view 
Listening and 
contributing 
Preparation 
and projection 
Have an opinion on 
every (important) 
point. 
16% 
4 
2 
2% 
3 
Re-consider my view/ 
have an open mind/ 
think about it. 
3% 
Table 31: Scientific Misconduct and Integrity, Question One A 
(a= Genetics and b= Zoology/Aquatic Bioscience) 
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In general students had a good idea of what type of participation is desirable in a 
discussion group. I would personally agree strongly with the shaded categories 
which emphasise participation and preparation as well as listening skills. I would 
be less likely to endorse criteria that required students to hold an opinion on all 
issues - it should not be considered undesirable to be in a process of forming 
one's opinion. The students' self assessment at the end of these sessions did not 
change significantly from what they had given themselves after the previous 
sessions. The benefit of this exercise was thus an improved shared understanding 
on what is  'good' participation in a discussion group. 
The last seven groups (64 students) were asked to write a short answer to the 
following question: 
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QI b) Think of  a situation where you have beenlcould imagine being tempted 
with scientific misconduct? 
The question was changed mainly because I believed that the new one would 
provide a better starting point to the discussion. 
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The student responses formed two distinct categories: falsification, and 
plagiarism. Most suggested situations included a reason for misconduct and the 
responses could be divided into sub-categories according to the reasons given. 
Some students gave more than one scenario (n=73) and the percentages in the 
table represent the percentage of students in each category rather than the 
proportional popularity of each scenario. All responses were included in the 
analysis. 
1  2  3 
Change data to fit 
Falsify for time  Falsify to get better 
Falsification  hypothesis or 'right 
marks/more money. 
results'. 
pressure. 
44%  25%  30% 
4  5 
Plagiarism 
Copy lab reports ->  Adopt theories 
better mark.  without credit. 
8%  8% 
Table 32: Scientific Misconduct and Integrity, Question One B 
The vast majority of students seem to be most familiar with falsification. When 
specific cases were discussed, most experiences were with lab reports and often 
it was pointed out that staff had encouraged them to copy someone else's work 
when theirs had not worked out. Maybe this is an issue that should be addressed 
more generally by staff. Otherwise I believe this question set the scene for most 
sessions very well, with students bringing in their personal experience and being 
more likely to discuss their own experiences during the session. 
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At the end of the session students were asked two questions. The first one was: 
Q2 What is the main point you learnt from the discussion today? 
The objectives for this exercise were to give a clear description of what 
constitutes scientific misconduct; describe how it impacts research, encourage 
students to reflect on their own practice; and highlight the complexity of choices 
and responsibilities in scientific integrity and misconduct. 
The student responses to this question formed four distinct categories: 
1.  Reflections on the importance of scientific integrity and misconduct 
2.  Consequences of misconduct 
3.  Personal reflections 
4.  Nature of knowledge. 
Within these 2 sub-categories could be identified: 1) statements, and 2) 
evaluations/questions. 
There were four responses that did not fit into this framework: 
1.  Ethics 
2.  Those who attended the seminar had not contributed to gross scientific 
misconduct. 
3.  People have different views on intelligence. 
4.  Science is subject to good and bad points of human nature. 
Altogether 107 students answered this question generating 120 responses. The 
percentages in the table represent the percentage of students stating each learning 
gain rather than proportional popularity of each category and thus they add up to 
more than 100. 
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Importance of 
misconduct and 
integrity 
Consequences 
Personal view 
Nature of 
knowledge 
Consequences of 
misconduct can be 
great - need to be 
considered. 
28% 
5 
8 
Knowledge can be 
used for good and 
bad/ importance of 
considering 
implications. 
8% 
2 
You need a big 
picture and at the 
same time consider 
all situations at their 
own merit. 
7% 
6 
F'~r§onali.ntegri!yjs~:~ 
important ·::·.we  Il~v~~' 
reSPO!1$ibilityl:,  ~~~;~ 
imJ)or!a,nce·of eti1jca,t 
considerations.c~:&  ',~ 
8 
Who should be 
credited. 
3% 
7 
Table 33: Scientific Misconduct and Integrity, Question Two 
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None of the categories represent learning gains that would have been irrelevant 
in the light of the exercise objectives, but the shaded categories represent direct 
correspondence with the set ones. Categories 5 and 6 are considered to be 
particularly positive as they include personal involvement with the learning. 67 
students (56%) reported at least one of these elements in their response. This is a 
very positive result that supports the positive impact of the exercise. 
The final question as the end of the session was: 
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Q3 How would you describe the benefits of  ethics seminars to students who have 
not yet participated in them? 
By answering this question it was hoped that students would re-cap for 
themselves the benefits of ethics seminars and give feed-back on their views to 
the developers and facilitators of the seminar series. 
The student responses generated two distinct categories: reflections on thinking 
and communication skills, plus three small sub-categories without a unifying 
theme. The main categories could be divided into three sub-categories to 
highlight different elements within each consideration. There was one response 
that did not fit into this key: "Probably came too late, better if tutorials were done 
in 2
nd year, as they would be before you make your degree choice". 
Altogether 135 students responded to this question generating 269 responses. 
The percentages in the table represent the percentage of students supporting each 
view rather than the proportional popularity of each category. 
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1  2  3 
Makes you re-
consider your views / 
Thinking  Clarifies issues  Broadens your view 
makes you think / 
helps you to develop 
ways to justify your 
views. 
9%  43%  54% 
4  5  6 
Helping you to 
Important to listen to 
expressing  express your views / 
others / learning from 
views  communication skills / 
others / interesting to  Changed my views. 
gives you confidence 
hear others' 
viewpoints. 
20%  40%  2% 
7  8  9 
other 
Singular positive: 
Should be more  nothing 
Interesting / beneficial 
6%  23%  1% 
Table 34: Benefits of Ethics Seminars - Student responses 
Responses in the first category fit directly into the aims of the ethics course, to 
encourage moral sensitivity and give opportunity to practice moral decision-
making skills. 74% (100) of the students stated at least one of the elements 
belonging the first category in their response. Further the second category shows 
student learning from a communication view point. This was not an explicit aim 
of the course, but a benefit all the same. Only one student saying that he/she 
learnt nothing is also very positive. Also 23% of students explicitly asking for 
more sessions suggests that students have found these sessions beneficial to 
them. 
At the end of the session, students also gave a score for themselves, the group 
and the facilitator on how well they thought each had done during the session. 
The students' self-assessment average was 3.6, their group appreciation 4.2 and 
the facilitator average of 4.5; all out of five. 
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9.7.2  Summary 
The scientific misconduct and integrity exercise has proven to be interesting and 
successful. Students participated actively and often reflected on the impact of the 
discussed issues on themselves. All students reported learning gains relevant to 
the learning objectives of the exercise. The data collected during the exercise 
also gives confidence that students appreciate the ethics sessions and the 
majority recognised learning gains in the areas designed to support their 
development. 
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9.8  Summary of course material and student responses 
The evidence supports the conclusion that the course material used in the ethics 
exercises studied here has supported the growth of moral sensitivity in students. 
The student responses at the start of each session reflected the themes of the 
assigned reading and the students adopted some of the philosophical language 
used in reading material. I believe it was important to have dedicated reading for 
each exercise: this provided a common ground for the discussion and focused 
student attention on the relevant issues of the problem. From these results I have 
gained confidence that the chosen material fulfilled this task. 
Students' self-declared learning gains matched well or very well with the 
learning objectives for each exercise. In very few instances, students reported 
learning that was irrelevant to the course and in some instance the reported 
learning was relevant though it did not correspond with the explicit learning 
objectives. Most of the stated learning gains were in moral sensitivity - students 
reporting increased awareness and understanding of the complexity of the issues. 
There were also clear indications of students having learnt significant issues 
about moral decision-making procedures during the sessions. 
Most students left the sessions with a clearer understanding of the difficult 
issues. The unanswered questions they identified are some of the core ethical 
concerns in each subject area. The hope is that the identification of these 
questions could prolong their involvement with the subject matter. 
After the last exercise, students described the benefits they had gained from the 
ethics exercises in general. The vast majority identified increased moral 
sensitivity as the main benefit of the exercises. Students also identified the 
importance of discussion skills, and an opportunity to consider their personal 
values. This is supportive evidence that the students perceived the gains of the 
ethics exercises to be the ones motivating their inclusion in the degree courses. 
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10.  PBl experience and learning logs 
PBLs were used in ethics teaching at IBLS during the 1999-2000 academic year 
for the first time. No academic literature could be found to describe the use of 
PBL in ethics teaching, and thus this approach may have no precedent. The aim 
of the ethics PBLs was to support students' moral development: to stimulate their 
moral sensitivity and to allow them an opportunity to practise their moral 
decision-making skills. 
In IBLS, PBL was chosen as the method of ethics teaching in two Honours 
courses (Microbiology, and Physiology and Sport Science). In the new joint 
degree of Microbiology and Parasitology, the Microbiology students participated 
in two ethics PBLs (one in each term), while Parasitology students worked at the 
same time on scientific PBLs. Both PBLs consisted of 5 contact hours and 10 
hours of independent work. 
The Ethics PBLs were designed to give students an opportunity to explore ethical 
issues in context with scientific decision-making. The two Microbiology PBL 
exercises covered two areas of vaccine development: 1) the choice of research 
topics (TB or Meningitis B), and 2) the design of an ethically-sound testing 
protocol involving both animals and humans (see Appendix XXI - Microbiology 
PBL). 
In the Physiology and Sport Science degree the 180 L3 students were divided 
into two groups, one working on an ethics PBL and the other on a scientific one. 
The ethics groups (6) were involved in a problem dealing with drugs in sport:  1) 
investigating the reasons why they are banned, and 2) deciding on a suitable 
punishment in two hypothetical cases. The PBL consisted of 3 contact hours and 
10 hours of independent work (see Appendix XXII - Sport Science PBL). 
The problems were designed so that a good answer could not be achieved 
without the inclusion of ethical considerations. The PBLs in both Honours 
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courses were assessed by students completing learning logs (see Appendix XXIII 
- Introduction to Learning Logs). 
It should also be noted that the ethics PBL was the first experience of PBL for 
these students. Thus, the students required possibly more support than an ideal 
PBL design would suggest. For both courses, this meant a preliminary session on 
how PBLs work and an explanation of the assessment method in detail. For both 
groups a resource file was also collected which included relevant articles to solve 
the problem and a web-site was created with a large list of links to relevant 
Internet sites. 
The Microbiology PBL in Term 1 started with a quick revision of the PBL 
format and then a reminder that the facilitator was not there to lecture, but to 
support their learning. After this the students were given their problem and 
encouraged to start the work with a brainstorming session. All three groups 
adopted this approach and much of the first 2-hour session was taken up by this 
and a preliminary division of labour. Two groups out of three had quite severe 
difficulties in agreeing on the division of labour and how to group tasks, which 
suggests that PBLs offer a great opportunity for learning team work and how to 
organise research. 
The second session (lhr) was a week later and the groups had agreed to come to 
this session with more information in order to have a clear idea what still needed 
to be done. With all three groups, students had prepared for the session relatively 
poorly and the groups were predominantly still in the starting position or found 
themselves to have mainly looked at the same issues, and the benefit of team 
working on a problem had not materialised. The session ended with a further 
division of labour. 
The last session (2hr) followed two weeks later. The group knew that they 
needed to reach an agreement on a vaccine to develop. In most groups the 
students came into the last session with a clear view on which vaccine to choose. 
When questioned further, in all groups the decision-making process needed to be 
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re-traced and the students only then realised the magnitude of issues they could 
consider before making a decision. The importance of facilitation was thus 
highlighted. 
In term 2 the same groups continued to work together in designing a testing 
protocol for the vaccine they had chosen in term 1 (all groups chose TB). The 
number and length of the sessions was the same as in Term l.The first session 
started with a return of learning logs. Students were given samples of 'A' and 
'D' entries and the group then discussed how to improve on their logs and on the 
group work for the second term. Groups 1 and 2 worked very well together, 
much the same way as in Term 1. The main change in the group work strategy 
was a decision that everyone would provide a hand-out at the start of each 
session in order to share their learning and to reduce duplicating each other's 
work. These hand-outs were of excellent quality and they improved the team-
work aspect of the second PBL immensely. The decision-making in this second 
PBL was a very lively session for both groups 1 and 2, and the students got into 
discussing some complex and interesting ethical issues in a very mature manner. 
Group 3, on the other hand, had serious problems, primarily due to poor 
attendance - I never met more than 3 out of 8 students at one time. In the end, 
communication with the group members was carried out bye-mail and most 
students worked individually rather than as a group. 
The Physiology and Sport Science students started their PBL in much the same 
way as the Microbiology students, though all of their sessions were Ihr in length. 
The first session was brain-storming and dividing labour. Most groups (6) 
divided work based on the different drugs mentioned in the problem, and the 
elements in the coach's statement. The groups were lively and well-organised. 
One of the groups also asked for a sample of a good learning log entry, which I 
wrote and then distributed to all groups; the constitution of a good entry was 
discussed with all groups during the second meeting. In the second and last 
sessions, the groups often jumped into conclusions without much discussion, and 
interventions by the facilitator were necessary in order to guide the students to 
consider all elements in the problem. During the last session each group handed 
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in a decision on the hypothetical cases provided. The decisions between groups 
varied widely, while all of them used much the same arguments to support their 
conclusions. 
10.1  Learning logs 
90 students handed in a learning log, 21  in microbiology (two logs each) and 69 
in Physiology and Sport Science. Most logs contained 10 entries in total. The 
instruction was for the students to include four elements in each entry: 
1.  what I did (1-2 lines) 
2.  what I learnt (2-3 lines) 
3.  was it important and why (10-20 lines) 
4.  how this shapes my next learning unit (1-3 lines) 
The assessment criteria were based on the ability to reflect on individual learning 
(element 3). 
I included two (4
th and second last) entries from each log in order to analyse the 
widest possible spread of the 900 entries I had collected. 
Figure 4 contains a sample of three complete log entries from the Microbiology 
term 1 learning logs; one from a log given an 'A' and two from logs given a 'D'. 
ENTRY FROM A LOG THAT GOT AN A: 
"In this learning unit, I used mainly the Internet search engines (Nets  cape and Excite) to 
gather sociological information and statistics of Tuberculosis and Meningitis. To my 
surprise, much of the sociology does involve developing countries due to many complex 
reasons as I later found out. The statistics, which I obtained, implies that death rates are 
not most highest for developing countries for both diseases and much disease occurs in 
the poorest resourced areas of the world, such as, parts of Africa and Asia. It was no 
surprise when I found that 'lower' social classes across the UK were more likely to have 
disease than the 'upper class' because I did hypothesise this in my earlier learning unit. 
Only when reading information from reliable sources on the Web (WHO and UNICEF) 
that I discovered that the social factors for any major disease is extremely complex 
especially in developing countries. Some are large-scaled sociological factors (e.g. poor 
economics) whilst others are smaller but can still have a significant impact (e.g. 
hygiene). Every country has different behavioural attitudes, religious beliefs and ways of 
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life and can complicate sociological factors further. Why is this an important issue? It is 
important because the structure for vaccine implementation will be different for different 
countries and the demands for vaccines will vary for each country depending on which 
disease is more prominent. 
This learning unit was most meaningful and I learned a great deal more on sociological 
issues in developed and developing countries mainly because I had much more 
information to back up previous assumptions and I had facts to compare and contrast 
with. In addition, reliable web pages from the Internet are one of the best sources to get 
hold of up-to-date information. The Internet certainly helped me in this learning unit. 
However, I had hoped for more information on developed countries. 
I managed to print off lots of information too and I would like to analyse them further 
for other potential sociological factors of importance for both developed and developing 
countries." 
ENTRIES FROM LOGS THAT GOT A D-
"Use Internet to look into relevant sites. GlaxoWellcome and Beecham." 
"Today we received the problem that we will be looking at over the next few weeks. 
After some discussion we divided the problem into different subsections. These 
subsections will then need to be researched to find out information." 
Figure 4: Learning log sample entries 
In analysing the entries I first collected the following data 
•  the length of the log (lines, most of them are typed) 
•  identify the following elements: description (elements 1 and 2), 
reflection (element 3), and projection (element 4) and their line lengths 
"  the mark the log received (the logs were marked by the facilitator 
Henriikka Clarkeburn). The mark was part of the students' continual 
assessment. 
A more detailed analysis was carried out on the reflective elements. There were 
three main reflective categories: 
1.  decision-making contemplation; e.g. "I think this was important 
because in an hour, what we learnt gave a solid foundation to what we 
already knew, that we should go ahead and recommend the TB 
vaccine. The charity is not likely to want to sponsor a vaccine that is 
going to be made redundant in a few months/years." 
Henriikka Cia rke!J1I rIl, June 2000 m  Part IV - Results  282 
2.  learning skills and habits; e.g. "I thought TB would be the best vaccine 
to make and therefore my next piece of learning was influenced 
towards TB. This I think was wrong of me as I should have been more 
open-minded when I searched for information, as when people are 
influenced in one direction people tend to look for information on that 
side of the argument and not the other side of the argument". 
3.  ethical considerations; e.g. " When I was reading the book I realised 
that the number of people who were suffering from each disease was 
not as relevant in choosing a vaccine any more as each one of those 
numbers was a single person with a real life." 
In order to gain more detailed understanding of the ethical reflections, I 
developed the three-level ethical scale below (the quotes in levelland 2 are 
from Microbiology student logs, and the level 3 quote is a sample written to 
demonstrate the content of level three entries): 
Levell: Basic recognition of ethical issues - e.g. "the number of people 
dying is an issue". 
Level 2: Representation of basic ability to reflect on ethical issues - e.g. 
"the number of people who were suffering from each disease was not as 
relevant in choosing a vaccine any more as each one of those numbers 
was a single person with a real life". 
Level 3: Mature reflection and personal account in relation to the ethical 
issues - e.g. "we can't look at just number of people we can save, because 
to us it is not the same moral issue whether we see one of our loved ones 
die or someone we don't know. We might have more demanding moral 
duties to save those who we are responsible for.  At the same time it 
would be morally wrong to save only one human if you could save 10 
more as well. Also it makes a difference if we are talking about identified 
existing people or hypothetical/unknown people. If  we are talking about 
the latter kind, then I believe our duty is to try to save as many as 
possible." 
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10.2  Analysis of learning logs 
The average length of each entry for hand written learning logs (n=30) were 17 
lines and for typed logs (n=60) 16. Because the average lengths of both hand-
written and typed entries were so similar, further analysis considered the whole 
group together, even though the lengths represent slightly different actual word 
lengths. 
50 
~  40  - s::: 
CJ.) 
'0  30 
.s:::  - C) 20  s::: 
CJ.) 
..J 
10 
0 
25  35 
" " 
• 
•  "  •  •  "  "  " 
45  55  65  75  85  95 
Score % 
Figure 5: Relationship between length of log entry and score 
The length of a log entry does have a significant relationship with the score. The 
graph above shows a linear regression line statistically different from zero 
(p=0.0004). It is worth noting though, that the length alone cannot explain the 
score, as can be seen in some very long entries scoring less than 60%. The vast 
majority of the logs were well written, had a balanced structure, and dealt with 
issues relevant to the PBL. The length is therefore best understood as a sign of 
dedication to the log, and thus it is to be expected that the length and score have 
a positive correlation. 
Most entries had elements in 1-3 different categories, mostly at least one 
descriptive and one reflective. Table 36 shows proportionate length (in 
percentage) of each entry type for the Physiology and Sport Science, and 
Microbiology learning logs for term 1. 
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Average proportion of entry (%) 
Descriptive  Reflective- Reflective- Projective  Reflective - Reflective -
Decision- Learning  Ethics  Ethics 
making  skills  level 1  level 2 
4th entry (n= 90)  47.3  34.3  3.4  7.7  0.6  3.1 
2
nu last entry (n=90)  52.1  29.9  12.7  1.0  1.2  5.9 
Table 35: Termllearning logs:  proportional lengths of different elements 
The first notable element in these type lengths is the dominance of descriptive 
elements. It was emphasised in the introduction to learning logs and during the 
sessions that the logs should be an account of their thoughts, not what they had 
done. Still, approximately half of each entry comprised descriptive elements. 
There were also 12 students whose 4th entry was completely descriptive and 19 
whose 2
nd last entry had no other element types. 
The second noticeable quality of these entries is the very small proportion of 
ethics reflection, including a complete lack of level 3 ethics reflection in all 
entries. 
Table 36, for the Microbiology Term 2 logs (n=21), shows small but important 
differences: 
Average proportion of entry (%) 
Descriptive  Reflective- Reflective- Projective  Reflective - Reflective -
Decision- Learning  Ethics  Ethics 
making  skills  level 1  level 2 
4th entry  36.0  31.5  14.0  6.3  5.9 
2nd last entry  29.4  37.3  10.6  2.6  8.1 
Table 36: Term 2 (Microbiology) learning logs:  proportional lengths of 
different elements 
6.3 
9.0 
The dominance of descriptive elements in the entries has been reduced, though it 
is still high in the light of the instructions given to students. The proportionate 
weight of ethics reflection has also increased in their second logs. The proportion 
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is still low, but the practice with this type of work seems to have increased both 
the students' ability to consider and write about ethical issues. 
10.2.1  Summary of PBL experience 
As experienced in the PBLs in this study, undergraduate science students have 
relatively low competence levels in using ethical tools in problem-solving. This 
has become apparent also in the discussion groups carried out with Level 3 
students in other Honours courses. Students do not 'see' moral problems and 
they do not prioritise them in their decision-making. Thus, when allowed to 
approach problems on their own, students have a tendency to ignore sometimes 
even potent ethical problems facing them. For example, Microbiology students 
can without a moment's hesitation suggest that an ideal research protocol for a 
vaccine includes the use of over 500 primates in the initial animal trial phase. 
Not only is this financially crippling (resource allocation issues), but also 
ethically questionable in the magnitude of pain caused to animals. The students 
did not question the justification for using animals, unless directly questioned 
and even then the first knee-jerk reaction was that people who support animal 
rights are terrorists and use of animals is essential and right. Therefore, the 
facilitator participation in these PBLs was probably more active and directive 
than an ideal PBL design would suggest. 
The learning logs reflect a relative lack of interest or ability to engage in ethical 
considerations. The high proportion of descriptive elements in the entries could 
have been a result of at least two things:  1) the instructions were not clear 
enough, or 2) the students had genuine difficulties in reflecting on their learning. 
I believe the problem was rather in the latter. The main benefit of the learning 
log and the feed-back the students received would have been in the realisation of 
the nature and difficulty of reflection on learning. A learning process can be 
observed in the proportional differences between Term 1 and Term 2 logs. In 
their second log, the students were more focused on reflection and increased the 
proportion of their log discussing ethical problems. 
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PBL has considerable potential as a good form of ethics teaching, but it is not 
without problems. First, it is probably not ideal to introduce students to both PBL 
and ethics at the same time. The learning of both a new method of study and 
team work, and a completely new subject may require students to choose where 
to focus their energies and attention. Judging from this experience, the energy is 
directed at mastering the PBL approach to learning, rather than at ethics. Dr 
Mary Tatner, who taught the science-based PBL to parasitology students (the 
control group), reported a similar experience. During the first PBL in term 1, 
students spent a considerable amount of their time in learning the method and 
gave the problem itself less of their time and attention. 
If  students are familiar with PBL and have had at least some very preliminary 
introduction to the nature of philosophical inquiry, I believe that PBL offers an 
excellent method for ethics teaching. It allows students to explore the issues 
independently and thus not pose problems with indoctrination and could enhance 
the understanding of ethics in difficult decision-making far better than discussion 
groups. 
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11.  Analysis of the Moral Development Questionnaire 
The Moral Development Questionnaire was designed to detect three distinct 
elements in moral development: moral sensitivity, moral cognitive skills, and 
meta-ethical conceptions. The results of the questionnaire, applied before and 
after the ethics education intervention, were expected to identify progression and 
regression in all of these three developmental elements. The effects of ethics 
teaching were the main focus of the analysis of these results. 
The Moral Development Questionnaire was administered to each L3 Honours 
course during the first few weeks of Term 1 and then again either at the end of 
term 1 or at the start of Term 2, which ever was most applicable considering the 
teaching schedule. Approximately 450 students in the L3 Honours courses 
participating in ethics teaching were expected to fill in the questionnaire. Due to 
scheduling difficulties in organising a time for the questionnaire to be filled in 
and to variable student attendance at these sessions, the actual number of 
students filling in either the pre or post questionnaire was considerably lower 
(374 for the pre and 301 for the post questionnaire). The numbers were further 
reduced after the students filling in only one of the questionnaires were removed 
from the analysis (242 for DIT). 
This reduction in number of questionnaires included in the analysis was 
unfortunate. The original plan to compare results between Honours courses had 
to be abandoned in most cases as the group sizes were too small. Also, some of 
the gender-based analysis carried out suffered from small group sizes. 
All that could be done, was done in organising the questionnaire times as 
suitably as possible for the students. Variable attendance is a common 
phenomenon throughout the course structure, so the lack of students attending 
these sessions was not out of the ordinary. However, the fact that for most 
students, the ethics component was not part of the course assessment may have 
influenced the students' motivation to attend these sessions. 
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The main statistical test used to analyse the Moral Development Questionnaire 
data was the Wilcoxon paired sample t test. This is a non parametric analogue to 
the paired-sample t test. The Wilcoxon t test is applicable whenever a paired t 
test is applicable, but also when we cannot assume normal distribution. The 
testing procedure involves the calculation of differences, which are then ranked 
according to absolute values of differences, from low to high (the smallest 
difference being assigned a rank of 1, the second smallest two etc.). Then the 
ranks with a plus sign are summed and those with a minus sign are summed. The 
higher raw value of rank sums indicates the direction of change. However, this is 
only indicative as different distribution patterns in the ranks can strongly 
influence the rank sums. The Wilcoxon test identifies differences in samples 
even when the mean differences are very small by comparing each pair 
indi viduall  y (Zar, 1999). 
Other statistical tests used were an unpaired t test with Welch's correction and 
the Mann-Whitney test. Welch's correction takes into consideration that the two 
data sets may not have equal variances, when Mann-Whitney does not assume 
normal distribution. All data were tested for normality and variance before an 
unpaired t test was carried out. Normality was tested with Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. Pearson correlation coefficient was also employed. 
As will become apparent in this chapter, these data have a high level of noise. 
Significant numbers of students both progress and regress in all measures. This 
leads to very small changes in the mean scores. Also, emerging trends are only 
moderate due to the movement of scores in both directions. This made the 
analysis complicated and created challenges in drawing firm conclusions. 
This chapter looks at each of the three elements in the Moral Development 
Questionnaire separately first and then compares the results at the end. 
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The first element looked at is the Moral Sensitivity test, section 11.1. This is 
followed by DIT results in section 11.2. The DIT results are divided into six 
main sub-sections: 
11.2.1 P-score, 
11.2.2 N2-score, 
11.2.3 Gender variance in P- and N2-score, 
11.2.4 Type-score, 
11.2.5 U-score, and 
11.2.6 Gender variance in Type and U-score 
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The last element in the Moral Development Questionnaire is Perry development, 
results of which are detailed in section 11.3; the gender variance in Perry is 
summarised in sub-section 11.3.1. 
The last section (11.4) in this chapter describes the relationships between all 
these three elements. 
The Chapter ends in a summary of the results. 
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11.1  Moral Sensitivity results 
The Moral Sensitivity Test measures development in the first element of moral 
decision-making - the ability to recognise moral problems. Without this 
recognition there can be no further solving of a problem. 
The first part of the Moral Development Questionnaire was a Moral Sensitivity 
Test. Students were asked to write no more than five questions or issues they 
believed should be considered before making a decision on whether to start 
research on a genetically modified cow producing pharmaceutical milk to treat 
Cystic Fibrosis (see Appendix IV - Moral Development Questionnaire). The 
scoring guide for these responses is discussed in more detail in section 5.3.2.2 
(Scoring method) and the guide itself can be found in Appendix X - Scoring 
Guide. 
11.1.1  Moral Sensitivity response frequencies and averages 
Student response forms (protocols) were included in the analysis if there was at 
least one issue or question raised. Protocols left blank were removed from the 
analysis, because it was not possible to know whether students had not 
recognised any issues (genuine blank) in the proposal or whether they had 
skipped the Moral Sensitivity Test altogether (artificial blank). Table 37 shows 
the numbers of protocols in each step of inclusion. 
Moral Sensitivity  pre  post 
Protocols 
All returned  374  301 
At least one response  367  274 
Paired  267  267 
Table 37: Number of Moral Sensitivity Protocols 
Table 38 details group sizes of included protocols both in relation to the 
male/female divide, and different teaching approaches. 
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Teaching Approach  Gender 
All  PBL  Discussion  Female  Male 
Test  133  48  85  91  42 
Control  134  49  85  98  36 
Table 38: Gender and teaching approach in Moral Sensitivity 
The mean number of questions or issues raised was approximately 3.2 in both 
pre and post questionnaire and for both Test and Control groups. Table 39 
summarises the information on the mean number of issues raised in the pre and 
post Moral Sensitivity Tests. 
Group  Mean number of 
responses 
pre  post 
Overall (n= 267)  3.21  3.22 
Test (n=133)  3.15  3.23 
Control (n=134)  3.28  3.21 
Table 39: Moral Sensitivity test mean number of responses 
If  issues scoring zero (non-ethical responses, for further details see Appendix X -
Scoring Guide) are removed from the frequency analysis, we find some 
differences between the mean number of issues/questions raised between Test 
and Control group pre and post tests. Table 40 summarises the mean numbers of 
responses after the exclusion of responses scoring zero. 
Group  Mean number of 
responses 
pre  post 
Overall (n=267)  2.87  2.99 
Test (n=133)  2.83  3.08 
Control (n=134)  2.91  2.91 
Table 40: Moral Sensitivity Test: mean number of responses scored above 
zero 
The issues and questions scoring a zero are not ethical considerations. Thus a 
student could raise five issues/questions without showing any ethical sensitivity. 
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By removing the zero scoring responses, we get a more accurate understanding 
of the increase/decrease of ethical questions/issues raised by students. 
The mean number of responses after zero-scoring responses were removed, given 
by Test and Control groups, was not statistically different (p=O.639 in the pre test 
and p=O.303 in the post test, unpaired t test with Welch's correction). The 
increase in the mean number of responses in the Test group was cancelled out 
due to high variation in the number of responses in both Test and Control group. 
In both Test and Control group, there were significant differences in individual 
students' number ofresponses in the pre and post test (p<O.OOOl, Wilcoxon t 
test). In the Control group, the ranked changes in the number of responses 
cancelled each other out, while in the Test group the increase of responses was 
on average larger than the decrease. 
The scoring guide for the Moral Sensitivity Test identified four logically 
independent types of responses: 
I Risks 
•  to human health 
•  to animals 
•  issues of supervision 
•  testing and labelling products 
II Cost and Benefit + Research issues 
•  medical' benefits to humans 
It  opportunity costs in research 
•  commercial involvement and access to treatment 
III Issues of Basic Values 
•  genetic research 
•  animal rights 
IV Public Opinion 
Table 41  details the mean number of responses in each type. Responses scoring 0 
(see Appendix X - Scoring Guide for details) are included in this table, while 
duplicate responses (more than one issue/question raised in the same sub-type) 
have been removed before means were calculated. The responses scoring zero 
were included in order to give an accurate picture of the types of issues students 
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recognise. It is worth noting, however, that types III and IV have no zero scoring 
elements. 
Group  Types 
Pre  I  II  III  IV 
Overall (n=267)  1.38  1.35  0.30  0.19 
Test (n=133)  1.36  1.32  0.32  0.15 
Control (n=134)  1.39  1.38  0.28  0.23 
Post  I  II  III  IV 
Overall (n=267)  1.34  1.48  0.25  0.16 
Test (n=133)  1.33  1.44  0.31  0.15 
Control (n=134)  1.35  1.53  0.17  0.17 
Table 41: Mean response frequencies in each type 
The number of responses in each category was very similar in Test and Control 
groups in both pre and post test. When the pre/post answering patterns are 
compared for each student there are no statistically differing patterns (p=0.879, 
paired t test). The biggest percentage difference is in the decline of mean number 
of responses by the Control group in type III. 
11 .1.2  Moral Sensitivity scores 
The Moral Sensitivity Test was scored using the scoring guide (Appendix X -
Scoring Guide). The level 0 answers did not accrue any points, levell answers 
were given 1 point, level 2 answers 2 points and level 3 answers 3 points. If  a 
student had more than one answer in one sub-type, the highest scoring element 
was the only one included in the score. 
The pre score mean for the entire group was 4.780. For the Control group the pre 
score mean was 4.890 and for the Test group 4.681. The difference between 
Control and Test group pre-scores was not statistically significant when tested 
using an unpaired t test with Welch's correction (p=0.443). 
Table 42 summarises information on the direction of change in the Moral 
sensitivity Test scores in Test and Control groups, pre and post teaching. 
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Group  Direction of  chanqe (%) 
ProQressinQ  ReQressinQ  No chanQe 
Test All (n=133)  51.8  33.3  14.9 
Discussion (n=85\  49.4  32.9  17.7 
PBL (n=48)  54.2  37.5  8.3 
Control All (n=134)  31.5  44.9  23.6 
Discussion (n=85)  31.8  48.2  20.0 
PBL (n=49)  27.7  46.8  25.5 
Table 42: Moral sensitivity progression/regression 
It is noticeable that a large percentage of students progressed and regressed 
during the test period in both Test and Control groups. However, the Test group 
has a higher percentage of progressing students and a lower number of regressing 
students than the Control group. Also, a higher percentage of Control group 
students experienced no change between the pre and post Moral Sensitivity 
Questionnaire. The numbers of male and female students regressing/progressing 
in the Control and Test group were not significantly different from percentages 
for the whole group. When the change direction patterns between Control and 
Test groups are compared using chi-square, the patterns appear significantly 
different (p<O.OOOl, X
2=24.941, df=2). 
Even though there were no great differences in the direction of change between 
Discussion and PBL groups, the trends are still interesting. Students in the PBL 
Test group progress more than students in the Test Discussion group, while 
fewer students in the Control PBL group progress than students in the Discussion 
Control group. The Test PBL group has also the smallest percentage of students 
not experiencing any change. 
The fluctuations of students in both Test and Control group make further 
interpretation of moral sensitivity scores tentative. The level of noise may mask 
some significant differences between sub-groups and the other way round; 
significant changes may result from a coincidence in high noise data. However, 
the directions of change indicate that ethics education has encouraged positive 
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provided by the academic experience in general. 
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Figure 6 shows the relationship between the Moral Sensitivity pre score and the 
size and direction of the change between pre and post questionnaire for both Test 
and Control groups. 
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Figure 6: The linear regression between Moral Sensitivity pre scores and the 
pre/post difference 
The linear regression is highly significant (p<O.OOOl, r
2=0.362). The higher the 
pre-score the more likely the student to regress and the lower the pre score, the 
more likely progression becomes. This is logical as those with a higher pre-score 
have more 'room' to regress than those with a low pre-score, and those with a 
low pre-score have more 'room' to progress. What is noticeable, however is that 
the Moral Sensitivity score is not a particularly static variable and students 
scoring high at one testing occasion may not do so next time. It would be 
interesting to measure students at several points and try to seek a truer estimate 
of their moral sensitivity and identify the issues that contribute to the variability. 
Table 43 summarises the mean Moral Sensitivity Scores for both Test and 
Control groups in the pre and post questionnaires. 
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Group  Score (mean ±  SO) 
Pre  Post 
Test (n=133)  4.68 ± 2.27  5.30 ± 2.25 
Control (n=134)  4.89 ± 2.18  4.67 ± 1.95 
Table 43: Moral Sensitivity scores 
In both the Test and Control groups the pre and post sensitivity scores were 
found to be significantly different (p<O.OOl, Wilcoxon t test), which again shows 
the nature of the measure. For the Test group the difference between sums of 
positive and "negative ranks was 2112 (2574 and - 4686). This indicates that the 
larger changes in the group were regressive and the smaller changes progressive. 
The smaller number of regressive students can influence the Wilcoxon sum of 
ranks greatly in a large sample size. Therefore, considering a) the percentages of 
students progressing, regressing and experiencing no change (Table 42: Moral 
sensitivity progression/regression; b) the change in mean Moral Sensitivity 
score; and c) the Wilcoxon t test, I conclude that the overall change in the Test 
group was progressive, while at the same time the regressive differences were on 
average larger than the progressive differences. 
For the Control group the difference between sums of positive and negative 
ranks was 576 (2665 and -2089). The positive sum of ranks being larger 
indicates bigger differences in the progressive sub-group. However, considering 
the percentage of students progressing, regressing and experiencing no change; 
the change in mean moral sensitivity score; and the Wilcoxon t test, I would 
conclude that the overall change in the Control group was regressive, while at the 
same time the progressive differences were on average larger than the regressive 
differences. 
11 .1.3  Gender differences in  Moral Sensitivity 
Gender is one possible variable in moral sensitivity. This section identifies the 
role gender plays in the Moral Sensitivity scores and moral sensitivity 
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Table 44: Moral Sensitivity scores by gender in the pre and post questionnaire 
Moral Sensitivity score means for female and male students in Test and Control 
groups. 
Group  Score (mean ± SO) 
Pre  Post 
Female all (n=189)  4.86 ± 2.21  5.08 ± 2.18 
Male all (n=  78)  4.62 ± 2.27  4.77 ± 1.91 
Test (n=133)  4.68 ± 2.27  5.30 ± 2.25 
Female (n=91)  4.96 ± 2.26  5.34 ± 2.34 
Male (n=42)  4.18 ± 2.23  5.22 ± 2.12 
Control (n=134)  4.89 ± 2.18  4.67 ± 1.95 
Female (n=98)  4.76 ± 2.17  4.78 ± 2.11 
Male (n=36)  5.22 ± 2.21  4.39 ± 1.48 
Table 44: Moral Sensitivity scores by gender 
The pre and post score mean differences between male and female students (Test 
and Control groups combined) were not statistically significant (pre p=0.414 and 
post p=O.780, Mann Whitney unpaired t test). There no gender differences within 
Test and Control groups either (Test Pre scores p=O.058, Test Post scores 
p=O.599,  Control Pre scores p=O.323, and Control Post scores p=O.350; Mann-
Whitney unpaired t test). 
Table 45 details the percentage of female and male students either progressing, 
regressing or experiencing no change in Moral Sensitivity score. 
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Group  Direction of change (%) 
Progressing  Regressing  No change 
Test All (n=133)  51.8  33.3  14.9 
Female (n=91)  48.3  37.4  14.3 
Male (n=42)  57.1  28.6  14.3 
Control All (n=134)  31.5  44.9  23.6 
Female (n=98)  31.6  48.0  20.4 
Male (n=36)  25.0  47.2  27.8 
Table 45: Moral Sensitivity direction of change by gender 
When we look at the data from both tables (Table 43 and Table 44), the pre and 
post scores for the female students in the Control group are significantly different 
(p<O.OOO 1, Wilcoxon t test), but the difference between the sum of ranks is only 
15 (1271 and -1286). Thus, the sizes of positive and negative change within the 
group were close to equal in both directions. The difference between means is 
also very moderate. Including the percentage of students experiencing positive 
change (31.6%), the general trend in the Control group females seems to be 
dominantly one of equal changes in both directions, with a higher percentage of 
students regressing than progressing. 
The difference between pre and post Moral Sensitivity Test for the female 
students in the Test group was also highly significant (p<O.OOOl, Wilcoxon t 
test), and the difference of their median ranks was 519 (1281  and -1800). Also, 
almost half of the Test group female students progressed in the Moral Sensitivity 
score and a smaller number regressesed. Thus the general trend is clearly 
progressive. 
For the male students in the Control group, the difference between pre and post 
Moral Sensitivity scores was again highly significant (p<0.0001, Wilcoxon t 
test), and the difference of sum of ranks was 161  (256 and -95). This indicates a 
progressive trend in the scores, or that the progressive differences were of a 
larger impact and thus ranked lower (higher rank sum) in the Wilcoxon t test. At 
the same time the means of pre and post Moral Sensitivity scores for males in the 
Control group regressed from 5.22 to 4.39. Also, only 25% of males in the 
control group progressed, compared with 47.% regressing and 28% experiencing 
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The males in the Test group also had a highly significant difference between pre 
and post Moral Sensitivity Scores (p<O.0001, Wilcoxon t test). The difference in 
sum of ranks was -462 (221  and -682), which indicates larger negative than 
positive changes. This is contradicted by the increase of means from 4.18 to 5.22. 
Also, 57.1 % of test group males progressed, with only 28.6% regressing and 
14.3% experiencing no change. Considering all these data, I conclude that the 
male students in the test group had both statistically and genuinely significant 
gains in their moral sensitivity scores after their experience of moral education. 
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DIT measures moral cognitive skills and the ability/desire to use justice-based 
reasoning in moral decision-making (for further details see section 4.3). 
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The Defining Issues Test has a set analysis approach explained in section 4.3.3. 
The data were extracted from the optically read questionnaires first into an 
Access file. In this format, the computed results that were either incomplete 
(blanks) or had mUltiple entries were compared with the paper originals and 
either corrected, included with a note or disregarded from further analysis. 
Table 46 summarises the inclusion steps and numbers of questionnaires in each 
step: 
OIT protocols  pre  post 
Optical reading 
complete  215  147 
blanks  129  141 
multiples  30  12 
All  374  300 
Pairing  256  256 
OIT validity  195  195 
Table 46: DIT protocols included 
After the questionnaires that could be completed (blanks) or corrected 
(multiples) had been dealt with, students were paired and only those that had 
completed both the pre and post questionnaire were included in the analysis. The 
next step was the DIT validation procedure outlined by Rest (1986). Out of the 
protocols rejected at this stage, 33 were rejected due to an unacceptably high M-
score (M>  7),  11  because of more than 9 same ratings in a story (indicating 
completion without due consideration of items), 2 because of P-score and N2-
score inconsistencies, and 15 because of inconsistencies in the ranking and rating 
of data. Thus 23% of paired protocols did not pass at least one of the validity 
tests. This figure is higher than the quoted average rejection percentage of 10-
15% (Rest ef al., 1997). 
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Table 47 summarises the sizes of sub-groups in the included valid DlT protocols. 
Teaching Approach  Gender 
All  PBL  Discussion  Female  Male 
Test  114  47  67  73  41 
Control  81  25  56  59  22 
Table 47: Sex and teaching approach ratios of valid DIT protocols 
11.2.1  P-score 
P-score is the widest used and one of the oldest DIT scores computed (see 
section 4.3.3 for further detail). The P-scores I quote here were validated by Dr 
Stephen Thoma from the University of Alabama. Dr Thoma offered to double-
check my calculations after my first two efforts produced unusual results. The 
results Dr Thoma calculated matched the original results. 
The first unexpected P-score result was the low P-score mean in the pre-
questionnaire. Table 48 shows the results. 
Group  pre P-score 
(mean ± SO) 
Control  30.44± 14.18 
Test  32.89± 15.83 
Table 48: Pre P-score means for Test and Control groups 
These P-score averages for the Glasgow University Level 3 Bioscience students 
correspond with international averages for high school students, not with 
students already in tertiary education. The international average for tertiary 
students is 42.3 based on a sample of 2886 (Rest 1986). 92 (24.6%) students in 
my sample had a pre P-score higher than 42.3, thus exceeding international 
averages for students with similar educational back-ground. The pre P-scores of 
Test and Control group were not significantly different (p =  0.1755, unpaired t 
test with Welch's correction). 
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The second, and even more unusual, element of the P-scores was the high 
percentage of students regressing between pre and post questionnaire i.e. their P-
score was lower in the post-questionnaire. Table 49 shows the percentage of 
students changing in each direction in P-scores. 
Group  Direction of change (%) 
Progressing  Regressing  No change 
Test All (n=114)  51.8  46.5  1.7 
Discussion (=67)  55.2  44.8  -
PBL (n=47)  46.8  50.0  4.2 
Control All (n=81)  59.3  39.5  1.2 
Discussion (n=56)  55.4  42.9  3.6 
PBL (n=25)  68.0  32.0  -
Table 49: P-score - direction of change 
There is no published precedent for such a high percentage of students regressing 
in the DIT. Regression is not recognised in the original Kohlberg theory, though 
regression has been detected in DIT protocols in longitudinal studies, but never 
to this extent (personal e-mail correspondence with Dr Thoma). In particular, it is 
to be noted that more students in the Test group regressed in comparison to the 
students in the Control group. 
Figure 7 details the sizes of P-score changes for Test and Control groups. The 
changes are divided into eight bands and the bars represent the percentages of 
students in Test and Control groups for each change band. 
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Figure 7: P-score differences between Test and Control groups 
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The differences in P-score change between the Control and Test groups are not 
statistically significant (p=0.896, unpaired t test with Welch's correction), though 
their variances are significantly different (Pearson correlation coefficient 
p<0.05). The difference in variance indicates different types of movement 
between the groups which can also be detected in Figure 7. In general, the Test 
group students have a higher percentage of students at both the positive and 
negative end of the scale. Almost half of the students in both groups have a P-
score change size less than 10. 
Table 50 details the mean progression and regression sizes for Test and Control 
groups. 
Group  P change size 
Progressing  Regressing 
Test (n=114)  15.10  -11.40 
Control (n=81)  11.60  -10.10 
Table SO: P-score change means 
The magnitude of these changes, more than 10 points on average, is very large. 
In P-scores, changes of this magnitude often represent, on average, progress 
gained from 5 years of formal education. Though there are educational 
interventions that report changes of similar size (Self and Ellison, 1998), change 
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of this magnitude was not expected from a minimal intervention (Schlaefli et al., 
1984). 
Considering the number of students progressing and regressing between pre and 
post DIT, it is not surprising that the Wilcoxon t test for the pre and post tests for 
both Test and Control groups shows a highly significant difference (p<O.OOOl). 
The comparisons between positive and negative rank sums between Control and 
Test groups are very similar, indicating similar magnitudes of change in both 
directions. Also, there are no significant differences between Test and Control 
group Post P-scores (p=0.3359, unpaired t test with Welch's correction). 
Therefore, taking into consideration both the high variance in both Test and 
Control group, and the lack of significant P-score differences in the post scores, I 
conclude that the ethics intervention produced no noticeable effect on students 
moral decision-making skills when measured by DIT P-score. 
11 .2.2  N2-score 
A newer DIT score is N2 (for more details refer to section 4.3.3 ). It has been 
found to detect similar developmental tendencies to the P-score, while it is more 
sensitive towards changes after educational interventions (Rest et al.  1997). 
The N2-score follows the same trends as the P-score in relation to students 
regressing and progressing between the pre and post questionnaires. In only 17 
protocols, the direction of change was different between P- and N2-scores. Out 
of these, 13 had P-score changes less than 0.1, proposing no difficulty in 
accepting the difference. In the remaining four there were two major shifts 
(change difference >10), one from a P-score difference of -9.97 compared with a 
N2 difference of + 1.06 and another from P-score difference +26.7 compared with 
a N2 difference of -6.21; the other two protocols had a change difference less 
than 3. The two highly irregular protocols were removed from further analysis on 
account of inconsistencies in the original data. 
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The average Pre N2-score for the Control group was 30.64 and for the Test group 
34.13. This is again lower than international averages for university students -
N2 scores have similar averages to P-scores and thus the N2 international 
averages for tertiary students are in the low 40s (personal correspondence with 
Dr S. Thoma). The Test and Control N2 pre-scores were not statistically different 
(p=0.90, unpaired t test with Welch's correction). 
Figure 8 details the sizes of N2-score changes for Test and Control groups. The 
changes are divided into eight bands and the bars represent percentage of 
students in Test and Control groups for each change band. 
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Figure 8: N2-score difference in Test and Control groups 
The difference between Test and Control group N2 changes (before and after the 
ethics intervention) is not statistically significant (p=0.514, unpaired t test with 
Welch's correction). The N2 scores resemble P-scores in there being 
proportionally more Test group students at the far ends of the scale and in that 
most students experience more moderate change. 
Table 51  details the N2 mean size of change for regressing and progressing 
students separately for Test and Control groups. 
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Group  N2 mean change size 
Overall  Progressing  Regressing 
Test (n=114)  1.63  13.00  -11.93 
Control (n=81)  2.99  12.20  -9.75 
Table 51: N2 mean change size 
The overall mean change size for N2 is very small, when compared with pre-post 
change sizes reported in Rest et ai., (1997). There the mean change size 
(including both regressive and progressive students) is  13.94 (n=502). The Rest 
et ai.  study does not specify regressive and progressive means, but as regression 
is rare in DIT, it seems safe to assume that the low mean N2 score for the 
Glasgow University sample is due to the large number of regressing students. 
Taking into the consideration the large movement between pre and post N2 
scores, it was to be expected that the Wilcoxon t-test would confirm the 
difference between pre and post scores as highly significant for both groups 
(p<O.OOOl). Also, the sum of positive and negative ranks was very similar 
between Test and Control groups. 
The pre score was identified as a possible predictor of DIT change size and 
direction between pre and post questionnaires. In order to find out whether the 
pre-score could be used as an indicator of this sort, linear regression was carried 
out (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: N2 pre/difference regression 
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The linear regressions for both Test and Control groups are statistically 
significant (p<O.OOO 1). The regression was also statistically linear with the 
residual p value >.05. Still, even though the regression is significant the power of 
this prediction is relatively small (Control r2=0.268 and Test r2=0.178). 
These regressions indicate that we may not expect significant change in N2 -
scores from students whose N2 pre-score falls close to the average score for the 
group (35-45). A more significant regression or progression can be, on the other 
hand, expected from the subjects scoring either lower than average in the pre-
questionnaire (progression) or higher (regression). This seems only logical, as 
the students scoring low can only either progress or experience no change, while 
the students scoring high have an option either to maintain their score levels or to 
regress. This might indicate, in the light of regression being relatively rare in 
DIT, that the high pre-scores in  this population might have been coincidental 
rather than true indications of a higher level of moral development. 
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The post N2 scores were not significantly different between Test and Control 
groups (p=O.3218, unpaired t test with Welch's correction). Considering this and 
the high number of students regressing and progressing in both groups, I 
conclude that when measured by DIT N2, no difference could be detected in 
students' moral decision-making skills in relation to whether they attended an 
ethics course or not. 
11.2.3  Gender variance in  P- and N2-score 
There has been a lot of controversy about possible gender bias of DIT. This is 
one reason to look into the DIT results from a gender specific point of view. 
Also, it is important to find out whether genders benefit differently from this type 
of ethics teaching. 
Table 52 summarises P and N2 pre scores for both genders. 
Group  Mean scores 
P  N2 
Pre 
Female (n=132)  34.20  36.39 
Male (n=63)  27.56  28.42 
Post 
Female (n=132)  36.32  36.35 
Male (n=63)  31 .. 19  31.78 
Table 52: P and N2 mean scores by gender 
The differences between male and female students' pre scores were statistically 
significant for both P and N2 (p<O.005, unpaired t test with Welch's correction), 
with female students scoring higher in the pre test. This does not support the 
view that DIT discriminates against female-specific decision-making methods, or 
that females would be less capable in using justice-based moral decision-making. 
In the post scores the difference between genders, when measured as a unified 
group, was reduced in both measures. For the P-score the difference is 
Henriikka Clarkebllnl, lillie 2000 m  Part IV - Results  309 
statistically significant at p<O.05 (unpaired t test with Welch's correction), but 
the N2 score difference is just below statistical significance (p=O.058, unpaired t 
test with Welch's correction). 
Table 53 summarises the gender differences in P and N2 scores separately for 
Test and Control groups. The asterisk in the table indicates significance: * 
p<O.05 and ** p<O.Ol. 
Groups  PIContro/  PlTest  N2lContro/  N2/Test 
Pre 
Female  **32.75  35.38  *32.64  36.39 
Male  **23.32  29.84  *25.27  33.05 
Post 
Female  33.92  37.89  34.44  37.89 
Male  30.9  31.97  31.43  31.97 
Table 53: P and N2 scores by gender and Test/Control 
The differences between male and female students are evened out when the 
comparisons are made within Test and Control groups. The only statistically 
significant gender differences can be detected in the Control group pre-scores (P-
score p=O.005 and N2-score p=O.018, unpaired t-test with Welch's correction). 
What is particularly worth noting in Table 53, is that male students in the Control 
group catch up with the female students by the time the post test was applied. 
Further, it is worth noting that in ALL female groups the averages are slightly 
higher in the post questionnaire, while the average for Test group male students 
actually goes down in the N2 measure. Female students also continue to score 
higher in all measures in the post questionnaire. 
Table 54 summarises the proportions of female and male students progressing 
and regressing in the N2 score. Only N2 is presented here for the sake of 
simplicity and no important information is likely to be lost considering that the 
direction of change was found to be very similar in the N2 and P scores above. 
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Groups  N2 change (%) 
Pmgressing  Regressing 
Test All (n:114)  54.4  45.6 
Female (n=73j  54.8  45.2 
Male (n=41)  53.7  46.3 
Control  58.0  42.0 
Female (n=59j  52.5  47.5 
Male (n=22)  72.7  27.3 
Table 54: N2 change direction by gender and Test/Control 
In the Test group the direction of change is very similar between male and 
female students. In the Control group, on the other hand, we notice highly 
different patterns of change. The female students follow the pattern of students in 
the Test group, while a considerably higher proportion of the Control group 
males progress. This could be explained by the low pre score average of Control 
group male students (25.27 compared with the overall pre N2 average of 34.50). 
The low Control male pre score is equivalent to high-school scores (Rest 1994). 
This strong change and very low pre-score indicates a confusion within the 
student population about the moral decision-making tools they use: a genuine 
ten-point change, at least without intervention, is highly unlikely. 
11.2.4  Type-score 
One of the newest DIT measures is the Type -score (for more details refer to 
section 4.3.3). It is calculated from two components, a C-score measuring 
consistency in the choice of DIT items, and the dominant scheme a student uses. 
Table 55 details the Type results from both pre and post questionnaires for Test 
and Control groups. 
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Group  OfT Types (% of  students) 
Type  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4  TypeS  Type 6 
(% from Rest et al.  1999a)  (4.4)  (40.5)  (13.8)  (29)  (12.2) 
Test (n=123) 
pre  12.4  45  1.6  39.5  1.6 
post  10.6  48.8  4.1  33.3  3.3 
Control (n=106) 
pre  13.6  38.2  1.8  44.5  1.8 
post  11.3  54.7  1.9  31.1  0.9 
Table 55: DIT Types pre/post 
First, the Test and Control group pre Types are not statistically different 
(p=0.494, Mann-Whitney). The second thing to note from the Type summary, is 
the low percentage of 'consolidated' subjects in either pre or post questionnaires 
(Types 1,4, and 6). Consolidation refers to a stage where a subject is using 
dominantly one of the decision-making schemas, unlike transitional subjects, 
who use several schemas in a more interlaced manner. The C-scores (see 
Appendix V), which identify whether a subject is consolidated or transitional, 
ranged between 0.014  and 40.322, where the cut-off point for consolidated 
subjects is C> 15.705. The standard deviation of all C-scores (Test/Control, 
Pre/Post) was 1.172 which is considerably lower, for example, than the SD of 
9.09 in a 505 subject sample presented by Rest et ai.  (1999a). This again 
supports the suggestion that the students are experiencing a stage of transition 
and possibly even confusion in relation to their preferred moral decision-making 
method. 
The high percentage of Type 2 students in the Glasgow University Bioscience 
population is one of the main differences between these two samples (Glasgow 
and Rest's 505 sample). This again indicates less mature stages of moral 
development in the Glasgow University sample in comparison to published 
international data. Also, the very low percentage of Type 4 students in the 
Glasgow University sample is worth noting. 
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In Type, as in P- and N2-scores, students both regressed and progressed between 
the pre and post questionnaire. Table 56 details the percentages of students in 
each group either progressing, regressing, or experiencing no change. 
Group  Direction of Type-score change (% of students) 
Progressing  Regressing  No change 
Test  32.79  28.69  38.52 
Control  26.21  33.98  39.81 
Table 56: Type-score change % 
Again, we find a large percentage of students regressing. But as the Type-score 
identifies more slowly occurring changes in the moral decision-making patterns 
than P-score and N2, there are more students who experience no change in Type-
score between pre and post questionnaire in both Test and Control groups. 
The changes between pre and post Types are statistically significant for both Test 
and Control group when measured using the Wilcoxon t-test (p<O.OOOl). There is 
no significant correlation (Spearman's rank-order correlation co-efficient) 
between the pre and post scores for either group, thus a pre Type cannot be used 
to predict post Type. However, it is worth noting that the non-significant 
correlation was negative (rs=-O.0430) in the Control group and positive 
(rs=O.0979) in the Test group - the test group students' pre-scores indicating a 
slight progression on average in the Test group in comparison with the slight 
regression on average in the Control group. 
11 .2.5  U-score 
U-scores measure the level of utilisation of justice based items in making a 
decision in the DIT (for more details refer to section 4.3.3). U-scores for the 
sample were calculated by Dr Steven Thoma. A large number of students had not 
chosen an action for all three stories and the U-score could be calculated for only 
a sub-group of the DIT sample. Table 57 details the numbers of students in each 
DIT sub-group and the averages of their U-scores. 
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Groups  U-score 
Pre  Post 
Test  0.217 (n=79)  0.197(n=71) 
Control  0.207 (n=59)  0.189 (n=56) 
Table 57: U -score mean 
The U -scores are relatively low. U-scores have a potential range of -1  (low 
utilisation) to +  1 (high utilisation). However, large sample estimates of 
utilisation suggest an actual range of -.40 to .77 (Thoma and Rest 1999). These 
results indicate that the Glasgow University Bioscience students are using justice 
based reasoning only moderately as the basis of their decision-making. This 
coincides with the transitional Types dominant in the sample. 
The differences between pre and post U-scores for the Control group were 
statistically highly significant (p<0.001, Wilcoxon t test) and the positive 
changes were larger than the negative changes. For the Test group the difference 
was also significant (p=0.029, Wilcoxon t test) and the difference of changes in 
both direction was relatively equal. 
11.2.6  Gender variance in Type and U-score 
The gender differences in Type-score in either Test or Control group, pre and 
post are not statistically significant (Control  p=0.152 and Test p=0.026 both 
with Mann-Whitney). 
There are no significant differences between male and female students in U-score 
either pre or post (Pre p=0.799 and Post p=0.969 both with unpaired t test with 
Welch's correction). 
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11.3  Perry Results 
The Perry questionnaire was designed to measure students' meta-ethical 
developmental level. In this continuum a more advanced meta-ethical approach 
appreciates uncertainty in the application of moral values and recognises the 
importance of personal commitment and responsibility as part of being an 
independent moral agent (for more details see Appendix III - Perry's Scheme). 
Table 58 details the inclusion criteria and the number of protocols at each step. 
Pre  Post 
All  374  300 
Complete Perry  358  282 
Valid  326  278 
Paired  225  225 
Table 58: Inclusion steps for Perry 
The validation of the Perry questionnaire was based on a comparison of 
questions 6 and 9, which represent the same items with different wording. If  the 
difference between the choices of these two items was more than one place on 
the Osgood scale, the protocol was rejected on the assumption that the student 
had not read the questions properly. 
Table 59 details the sizes of Test and Control groups, and their sub-groups in 
relation to teaching approach. 
Groups  Perry Protocols 
All  PBL  Discussion 
Test  118  48  70 
Control  107  36  71 
Table 59: Perry protocols 
In the pre questionnaire, similar trends to those detected in the trial Perry 
questionnaire (refer to section 5.3.1.2 and Appendix VII - Preliminary Perry 
Questionnaire for further details), could be detected in the dominance of Perry 
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type statements chosen for element IV in comparison to overall choices (see 
Figure 10: Perry Type usage in the pre questionnaire). Students who otherwise 
chose dominantly C or Cb items in the questionnaire (indicating the highest 
developmental levels in the Perry scheme) , chose B items (indicating lower 
levels of development in the Perry scheme) far more readily than other items for 
element IV - Commitment. This confirms the earlier hypothesis that commitment 
is the last step in the Perry developmental scale and that the students in Level 3 
have made or are still in the process of making that transition. 
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Figure 10: Perry Type usage in the pre questionnaire 
A Personal Perry Score (PPS2) was calculated for all paired subjects, first for the 
entire questionnaire and then individually for the five distinct Perry elements: 
I Source and type of moral answers (Q2, Q4, and Q7) 
II Role of Authority (Q3) 
III Nature of multiplicity (Q8) 
IV Personal responsibility and relationship with multiplicity (Q 1, Q5, and 
QlO) 
V Purpose of moral discussions (Q6, and Q9) 
Table 60 shows the results for Test and Control group pre test. All the scores in 
Table 60 are means per statement, so that different elements can be more easily 
compared. 
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Groups  PPS2 scores 
PPS2  PPS21  PPS211  PPS2 III  PPS2 IV  PPS2V 
Test (n=118)  17.49  18.81  15.79  18.97  14.41  20.28 
Control {n=1 071  16.87  18.17  15.14  18.03  14.04  19.50 
Table 60: Pre PPS2 
The overall pre PPS2 scores for Test and Control groups were not statistically 
different (p=O.155, unpaired t test). It is worth noting from this table that the 
average is below Cb threshold (16) only in elements II and IV. This supports data 
shown in Figure 10, that students choose on average less advanced statements in 
element IV. Element II was found previously in the preliminary Perry 
questionnaires to have a higher percentage of straight A responses, which brings 
the average down. In this sample, 49 students (21.7%) chose either an A or Ab 
item for element II. This is considerably more A items than for any other element 
(3 only for element III and 1 only for element V). 
The direction of change in the Perry questionnaires (PPS2 for all elements) 
between pre and post ethics teaching intervention can be found in Table 61. 
Groups  % of students (average change) 
Progressing  Regressing  No change 
Test (n=118)  40.7 (+2.4)  54.2 (-2.5)  5.1  (0) 
Discussion (n=70)  41.4 (+2.5)  51.4 (-2.8)  7.1 (0) 
PBL (n=48)  39.6 (+2.2)  58.3 (-2.2)  2.1  (0) 
Control In=1 071  49.5 (+1.7)  48.6 (-2.9)  1.9 (0) 
Discussion (n= 71)  52.2 (+1.4)  46.5 (-2.3)  1.4(0) 
PBL (n=36)  44.4 (+2.4)  52.8 (-3.4)  2.8 (0) 
Table 61: PPS2 direction of change 
Again, approximately half of the students regressed between the two 
questionnaires. Though pre and post PPS2 scores are significantly different 
(Wilcoxon t test, p<O.OOOl) for both Test and Control groups, the average 
changes are only small. Also, when the size of change was compared between 
Test and Control groups, they were not found to be statistically different 
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(p=0.0630, unpaired t test with Welch's cOlTection). Still, Table 61  shows an 
interesting trend of Test group students being more likely to regress than Control 
group students. 
In order to identify the area of change, changes in different Perry developmental 
elements were compared pre and post for both Test and Control groups (Table 
62). In the table the higher PPS2 mean is highlighted. 
Test (n=118)  PPS2  PPS21  PPS2 II  PPS2 III  PPS21V  PPS2V 
Pre  17.49  18.81  15.79  18.97  14.41  20.28 
Post  17.09  17.58  17.98  18.92  14.58  19.43 
Control In=1 071 
Pre  16.87  18.17  15.14  18.03  14.04  19.50 
Post  16.30  17.07  16.41  17.63  13.85  18.59 
Table 62: PPS2 mean scores: Test and Control groups, pre and post 
The only difference between the Test and Control groups in the mean direction 
of change is in element IV - commitment and responsibility. The average 
magnitude of change is very small in PPS2 element IV - in the Control group -
0.184 and in the Test group +0.169. The range of change on the other had is quite 
large - from + 12.33 to -10.33 in the Test group and from -10.0 to +8.33 in the 
Control group. However, the difference between the PPS2 element IV change 
between Test and Control groups is not statistically significant (p=0.461, 
unpaired t test with Welch's correction). 
It is also noticeable that both groups progress in element II, the role of authority 
in moral questions. In the Post test the number of students choosing type A or Ab 
items in element II had reduced from 49 to 34 (15%), which accounts for much 
of the increase in average scores. 
The post PPS2 scores for Test and Control groups were not statistically different 
(p=0.9142, unpaired t test with Welch's correction). Considering this, the high 
variation in the data, and the lack of clear difference in progression/regression, I 
conclude that the ethics intervention did not make a significant difference to 
Perry scores in general. 
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11 .3.1  Gender variance in Perry 
Gender differences have been found in both Moral Sensitivity test and DIT, so it 
seems only plausible to suspect that similar differences could be found in the 
Perry Test. 
Table 63 details the numbers of male and females students in Test and Control 
groups. 
Test  Control  All 
Female  81  74  155 
Male  39  31  70 
Table 63: Gender groups in Perry 
Table 64: Pre PPS by gender details the mean pre Perry scores by gender. 
Groups  Pre PPS2 
PPS2 All  PPS21  PPS2 II  PPS2 III  PPS21V  PPS2 V 
Female  17.43  18.85  17.07  18.70  14.35  20.09 
Male  16.66  17.73  15.98  18.11  13.98  19.51 
Table 64: Pre PPS by gender 
In the pre scores gender differences were not found to be significant (p= 0.096 
unpaired t test with Welsch's correction). It is worth noting that in the pre test, 
female students score higher in all five Perry elements. Element IV is again the 
lowest element for both genders, reflecting the overall result. 
Table 65 summarises the average pre and post PPS2 scores for Test and Control 
group females. 
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Female  PPS2 All  PPS21  PPS2 II  PPS2 III  PPS2 IV  PPS2 V 
Test 
Pre  17.77  19.13  18.17  19.33  14.51  20.57 
Post  17.39  18.25  18.13  19.72  14.21  19.78 
Control 
Pre  17.08  18.57  16.00  18.05  14.18  19.59 
Post  16.62  17.19  17.33  18.08  13.91  19.22 
Table 65: Female PPS2 scores 
Although Test group females score higher than Controls in all five Perry 
elements, the differences between the groups are not significant in the pre-scores 
(p=O.159 unpaired t test with Welch's correction). The pre/post difference in 
PPS2 in the Test group is, however, highly significant (p<O.OOOI,  Wilcoxon t-
test). The direction of change is regressive - 38% of students progressed, 54% 
regressed and 8% had no change. In the Control group the difference was also 
highly significant (p<O.OOOI, Wilcoxon t-test) and the direction was more 
ambiguous - 52% progressed, 46% regressed and 2% had no change. The 
regressions were larger in size in the Control group than the progressions, and 
the general trend in the t test was thus regressive. 
Table 66 summarises the Male students PPS2 scores in pre and post test. It is 
worth remembering that the group sizes for male students were less than half of 
those of the female students, and that this has an effect on the power of the 
statistical tests. 
Male  PPS2 All  PPS21  PPS2 II  PPS2111  PPS2 IV  PPS2V 
Test 
pre  16.91  18.16  16.47  18.23  14.21  19.71 
post  16.48  16.21  17.65  17.31  15.32  18.73 
Control 
pre  16.35  17.18  15.41  17.97  13.70  19.26 
post  15.52  16.76  14.10  16.52  13.72  17.03 
Table 66: Male PPS2 scores 
Again, the Test group males scored higher in all five Perry elements in the pre-
score. These differences were not significant however (p=O.602 unpaired t test 
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with Welch's correction). The differences between pre and post PPS2 are highly 
significant for both Test and Control group males (p<O.OOOl) and the trend in 
both groups is regressive. When comparing the sum of positive and negative 
ranks, it appears that the regressive trend was stronger in the Control group. In 
the Test group 45% of the male students progressed and 55% regressed, while in 
the Control group 41 % of the male students progressed and 55% regressed and 
3% stayed the same. 
From the data above, I conclude that there was no significant gender variation in 
relation to the Perry scores and the teaching style did not have a gender-specific 
impact on students. 
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11.4  Comparisons across the Moral Development Questionnaire 
161 students completed all three elements in the questionnaire and passed all 
validity tests for both pre and post test. This sub-group of students allows 
comparisons to be made between the different elements in the questionnaire. 
Table 67 summarises the sizes of groups for males/females and Test/Control. 
All  Male  Female 
Test  96  33  63 
Control  64  18  46 
Table 67: Groups in cross questionnaire comparison 
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Because different elements in the moral development questionnaire are not 
directly comparable (different scales), the results in different elements cannot be 
compared by employing t tests. One method is to compare the directions of 
change. Table 68 summarises the results of this type of analysis. The first two 
lines in the table identify the direction of change of each element in the Moral 
Development Questionnaire, and the last two lines list the percentage of students 
in Test and Control groups for each direction of change pattern . 
Regress  All  PPS2 and  N2  N2 and  Sensitivity  N2 and 
Sensitivity  Sensitivity  PPS2 
Progress  All  N2  PPS2and  PPS2  N2and  Sensitivity 
PPS2 
N2and 
Sensitivity  PPS2  Sensitivity 
Test (n=96)  21.9  24.0  27.1  16.7  5.2  3.1  2.1 
Control (n=64)  26.6  20.3  29.7  18.8  1.5  1.6  N/A 
Table 68: Direction of change in cross-reference 
Close to half of the students in both Test and Control group either progress or 
regress in all three measures. When there are disparities between the different 
measures, N2 stands out as the one moving in a different direction to Moral 
sensitivity and PPS2. The last four directional combinations have six or less 
students in them, and are thus less significant. 
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The differences between Test and Control groups in changes of direction are 
small and from these data it is impossible to suggest that ethics teaching would 
have had a significant impact on the directional changes between parts of the 
moral development questionnaire. 
An alternative analysis for comparing different elements of the Moral 
Development questionnaire is to carry out linear regression analysis between 
different elements either pre or post. This was done for the following pairs of 
Moral Development Questionnaire elements: 
•  Pre N2IPPS2 (p=O.OlO, r2=0.041)** 
•  Pre N2/Morai Sensitivity (p=0.038, r2=0.027) * 
•  Pre Moral SensitivityIPPS2 (p=0.825, r2=0.000) NS 
•  Post N2/PPS2 (p=0.033, r2=0.028)* 
•  Post N2IMorai Sensitivity (p=0.078, r2=0.019) NS 
•  Post Moral Sensitivity/PPS2 (p=0.395, r2=0.005) NS 
Statistically significant linear relationship could be found in three pairs: Pre N2 
and PPS2, Pre N2 and Moral Sensitivity, and Post N2 and PPS2. For all of these 
three pairs the goodness of fit of the linear regression line is very low (r2 <0.041). 
The explanatory power of these regressions is thus very weak. 
These data suggest that when there is a moderate link between the direction of 
developmental change in moral cognitive skills (N2), moral sensitivity, and 
meta-ethical understanding. When the different elements are not connected, 
moral cognitive skills proceed as an independent element. When the scores are 
compared pre and post, only very moderate relationships between different 
elements could be demonstrated. Thus students tend to develop in these skills 
more often than not on all fronts, but there is no link between the levels of skills 
in each element. 
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11.5  Summary of Moral Development Questionnaire results 
The results from the Moral Sensitivity Test indicate that ethics education in the 
form of discussion groups and PBL encouraged development of moral 
sensitivity. In the Test group more than half of the students progressed in the 
Moral Sensitivity score during the research period and these changes were 
statistically significant. This is highlighted in the mean score change from 4.68 to 
5.30. In the Control group only 31.5 percent of the students progressed during 
the research period and the mean Moral Sensitivity score regressed from 4.89 to 
4.67. The Control group pre and post Moral Sensitivity scores were significantly 
different. 
There were no significant differences between the mean Moral Sensitivity pre 
scores of male and female students. However, the male students in the Test group 
improved more as a result of the intervention than the female students. At the 
same time, the males in the Control group regressed more during the research 
period than the female students. 
The DIT scores returned highly unexpected results, with close to 50% of the 
students regressing between pre and post questionnaire in both Test and Control 
group. Regression is recognised in DIT, but for this level of regression there is 
no published precedent. Possible explanations for this pattern are explored in the 
Discussion to follow. Also, it is worth noting that the pre P- and N2 scores for 
the Glasgow University sample are significantly lower than international 
averages for university students. 
Differences between groups were in many respects insignificant: there was no 
statistical difference between the following data sets: 
•  Pre-questionnaire P-score between Test and Control groups 
•  P-score change in size between Test and Control groups 
•  Post P-scores between Test and Control groups 
•  N2 pre and post difference between Test and Control groups 
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•  N2 post scores between Test and Control groups 
•  Female and male students (when divided into Test and Control groups) 
for pre and post P- and N2-scores (apart from Control pre scores) 
•  Gender difference for Type-score 
•  Gender difference for U  -score 
On the other, the following statistical analyses revealed significant differences: 
•  Paired pre and post P-scores for both Test and Control groups 
•  Paired pre and post N2-scores for both Test and Control groups 
•  Pre N2 and N2 change negative regression for both Test and Control 
group 
•  Pre N2 and P between male and female students including both Test 
and Control group students (females scoring higher) 
•  Only Control group female/male students in pre N2 and P scores 
•  Pre and post Type-scores for both Test and Control group 
•  Pre and post U-scores for both Test and Control group 
From this we can draw three main conclusions: 
1.  Ethics teaching did not have a statistically significant impact 
detectable by P- or N2 score on the moral development of Test group 
students. 
2.  The high fluctuation of scores, dominance of transitional decision-
making schema and the relatively low U score indicate confusion 
among students in choosing ethical decision-making methods in a 
consistent manner. 
3.  There are no significant gender differences in DIT scores. 
The Perry scores support the original hypothesis that commitment and 
responsibility are the final challenge in the Perry development scheme. In 
elements IV and II (authority) the average pre scores were less than the Cb 
threshold. 
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In the Perry questionnaire, the students moved in both directions - progressed 
and regressed - in very similar proportions. Regression was, however, slightly 
more common within the Test group. Due to this high level of movement there 
were highly significant changes between pre and post Perry scores within both 
Test and Control groups, but  no significant differences between them. There was 
also no significant gender variation in the Perry score. 
These results support the data from the other questionnaire parts in describing the 
students as in transition and search for moral decision-making tools. In Perry, 
that is particularly highlighted by the low scores for commitment and moral 
responsibility. 
When comparing different elements of the Moral Development Questionnaire 
two main results emerged: 
.,  Approximately half of the students either regress or progress in all 
three measures and for most of those students who have less consistent 
developmental patterns, the direction of N2 changes is different from 
Moral Sensitivity and PPS2 . 
.,  There are only very weak relationships between the different elements 
of the Moral Development Questionnaire indicating that the parts are 
measuring genuinely different elements of moral development. 
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12.  Moral Development Questionnaire - Level 1 results 
The original research plan included ethics teaching in Ll. It turned out  to be 
technically impossible to introduce any significant amount of ethics teaching into 
the L1 curriculum and the full inclusion of L1  in the research had to be 
abandoned. Moral Development Questionnaire data was, however, collected 
during the first week of term 1 in order to study natural developmental patterns 
in university students, by comparing the L1  data with the L3 pre-teaching data. 
There is no particular reason to expect session 1999-2000 L1  students to be 
different in terms of moral sensitivity or moral cognitive skills from the 
equivalent group two years before, and the relatively large sample size I was able 
to compare, gives confidence in the comparison. Ideally, it would have been 
desirable to follow moral development in a group of students through from L1  to 
L3. However, time constraints did not allow this. 
The L1  sample consists of 253 questionnaires of which 172 (68%) are female 
and 81  (32%) male. The sample is approximately a quarter of the entire L1 
popUlation. The students were chosen at random: five laboratory groups filled in 
the questionnaire. 
12.1  Moral Sensitivity results 
The Moral Sensitivity scores were calculated for a randomly chosen 
representative sample of the L1  Moral Development Questionnaires. The sample 
consisted of 50 questionnaires, 36 (72%) female students and 14 (28%) male 
students. 
The mean number of responses (including zero scores) was 3.90. After the zero 
scoring results were removed from the analysis, the mean number of responses 
was 3.18. The mean number of non-zero scoring entries was not significantly 
different from the L3 pre mean of 2.87 (p=O.77, unpaired t test). 
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When the response frequencies are compared per types in the scoring guide 
(Table 69), the differences between Ll and L3 are statistically significant 
(p<O.OOOI, unpaired t test). The differences appear in types I and II, with Ll 
scores significantly higher. 
Moral sensitivity tYQes 
Group  I  II  III  IV 
L  1 (n=50)  1.72  1.75  0.29  0.14 
L3 (n=267)  1.38  1.35  0.30  0.19 
Table 69: Ll and L3 Moral Sensitivity response frequencies by type 
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The mean Moral Sensitivity score for the Ll sub-sample is 4.275. Even though 
the L3 pre score mean is 4.780, the means of the two scores are not statistically 
different (p=0.097, unpaired t test). The higher mean of non-zero scoring 
responses in Ll and the lower Moral Sensitivity scores indicate that the Ll 
students had more lower level scoring responses when compared with L3. 
12.2  DfT 
Out of the 253 completed Ll DITs, 37 (15%) did not pass one of the validity 
tests. Out of the rejected questionnaires, 8 failed the M-test and the rest (29) the 
internal consistency test. This is a considerably lower rejection rate than for L3 
(23%), and within the average rejection rate quoted by Rest et ai.  (1997). Later, a 
further 23 DIT questionnaires were abandoned due to incompleteness of rating 
data. 
The mean P-score for LI is 28.94 and it is not statistically different from the L3 
pre score of 30.94 (p=0.513, unpaired t test). The mean N2 score for Ll is 28.49. 
Again, there is no significant difference between the L3 pre N2 score (31.09) and 
Ll N2 score (p=0.504, unpaired t test). 
Figure 11  shows the differences in Type-score between Ll and L3 students. 
Henriikka Clarkebllrl1, lillie 2000 ~  Part IV - Results  328 
DlT Type-score 
Figure 11: Type score for Ll and L3 
Figure 11  shows clear differences between the Ll and L3 Type-scores.  The 
scores are significantly different (p=O.OlO, Mann-Whitney test). What is 
noticeable in this graph is the higher percentage of Ll students in both extreme 
Types 2 and 6. Ll students are also across the board more consolidated (types 4 
and 6) than L3 students who are dominantly transitional (types 2, 3, and 5). 
12.3  Perry 
Out of the 253 Ll Perry questionnaires, 19 (7.5%) did not pass the internal 
validity test. 
Figure 12 shows the Perry scheme patterns both for all Perry elements and then 
separately for Perry IV elements in Ll and L3. 
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Figure 12: Ll and L3 Perry usage 
The Ll students follow the pattern of choosing lower level items for Perry IV 
elements. It  is noticeable, however, that the Ll students have chosen Type B 
items more often than L3 students and correspondingly less C and Cb items in all 
Perry elements. 
Table 70 details the PPS2 data for Ll and L3 (Test and Control group pre data). 
PPS2 - all  PPS21  PPS2 II  PPS2111  PPS21V  PPS2V 
L  1 (n=234)  15.26 ± 3.05  15.29 ± 4.52  14.25 ± 8.84  18.42 ± 6.93  13.63 ± 3.32  16.58 ± 5.56 
L3 (n=225)  16.72 ± 3.23  17.34 ± 4.63  16.14 ± 7.89  18.31  ± 6.13  14.23 ± 3.73  19.03 ± 5.14 
Table 70: Ll and L3 Perry scores 
The Ll and L3 Perry scores per type are statistically different (p=0.0095, 
unpaired t test). The Ll students scored lower in all elements except III, where 
the mean score is only a fraction higher than that of L3 students. 
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12.4  Gender variance in L 1 scores 
The moral sensitivity scores were calculated for 37 female students and 14 male 
students. The scores were not significantly different (p=0.600 1, unpaired t test) 
In L1, 137 female students and 56 male students completed a valid DIT protocol. 
There were no significant differences between the male and female students' P 
scores (p=0.971, unpaired t test), or N2-scores (p=0.985, unpaired t test). 
The Type-scores were not significantly different (p=0.355, Mann Whitney test). 
The PPS2 was calculated for 160 female students and 74 male students. There 
was a significant difference (p=0.008, unpaired t test) between the male and 
female student PPS2 scores when they are compared in all five elements. 
Table 71  shows the PPS2 for L1  female and male students separately. 
PPS2  PPS21  PPS211  PPS2 III  PPS21V  PPS2V 
Female  16.64 ± 3.36  17.42 ± 4.94  15.31  ± 8.03  18.88 ± 6.76  14.30 ± 3.70  18.55 ± 5.69 
Male  15.35 ± 3.16  15.52 ± 4.86  11.59 ± 8.59  19.50 ± 6.34  13.23 ± 3.75  18.11±5.79 
Table 71: L1 PPS2 by gender 
The female students scored consistently higher (apart from element III - Nature 
of multiplicity) and the difference was particularly marked in element II - Role of 
authority. 
12.5  Summary and conclusions of  L 1 results 
In the Moral Sensitivity test, L1  students raised on average more questions and 
issues than L3 students, but scored lower. The number of responses raised by L 1 
students was significantly higher than the L3 figure, while the difference 
between the Moral Sensitivity scores was not.  This suggests two conclusions: 
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1.  L1  students did take the questionnaire seriously and thus we can 
assume that the scores are a true reflection of their moral sensitivity. 
2.  Even though the Moral Sensitivity scores were not significantly 
different, the fact that the L3  students have a higher average score per 
raised issue/question indicates that there is a natural progression 
towards more sophisticated moral sensitivity during the first years of 
tertiary education. 
In DIT the differences between L1  and L3  students were not statistically 
different when P- and N2 -scores were calculated. The Type-scores, on the other 
hand, were significantly different, with L1  students more consolidated than L3 
students. This suggests that the university experience gained by the L3  students 
does not, per se, encourage moral development as far as it is measured by the 
DIT, while it does seem to increase the mix of schemas the students use. The 
increase in transitional types could be interpreted as increased confusion about 
moral decision-making tools, which is apparent in the L3 pre and post 
questionnaire data. 
In the Perry questionnaire, L1  students follow the same pattern as L3 of choosing 
lower level items more often in element IV than in any other element. The PPS2 
scores of L1  and L3 students are statistically different with L3 students appearing 
more advanced than the Ll students. This suggests two conclusions: 
l. When introducing ethics, we need to take into account students' ability 
to deal with complex moral issues. If  students are dominantly Perry 
types A and B, teaching needs to be designed to support the learning 
process of students at those stages. 
2.  PelTY development seems to occur spontaneously, possibly both as a 
result of the academic experience and of general life-experiences. 
The gender differences found in the PelTY questionnaire, with the male students 
choosing significantly more often lower level Perry items than the female 
students, suggest that the male students would have more difficulty following 
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ethics teaching that is not designed to promote growth in meta-ethical thinking, 
but rather further development of students who have reached Perry type C. 
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Part V - Discussion and Recommendations 
The ethics intervention at Glasgow University during the academic years of 
1999-2000 was a challenging project. Not only was there no known precedent of 
science ethics education in UK, there were also academic and practical 
challenges in setting up a manageable ethics course and a suitable assessment 
method. In this discussion I hope to draw together the different elements in what 
I would regard as a successful ethics course based on the experience at Glasgow 
- from creating a suitable teaching method to using assessment methods as 
supportive tools in the process. In the end, I will summarise the essential criteria 
for an effective ethics course for biological science students. 
Henriikka Clarkebllm, June 2000 m  Part V - Discussion and Recommendations  334 
13.  Teaching Ethics 
13.1  Creating an Interest 
Maximising the opportunities for student participation was a successful 
pedagogical choice in teaching ethics. The Glasgow University L3 Bioscience 
students participating in the ethics intervention clearly expressed their interest in 
ethics and enjoyment in learning by doing. 
I have once heard a bold claim that 70% of learning is based on motivation and 
30% on intellectual/cognitive abilities (lecture by Professor Arto Mustajoki, 
University of Helsinki, 1996). If  this is anything close to the truth, we cannot 
ignore the student perception of teaching. This is particularly the case when the 
teaching involves a subject area not directly chosen by the students, like ethics in 
a science curriculum. This is in contrast to more obviously subject-based 
material students may see the need to learn such as, say, molecular techniques. 
There is a greater need for personal motivation for a subject students regard as 
less relevant to their future careers. If  the students are not motivated, ethics 
courses will fail to generate learning. There is increasing support and demand for 
ethics education for science students, but there is no necessary link between that 
and student motivation. It is a task for the educators to encourage and nurture 
motivation towards what is considered important, both in life and within the 
degree-course. 
I also believe that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to create a motivational 
ethics course which aimed at inculcating the 'right' values. This approach, as 
was discussed in Part I, is not only morally questionable, but also demeaning to 
the students. It is certainly possible that some students would have an interest in 
receiving the 'right' answers from an ethics course. Science students often find 
the lack of 'right' answers very uncomfortable - saying things like 'I've found 
my degree course till now very effective: teachers have told me what to learn and 
I've done it. Now, you are asking me to read all this complicated and 
contradictory stuff which simply confuses me  '"  why don't you just tell me the 
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answer!' Unfortunately such a course would not spark motivation in the students 
to develop their skills further and to explore unexpected new problems with 
confidence and skill. 
Students in this project arrived at the ethics sessions with their own pre-
conceptions of what it was for and how highly they valued these expected 
benefits. My perception is that most of them were at the best curious about it, but 
rarely enthusiastic. It was then my task as a facilitator to describe the reasons for 
the ethics course, the benefits I believed were to be gained from it, and to create 
an environment where the students could build their own motivation. For me, the 
key in motivating students towards ethics was a respect for students' own views, 
and provision of an intellectual challenge. 
Reluctance to discuss, poor motivation, shyness, and lack of skill needed to be 
overcome before the sessions could achieve their core objective - to ignite a 
spark to think and consider ethical issues. I certainly did not succeed in 
overcoming these obstacles with every group, but with the majority I believe I 
did. It was enjoyable to see the interest grow, the views develop, and, quite 
literally, learning to take place during the discussions. This subjective impression 
of the discussions is supported by 74% of the students highlighting challenges to 
personal ethical views as one of the main benefits of ethics sessions. 
13.2  Developing skills 
Once the motivation is in place, I believe that the next most important thing in 
teaching ethics is to actively engage students in using and improving their skills. 
Moral decision-making is not about having the 'right values', but a skill to 
recognise moral issues, to include all shareholders in the consideration, to use 
adequate methods for comparing different routes of action, and having the 
personal strength to follow the decision through. We cannot teach skills without 
creating an environment where they can be practised. 
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Creating an opportunity for students to practice their moral decision-making 
skills is not about stepping back and letting them get on with it: very 
emphatically not. In order to create an environment for growth, you need to 
nurture the skills, provide students with the basic tools they need, and give them 
explicit support and encouragement. A logical and chronological order might call 
for a series of introductory sessions for 'giving the tools' - i.e. explaining the 
methods of moral decision-making. I believe that this would be, in most 
instances, detrimental to motivation. Starting an ethics course with students in a 
passive role, creates an unnecessary uphill struggle when later trying to re-
activate the students to practice and use their skills. It is also a subtle message of 
distrust - we believe you cannot make good/right moral decisions, so we are here 
to tell you how. It escapes me how that is supposed to motivate anyone. People 
have a tendency to want to live up to the expectations they perceive, and it can 
well be that when you expect a little, you only get a little. 
In this aspect ethics education seems to begin at the stage that traditional science 
teaching tends to reach at advanced stages i.e. an elementary approach in science 
is to teach the 'facts' first and only later to emphasise areas of doubt where 
hypotheses compete and cannot be easily resolved. The contrast does not need to 
be this sharp. If  students lack the basic skills of ethical decision-making, an 
ethics course requiring advanced skills would not be the most successful one. 
Ethics, like science,  is not a discipline where advanced levels can be 
successfully understood without basic knowledge. Further, ethics and science are 
similar in their emphasis at the more advanced levels on the value of finding out 
for yourself rather than relying on an 'authority' for the truth. But what is 
important, however, is that the basic tools of ethics do not need to be taught 
using didactic teaching methods. Student-centred teaching can be designed to 
encourage moral development even when students still have a long way to go 
before reaching maturity as moral agents. David Shapiro in his wonderful book 
'Choosing the Right Thing to Do' (1999) describes several such methods. 
Inclusion of support and supply of tools in student-led learning is not a straight-
forward process. It involves striking a fine balance between offering too much 
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and too little support, and timing it right. Each group is different; every meeting 
with the students is unique; so it is impossible to have a set plan to deliver the 
pieces of golden wisdom you might perceive that the students need. Instead, 
what a facilitator can do is to have a collection of methods and tools ready and a 
perceptive eye to see when and how to deliver them. Facilitation is a skill that 
requires training and practice. Even after almost 200 hours of facilitating ethics 
discussions, my learning curve as a facilitator did not reach a plateau during this 
project - there remain many areas where I can see improvements both as possible 
and necessary. 
13.3  Teaching in Glasgow University 
The two different teaching methods chosen for ethics teaching both worked well, 
but they were distinctly different. From the comfort of hindsight, I would now 
say that the discussion approach had distinct advantages over PBL. One of the 
main disadvantages of the PBL programme in this project was the concurrent 
introduction of both PBL as a method and ethics as a subject. Even though the 
teaching practice at Glasgow University is changing towards student-centred 
approaches, didactic teaching is still the dominant form. Further, students have 
over 10 years of school experience, which has more often than not encouraged 
passive learning techniques. Against this back-drop, PBL is a radical approach to 
learning. Students who are used to being told what to learn, how to learn it, and 
when to learn it may find the responsibility for learning daunting and unnerving. 
There is safety and comfort in being told. The transition from a passive absorber 
to an active searcher of knowledge takes energy and attention, which at first may 
detract from effective learning of the subject matter. 
In  this project, to make things even more demanding, the subject matter was also 
difficult in its essentially novel approach to problems. The methods of doing 
good ethics and the methods of doing good science are not identical: in some 
places they are even distinctly foreign to each other. In science the quest is for 
the best approximation of reality based on hard facts in numbers from 
experiments. Ethics, on the other hand, is not based on hard facts, but an 
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appreciation of reality based on a coherent application of value systems. Where 
science describes reality, ethics evaluates it. Glasgow University students have 
some exposure to ethical decision-making before L3 (see chapter 8 Teaching 
strategy), but the ethics course designed for this project requires students to 
adopt a more focused approach to ethics than before. 
The ethics PBLs did not achieve their full potential because the students needed 
to direct their attention and energy towards mastering the method at a cost to 
concentration and focus on the subject. The students were also genuinely at a 
loss to understand and recognise the ethical dimensions of the problems they 
were given. It is my belief that without active facilitation most groups would 
have proceeded to solve their problems with only minimal consideration of 
ethics. The main learning gain would have thus been the process of PBL, not 
ethics. Ideally then, PBL should be used in ethics teaching only when either 1) 
the students are already familiar with the PBL method, or 2) they have had an 
introduction to ethics as a form of inquiry, possibly structured ethics discussions. 
In my experience, the chosen problems functioned as well as they could in 
integrating ethics and science in a meaningful way and allowing students to 
approach the problem with the level of detail and dedication they chose. Thus, 
the PBLs were not unsuccessful, while they did not meet their full potential as a 
method for teaching ethics. 
The structured discussion programme provided a vehicle for students to explore 
their own moral values and moral decision-making models and to learn from 
those of others. In most instances the discussion seemed to capture the attention 
of the majority of students and the learning gains were both in increased 
understanding of the issues, and in improved personal decision-making skills. 
I believe that the preliminary reading was essential to the success of the 
discussion programme. It gave the sessions a focus, a reference point, and 
highlighted alternative ways of looking at a problem. The choice of the reading 
was difficult, however. The piece needed to be short and challenging, while at 
the same time an understandable overview of the key ethical issue. In my view, it 
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is important to read difficult texts as well as easy ones, both truly philosophical 
and scientific ones from which to distil the ethical issues. The reading should 
provide a challenge appropriate to the skills of the students. I chose to write the 
preliminary reading for a few topics when it proved impossible to find a suitable 
paper, but I believe it would not have been ideal to prepare the material 
specifically for all courses. Important learning opportunities could have been 
lost, if the reading material had been too homogeneous. 
I also believe it was essential to have a facilitator with a strong ethics 
background. The students needed a lot of facilitation in recognising and 
analysing ethical issues. I believe this would have been difficult provide if the 
facilitator had only a limited understanding of ethical theories and had not had a 
formal opportunity to practise ethical decision-making skills. Further, it was 
extremely important that the students were actively encouraged to explore ethical 
issues and that their efforts were supported in a friendly and appreciative 
environment. 
If  I were to design an ethics course afresh with what I know now, and 
importantly, if I had more time with the students, I would not design a straight 
structured discussion course, nor a PBL one. A mixture of these two could prove 
beneficial - structured discussions preceding PBL. An alternative would be a 
discussion programme including more varied forms of interaction - role plays, 
debates, games, and presentations. These could add a new dimension to the 
understanding of ethical issues and make the learning more fun - possibly a key 
element in motivation. 
13.4  Assessment 
I believe it is crucial for the success of an ethics course that it should be included 
in the assessment procedures. Assessment is an agreed sign of importance and 
students are apt and accustomed to make their time and effort-related choices 
based on these signs. If  ethics is a valued and important part of the curriculum, 
we need to attach the appropriate credentials to it. Assessment also provides 
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external motivation, possibly not sufficient on its own to make the most of ethics 
teaching, but it might be a good starting point. 
Before implementing an assessment procedure, we need to ask ourselves what 
aspects of a bioethics courses are appropriate for assessment? We can assess, 
among other things, the knowledge of ethical theories, the ability to apply 
different moral decision-making methods, and participation and/or attendance. I 
do not believe that measuring knowledge of ethical theories is appropriate for 
bioscience ethics courses, for the simple reason that the understanding of theories 
should not be an important objective of a bioethics course. An ability to apply 
different moral decision-making methods coincides better with the objectives, in 
particular if recognition of the issues is also included in the task. Attendance 
would be the bare minimum, guaranteeing that the students would at least allow 
themselves to be exposed to new thoughts. 
Including ethical considerations in what is considered a successful exam-answer 
is one of the best available methods to assess ethics. It would highlight the 
interaction between the scientific curriculum and ethics; it would require students 
to use their moral decision-making skills in context, and it would give ethical 
concerns an unquestionable seal of inclusion in the important elements of science 
education. At the same time, it should not present a barrier in an ethics 
discussion, which would decrease the freedom students perceive they have in 
expressing their views. 
Assessing students before an ethics course may also be essential to a successful 
ethics course. Students' ability to recognise moral issues, to deal with the 
information, and how they perceive moral reality influences the way they 
perceive ethics teaching. It may well be that certain teaching approaches are 
more likely to encourage moral development of students in a particular stage of 
their moral development and even halt progress of students at another stage. For 
instance, it may be that the traditional ethics education process of challenging 
existing moral understandings has different effects on students based on whether 
they use a high mix of schemas (transitional) or a low mix (consolidated), or on 
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their U-score (utilising justice-based considerations in moral decision-making). 
A transitional individual with a low U-score may not benefit from a traditional 
ethics education approach, which challenges different moral views, since the 
intervention may serve mainly to highlight confusion and the limited utility of 
moral concepts. On the other hand, more consolidated subjects with a high U-
score may respond in the intended manner to the intervention and find it 
conducive to re-considering their chosen moral views. It would be fascinating to 
study further the possibility of tailor-making ethics education to suit students in 
different stages of their moral development. 
It is not particularly common to test students at university before designing 
teaching. Some methods have been employed, particularly in IT, to make 
teaching appropriate to the existing skill levels, but in more academic subjects it 
is not a widespread approach. The benefits of testing students before an ethics 
course are significant however. The testing methods used here tell us more than 
just students' moral decision-making levels - they describe some of the 
fundamental approaches students use in moral decision-making. These 
approaches may influence directly, as suggested by Thoma and Rest (1999), the 
benefits students can receive from an ethics course using a particular method. 
This is similar to testing students on their approaches to learning in general - do 
they use deep/surface learning approaches; how versatile are they in mixing 
different learning approaches (Entwistle, 1988); do they excel in private study or 
in group work etc?  Designing a course based on the knowledge you have gained 
about how your students learn, can enhance the impact of your course greatly. I 
believe this to be particularly true for ethics teaching. 
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14.  Results 
Measuring moral development is difficult. Even after an agreement on what 
moral development consists of, the development of a measuring approach and 
tools is complex and demanding. My choice in this research was to include one 
existing and validated measure (DIT) and to develop two new methods to study 
other areas of moral development. This was important for two reasons: 1) 
because the scope of DIT is very limited, and 2) because a reliable measure 
would provide an important comparison point to the new methods. 
Even though only half of the students participating in the study filled in both 
questionnaires, the numbers remained comfortably large enough for most 
planned analysis. The results from the Moral Development Questionnaire proved 
complex and unexpected. The main result expectation - a clear difference 
between the Test and Control groups - did not materialise in most instances, but 
the results revealed interesting trends in student development. 
The Moral Sensitivity Test was designed to measure students' ability to 
recognise moral problems. The fact that the mean number of questions/issues 
raised by students was 3.2 indicates that the students responded with an intention 
to give a genuine account of their thoughts. This is supported by the relatively 
small number of students leaving the Moral Sensitivity Test completely blank. 
This measure is, however, more subject to time-pressures and motivation than 
other parts of the Moral Development Questionnaire. Still, I believe that there is 
enough evidence to confirm that the results reflect students' genuine ability to 
recognise moral issues. 
The overall mean Moral Sensitivity scores for all groups both pre and post 
teaching are relatively low, only a third of the theoretical maximum. Students, 
when they recognised an ethical issue, recognised it only in its most basic terms, 
accruing a low score. The scoring guide was designed to minimise the 
importance of length in answers, and thus reduce the impact of style in the score. 
The variation of scores within the group was also relatively high. In my 
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understanding these results highlight two main issues: 1) that moral sensitivity is 
an area where students need to progress further in order to call their moral 
decision-making skills excellent, and 2) moral sensitivity is a very individual 
measure, where large differences between students exist, while gender is not a 
key identifier. 
There was a statistically significant difference between the Test and Control 
groups in Moral Sensitivity. The Test group had a progressive trend, while the 
Control group had a regressive one. The difference was not clear cut between the 
groups, as a third of the Test group students regressed during the study period 
and a third of the Control group progressed. Still, the benefits of ethics teaching 
were clear and distinct. 
Moral sensitivity is the first element in moral decision-making. Before 
recognition of problems, there cannot be a decision-making process, which 
makes moral sensitivity not only the first, but an essential part of the process. 
Progress in moral sensitivity is increased awareness. It is adopting new ways of 
looking at a problem and including more shareholders into the considerations. 
The teaching methods in this project concentrated on the recognition and 
discussion of the nature of moral problems. The results showed that the approach 
was successful in meeting its objectives in increasing student awareness of 
ethical issues. 
The DIT measures the use of  justice-based moral decision-making tools. The 
DIT results were unexpected in two ways; 1) the students scored lower than 
expected for their age group, and 2) regression was much more common than 
previously reported for DIT (Self et ai.  1998; Schlaefli 1984; Thoma 1984; Rest 
1986). 
There were no distinct differences between Test and Control groups in any of the 
DIT scores calculated. When we add to these results the significant changes 
between pre and post scores for all student groups, we get a picture of a student 
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body that is very much unsettled and immature in their use and choice of moral 
decision-making tools. 
The high rate of progressing and regressing in both groups, and the magnitude of 
change they experience, indicates that the students did not have a consistent 
approach to making moral decisions. They also utilised justice-based 
considerations only very moderately. The best explanation for this high level of 
fluctuation in both directions on the DIT scale, is that the students were 
profoundly confused about moral decision-making methods and as a result 
employed methods at their disposal in an inconsistent manner. The low P and 
N2-scores add to this confusion. The students were not only confused, but they 
predominantly used less sophisticated decision-making methods than expected 
for their age. 
It is worth considering why these young adults appear to experience this intense 
confusion. As was found by Spickelmier (Rest and Deemer 1986), moral 
development in higher education is not dependent on specific skills, but rather 
the personal orientation to learning and development in general. When we 
consider the increasing pressures on students today to juggle part-time jobs in 
order to finance their studies and that teaching is becoming increasingly goal 
orientated with specific learning objectives for each course, it seems possible that 
universities are no longer offering the best possible environment for moral 
development to take place. There seems to be a decreasing amount of time and 
encouragement for following individual interests in studying which may create 
an atmosphere more suitable for training than education. This corresponds poorly 
with the ideal of a higher education which supports deep learning, students' 
competence in critique and self-reflection, and provides an opportunity for 
students to engage in an enquiry process in open dialogue and co-operation, 
freed from unnecessary direction (Barnett, 1990). Ethics education seems to have 
a role to play in reaching this ideal, but it cannot alone counter-balance the 
strong training-like characteristics students face in so many of their courses. 
Henriikka Clarkebllrll, JUlie 2000 ~  Part V - Discussion and Recommendations  345 
I have not been able to locate any DIT studies carried out exclusively on 
bioscience students, but I do not believe there to be any inherent difference 
between bioscience students and higher education students in general that would 
explain the low DIT scores in the Glasgow University bioscience student sample. 
Neither do I believe that the Glasgow University sample has some inherent 
disadvantages that would be reflected in the low DIT  -scores. Based on these 
assumptions, I would suggest that the low DIT  -scores in the Glasgow University 
sample represent a more general trend in young adults in the UK today. This is 
something that might be worth further investigation. 
The ethics education intervention in this study was from the out-set a minimal 
one. It did not compare well with the most successful interventions lasting 4-12 
weeks with weekly sessions (Schlaefli 1984). To reach this level, the contact 
hours would have needed to be at least doubled if not even tripled. For this 
reason also, it is not surprising that the DIT results did not detect significant 
benefits of ethics teaching in the Test and Control group scores. 
The Perry questionnaire measures students' meta-ethical development. The 
results resemble the Moral Sensitivity and DIT results in having a high 
percentage of students both regressing and progressing between pre and post 
questionnaires. Out of the five Perry elements, in only one (personal 
responsibility and relationship with multiplicity) were the L3 students still 
experiencing major developmental shifts. In all other areas the students had 
predominantly reached the highest levels of development. 
This result is comforting. The students have the basic understanding of the nature 
of moral questions, which is important for the type of ethics teaching employed 
in this research. If  the students did not accept the multiplicity of moral answers 
and the relativity of right and wrong in applying moral principles, the teaching 
would have to address these issues before it could concentrate on moral 
sensitivity and cognitive skills. 
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The ethics intervention did not make a significant difference between Test and 
Control group Perry scores. This is understandable for two reasons: 1) Perry 
development is a fundamental process involving a change in a larger perspective 
of life and a short ethics course is unlikely to make a great impact on that, though 
it can be one of the elements encouraging change, and 2) most students had 
reached the highest levels of Perry development already, before the ethics 
intervention, and thus there was only limited room for development. 
The benefit of the Perry questionnaire was the gained knowledge of students' 
Perry developmental stage. It is reassuring to have evidence that the students did 
not perceive moral reality as black-and-white and thus were within the reach of 
ethics education as it was designed in this intervention. 
Analysis of the Moral Development Questionnaire results for Level I students 
suggests that there is only a limited amount of spontaneous moral development 
between L1  and L3. The Moral Sensitivity scores were not significantly different 
between L1  and L3 students, and neither were the DIT P- and N2-scores. The 
DIT Type-scores, on the other hand, indicated a shift from more consolidated 
schemas to more transitional ones as students progressed from L1  to L3. Also, 
there was a significant change in the L1  and L3 Perry scores, which suggest that 
students' views on moral reality have matured during their first years at 
university. This indicates that where students did not gain any major advantage 
in moral sensitivity or moral cognitive skills, their pattern of approach did 
change. The two extra years of academic life seem to reduce students' 
confidence in one moral decision-making method being sufficient. Thus 
movement has taken place and needs to be captured by moral education to use it 
productively towards moral development. 
Different elements in the Moral Development Questionnaire, when studied from 
the L3 data, were not connected. Scoring high in one element did not indicate a 
high score in another element. This shows that moral sensitivity, moral cognitive 
skills, and meta-ethical conceptions are distinct elements of moral development. 
However, the elements are linked dynamically. Progressing/regressing in one 
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element is more often than not linked with a progression/regression in the other 
two elements as well. In other words the developmental patterns are connected. 
When the connection is broken, moral cognitive skills move in the opposite 
direction to moral sensitivity and meta-ethical conceptions. This highlights moral 
cognitive skills as separate in nature from the basic understanding and 
recognition of moral issues. 
The teaching should thus include exercises in recognising the issues - explicitly 
working through a problem in order to highlight all the possible ethical questions 
that arise. Also, students need to engage in serious decision-making processes -
trying different methods within one problem to see the differences between 
outcomes and thus assisting them in choosing the most appropriate methods. 
These two tasks can naturally be linked chronologically and around the same 
problem. Structured discussion programmes and PBLs allow the inclusion of 
these elements naturally and provide a suitable setting for both types of learning. 
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15.  Conclusion and recommendations for the future 
Ethics teaching is important and necessary. The external pressures to guarantee 
that graduates have at least elementary understanding of ethical decision-making 
methods and ability to recognise ethical issues are increasing and students see 
this need themselves. At the same time, the results from this study clearly and 
unmistakably demonstrate that the students do not have these skills as yet. They 
use relatively unsophisticated moral decision-making methods in an inconsistent 
manner. Ethics teaching is needed to meet the needs of both students and the 
society they are to live in. 
The minimal intervention designed for Glasgow University Bioscience students 
has proven to be a suitable approach, but an inadequate one. It has given distinct 
advantages to students in supporting the development of their moral sensitivity, 
but it was not extensive enough to make a difference in their choice of decision-
making methods. The students' self-reported benefits tell of motivation and 
interest in the way ethics has been taught, which is half-way to a successful 
outcome. 
For ethics teaching to achieve more substantial benefits in both moral sensitivity 
and moral cognitive skills, the following elements would be essential in course 
design: 
1.  The minimum extent of the course should be five meetings + 
independent study. 
2.  Teaching methods should be student-centred and the facilitator have a 
strong knowledge-base in ethics. 
3.  Ethics should be included in course assessment procedures. 
Further, the impact of ethics teaching is likely to be highlighted if the following 
elements support the course structure: 
1.  Ethical considerations are raised through-out the course structure by 
staff members who have participated in an introductory ethics course 
themselves, as well as in dedicated ethics sessions. 
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2.  Ethics is included as part of the course through-out the four year 
university degree. The quantity of the teaching should increase 
towards the end of the degree with proportionally more ethics each 
year as students mature in their ethics decision-making abilities. 
Ethics education has an opportunity to make a difference in students' lives, so 
let's do it! 
349 
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Appendix I:  University Survey 
During September/October 1998 UK Universities offering a bioscience degree were 
sent an e-mail with the following questions: 
Does your university include bioethics components in the science curriculum? 
Yes/No 
Or do you have special courses available in bioethics for students of biomedical or 
life sciences? Yes/No 
If  the answer is no, thank you for your response, 
if the answer is yes, please look at the questions below. 
Is the bioethics teaching included in compulsory studies? Yes/No 
Or are the courses elective? Yes/No 
Or both Yes/No 
At which stage of the studies are the bioethics courses or components available? 
1st  year undergraduate 
2nd  year undergraduate 
3rd year undergraduate 
4th year undergraduate 
post-graduate 
Is the bioethics teaching provided in form of: 
lectures,  (Y es/N  0 ) 
tutorials, (Yes/No) 
self-study modules (Yes/No)? 
How are the bioethics courses or the components of bioethics within other courses 
assessed? 
Is there a set of objectives clarified for the bioethics teaching? 
If  yes, what are they? 
The e-mails were sent to the heads of departments/faculties and if there was no 
response to the first e-mail, the second one was sent to the same recipient. 
The following tables detail the Universities that did/did not reply and the form of 
ethics teaching in the Universities that included ethics in their curriculum. 
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Replied 
University of Aberdeen 
University of Bath 
Queens University Belfast 
University of Birmingham 
University of Bradford 
University of Bristol 
University of Cambridge 
Cardiff University, Wales 
Type of ethics, if any 
Compulsory, 4th Year, examined 
Optional, 3
rd&4
th  Year 
Ethical use of animals course 
360 
University of Central Lancashire  Optional self-study, 2
nd Year 
University of Derby 
University of Dundee 
University of Durham 
University of East Anglia 
University of East London 
University of Edinburgh 
University of Essex 
University of Exeter 
Heriot Watt University 
University of Hertfordshire 
University of Hull 
Liverpool John Moores 
University of Keele 
Kingston University 
University of Leicester 
University of Liverpool 
University of Manchester 
Manchester Metropolitan 
University of Oxford 
University of Plymouth 
University of Reading 
University of Sheffield 
University of St. Andrews 
University of Stirling 
University of Strathclyde 
University of Wales, Swansea 
University of York 
No reply 
University of Leeds 
University of Wales, Bangor 
De Montfort University 
University of Greenwich 
Liverpool Hope University 
University of Middlesex 
Napier University 
Nottingham Trent University 
Inclusion of ethics in lectures, exam questions 
Inclusion of ethics in lectures, exam questions 
Tutorial discussions, 3  rd Year 
Optional course 
Inclusion of ethics in lectures, exam questions 
Compulsory lectures, 2
nd year on ethical issues 
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University of Nottingham 
Open University 
University of Southampton 
University of Sussex 
University of Westminster 
University of Portsmouth 
Lancaster University 
Cardiff University 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 
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Appendix II: One Theory 
To a certain extent at least, the first perspective of Gilligan and the pre-conventional 
stage of Kohlberg can be considered similar, both pre-occupied with the self and the 
idea that moral issues have validity only through the self. Again, the second 
perspective of Gilligan's moral development and the conventional stage in Kohlberg 
share the concept of accepting social norms as the guidance through moral problems, 
even though the perception of the content of these conventional moral rules is 
different. Gilligan is describing a traditional agenda of femininity, of care, harmony, 
compassion and self sacrifice, while Kohlberg depicts a level of social organisation, 
a system of rights, rules, respect and fairness. The primary moral imperative for 
Gilligan is thus non-violence and care and for Kohlberg it is justice. 
Also in the transition from the second perspective to the third or from Kohlberg's 
conventional stage to post-conventional, both sexes move away from absolutes, 
though the absolutes themselves differ. In Gilligan's description of development it is 
the absolute of care, defined initially as not hurting others. The recognition of the 
need for personal integrity gives rise to the claim for equality embodied in the 
concept of rights. This changes the understanding of relationships and transforms the 
definition of care. According to the theory of Kohlberg, the absolutes to move away 
from are truth and fairness, defined by concepts of equality and reciprocity. These 
are called into question by experiences of multiple truths and the existence of 
difference between self and others. This leads to a relativising of equality in the 
direction of equity and gives rise to an ethic of generosity and care. In both theories 
the existence of two contexts for moral decision makes judgement by definition 
contextually relative and leads to a new understanding of responsibility and care 
(Gilligan, 1993; Kohlberg 1976). 
But the differences are not only in content, but also in the nature of moral dilemmas, 
determinants of moral obligation, and views of the self as moral agent. For Gilligan 
the moral dilemmas are threats to harmony and relationships, while for Kohlberg 
conflicting rights are the source of moral dilemmas. The determinants of moral 
obligation for Kohlberg are principles of justice, while for Gilligan they are 
relationships. In Gilligan's view, moral agents are connected and attached within a 
net of relationships while in Kohlberg's view the agent is separate and individual, 
not tied to other people (Brabeck, 1993). 
Moral development as depicted both by Gilligan and Kohlberg seems to entail a 
similar integration of rights and responsibilities. According to the development 
process as presented by Gilligan, the integration of rights and responsibilities takes 
place through an understanding of the psychological logic of relationships. As for 
Kohlberg, recognition through experience of the need for more active responsibility 
in taking care corrects the potential indifference of a morality of non-interference and 
turns attention from the logic to the consequences of choice. In Gilligan's theory 
subjects come to see the violence inherent in inequality, while Kohlberg's subjects 
come to see the limitations of a conception of justice blinded to the differences in 
human life (Gilligan, 1993). 
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Possibility of a consensus 
Rest has attempted to merge these disparate but related concerns presented by 
Gilligan and Kohlberg into a comprehensive moral theory. He has described four 
components of morality: 1) interpretation of a situation as moral and the appropriate 
affective response (outrage at a wrong committed, sorrow at a pain inflicted); 2) 
judgement about what constitutes the moral ideal or the just outcome; 3) decision 
about a course of action; and 4) an appropriate behavioural response. Rest places 
Kohlberg's theory in component 2, judgement of the ideal, while Gilligan speaks of 
components 1 and 3 (Rest, 1983). 
When Gilligan's and Kohlberg's theories are taken together, the moral person is seen 
as one whose moral choices reflect reasons and deliberate judgement that ensure 
justice be accorded to each person while maintaining a passionate concern for the 
well-being and care of each individual. Justice and care are then joined; the demands 
of universal principles and specific moral choices are bridged, and the need for 
autonomy and for interconnection are united in an enlarged and more adequate 
conception of morality (Brabeck, 1993). 
At least from the point of view of Gilligan, the merger of these two moralities, -
Kohlberg's based on impartiality and justice, and the one she puts forward of 
partiality and care, are not incompatible. Gilligan, according to Blum (1993), holds 
that there is an appropriate place for impartiality, and universal principle within 
morality, and that a final mature morality involves a complex interaction and 
dialogue between the concerns of impartiality and those of personal relationship and 
care. 
There is no logical reason why both care and justice considerations cannot be 
introduced, where relevant, into one and the same reasoning episode. It is possible to 
imagine a person who is both caring and just and who, in addition, has finely toned 
sensitivities for perceiving moral salience and seeing particular problems as 
problems of great diversity. This is not to deny that in some cases, construing a 
particular problem from both perspectives will block moral clarity about what should 
be done, nor is it to deny that it is important to have, even imperfect, decision-
making procedures to resolve such conflicts (Flanagan and Jackson, 1993). 
The concepts of  justice and care can therefore be considered as mutually compatible. 
People who treat each other justly can also care about each other. Justice is relevant 
to personal relationships, because considerations of justice determine appropriate 
ways to treat friends and intimates. Justice as it bear on relationships among friends 
and family, or other close personal ties, might not involve duties which are 
universalisable , but this does not entail the irrelevance of justice among friends and 
intimates. Justice is present in two ways. One, justice plays a part in distinguishing 
what people can justly expect in close relationships. The maintenance of a 
relationship requires effort by participants. One intimate may bear a much greater 
burden in sustaining a relationship than the other(s) and may derive less support, 
concern and so forth than she deserves for her efforts. Two, the opportunity for harm 
within a close relationship ( physical injury, sexual assault, psychological blackmail 
etc.) is significant and if such harming takes place, it requires rectification of some 
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sort. These are considerations of justice about the limits of actions within close 
relationships. In a similar manner care is present in the public domain. It shows 
itself, perhaps, in foreign aid, welfare programmes, famine and disaster relief, or 
other social programmes designed to relieve suffering and to attend to human needs 
(Friedman, 1993). 
It is also possible to consider that the division of the care and justice-oriented 
approaches to moral problems coincide with the distinctions between perfect and 
imperfect duties. Perfect duties are negative duties - that is, duties of omission; 'do 
not kill', 'do not cheat' etc. Imperfect duties are in comparison positive duties, duties 
of commission, duties to act. These are not necessarily specific guides to action, but 
maxims like 'practice charity' or 'love thy neighbour'. Perfect duties should be 
followed in all situations. This is possible because they do not require one to act, at 
least in non-conflictual cases. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, cannot be 
observed completely; it is impossible, for example, to practice charity all the time 
and regarding everybody. Imperfect duties are therefore contextual and require 
judgement of the situation in their application. In comparison, in a non-conflictual 
case, the following of perfect duties presupposes scarcely any knowledge of 
situational specifics. As all that is required is not to act in a specific way at any time 
or location and with regard to everybody, all one needs to know is some general 
empirical facts (giving someone an overdose of morphine will kill them) or at best 
some narrowly limited specific facts (in case of a child or otherwise weak individual, 
a lesser amount of morphine will lead to death). But this is true only if there are no 
conflicting moral duties and, in case of conflict, one believes there are rules 
absolutely without exceptions. Such an extreme position is not supported by many 
and therefore even concerning perfect duties one needs to engage in justifiability of 
exceptions to rules which are widely accepted (Nunner-Winkler 1993). 
The difference between perfect and imperfect duties is, hence, that imperfect duties 
are embedded in their context and contextual assessment and justification of action is 
necessary for all moral decisions. Perfect duties are less contextually bound, as rules 
can be followed without contextual appreciation or judgement, while perfect duties 
need not be considered to be totally context-free and absolute. Including contextual 
appreciation in fulfilling perfect duties is a less dominant feature than in imperfect 
duties. First, there are rules, and before their application some contextual assessment 
might be necessary or at least desirable: but rules apply unless otherwise proven. In 
imperfect duties, contextual assessment is necessary in all situations as none of the 
imperfect duties can be proposed without contextual information. 
The ethics of care and responsibility can be described as having a primary orientation 
to imperfect duties and the ethic of rights and justice to perfect duties. At the same 
time, both kind of duties can be part of the same morality. Therefore there need not 
be two different moralities, but a dissonance in the preference of which type of duties 
take precedence in conflicting situations. The order of priority need not be rigid, but 
precisely a mode of preference. 
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Appendix III - Perry's Scheme 
Perry's scheme is a description of evolution in students' interpretation of their lives. 
The evolution consists of a progression in certain forms in which the students 
construe their experience. These forms characterise the structures which the students 
explicitly or implicitly impute to the world, especially those structures in which they 
construe the nature and origins of knowledge of value and of responsibility. 
Methodology 
In the 1950's and 1960's Perry conducted a longitudinal study involving lengthy 
interviews of students from various classes at Harvard and Ratcliffe. From analysis 
of these interviews, a 'Scheme' of intellectual and ethical development for higher 
education students emerged. The starting point was to illustrate the variety in 
students' response to the impact of intellectual and moral relativism, which the 
research team had encountered in their role as student counsellors. The original idea 
was to measure personality differences in relation to learning. A selection of students 
presenting a wide range of views in a Checklist of Educational Views (CLEV) from 
the ultimately dualistic to mature relativism, were interviewed at the start of their 
first year and again at the end of the year. Some students changed their scores 
markedly between the two points of measurement. In the original study 98 tape-
recorded interviews were collected, including 17 complete four-year records. The 
interviews were open-ended - "what do you think has influenced you most during the 
year?". Based on these preliminary results a larger study including 67 complete four-
year records was conducted. From these interviews the researchers started to detect a 
common sequence of challenges to which each student addressed himself in his own 
particular way. The way the students addressed the challenges in both academic and 
social life seemed to represent a coherent development of forms in which they 
experienced values and in the form in which they construed the world. The 
formulation of theory from the interviews could only be done by inference, as the 
students rarely spoke explicitly at the abstract level of developmental theory. The 
interviews were presented to independent observers and they were asked to identify 
which stage of the hypothesised developmental scheme best represented the 
dominant form of structuring of the world in each report. Agreement between 
independent observers was the measure of validity of existence of the developmental 
scheme. From these interviews a scheme of moral and intellectual development was 
constructed. 
The main line of development has nine positions which can be grouped into three 
categories. 
Dualism 
Basic Challenge: Impact of multiplicity 
Position 1 - basic duality: The student sees the world in polar terms of we-right-good 
vs. other-wrong-bad. All issues are construed in terms of sweeping and unconsidered 
differentiation between in-group vs out-group. The right answers to everything exist 
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in the absolute and they are known to the authority whose role is to mediate (teach) 
them. Knowledge and goodness are perceived as quantitative increase of distinct 
rightness to be collected by hard work and obedience. One's own role and level of 
personal responsibility consists of simple obedience. Moral decision making consists 
of commitment to memory, through hard work of an array of discrete items - correct 
responses, answers, and procedures, as assigned by an authority. The existence of 
absolute answers is taken for granted. In very primitive forms the truth of the 
authority is considered absolute. This is the level of epistemological innocence. Very 
few university students hold or persist in position 1:  it is, rather, a scheme 
representing how small children divide their world between family and the vague 
inchoate outside. 
Position 2 - Multiplicity pre-legitimate: The student perceives diversity of opinion 
and uncertainty and accounts for them as unwalTanted confusion and poorly qualified 
authorities or as exercises set by the authority 'so we can learn and find the answer 
ourselves'. This is the first step in the journey from epistemological innocence. The 
students at this level of development often take a stand in opposition to what they 
perceive as  the 'vague theorising' of academic authorities and take a bold step in 
personal individuation, but then quickly find out that they have painted themselves 
into a corner. Alternatively the students who perceive diversity only as the authority 
presenting complexities as a mere exercise, are taking a far less radical step in 
personal development, but find themselves in a more flexible position in the future. 
All the same diversity is perceived only as a teaching method for the students to 
learn the 'truth' for themselves. Diversity is still alien and the authority can be 
perceived to be a poor authority who is failing in the role of mediator of the truth. 
Position 3 - multiplicity subordinate: The student accepts diversity and uncertainty 
as legitimate but still temporary in areas where the authority has not yet found the 
answers. The epistemology has room for legitimate human uncertainty, but this does 
not affect the nature of truth itself, only human relation to it. This accommodation 
loosens the tie between authority and the absolute - uncertainty is now unavoidable 
in the present. This proposes a procedural problem - how in an education institution 
where the students' every answer is evaluated are the answers judged if even the 
authority does not yet know the right answer yet: is not any answer as good as 
another? Rightness and hard work vanish as standards and good expression (the 
importance of quantity) seems to be left as the only criteria of judgement. The 
student solves this tension by focusing on an effort to reappraise what is that 'they 
want' and will now listen with more open ears to what the instructors say they are up 
to. 
Contextual relativism 
Basic challenge: the instability of the self in a diffuse relativism 
Position 4 - Multiplicity correlate and relativism subordinate. In their efforts to 
develop some rational which would account for the anomaly of being judged over 
issues where truth is not known, the students develop one of two alternative methods. 
These alternatives are developmental equivalents in that they represent an ultimate 
extension or accommodation of the old fundamentally dualistic structure before its 
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capitulation to the vision of generalised contextual relativism in position 5. A) 
Multiplicity correlate. The student perceives legitimate uncertainty to be extensive 
and raises it to the status of an unstructured epistemological realm of its own in 
which 'anyone has a right to his own opinion' and 'they have no right to call me 
wrong'. Moreover as students find the area to be ever larger than expected, and the 
day of revelation of the truth ever more remote, they claim for multiplicity a domain 
of its own, an epistemological equal, over against the authorities realm where right 
and wrong still prevail. This approach is typical for those taking an oppositional role 
in position 2. B) Relativism subordinate. The student discovers qualitative contextual 
relativistic reasoning as a special case of 'what they want' within the authority's 
realm. This is a more common pathway from position 3 to the vision of relativism in 
position 5. The paradox of this position is that students are learning to think 
independently, because they believe that is what the authority wants - independent-
like thought gets good grades. Genuine independence of thought is an issue to be met 
later. The requirement that an answer be reasonable raises the possibility that some 
questions may have some legitimate answers instead of one or any number of equally 
legitimate answers. The difficulty of making a dualistic determination as to whether 
a given opinion or answer is reasonable or not will then inevitably lead to the 
discovery of degrees of reasonableness which is typical of position 5. 
Position 5 - Relativism correlate, competing or diffuse: This is a drastic revolution. 
Up till now students have been able to assimilate the new to the fundamental 
dualistic structure: this is no longer possible. The student perceives all knowledge 
and values (including authority's) as contextual and relativistic and subordinates 
dualistic right-wrong functions to the status of special case, in context. This is the 
major shift, for relativism to be promoted from its status of special case to the status 
of context. Students discover not only a multiplicity of point of view about such 
matters as literature, history, or politics, but a pattern within each points of view, an 
interdependency of parts within the whole, which gave each 'point of view' its 
special character, its coherence, its integrity. This is a quiet revolution of the 
relativistic thinking of position 4 slowly becoming habitual. 
Position 6 - Commitment foreseen: The student apprehends the necessity of 
orienting himself in a relativistic world through some form of personal commitment. 
When one is confronted with an infinite universe of potential contexts for truth and 
care, one is threatened with loss of identity - a humanly unbearable disorientation. 
Other than by rejecting relativism, one can solve the threat to identity in three ways: 
1) to deny any meaning beyond one's immediate, passive responses, 2) to exploit the 
situation deliberately by becoming an active opportunist of the relativist reality, or 3) 
taking a step towards commitment - becoming an agent who chooses the aspects in 
his/her life and takes responsibility for them. The first two are defensive, while the 
third option provides a way forward. Position 6 is the moment of realisation of the 
responsibility of the individual in relating him/herself to the relativistic world. In 
position 6 commitment is foreseen as the resolution of the problems of relativism, 
but it has not yet been experienced. 
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Commitment in Relativism 
Basic challenge: responsibilities of commitment. No major reconstructing is 
apparent in the last stage of development: the drama of maturation has been 
stabilised. The development is therefore more qualitative than structural - one is 
already aware of the need to make commitment. Positions 7, 8, and 9 are therefore 
less distinct and more an expression of degrees of maturation 
Position 7: The student makes initial commitment in some area - this can be a career 
or political orientation for example. The student is quite taken up by the content of 
the commitment. 
Position 8: The student experiences the implications of commitment and explores 
the subjective stylistic issues of responsibility - deciding between the ways to fulfil 
one's commitment. 
Position 9: The student experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple 
responsibilities and realises commitment as an ongoing, unfolding activity through 
which he expresses his life style. Very few of the students in Perry's sample had 
reached position 9 - it is rather a way to round out the scheme by extrapolation, as 
much as position 1 did in the other direction. 
In any of the positions in the developmental scheme, a person may suspend, nullify 
or even reverse the process of growth:  1) a student may pause for a year or more, 
often quite aware of the step that lies ahead as if waiting or gathering the force 
(temporising). 2) The student may entrench him/herself, in anger or hatred of 
otherness, in the me-they or we-other dualism of the early positions (retreat). 3) 
Students may settle for exploiting the detachment offered by some middle position in 
the scale, in the deeper avoidance of personal responsibility known as alienation 
(escape). These are elements of a growth that is rarely linear and more usually 
wavelike. Growth usually occurs in surges and between these surges students might 
pause to explore the implications of the new position, or they might wait for the 
resurgence of strength to meet the next challenge, or even detach themselves 
completely and/or retreat to an old position. Every moment between surges involves 
a risk of the forces of growth being denied. 
Perry's scheme is dominantly used as a description of intellectual development 
(Finster, 1989) or measuring attitude change in students to teaching and learning 
(Katung et al., 1999), but was originally seen by Perry as also encompassing moral 
development. 
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PleBsB  write your MBtrlculatlon 
Number in  the boxes bBlow,  I11III 
snd msrk thB correspondIng 
bubbles in  thB grid.  Opinions on  Social Issues 
Use ONLY a pencil or a black pen. Do NOT fold or bend this form. 
For each question choose ONE answer and mark your choice with a stroke like this:  ... 
This questionnaire is  aimed at understanding how people think about social problems. 
Different people have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. 
Therefore there are  no right answers to the questions in this questionnaire in the 
way there is a right answer to a math problem. We would like you to tell us  what YOU 
think about several issues. The answers will be  fed to a computer to find averages 
and trends for the whole group, and your answers will not be  identified or appear in 
your academic record. 
The questionnaire has three parts. Work through them in the order they are here. 
You have 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
I  Surname:  I  Forename(s): 
PART I 
0 
I, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
" 
6  , 
7 
8 
I.' 
1
9 
Read the fol/owing scenario and then list below no mare than five issues/questions  YOU believe 
should be considered when making the decision. 
A research group is planning a project to create a cow that would produce milk containing 
a protein that could be used to treat patients with cystic fibrosis, which is a very 
debilitating human disease leading to premature death. Other pharmaceutical methods to 
produce this protein have not been successful or they have been very expensive. 
The plan is to introduce a new gene to the cow from another animal. 
The new gene will be introduced by nuclear transfer, a tecgnique also used in cloning. 
The group hopes to develop its research findings into a commercial product 
Yes  No  I am not sure 
Do  you think the research should go ahead? 
Please list below no more than five issues/questions YOU  think should be  considered 
when deciding whether to start the research: 
Which one of these reasons is the most influential in  your decision-making 
(please state the number of your response) 
2 
o  ,.0 
1  1 
2  2 
. : 
3  3 
4  4 
6  6 
6  6 
7  7 
8  1,8 
9  9 
4 
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0  0  0  0 
1  1  1  1 
2  2  2  2 
3  3  3  3 
4  4  4  4 
6  6  6  6 
6  6  6  6 
/, 
7  7  7 
8  8  8  8 
9  9  9  9 
5 
IlIIII 
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IIIIIII!II  PART II (Instructions) 
IIIIIII!II 
IIIIIII!II 
IIIIIII!II 
IIIIIII!II 
IIIIIII!II 
IIIIIII!II  - -
In this part you will be asked to give your opinions about several stories. Here is  an 
example, to show you what we will be  asking you to do: 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car.  He  is  married with two children and 
earns  an  average income. The car he buys will be  his family's only car.  It will be  used 
mostly to get to work and to drive around town, but also sometimes for vacation trips. 
In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank realises that there were a lot of  questions 
to consider. If you were Frank, how important would each of the following questions 
be  in deciding to buy a car? 
(On  the left hand side fill in ONE of the boxes for EACH  question, as  shown below) 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as  where Frank lives 
(in this sample the person answering the questions did not 
think this was important in making the decision) 
2. Would a used car  be  more economical in  the long run than a new car 
(the tick here indicates that this is a very important 
issue to the person answering the question). 
3.  Would a large roomy car be  better than a compact car? 
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200 
(If you are unsure about the meaning of the statement, as  this person was, 
then mark it 'no importance') 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group 
and  put the number of the question on the top line below. Do likewise for the second, 
third and  fourth most important choices. 
From the list above, select the four most important statements: 
2  4 
Most important 
2  4 
Second most important 
2  4 
Third most important 
2  4 
Fourth most important 
Page  2. 
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.  . 
PART II 
Story 1: Heinz and the Drug 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that 
the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a pharmacist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the pharmacist was 
charging ten times what the drug costs to make. He paid  £200 for the radium and charged 
£2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he 
knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about £1000, which is  half of 
the cost. He told the pharmacist that his wife was dying and  asked him to sell it cheaper 
or let him pay later. But the pharmacist said  "No, I discovered the drug and  I am going 
to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and  began to think about breaking into 
the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the Drug?  Should steal it  Can't decide  Should not steal it 
How IMPORT  ANT are the following statements in making the decision: 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
1. Whether a community's laws are going to be  upheld. 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No  2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
to care so  much for his wife that he'd steal. 
3.  Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as  a burglar or going to jail for 
the chance that stealing the drug might help. 
4. Whether Heinz is  a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with 
professional wrestlers. 
5. Whether Heinz is  stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else. 
6. Whether the pharmacist's rights to his inventions have to be  respected. 
7. Whether the essence of living is  more encompassing than the termination 
of dying, socially and individually. 
8.  What values are  going to be the basis for governing how people act 
towards each other. 
9.  Whether the pharmacist is  going to be  allowed to hide behind worthless 
law which only protects the rich anyhow. 
10. Whether the law in  this case  is  getting in the way of the most basic claim 
of any member of society. 
11. Whether the pharmacist deserves to be  robbed for being  so greedy and  cruel. 
12. Would stealing in  such a case bring about more total good for the 
whole society or not. 
From the list above, select the four most important statements: 
2  3  4  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Most important 
2  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Second most important 
2  4  6  8  9  10  11  12 
Third most important 
2  4  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Fourth most important 
Page  3 
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IIiIII 
IIiIII 
II1II 
II1II 
II1II 
II1II 
II1II 
II1II 
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11IIIIIIII  Story 2: Escaped Prisoner 
A man had  been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped 
from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and  took on the name of Thompson. 
For  8 years he  worked hard, and  gradually saved enough money to buy his own business. 
He  was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and  gave most of his profits 
to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an  old neighbour, recognised him as  the man who 
had escaped prison 8 years before, and  whom the police had  been looking for. 
11IIIIIIII  Should Mrs Jones report Mr Thompson to  Should report him  Can't decide  Should not report him 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
i  11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
11IIIIIIII 
the police and have him sent back to prison? 
How IMPORTANT are the following statements in making the decision: 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove 
he isn't a bad person? 
2.  Every time someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just 
encourage more crime? 
3. Wouldn't we be  better off without prisoners and the oppression of our 
legal system? 
4. Has  Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to the society? 
5.  Would society be  failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for 
a charitable man? 
7.  How could anyone be so  cruel and  heartless as  to send Mr. Thompson 
to prison? 
8. Would it be  fair to all  prisoners who had to serve their full sentences if 
Mr Thompson was let off? 
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
10. Wouldn't it be  a citizen's duty to report an  escaped criminal, regardless of 
the circumstances? 
11IIIIIIII  11. How would the will of the people and  the public good be  served? 
Great  Much  Some  Little  No 
IIIIIIIIIIII  12. Would going to prison do  any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody? 
From the list above,  select the four most important statements: 
2  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  II  12 
IIIIIIIIIIII  Most important 
2  4  5  6  9  10  II  12 
IIIIIIIIIIII  Second  most important 
2  4  6  7  8  9  10  II  12 
IIIIIIIIIIII  Third most important 
2  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  II  12 
IIIIIIIIIIII  Fourth most important 
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Story 3: Newspaper 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a newspaper for students so that he could express many 
of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the Vietnam war and  against some of the school rules, 
like the rule of forbidding boys to wear long hair. 
When Fred  started his newspaper, he  asked the principal for permission. The principal said it would be all  right 
if before every publication Fred would turn over all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and  turned 
several articles in for approval. The principal approved all of them and  Fred  published two issues of the paper 
in the next two weeks. 
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so 
excited by the paper that they began to organise protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. 
Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal, telling him that the newspaper was 
unpatriotic and  should not be  published. As a result of rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop 
publishing. He gave as  a reason that Fred's activies were disruptive to the operation of the school. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper?  Should stop it  Can't decide  Should not stop it 
How IMPORTANT are the following statements in making the decision: 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Great  Much  Some 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
Little  No 
1. Is the principal more responsible to the students or the parents? 
2.  Did  the principal give his word that the newspaper could be  published for a 
long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time? 
3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped 
the newspaper? 
4. When welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right 
to give orders to students? 
5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say  'no' in this case? 
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper, would he be preventing full discussion 
of important problems? 
7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred  lose faith in the principal. 
8. Whether Fred  was really loyal to his  school and  to his country. 
9. What effect would stopping the newspaper have on the student's education 
in  critical thinking and  judgement? 
10. Whether Fred  was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing 
his own opinions. 
11. Whether the principal should be  influenced by some angry parents when 
it is  the principal who knows best what is going on in the school. 
12. Whether Fred  was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and  discontent. 
From the list above, select the four most important statements: 
1  234  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Most important 
2  4  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Second most important 
2  4  6  7  9  10  11  12 
Third most important 
2  3  4  6  7  9  10  11  12 
Fourth most important 
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- PARTHI 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
In the following questions you are  provided with a pair of opposing statements with 
five boxes in between. For example: 
I must have background music 
when I study 
D  M  N  M  D 
I cannot stand any background 
noise when I am  studying 
By shading either of the outer boxes you indicate that you agree strongly with the closest 
statement. Shading the second boxes means you favour the statement, but less strongly. 
The middle box would mean that you do not have a strong preference or you are  unsure. 
Again there are  no right answers, only YOUR view matters. 
Mark the appropriate responses - note: 
D = Definitely my opinion 
M  = More or less what I believe 
N =  Neither of the statements represents my view 
1. It is  not my place to make  D 
moral choices. 
2. When we make moral decisions, the  D 
best we can do is to decide what is 
better or worse in  different situations. 
3.  I don't think teachers should assess  D 
my moral arguments if they do not 
know the right answers themselves yet. 
4.  Personal values need to be  D 
re-considered from time to time. 
5. People cannot choose their values,  D 
because values are either 
right or wrong. 
6. I don't enjoy discussing moral  D 
problems, unless the teacher can give 
the right answer in  the end. 
7.  It is  almost impossible to answer  D 
moral  questions without providing 
arguments to support them. 
8.  There are  very few absolutely right  D 
answers in  the world and  answers to 
moral questions are  not amongst them. 
9. I don't think discussing moral  D 
problems is  beneficial for me unless a 
right answer can  be  found in the end. 
10. I need to commit myself to a set of  D 
values even  when I am  uncertain 
whether they will always be 
the right values to have. 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
N  M 
Page 6 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
1  . When I have a moral problem I try 
to think the answer through myself. 
2. I believe we can  always make a 
judgement whether actions are right or 
wrong and these rules do not change. 
3. It is  important that teachers assessing 
moral arguments look for logical structure 
and good reasoning rather then 
a particular answer. 
4. Moral values are the same forever. 
5. I am  committed to a set of values 
I have chosen for myself. 
6. I am  comfortable with discussing my 
values in  the class even when we cannot 
agree on one right answer in the end. 
7. Answers to moral questions should be 
short and  simple. 
8.  Moral questions have absolutely right 
answers just like scientific ones. 
9. Discussing values with other people 
gives me  a beneficial opportunity to reflect 
on  my own values, even when there 
is  no  agreement in  the end. 
10. I do  not doubt that my values are  the 
right values to have. 
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Appendix V - Computing C -scores from DIT Data 
From Rest et al.  (1999a) 
story  pro con 
1.55 total =  L  L 
J 
Stage 
LX2(ijm) 
m 
2.  CF =  (LXijm)2 + (total number of items in test) 
3. 55 deviation = SS total - CF 
stage  story  pro-con 
4.55 stage =  L  L  LXijm2 +(number of items in stage) - CF 
5.  C =  (SS stage +SS(deviation) x 100 
375 
0) To calculate for each participant the 55 - total, do the following: (a) For each item that 
represents stage 2 or stage 3 (22 items in 6 story DIT), square the rating for the item and 
sum. Then multiply by 20122 (to adjust to equal number of items for each group of 20). (b) 
For each item that represents stage 409 items), square the ratings; sum these squares; then 
multiply by 19120. (c) For each item that represents stage 5 or stage 6 (21  items), square the 
rating; sum these squares, then multiply by 20121. (d) the 55 - total is the sum of (a) + (b) + 
(c). 
(2) To get CF: (a)take each item that represents stage 2 or stage 3, add the ratings of the 22 
items together, adjust this total by multiplying by 20122; (b) take each item that represents 
stage 4, add the ratings of the 19 items together, adjust this total by multiplying by 19/20. (c) 
take each item that represents stage 5 or 6, add the ratings of the 21  items together, adjust 
this total by multiplying by 20/21. (d) add together sums (2a) + (2b) + (2e), square this total, 
then divide by 60 (the number of items in the entire 6-story DIT). 
(3) To get 55-deviation, substraet CF (2) from 55-total (1). 
(4) To get 55-stage do the following: (a) take each stage-group sum derived in (2a), (2b), and 
(2e), and square each; (b) add the squares together; (c) divide by  10 ; and then subtract CF 
(2). 
(5) The C-score for a participants is the 55-stage divided by 55-deviation, then multiply by 
100. 
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Appendix VI - Perry Judges 
First round (all from University of Glasgow unless stated otherwise): 
Prof Alex Johnstone, Science Education 
Dr. Norman Reid, Science Education 
Dr Lisa Schwartz, General Practice 
Dr Jen Harvey, University of Edinburgh 
Ms Cecilia Edwards, University of Dundee 
Dr Craig Gray, Teaching and Learning Services 
Ditshupo Selepeng, Centre of Science Education 
Prof. Robin Downie, Department of Philosophy 
Second round: 
Dr. Bob Matthew, Teaching and Learning Service 
Dr. Erica McAteer, Teaching and Learning Service 
Dr. Rob Hoyle, Department of Chemistry 
Dr. James Wilson, Department of Management Studies 
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Appendix VII - Preliminary Perry Questionnaire 
In the following questions you are provided with a pair of opposing statements with five 
boxes in between. For example: 
377 
f"I'~~~t"h~~~"b'~~kg~~~~d'~~'~'i~"~h~~""'f""'"·  .. ············ .. ······· .. ·········· ..  ·············f··I·~·~~·~~t··~·t~~d··~~y··b~~kg~~·~~d··~~i·~·~········  .. ··j 
l  .. ~.~~.~9.y.  .................................................................... l  .......................................................... l  ..  '!!.~.~~.L~~  ..  s.~~.~y..~~g  ................................................ : 
By shading either of the outer boxes you indicate that you agree strongly with either 
statement. Shading the second boxes means you favour the statement, but less strongly. The 
middle box would mean that you do not have a strong preference or you are unsure. 
Again there are no right answers, only YOUR view matters. 
Mark the appropriate responses - note: D = Definitely my opinion, M = More or less what I 
believe, and I =  I can't decide 
D  M  I  M  D 
1. I don't think discussing moral  l. Discussing values with other people 
problems is beneficial for me unless a  gives me a beneficial opportunity to 
right answer can be found in the end.  reflect on my own values, even when 
....................................................................................................................................................  !~~~~  ..  ~~  ..  ~9  .. ~g~:~~~~.~~  ..  !.~.~~~  ..  ~~~:  .................... . 
2. When we make moral decisions,  2. I believe we can always make a 
the best we can do is to decide what  judgement whether actions are right or 
is right as far as we can tell in  wrong and these rules do not change. 
different situations  . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  M •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  M •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
3. I don't think teachers should assess  3. It is important that teachers assessing 
my moral arguments if they do not  moral arguments look for logical 
know the right answers yet.  structure and good reasoning rather than 
....................................................................................................................................................  ~.p.~.~~.~~~~.~.~  ..  ~~.~.~.~~:  ............................................... . 
4. Personal moral values need to be  4.  Personal moral values are the same 
re-considered from time to time.  forever. 
.....................................................................................  M •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  _  •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
5. There are very few absolutely right  5. Moral questions have absolutely right 
answers in the world and answers to  answers just like scientific ones  . 
....  I??~:~!  .  .9.~~.~.~!?~.~  .. ~~~  ..  ~~.!  ..  ?~.~.?f..~.~~.I?.:  ............................................................................................................................................................  . 
6. I don't enjoy discussing moral  6. I enjoy discussing my values in the 
problems, unless the teacher can give  class even when we cannot agree on one 
....  ~~.t:  ..  l:!g~.t.~.~~'!!.~~  .  .i.~  ..  ~~.~  ..  t:.~.~:  ........................................................................................  r.~g.~~  ..  ~~~~.~r..!.~  ..  ~~.~.~.~9.:  ...................................... . 
7. You cannot have a good moral  7. A good moral answer is short and 
answer without arguments to support  simple, because you know the right 
it, because moral answers are never  answer. 
....  ~.~~:~!g~.~.f<?r.~~.~9.:  ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
8. People cannot choose their values,  8.  I am committed to a set of values I 
because values are either right or  have chosen for myself. 
....  ~~:9.~g:  ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
9. It is not my place to make moral  9. When I have a moral problem I try to 
choices, because right answers have  think the answer through myself 
....  ~~~.~  .  .t?~.~~  ..  ~.\~:~~9.Y...~'/.  ..  ?~.~~~:~:  .......................................................................................................................................................................... . 
10. I need to commit myself to a set  10. I do not doubt that my values are the 
of values even when I am uncertain  right values to have. 
whether they will always be the right 
values to have. 
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Story 1 - research laboratory 
Ll 
L3 
no issues 
20% 
0% 
1 issue 
13% 
22% 
2 issues 
20% 
11% 
3 issues 
27% 
28% 
4 issues 
13% 
17% 
5 issues 
7% 
22% 
Ll average =  2.1  L3 average =  2.5 
Employment of support staff 
Benefits to asthma sufferers 
Patent rights 
Other alternatives 
Employment of academic staff 
Who gets the credit 
Rights of the company to exploit 
the research results 
13  Who decides on the research 
13  Benefits of research in general 
8  Advances science? 
7  New location 
6  Convenience of the move 
5  Facilities in the new laboratory 
3  Animal testing 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Story 2 - pharmaceutical milk 
Ll 
L3 
No issues 
25% 
0% 
1 issue 
5% 
5% 
2 issues 
25% 
14% 
3 issues 
30% 
14% 
4 issues 
15% 
14% 
5 issues 
0% 
53% 
Ll average =  2.1  L3 average =  4.0 
Cost and benefits 
Animal Welfare 
Risks to humans 
Scientific viability 
30 
20 
19 
10 
Ethics of mixing genes/cloning  8 
Environmental impact of cross-breeding  6 
Public opinion  5 
Advancement of science  2 
Story 3 - modified plant virus 
Ll 
L3 
No issues 
13% 
9% 
Ll average =  3.1 
Is it worth it? 
Environmental risk 
Food safety 
Developing country 
Cost and funding 
1 issue 
9% 
3% 
2 issues 
4% 
19% 
3 issues 
31% 
6% 
4 issues 
17% 
13% 
5 issues 
26% 
50% 
L3 average = 3.4 
36  Animal welfare  6 
31  Issues of research safety  5 
30  Public perception  5 
25  Issues of genetic engineering  4 
21  Land use  1 
Commercial driving force  1 
Ethics of abandoning the technology 
Henriikka ClarkeburIl, June 2000 Appendix IX - Plant Virus - sample responses 
Cost and Benefitiis it worth 
I 
I  I 
it?  I  I 
· 
Is it feasible to create an  I  •  What are the dietary  I  •  How large is the increased 
I  I 
enhanced crop?  I  benefits to the population?  I  quality of crops vs. any 
· 
Benefi t  -cost?  I  •  Is  it necessary to improve  I  harmful effects? 
· 
Potential benefits?  I  the crop?  I .  Is it necessary/justified to 
I  I  · 
Is it worth it?  I  •  How great is the dietary  I  increase protein content? 
· 
Can you fund the entire  I  improvement?  I  •  What are the alternative 
experiment')  I  I  methods for achieving the  I  I 
I  I  same effect?  , 
Environmental risk 
I  I 
I  I  · 
Are there side-effects?  I  •  Will the crop interfere  I 
· 
What are the effects on the  I  with organic farming?  I 
environment'7 
I  Who knows about the 
I 
I  •  I 
I  long-term effects?  I 
I  •  Can the virus become a  I 
I  I 
I  disease when spreading to  I 
I  other plants?  I 
Risks to humans/  I  I 
Food safety  I  I 
· 
What are the risks of  I  •  What is the level of  I 
eating the plant? 
I  certainty of side effects') 
I 
I  I 
· 
Is  it safe"7  I  •  How is the safety tested?  I 
~ 
::::. 
~ 
Q 
l:l 
~ 
<::l"  ::; 
""~ 
· 
Ant. oncogenic effects?  I  I 
Developing countries  :  I  · 
Will it grow in  areas that  I  •  Can developing countries  I  •  It is ethically nice to 
have difficulty supporting  I  afford this plant?  I  develop, but if developing 
vegetation') 
I  Will it have a beneficial 
I  countries cannot pay  I  •  I 
· 
Use of plant in developing  I  dietary value in  I  enough to recoup the R7D 
countries?  I  developing countries?  I  costs, who will subsidise? 
I  I 
I  •  The willingness of  I  •  GM food may not solve 
I  developing countries to  I  the problems that are 
I  participate 
I  rooted in poverty and lack 
I  I  ? 
ti:  I  I  of education. 
Non-ethical statements (not scored): 
· 
Is it profitable? 
w 
§ 
· 
What is the overall expense? 
· 
What is the mutation rate of the virus 
· 
Are the viruses going to be broken in the body? 
--._--_._--_  .. _-_  ....  -
Ethics of mixing  : 
I 
I 
genes/cloning  I  I 
· 
Is it ethical?  I  •  Is genetic modification  I 
We have to think where  I  I  • 
I  acceptable?  I  this can lead to? 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
Animal welfare 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
Public perception  I  I  · 
What is the public reaction  I  •  Will majority of people  I 
I  accept the final product?  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
Advancement of  science  I  I  · 
Is it possible  I  I 
I  •  Safety of research  I 
I  protocols (to contain the 
I 
I  I 
I  virus in the laboratory)  I 
I  •  How are the field trials  I 
I  I 
I  organised to secure that  I 
I  the virus does not escape?  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
· 
Are the plants tested the same as used for food? 
· 
Pathogenity of the virus described? 
· 
Would people buy the product? 
· 
Number of posts created? 
· 
Cost 
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I RISKS 
IA  HUMAN HEALTH  IE  ANIMAL  Ie SUPERVISION  ID  TESTING and LABELLING 
LEVEL 0: 
questions of risk for which an answer can be given on purelL  factual basis - i.e. no moral considerations required. 
What is the physiological influence of the drug  · 
how will the gene affect cow's original genes?  · 
Is it legal"  · 
Whether the taste of the milk will 
to CF patients?  · 
Where wil! the gene come from?  •  Where will the cows be kept"  alter. 
Should proteins manufactured in an animal  · 
How will the milk affect the calves?  · 
How will the milk be  purified" 
transfer to humans? 
LEVEL 1: 
First brief recognition of risk, which might serve as a stepping stone for higher level considerations. 
Any threat to humans?  · 
How many animals are involved?  •  Chance of modified cow interbreeding with  · 
Is  the product tested" 
Will it be safe for humans to drink this milk?  •  Is nuclear transfer safe?  normal cows  · 
How will you distinguish 
Will anyone get hurt?  · 
Side-effects on the cow?  · 
Would the cows be living in a normal farm  normal/altered milk" 
•  The effects of inter-breeding between normal  or would they be segregated to sterile 
cow and en  aineered one?  environment7 
LEVEL 2: 
Better understanding of risks, the considerations are more factual than moral, though moral elements are no"" present. Reference to long-term safety and harm characterise the human health risks. 
Emergence of concern for control and supervision also characterise the level, but there is yet no concern about who are the decision-makers and how do we balance risks and benefits. Responses also 
sometimes include strona, but unqualified, value-statements. 
Possibility of more harm if cow diseases  •  Will the cow suffer from producing the milk?  · 
Will there be controls7  · 
Does the product require animal 
transfer to humans?  •  is the quality of cow's life adversely affected?  •  What are the research protocols to  testing? 
Will it get into human food chain?  · 
Animals should not be subjected to any pain or  guarantee non-breeding between  · 
How can the product be tested for 
Long-term effects - what if it causes death to  distress?  engineered and normal cows?  human consumption without an} 
the patient a few years later?  · 
What are the long-term effects of creating a  •  Can we monitor the welfare of the animals  risk to (young) subjects" 
transgenic animal?  at all times"  · 
How will the product be tested" 
· 
There should be no way this gene could 
enter the wider population. 
LEVEL 3: 
The responses now include serious considerations about the role of decision-makers and what should influence the acceptance of different levels of risk. Justification for risk in  using animals is 
exIJiicitly sOllght. 
How big of a risk to adverse health  · 
How much animal suffering can we justify for  · 
Who should supervise the project- it should  · 
Is there an opportunity to refuse to 
implications are we ready to accept when this  commercial profit?  be an outside body"  drink the modified milk - labelling 
product is used to treat CF patients?  · 
How could the research results be abused  is  necessary! 
by others? 
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II COST AND BENEFIT + RESEARCH ISSUES 
I1A  HB  lIC 
MEDICAL BENEFITS  OPPORTUNITY COST and RESEARCH  COMMERCIAL INVOLVEMENT AND ACCESS 
LEVEL 0: 
Considerations of cost and benefit that are either purely commercial or otherwise answerable without any moral considerations and questions about the scientific procedure answerable with scientific 
knowledge 
· 
How much milk do the CF sufferers need to drink?  •  Cost / How expensive is the research going to be?  · 
Is there already a patent for CF cowo 
· 
What is the reason to think this protein is therapeutic?  · 
Commercial viability  · 
How large is the market for new CF drugO 
· 
How many CF sufferers are allergic to dairy PIoducts?  •  IWhy_ have previous research failed?  · 
How quicklY could this become a commercial productO 
LEVEL 1: 
Introduction of some cost-benefit considerations, though still answerable \Jy factual information, some moral considerations could be included as  well 
· 
Will it benefit CF sufferers?  · 
cost-benefit / Available resources / Alternative methods  · 
Is there enough money to go ahead" 
· 
Will it greatly relieve sufferingO  · 
Has enough research been done?  · 
Funding 
· 
How many people will benefit?  •  Effectiveness of technique? 
· 
Chances of success? 
LEVEL 2: 
More profound considerations of benefits in terms of improvement of quality of life for CF sufferers and animals or comparison of costs and benefits by asking 'Is it worth itO'  Any consideration of the 
whether the product should be commercial or access is likely to be at least level 2. 
· 
There is a need to reduce human suffering!  · 
Should funds be used to develop the original teChnique or the  · 
Who will pay for itO 
· 
Will the drug improve the quality of life of CF sufferers?  new one?  · 
How expensive/ affordable will the treatment beo 
· 
How long will it take for patients to benefit?  •  How hopeful are researchers. Is it one in a million chance? Is it  · 
copyright 
worth it?  · 
How would the cost/distribution be handled"  · 
Is it a must?  · 
What is risked for commercial gai n ° 
•  Do benefits outweigh harms?  •  Who will benefit the most? 
•  Would there be other benefits?  •  Is economics the only reason cows are used" 
· 
Is it for human or commercial gain" 
I 
LEVEL 3: 
The responses now seek justification of costs in comparison to benefits, are concerned with the role of commercial companies in relation to copyright or access to the drug and whether use of resources 
I  for this research are justifiable in light of opportunity costs (i.e. understanding of resource scarcity) 
· 
Will benefits to patients be worthwhile enough to justify  •  Are funds being transferred from other beneficial causes?  •  Should it be a commercial productO 
I 
altering the genetic composition of a cow?  · 
Is the research justifiable in terms of time& money& sacrifice?  •  Should a company be allowed to copyright life-saving 
I •  Could it raise false hopes of cure?  · 
Is this the path that will benefit the CF patients mostO  treatmentsO 
I  •  Who decides which human disease is most debilitating and  · 
Is there any point doing this if people cannot afford the 
therefore deserves attention and investment? 
~-L- ___  - - treatment in the end? Is it for human or commercial gain. 
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HI ISSUES OF BASIC VALUES 
IlIA  IIIB 
GENETIC RESEARCH  ANIMAL RIGHTS 
LEVEL 0: 
All considerations of basic values include moral elements, so there are no level 0 responses 
LEVEL 1: 
Responses indicate distinct recognition that there are moral issues, but offer no further considerations. 
Messing with genes.  · 
Is the new gene from an ethical source? 
I don't like the idea of cloning 
LEVEL 2: 
Res(lonses elaborate on the level 1 !ype responses, but do not involve issues of justification. 
Is it right to play God and mess around with genes?  · 
Should we clone animals? 
We have to consider the whole Gm thing  · 
Animal rights 
Moral issues regarding the creation of transgenic animals  · 
Is it ethical to use a protein from another animal to treat human disease? 
Consequences for further developments 
Does this group have good human rights/other rights record? 
Ethics of clonin" and use of cloned materials for treatment of humans. 
LEVEL 3: 
Responses show mature understanding of the questions of genetic engineering and seek answers that would justify choices, namely control, should it be  limited and what type of animal 
eXJ:lerimentation is in  J;eneral acceptable. 
Further growth of cloning idea - is this acceptable?  •  Ethics and rights to use animals for human use 
Who will control how far this goes?  •  Do we have a right to create a lifeform? 
•  Is it fair to use animals in  research that dangers their health? 
· 
Is it better that human quality of life is improved, when cows are damaged') 
•  What value is given to suffering and life of cows? 
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IV PUBLIC OPINION 
LEVEL 0: 
All public opinion entries contain at least a possibility of moral concerns, and therefore no level 0 items are scored 
LEVEL 1: 
Basic recognition that public opinion exists 
. Political opinion 
•  Public opinion 
LEVEL 2: 
Recognition of public opinion as something that may influence research decision-making. Also recognition that the opinion of some aroups may be more important than others. 
· 
How the CF sufferers and their families feel about this? 
· 
Public opinion (after education) 
· 
How will this finding affect society? 
· 
It would probably cause a lot of negative media attention after Dolly the sheep. Has this been considered? 
· 
Opposition from public/environmentalists 
· 
Should we ask a larger group what they think? 
· 
Will the public be informed or will this be kept hush-hush? 
LEVEL 3: 
An understandina that public opinion is partly dependent on information it is given and that the public is allowed to oppose even beneficial treatment on moral grounds. 
•  Whether or not the use of genetic engineering in the process will be accepted by the public/CF sufferers? 
· 
To make sure the sufferers know that the drug was produced via transgenic animal. 
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Appendix XI - Group Personalities 
Rabow et al.  (1994) list seven non-functional group roles and provide some tips on 
how to reduce their negative effect on group dynamics: similar problem types can be 
also found in Westberg and Jason (1996) and the following list comprises their 
suggestions for remedying the problems: 
1.  The silent one: to be a true member a person must listen and verbally 
participate. This is not to say that one cannot talk less than another, but that 
participation is mandatory for full group membership. Remedy: try to identify 
the reasons for a group member being silent, whether it is lack of knowledge or 
confusion when it can be remedied with short re-caps on the subject, or 
slowness to express oneself when the group can grow more comfortable with 
some quiet moments for all to gather their thoughts, or shyness when a leader 
can encourage the shy person to speak when they can detect eagerness and 
support their comments. 
2.  The over-participant: talking a lot is not necessarily over-participating, but talk 
that does not help the group move towards its goal (often involves use of 
detrimental statement styles), that leads to irrelevant directions, that takes too 
long in relation to the value of the idea to the group, or which makes others 
very uncomfortable should be considered counterproductive. Remedy: the 
leader or other members of the group should recognise the valid points and 
then invite other opinions to assist the discussion. It is important to listen to the 
comments actively and non-judgementally, just as it is important to have the 
courage to stop people kindly when it is to the benefit of the group. 
3.  The wanderer: a person who has an idea, but who has not thought it through 
and thus rambles along in trying to formulate the thought. Remedy: the person 
could be asked leading questions that should help to clarify their thoughts -
'Are you saying that ....  ?' 
4.  The tangent person: goes off the point with irrelevant associations that are only 
vaguely related to the discussion topic. Remedy: A question to follow 
immediately to bring the discussion back onto the subject by either asking the 
person to clarify their vision on how their comment relates to the discussion or 
not to comment at all and swiftly return to the subject. 
5.  The storyteller: stories, personal anecdotes and experiences can be valuable for 
a group, but when the stories get too long or there are too many of them, the 
time used is no longer beneficial. Remedy: clear and positive comment to draw 
attention to time restrictions 'I wish we had the time, but ... '. 
6.  The insecure talker: a person who often interjects with seemingly irrelevant 
comments may have feelings of insecurity in the group. Remedy: praise the 
contribution of an insecure talker and ask them to prepare something special 
for the next meeting to reduce their need to get their place in the sun by 
irrelevant comments. 
7.  The lone dissenter: an obstinate person expressing a minority voice in a 
forceful and stubborn manner. The voice of dissent need not be a problem, if 
the points can be accepted with respect and they help the group to appreciate a 
different point of view, but when the dissenting comments become dominant 
and increasingly frequent, they produce a hindrance for the group's other 
learning goals. Remedy: Comments like 'that really sets us thinking about this 
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in a new way' show appreciation and the dissenter may feel that his/her cause 
is acknowledged and their need to interrupt is thus reduced. Also asking the 
group member to clarify their point of view with supporting reasons may prove 
beneficial. 
As important as trying to reduce the effects of problematic group roles, the facilitator 
needs to recognise and support beneficial ones. Ideally the facilitator should adopt 
these roles as necessary for a smooth functioning of the group and when they seem to 
be lacking among the group members. Rabow et al.  (1994) describe seven positive 
group roles: 
1.  Encourager who praises, agrees, and accepts others' ideas 
2.  Harmoniser, who mediates and relieves tension 
3.  Compromiser, who comes half way, yields status and admits error 
4.  Expediter, who encourages and facilitates participation of others 
5.  Observer, who records group processes, feeds back to the group when 
needed. 
6.  Evaluator, who suggests new ways of looking at things (it might be better 
if we ....  ) or re-directs the groups activities (we seem to bogged down here, 
it might be beneficial to try the next step and come back to the definitions 
if we need to.) 
7.  Follower, who actively listens and accepts decisions. 
An alternative to these is Belbin's (1993) set of team roles. She has identified eight 
basic team roles, each serving a purpose in a well functioning team and each role 
having both negative and positive attributes. In a synergistic team individual 
strengths complement each other and individual weaknesses can be both tolerated 
and compensated for, provided there is someone else in the team with the relevant 
strength. 
The eight team roles described by Belbin are: 
1.  The Chairman: has a strong sense of overall objectives. Is able to keep an open 
mind and values contributions form any source. Generally of average mental 
ability and creativity. Good at controlling and co-ordinating resources. 
Democratic and encourages participation, but willing to take responsibility for 
decisions. Sometimes seen as reserved and detached, the Chairman's ability to 
remain objective is valuable when directing the efforts and activities of others 
towards an overall goal or objective. Allowable weaknesses of the Chairman 
are: uncompetitiveness, unambitious, amateurish, lazy, and not forceful. A 
person with low anxiety levels and fairly extrovert personality. 
2.  The Shaper: has strong sense of drive and urgency, and an outgoing, sociable, 
and dynamic personality. Readiness to challenge ineffectiveness, complacency, 
self-deception and a general lack of progress. Prone to provocation, irritation 
and impatience. May be seen as a bully by some, and may sulk if not getting 
own way. Strong preference to lead 'from the front' with an inner need to 
control decisions and actions personally. Can be quite aggressive and wants to 
see own ideas implemented, and quickly. Hates rules and regulations. A 
'natural' leader in some ways, and can command respect and generate 
enthusiasm and energy in others. Can be sceptical of others and yet be over-
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sensitive to criticism of own ideas. A person with high anxiety levels and an 
extrovert personality. 
3.  The Plant: the Plant's name stems from an ability to scatter around lots of ideas 
(seeds), many of which may lead to success while many may not. The Plant is 
the source of a team's creativity, with a fertile and intelligent mind, with plenty 
of original ways of looking at things. The Plant is concerned with the challenge 
of the new and can be obsessive. Often seen as having a head in the clouds, can 
be unaware of the need for sensitivity towards others. The Plant may not have 
much time for protocol, or the 'proper way of doing things', nor be terribly 
concerned with the practical implications of own schemes. Tends to be self-
sufficient and can be difficult and uncomfortable colleague. However, can also 
be caught up in a wave of enthusiasm and can be swept along with general 
team euphoria. There is a childlike element present in the Plant - likes to be 
flattered and does not like own ideas criticised. A person with s dominant yet 
introverted personality. 
4.  The Monitor-Evaluator: The Monitor-Evaluator is a highly intelligent team 
member whose principal team asset is an ability to process large amounts of 
information in an analytical, objective way. Possesses good judgement and 
shows hard-headed, shrewd approach to issues and ideas. Is cautious, has 
perspective and is highly critical of flawed thinking in others. Is the most likely 
person in the team to spot a fatal error in a scheme that everyone else has 
missed. The Monitor-Evaluator is, as a result, likely to be seen by the rest of 
the team as a 'wet blanket' , dampening down enthusiasm. Tends to lack ability 
to inspire and motivate others, and is rarely the source of new ideas. Often seen 
as over-critical and negative, the role is nevertheless crucial to successful team 
outcomes. A person with low anxiety levels and introvert personality. 
5.  The Resource Investigator: is the team's ambassador in its dealings with the 
world outside the team. Has the capacity for making highly effective contact 
with people and for exploring anything new. Will respond to new situations as 
exciting challenges, but can also lose interest quite quickly if progress is slow 
or once the initial fascination has passed. Variety and people are the essential 
diet of the Resource Investigator, who also has the ability in turn to stimulate 
and motivate others. An extrovert with low anxiety levels. 
6.  The Company Worker: is a team member who, above all, will be able to 
foresee how the team's ideas and plans will work out in practice. The 
Company Worker tends to identify strongly with the organisation and has a 
knack of knowing what practical issues will need to be faced. The Company 
Worker is naturally conservative and has to be convinced that an idea is a good 
one not just because it is new, but because it is of genuine worth. Has real 
organising ability and plenty of common sense. Hard working and strongly 
self-disciplined but can sometimes lack flexibility. An essentially stable 
personali  ty. 
7.  The Team Worker: is the fabric which helps to bind a team together. Promotes 
team spirit. Makes people laugh, is sensitive to other's feelings and to overall 
team mood. Is aware of the strengths and weaknesses of others and responds 
appropriately to people's differing needs. Can be indecisive in a crisis and may 
lack the necessary toughness in certain situations, but ability to  'read' others 
and to recognise own differing abilities promotes high morale and a good sense 
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of co-operation. For this reason is often a team leader. The Team Worker is an 
extrovert with low level of anxiety. 
8.  The Completer-Finisher: has a strong capacity for follow-through coupled with 
a striving for perfection which causes much anxiety. Will worry over small 
items, but, overall, accomplishes tasks well and on time. The nervous energy 
which is invested in the team's final product results in a high standard. Tends 
not to be a good leader - is fussy and can get bogged down in detail which may 
lower team morale. A introvert with high anxiety levels. 
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Appendix XII - L3 Structured Discussion Programme 
Together with course co-ordinators the following ethical themes were chosen as the 
core of ethics education for each L3 Honours course: 
r"Aq~'~ti~"Bi~~'~i~~~~"~~d""""""""""""f')\~'i~~i"~"i~"~~i~~tifi~"~'~';~'~~'~h""""""" ................................ ! 
: Zoology  : Ecological decision-making  : 
:  : Scientific misconduct and integrity  : 
t  ..................................................................................... 1  .......................................................................................................................... ! 
: Biomedical Science  : Animals in scientific research  : 
j  j Scientific Integrity  j 
···Bi~t~·~h·~·;i~·gy··~~d··B~·t~~y···················GM6~~··p~b"iid·ty··~~d··~d·~~·tifi~··i~t~·g·d·ty········  ............ . 
:  : Social implications of GMOs  : 
.........................................................................................  ~.~~~.~t.i~.~~  ..  :.~~.~~.~.~~.~.~  ..  ~.~.~  ..  i~.~~~~:i.t.~  ................................. . 
: Genetics and Molecular  : Animals in scientific research  : 
1 Biology  1 Embryo research / Genetic screening  1 
:  : Scientific misconduct and integrity  : 
t  ..................................................................................... 1  .......................................................................................................................... 1 
: Immunology  : Animals in scientific research  :  i  i  Scientific misconduct and integrity  i 
:  :  : 
t··pi~·~~~~~~l;gy···············································f··A~·i~~l~··i~··~·~i~~tifi~··~~·~~~~:~h··············································1 
:  : Drug testing (in the developing world)  : 
:  : Scientific misconduct and integrity  : 
, ••.•.•••••••.•.•••••...•.•••••••...••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••...•••..•••••••• +  ••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•..•••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••...•••••••••••.•••••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• , 
: Physiology  : Animals in scientific research  : 
:  : Ethical issues in pharmaceutical industry  : 
.........................................................................................  ~~i.~.~.t.i~~~  ..  ~i.~~~~.~.~.~.t  ..  ~.~.~  .. ~~~~.~.~i.t.~  ................................. . 
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Appendix XIII - PBl 
Microbiology and Parasitology 
Microbiology students participated in two ethics PBLs (one in each term), while 
parasitology students worked at the same time on scientific PBLs. Each PBL 
consisted of 5 contact hours and 10 hours of independent work. 
389 
The Ethics PBLs were designed to give students an opportunity to explore ethical 
issues in context with scientific decision-making. The two PBL exercises covered 
two areas of vaccine development: 1) the choice of research topics (TB or Meningitis 
B), and 2) the design of an ethically sound testing protocol involving both animals 
and humans. The 'problems' can be found in Appendix XXI - Microbiology PBL. 
The PBLs were assessed by students completing learning logs Appendix XXIII -
Introduction to Learning Logs. 
Physiology and Sport Science 
The 180 student L3 Physiology and Sport Science course was divided in two groups, 
one working on an ethics PBL and the other on a scientific PBL. The ethics group 
were involved in a problem dealing with drugs in sport: 1) investigating the reasons 
why they are forbidden, and 2) deciding on a suitable punishment in two hypothetical 
cases. The PBL consisted of 3 contact hours and 10 hours of independent work. 
Appendix XXII - Sport Science PBL. 
The PBL was assessed in both groups by students completing learning logs. 
Appendix XXIII - Introduction to Learning Logs. 
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Appendix XIV - Animals in Scientific Research 
Animal research and animal welfare -
where should we draw the line? 
390 
In  1998 in Great Britain 2.66 million scientific procedures were performed on living 
animals. Of these 60% used mice and 22% rats. Fish and birds were each used in just under 5% of 
procedures, rabbits in  1.4%, dogs in less than 0.3%, monkeys in less than 0.2% and cats in about 
0.05%. Fifty-two per cent of all procedures in  1998 were carried out for medical or veterinary 
research, drug development or pharmaceutical safety testing; thirty-four per cent as part of 
fundamental studies in the biomedical or biological sciences; and about six per cent for the safety 
testing of non-pharmaceutical products for worker, consumer or environmental protection. The total 
animal usage has declined steadily since the mid-1970s. 
An increasing number of people do not accept this use of animals in the laboratory. Their 
reasons for opposing differ, as do the extent of animals rights they put forward. The choice of using 
animals in research is in many instances a legal requirement, or elementary to scientific research, but 
it is also a moral choice. To be able to formulate and defend your own view on animal testing, as well 
as respect the views of others, it is essential to understand the ethical arguments involved. 
For this session on animal research and animal welfare you are asked to read two short 
papers (both attached) on ethical issues relating to animal research. The first paper, 'Why Ethics 
Matters', is a general discussion on the ethical theory involved in  any moral choice and it will give 
you some tools to read the second, 'Animals in Scientific Research', which discusses the use of 
animals in research with a more focused attention. 
Preparation for the session 
When reading the two articles, write down all the words that are unfamiliar, so that they can be defined 
in  the class. 
For the second article prepare a short answers to the questions asked in the paper. 
Be prepared to discuss your comments and views during the session. 
If  you wish to learn more about animal welfare issues, the following are good Internet sites to get started with (the links 
can also be found on  http://www.gla.ac.uk/Acad/IBLS/DEEB/ethics/link6.html(follow study packages and then 
Animal rights and animal welfare) - this will save you from typing all the URLs): 
Animal Welfare ethics - a long list of links http://www.ethics.ubc.ca/resources/animal/ 
Animal Rights Resource Site http://UlTs.envirolink.org 
Animal Rights; Ethics http://ethics.acusd.edu/animal.html 
Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments (FRAME) http://www.frame-
uk.demon.co.uk/ 
Animals (Scientific procedures) Inspectorate http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/animact/aspileaf.htm 
New Scientist web-site on animal experiments 
http://www.newscientist.com/nsplus/insight/animalexperiments/animalexperiments.html 
Interesting arctile 'Util-izing animals' by LaFollette and Shanks on utilitarian theory http://www.etsu-
tn.edu/philos/faculty/hugh/utilize.htm 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fishery web site on animal welfare 
http://www.maff.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/default.htm 
Hellriikka Clarkebllrt/,  1999 
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Why Do Ethics Matter? 
Henriikka Clarkebul71 
Our  lives  as  private persons,  and  responsibilities  as  professionals,  require  us  to  make  moral 
decisions each day of our lives. In our private lives, we make decisions such as telling a white lie 
to save a friend from pain, or saving up to buy a large purchase rather than giving any money to 
charity. In our professional lives as  scientists we need to  make decisions on which problems to 
study, which methods to  apply, and how to  present our data. Very few of these questions have 
straight forward answers, and we are often unsure whether we have made the right choice. 
Ethics is  an  academic discipline devoted to  finding and evaluating solutions to  ethical 
problems. The ethical principles found in these academic studies can give valuable guidelines to 
everybody, when making their personal and professional moral choices. 
Occasionally, those working in  life sciences are suspicious that 'soft' disciplines, such 
as moral philosophy, lack the type of academic rigor displayed in their own fields.  Some people 
believe that ethical opinions are mere preferences akin to  expressing a taste for a flavour of ice 
cream,  or a type of music.  However, very few  philosophers would agree with such a strongly 
subjective view of ethics. We can make rational decisions about our ethical positions in a way we 
cannot about ice cream. If  a friend expresses a preference for strawberry, we are not compelled to 
argue  the  merits  of chocolate.  This  would  not  be the  case,  if friends  expressed  an  intent  to 
commit murder - then we would be compelled to  persuade them to change their mind. However, 
ethics is not as  strongly objective as  many scientific principles are.  Scientists around the world, 
or at any time throughout history, who seek to measure the density of pure gold will find, within 
the accuracy of the instruments, the same result. Yet there is no comparable experiment which we 
could perform to assess the morality of a cultural practice, such as polygamy, which is acceptable 
is come cultures and taboo in others. Ethics falls in between these two extremes. Moral positions 
are  not a  matter of taste  or habit,  nor immutable physical constants  which can be objectively 
determined irrespective of time and culture. 
While there is not always an agreement on the best solution to a moral problem, and not 
all  philosophers  advance  identical  ethical  theories,  this  fact  should  not  be  attributed  to  any 
inherent weakness in the discipline. It is  not all  that uncommon that two biomedical scientists 
disagree on the implications of a particular data set. It is  also quite common for two scientists to 
approach a problem with two different hypotheses in mind. Likewise, given an ethical dilemma, 
you  can find  ethicists  who  reach  differing  conclusions  as  to  the  best  course  of action.  The 
difference of opinion may  be  attributable  to  the  fact  that each  ethicist has  tried  to  solve  the 
dilemma  by  using  a  different  theory,  or  alternatively,  they  have  used  the  same  theory,  but 
attributed  different  weights  to  different  aspects  of  the  theory.  In  addition  there  might  be 
disagreements over the empirical facts of the case (for example, whether animal feels pain, and 
how much, during a particular experimental procedure). 
However, it is equally important to realise that while many ethical dilemmas do not have 
a 'right' answer, there are answers which are clearly wrong. Who would seriously suggest that 
moral choices should be made by  tossing a coin,  or that abortions are moral on Mondays  and 
immoral  on  Tuesdays?  Ethical  positions  can  be  evaluated  and  compared by  using  techniques 
which are not all that foreign to those used in science. Ethical theories are judged on the basis of 
their rationality, their consistency, and even their usefulness. 
Ethical  theories,  like  any  other  theories,  are  expected  to  be  internally  consistent. 
Similarly, theories which are unclear and  incomplete are obviously less  valuable than  theories 
that  do not  suffer from  these flaws.  Simplicity  is  also  an  advantage,  because all  things  being 
equal, it is preferable to employ a simple theory over one which is difficult and complex to apply. 
We should also require that an  ethical theory  would provide us  with  guidance in  those  moral 
problems where intuition,  our gut feeling  of right  and  wrong,  fails  to  provide us  with  a clear 
answer. Most real-life moral dilemmas are considered problematic precisely because convincing 
arguments can be presented to support each side of the issue. These types of situations are where 
we most require the guidance of a moral theory. 
Additionally,  ethical  theories  should  generally  agree  with  our  moral  intuition.  Who 
would wish to  adopt an  ethic, which, although consistent and logical, would support murder for 
profit? However, it  is  more difficult to  decide about a moral  theory  which runs counter to  our 
moral  intuitions  in  an  area less  clear-cut than  murder.  How  are  we  to  decide whether it  is  the 
theory,  or our intuition,  that is  out of line?  One way  is  to  subject  the  moral  theory  to  several 
moral  problems,  to  try  it  out in  real-life  moral  dilemmas  and  if it  provides  good,  intuitively 
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acceptable answers in  many of the situations, than it might be that our intuition is  the one in  a 
need of re-consideration rather than our moral theory. While, if the moral theory fails  to  provide 
intuitively acceptable answers to the moral dilemmas which it is applied to, then we need to look 
for  alternative theories or ways  to  improve the one we  are  using.  Because no  moral  theory  is 
perfect, we need to  keep re-evaluating our adopted ethic time and time again, to make sure that 
our actions and opinions are coherent with the values we hold dear. 
The  ethical  theories  which  give  us  a  framework  to  make  our moral  choices  are  in 
general  divided into  two  major categories:  consequentalist theories,  which  concentrate on  the 
moral consequences of actions (hence the name) and  deontological,  which look at  the value of 
actions  separately  from  their  consequences.  Thus  to  determine  whether  an  act  is  moral  or 
immoral, a consequentalist needs  to  evaluate whether the consequences of that act are good or 
bad, while a deontologist determines the morality of an action solely on the moral principles that 
were used in deciding on the action. Some of the common moral disagreements arise from people 
approaching the moral dilemma from either a consequentalist or deontological point of view. In 
order to  make up your mind on a moral problem, it is  to your advantage to  understand how the 
different positions are constructed, to give you an opportunity to  evaluate their worth. The most 
common  of consequentalist  theories  is  utilitarianism  and  of deontological  theories,  Kantian 
categorical imperative. 
Utilitarianism 
One  cornerstone  of how  we  treat  other  people  (and  animals?)  is  the  thought  that  hurting 
unnecessarily is  wrong, whether we hurt them physically or their feelings. We might supplement 
this  by  considering  it  morally  valuable  to  try  to  increase  happiness  and  reduce  suffering,  in 
general to improve the lives of those around us.  Utilitarianism is  a systematic philosophical way 
of capturing these ideas. The core of utilitarianism is to consider the interests of all, not just self. 
The best moral  action is  the one which maximises the general good and minimises the general 
evil. 
For example, you  may be considering lying about the results from an  experiment you 
have set up  for  your project.  Your motive for lying is  to  get better marks, which could lead to 
better  chances  of doing  a  post-graduate  degree  or  a  better  job  and  salary  after  you  have 
graduated. However, utilitarianism requires you to consider the impact of your decision to lie on 
other  people.  You  must  consider how  presenting  the  false  results  may  affect  someone else's 
work, who is  to  build upon your work next year? What if the results lead to  other experiments, 
which could have clinical outcomes and your false results could lead to direct harm to patients or 
animals? What if you  get caught and this  leads to  a reduction in  students'  freedom to  do their 
projects in  subsequent years, as  they are considered untrustworthy because of your lie? What if 
the employers find  out that people complete their university degrees  based on false  data:  they 
might lose their trust in the degree, which could lead to  decreased employment opportunities for 
you and your class-mates? 
If you  consider all  these effects of lying,  not just the  positive effects for  you,  it  will 
become clear that the net outcome is a bad one. According to utilitarian theory, the act of deceit 
in  this  situation is  not good and  you  ought not carry it out.  But consider a different situation, 
where a mentally disturbed friend of one of your class-mates shows up in a lab you are working 
in, waving a scalpel screaming to kill your friend for 'ruining his life' and asks you to  tell where 
your friend  is  at  the  moment.  Although,  you  know  where  your friend is,  should  you  tell  the 
disturbed man in your lab? After performing a similar utilitarian calculus as above, the answer is 
mostly likely no. The net of good and bad consequences that flow out of this deceit are markedly 
different from  the  previous example.  One of the core elements of utilitarianism is  exactly this, 
you  must  evaluate each  choice  independently  and  decide  its  moral  worth  based  on  the  case 
specific particulars. 
But like all  moral theories,  utilitarianism is  not without problems. First,  we  will often 
find  it  difficult to  decide on  whether the  net balance of an  action  is  good or bad.  We may  not 
have included all those involved; we  may  not have considered all  aspects of benefits and harm 
that it may cause, and not all may agree on our evaluation on what outcomes are good and which 
ones are bad. 
Second,  utilitarianism  can  allow  actions  which  are  against  our  moral  intuition.  For 
example, torture of one person could be justified as  long as  it  made enough people happier as  a 
result. 
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Kant's categorical imperative 
Kant, a German philosopher in the 18
th  century, had a problem with the changing moral status of 
the same action (e.g. lying), which is  accepted in  utilitarian theory. He thus formulated a moral 
theory which requires us to  'act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law' . In other words, according to Kant, in order to determine if 
a particular act is moral, we must first ask ourselves if we could wish that the rule governing our 
action be made a universal law - that is, if we wish everyone to use the same rule to decide on a 
course of action.  An  action is  thus immoral, If we  cannot truthfully desire everyone else being 
permitted to  perform the  action  that  we  are considering. To Kant,  the  uttermost importance is 
why  we  do  what  we  do,  what  rules  and  theories  we  use  in  making  our  choices,  and  not 
necessarily what results from our action.  So it is  your intentions, not the consequences of your 
actions that make them moral or immoral. 
Consider  again  lying  about experiments  you  have  performed.  Before  doing  this  the 
categorical imperative requires you  to  first ask  yourself whether or not you can honestly  wish 
that  your  deed  becomes  a  universalisable  rule.  This  rule  would  allow  scientists  to  submit 
fraudulent data as genuine. Clearly such a rule would destroy the credibility of science and halt 
scientific progress considerably. No one could legitimately wish such a rule to  be universalised 
and thus the action of lying about your project would be immoral as  well. This rule would then 
apply to all situations of lying, making them immoral from the outset. 
Many  of our  political  rights  are  justified  by  reference  to  universalisable  rules.  For 
example, we do not wish to qualify basic human rights at each point of contention by reference to 
the consequences of each action. There seems to be something intuitively appealing about having 
some rights, which we feel are not going to be broken, that give us a baseline for interaction with 
others. 
The  difficulty  with  Kant's  categorical  imperative,  as  with  all  other  deontological 
theories, is  to find a balance on how widely, or narrowly, one defines universalisable laws. If  we 
deduce from the above example that deceit, in all its forms, is immoral, then we are committed to 
tell  the  scalpel-waving lunatic  where our friend  is.  On  the  other hand,  if we  believe that the 
universalisable law refers only to specific scientific conditions, we are faced with the laws which 
are not really universal, but particular, and thus  the moral rules would change from situation to 
situation, which would give an opportunity to change the description of morality to suit personal 
aspirations. This would stop being moral laws altogether. 
Conclusion 
There are several valid ways of looking at  moral problems. While both basic types of 
theories, utilitarian and deontological, have their fierce opponents and supporters, it  seems that 
solving real moral problems frequently requires both types of considerations to  be used before a 
solution  can  be  reached.  Understanding  the  basic  methods  of analysing  and justifying  moral 
decisions gives you tools to  make, if not always better, than at least more conscious and mature 
moral decisions. 
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Animals In Scientific Research 
by Henriikka Clarkeburn 
In recent years much attention has been focused on the use of animals in research. 
Both as scientists and consumers you are faced with personal decisions regarding this 
issue. Whether you are for or against the use of animals in research, it is in your interest 
to understand the arguments used on both sides of the issue so that you can both form 
the most coherent view for yourself and defend it when questioned. This short paper 
maps out the main arguments: we hope that it will provoke you into thinking what your 
own views are. 
The use of animals in research -debate has two paramount concerns: 1) that animals are being 
used for the wrong purposes i.e. questions of animal rights, and 2) that animals are mistreated or 
abused, whether or not the purposes are justifiable i.e. questions of animal welfare. The first type 
of concern can be linked with improper use of animals in general - for food, clothing, and 
experiments, while it can also be solely focused on the scientific purposes for laboratory animals 
- teaching, commercial testing, or medical research. The second concern can similarly span 
outside the scientific arena, considering the proper use of animals in farming, zoos and 
experiments alike. For reasons of consistency, it is often important to test the animal rights and 
welfare arguments presented for animal research by applying them to other types of animal use, 
but for the purpose of this paper, we will consider primarily how we define the correct use of 
animals in research. 
ANIMAL RIGHTS ApPROACH 
The animal rights argument is often supported by asking whether there are any relevant criteria 
for differentiating between humans and non-human animals? If  we cannot think of any such 
relevant criteria, than we must include animals in our moral concern equally with humans and 
give them at least the most basic moral rights - right to life as the most important one. In the 
absence of relevant criteria, if we still differentiate between humans and non-human animals our 
actions are analogous to racial and sexual bias, as we are distributing rights based on morally 
irrelevant criteria not unlike skin colour or gender. This is a deontological argument based on 
some inherent value which all animals, humans included, possess, and which grants them moral 
consideration. 
Can you think of  any sllch criteria that \Vould logically describe all humans alld humans only? 
Do you think that the criteria often suggested - rationality, autonomy, linguistic capacity -
actually irrefutably differentiate beflveen all humans and non-human animals? 
This kind of argument is essentially negative. It can demonstrate the absence of a significant 
difference between humans and other animals. We can also form a positive argument to support 
animal rights. This claims that moral standing is derived from the ability to feel pleasure and 
pain, or to be sentient. As Peter Singer
2 puts it: "If a being suffers there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration ... If  a being is not capable of 
suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment and happiness, there is nothing to take into account." 
Any moral agent must consider the pain and pleasure that results from his or her actions. This is 
the minimum requirement of morality. The capacity for experiencing pain and pleasure is the 
primary moral similarity between humans and non-human animals. Sentience, then, is the non-
arbitrary, non-speciesist basis of moral value. This argument is dominantly utilitarian and it is 
thus a consequentalist doctrine in which pain and pleasure are the main determinants of moral 
value. 
This second kind of argument is also used by those concerned for animal welfare. The 
presumption is that the pain experienced by an animal is morally significant and the use of 
animals should take into consideration the pain and pleasures of animals involved. The animal 
2 Singer, Peter (1977). Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, p.8. 
New York, A von Books. 
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welfare concern often accepts the use of animals in research, but advocates for procedures that 
minimise pain and discomfort experienced by animals in a laboratory. 
Why do you think avoidance of  pain is a 1Il0rai paradigm? If  you imagined humans beings were 
used in research in the fashion non-human animals are, what moral problems would YOll see? 
Both of these reasons for supporting animal rights and welfare, either in an attempt to stop the 
use of animals in research altogether or to increase the welfare requirements for laboratory 
animals, have been criticised and suggestions made of their fallibility as solid grounds for the 
case of animals. 
The deontological concern for animal rights, i.e. that the denial of animal rights without a 
specific moral criterion is analogous to racism and sexism, has been claimed, for example by 
Katz
3
, to rest on the marginal cases of humanity. These Katz defines to be the severely retarded, 
the insane, the comatose, newborns with severe birth defects, and fetuses. Katz suggests that it is 
empirically false to say that these 'marginal human beings' are treated as normal or typical 
humans from the moral point of view. If these 'marginal humans' are not treated with equal 
moral concern, Katz continues, than the entire speciesm argument collapses as there is no 
speciesist criterion used for different moral concerns, but rather morally relevant criteria of 
rationality, autonomy and the like. He goes on to say "the cases obviously differ, but all in all, 
these [marginal] humans are clearly deemed to have less moral value because of their reduced 
capacities ... This is a factual moral truth, however depressing it might be, that the hierarchy of 
moral value exemplified in the human treatment of animals is echoed and repeated in the human 
treatment of other humans." 
Are you convinced by Katz's refutation of  the deontological argument for animal rights? Ifnot 
why not? Call you think of  any other ways of  criticising the deontological argument? 
The utilitarian argument for animal rights, which puts sentience in the centre of the moral 
argument is often found problematic in two ways. First, how far down the scale of animal life can 
one safely assume the experience of pain and pleasure? This question has two elements: first, 
which animals can experience pain? and second, how can we determine whether they are 
experiencing pain or pleasure? It is suggested that insects have a requisite nervous system
4
, 
which would suggest that insects have a serious claim for moral consideration. Do you think this 
possibility suggests that the utilitarian basis for animal rights can be pushed too far, offeling a 
reductio ad absurdum of the position i.e. extending the principle until we are faced with an 
absurd conclusion? Alternatively we can choose to include only higher animals in our moral 
concern and avoid the reductio ad absurdulIl situation. Both are problematic. If  we include all 
animals in the realm of moral consideration we would find living difficult, as accidental 
squashing of a fly on the windscreen while driving on the motorway would become a morally 
reprehensible action. If  we alternatively draw the line to include only vertebrates in our moral 
consideration, we are just shifting the speciesm line further down the scale, but setting it at an 
equally irrational point. 
In  your view is this just a theoretical quibble? Why would the issue of  consistency matter in this 
situation? If  you were going to draw a line,  where would)lQ1l. draw it? 
The second problem with the sentience criterion is the contextual significance of pain, as Katz 
phrases it.  Katz suggests that the utilitarian argument contends that pain is an intrinsic evil. An 
inconsistency lies with the natural existence of pain in nature. Katz states that in its concrete 
natural existence pain has an instrumental function in organisms and if understood in context 
pain is not an evil at all, but it is an essential part of a successful organic life. Thus the abstract 
3 Katz, Eric (1997). Defending the use of animals by business. In Nature as a Subject: human 
obligation and natural community. pp. 79-90. Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield. 
4 Lockwood, Jeffrey A. (1988). Not to Harm a Fly: Our Ethical Obligations to Insects. Between 
Species 4:3:204-211. 
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denial of pain proposes a practically impossible denial of pain, which weakens the pain 
arguments significantly. 
Do you think this argument is convincing? When do you think pain is not evil? 
ANIMAL WELFARE ApPROACH 
396 
The animal welfare approach to animal use in research is most often based on utilitarian 
arguments, marking the significance of animal suffering, but giving it an unequal weight with 
human suffering. This argument often by-passes the above discussed considerations, which is 
both its deficiency and benefit. The presumption of lesser value of animals weakens the theory 
considerably because it cannot be easily defended and thus leaves the theory open to attacks of 
inconsistency, among others. But the avoidance of deep ethical considerations is also a benefit, 
because it allows people to move to discuss the actual animal use situations rather than being 
stuck on theoretical considerations of animal rights and moral status. 
The animal welfare approach is often an application of a painlbenefit calculus. The aim is to get 
the best possible benefits for minimal amount of pain. This involves both minimising the number 
of animals in laboratory and the pain they have to endure, and maximising the benefits expected 
from the results. In other words animal experiments would be morally acceptable only when we 
have reduced the animal pain to the minimum and when we can say our aims are morally 
significant. Most people would agree that cosmetics testing on animals does not qualify as a 
morally significant aim capable of justifying animal testing, while cancer research does. 
Do you find this way of  looking at animal research convincing? Where would you draw the line 
between morally justifiable research and morally unjustifiable research? Who in your view, 
should make that moral judgement? 
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DDT and ecological 
decision-making 
397 
Decisions in ecology often require us to  balance environmental harm with human 
welfare, and to consider costs of each alternative. These decisions are rarely easy. When 
they become complicated, it is important to use the best possible decision-making 
methods and tools to make sure that we make the best possible decision based on the 
knowledge we have at the time. 
The use of DDT as a malaria control is a case in point. We are faced with the dilemma 
that DDT is an inexpensive and effective malaria control but that DDT is a pesticide 
seriously harming marine and bird-life. 
Before our seminar, you should read the attached article by Curtis (1994) on the subject. 
While reading prepare a short summary of Curtis's key points and make notes which 
will help you to discuss the following issues during the seminar: 
Descriptions of any unknown words in the text 
What are the major elements to consider when deciding on a DDT ban? 
How do these elements of the DDT control issue apply to other ecological 
problems? 
How would you decide on this issue? 
How well do you think Curtis covered the subject? 
If you wish to learn more about malaria, the following web-sites are a good place to 
start: 
http://www.iea.org.uk/env/malaria.htm 
http://w w w .  w ho. in tlin f-fs/en/fact094.h tm I 
http://www.wehi.edu.au/MaIDB-www/who.html 
http://www.malaria.org/ 
CURTIS C.F. (1994). Should DDT continue to  be recommended for malaria vector control? [review]. 
Medical and Veterinary Entomology 8:2:107-12. 
Hellriikka Clarkebllrn, 1999 
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Appendix XVI- Genetic screening 
Moral implications of genetic screening ?I  ~ / ;\ 
the possible elimination of disease  --
IIIIIIIIIIIII 
Great hopes have been placed on genetic knowledge to provide a tool to create a disease free society, 
where all medical problems would be either removed or treated by genetic manipulation of one sort 
or another. The most realistic dreams for the genetic eradication of disease relate to inherited 
conditions resulting from a localised mutation which has direct and known impact on the carrier's 
health. An example of such conditions is cystic fibrosis. The dreams have extended further to cover 
diseases which result from a combination of genetic and environmental factors, including cancer and 
coronary heart disease. 
There are at least two difficulties in accomplishing a disease free society by application of genetic 
knowledge: 
It is not obvious how diseases could be eliminated by genetic manipulation alone. 
An attempt to eradicate genetic diseases has social, ethical and financial implications, which may 
outweigh the benefits of the programme. 
Before next weeks discussion you should read the attached article by Bruce Ponder (Science 
278(5340) pp. 1050-1054), which focuses on genetic testing for cancer. After you have read the 
article prepare a short summary containing answers to the following questions ( you will be asked to 
present your summary in the class): 
What is the author's main message? 
What are the major themes in  an attempt to eradicate cancer by application of genetic 
information 
Further, while reading, prepare notes that will allow you to discuss the following issues in the class: 
List of terms or concepts you are not sure of. 
What other social and ethical problems can you think of relating to genetic testing? 
What is your personal view of trying to eradicate diseases by genetic testing and/or 
manipulation? 
If  you wish to find further information relating to genetic research relating to cancer, the following 
articles are a good place to start with. All of them can be found both on the internet (use Ovid 
Biomed search tool and 'Core Biomedical Collection' - you'll need an Athens password, which you 
can get from the Library Inquiries desk) and in the library's Life Sciences Periodicals: 
DICKENSON D.L. (1999). Can children and young people consent to be tested for adult onset genetic 
disorders? British Medical Journal 318:7190: 1063-5. 
HABER D.A., FEARON E.R. (1998). The promise of cancer genetics [The Promise of Cancer 
Research and Treatment]. The Lancet 351 :2S: I SII-2SII. 
HOLTZMAN N.A., SHAPIRO D. (1998). The new genetics: Genetic testing and public policy. British 
Medical Journal 316:7134:852-6. 
KODISH E., WIESNER G.L., MEHLMAN M., J.D., MURRAY T. (1998). Testing for Cancer Risk: 
How to Reconcile the Conflicts. JAMA 279:3: 179-81. 
LOW L., KING S., WILKIE T. (1998). Genetic discrimination in life insurance: empirical evidence 
from a cross sectional survey of genetic support groups in the United Kingdom. British Medical 
Journal 317:7173:1632-5. 
WELCH H.G. (1998). Uncertainties in Genetic Testing for Chronic Disease. JAMA 280: 17: 1525-7. 
WILCKE J.T. (1998). Personal paper: Late onset genetic disease: where ignorance is bliss, is it folly to 
inform relatives? British Medical Journal 317:7160:744-7. 
WARNING OVER 'NAZI' GENETIC SCREENING: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/newsid_  415000/415136.stm 
Hellriikka Clarkeblll'll.  1999 
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The benefits and hazards of embryo 
research 
399 
Human embryo research promises to find ways to improve infertility treatment, to increase our 
knowledge, and possibly ability to cure, inherited diseases, and an opportunity to learn more 
about human development. Despite the potential in embryo research, it is not allowed in many 
countries (France forbids it completely and US will not fund it from public resources). Several 
ethical issues have led to the controversy over embryo research, for example: 
Is an embryo a human being and should it thus be entitled to the same respect as people in general, which 
would mean that destruction of embryos is equivalent to murder? 
Is there something inherently valuable in the potential of developing into a person, that requires us to  pay 
special attention and respect to embryos, though not the same as already existing people? 
Will embryo research lead to technology that may not be acceptable; human cloning, genetic engineering, 
and pre-implantation diagnosis? 
This seminar is your opportunity to learn more about these issues, to discuss them and develop 
your personal view on embryo research. 
Before the session you should read 'Pre-embryo Research: Medical Aspects and Ethical 
Considerations' by Eisenberg and Schenker (copy attached). While reading, you should make 
notes that will prepare you to answer the following questions: 
Were there any terms or concepts you were not sure that you understood correctly? 
What are the main ethical points made by Eisenberg and Schenker? 
What in your mind are the major issues in embryo research? 
What other moral and medical problems do you think relate to embryo research? 
What is your personal opinion about embryo research? 
To learn more about the issues of embryo research, you may want to start with the following 
articles: 
ANDREWS L., ELSTER N. (1998). International regulation of human embryo research - Embryo 
research in US. Human Reproduction 13:1:1-4. 
ANNAS 0.1, CAPLAN A., ELIAS S. (1996). The politics of human-embryo research - Avoiding 
ethical gridlock. New England Journal of Medicine 334:20: 1329-32. 
BERNAT E. (1999). The human embryo as object for scientists: Legal-ethical and legal-comparative 
reflections. Journal of Fertility and Reproduction 9: 1:7 -2l. 
CONCAR D. (1996). Into the mind unborn. New Scientist 19 October:40-5. 
HUNT O. (1999). Abortion: Why bioethics can have no answer - a personal perspective. Nursing 
Ethics 6:1:47-57. 
SCHENKER 10. (1998). International regulation of human embryo research - FlOO statements and 
world experience. Human Reproduction 13:8:2047-9. 
WATT H. (1996). Potential and the early human. Journal of Medical Ethics 22:4:222-6. 
Henriikka Clarkebul'll. 1999 
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Appendix XVIII - GM crops 
F============================================== 
Genetically modified crops: Ethical and social issues 
"OMO's, or genetically modified organisms, have hardly been out of the news during the 
last couple of years. And with each new headline has come another round of debate over 
whether biotechnology is the way forward. Many scientists and politicians are confident 
that genetic engineering will produce wonder plants that resist pests and diseases, flourish 
'\  :. 
despite drought and capture their own nutrients. Indeed, some consider biotechnology to be  \,j 
the only way in which to ensure that everyone in the world has enough to eat. Many others, 
however, are not so sure. Those that oppose genetically-engineered material do so for a 
wide variety of reasons, some are scientific, others concern power, choice and control, 
while many simply object on moral or ethical grounds. There is also deep rooted concern 
over who will have access to this technology and benefit from it." (New Agriculturist On-
Line) 
This and the following seminar are your opportunity to learn more about the social and 
ethical issues of OM crops, and as a result you should have more tools to both develop your 
own opinion about them and to understand the debate in the media. 
The seminars are structured around The Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on OM food, 
which is one of the most comprehensive of its kind produced in UK. You will find a copy of 
the report's introduction attached, and you may read and down-load the entire report from 
<http://www.nuffield.orgibioethics/publication/modifiedcrops/index.html>. You will also 
find three case studies in this package. 
Before the first session on 11th October you should read the report introduction up to 
paragraph 1.20 and the case studies 'OM pollen warning' and 'US to label OM foods'. 
While reading you should make notes, which will allow you to discuss the following 
~
~qu:;;estionS.dUl~!:~~l:e::nua:;amiliar words in the text? 
What are the five ethical principles relevant to the evaluation of GM technology? 
How do you feel the 'precautionary principle' should be interpreted in the case of 'GM pollen 
warning' ? 
What would be your approach to protecting both consumer and producer rights over labelling 
GM products (see case study 'US to label GM foods') 
For the second seminar on the 1st November, you should read the rest of the Nuffield 
Report, in particular the paragraphs 1.20-1.31, and the case study 'Food for All'. Some of 
/
~_th~e  questi,ons  ~~\~~s~:is~i::  ~;:~:~~~~1  ~::~C:l~~'~:gy? 
How do you understand the division of benefits and harms in introducing GM crops? 
How would you start solving the justice problems between developing and developed 
countries regarding GM crops? 
How convincing do you find the arguments of GM being 'unnatural'? 
Hellriikka Clarkebllnl, 1999 
(H. ClarkeiJlII"ll@bio.glll.ac.llk) 
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Controls to protect crops from cross-pollination by genetically-modified (GM) 
plants may be seriously inadequate, new research claims. Dr Jean Emberlin, 
Director of the National Pollen Research Unit, has produced evidence to show 
that pollen from maize an be dispersed over much greater distances than has been 
accepted by government scientists. 
At present, a 200-metre "exclusion zone" is set up around a GM maize crop 
undergoing trials and is considered a sufficient barrier to prevent cross-
contamination of ordinary maize crops or sweet corn. But, Dr Emberlin, whose 
research was commissioned by the Soil Association, says bees or strong winds 
will take the pollen such further. 
She believes the government should now stop the controversial large-scale 
cultivation of GM crops, which is planned to start in a matter of weeks. 
Environment Minister Michael Meacher told BBC Radio that he accepted there 
could be a contamination risk of around 1  % at 200m under moderate speed wind 
conditions. But he said the 200-barrier should be sufficient to ensure the purity of 
nearby crops. 
It was based on many years of research and recognised as adequate by the 
European Commission, the Origination for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, and the US authorities. 
"If it is necessary and right to revise the criteria by which we assess the 
likelihood of cross-pollination, we will do so," he said. Once again, he stressed 
the government's line on GM crops: "We are not going to allow commercial 
planting of GM crops until we are sure that we have the evidence to guarantee 
that there will be no damage to the environment - or indeed to human health." 
Political pressure 
Concerns over genetically-modified food in the last month have put the 
government under pressure to halt development until further tests are carried out. 
The Soil Association, which promotes organic food and is opposed to genetic 
engineering, asked Dr Emberlin to undertake this latest research after the 
government's refusal last summer to order the destruction of a GM maize crop 
bordering an organic farm in Devon. 
The government's Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (Acre) 
maintained there was little or no risk of cross-pollination. 
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But Craig Samms, of the Soil Association, says the new report does indicate a 
real risk to farmers growing GM free crops as well as the consumers who believe 
they are buying organic produce. 
"Nobody knows what the risk is to people because this technology has been 
introduced without any of the normal checks you would expect. 
"Genetic engineering in medicine is subjected to strict containment rules," Mr 
Samms added, "But here you have a technology that is just being planted in the 
countryside with no real idea of what the implications are". 
'Disingenuous' 
"The lack of acknowledgement of potential pollen spread concerns me," Dr 
Emberlin said. "Once the pollen is out there it is very difficult to redress the 
situation. I don't think it would be wise to go ahead with large-scale planting of 
GM crops without knowing more about the possible repercussions." 
A statement from the Department of Environment released before Mr Meacher's 
radio interview rejected as  "disingenuous" the suggestion that bees are a major 
factor in maize pollination in the UK. 
"The issue of bees carrying maize pollen is a smokescreen to cast doubt on the 
competence and quality of Acre's advice," the statement read. 
Liberal Democrat food spokesman Paul Tyler and environment spokesman 
Norman Baker welcomed the report. 
"This report gives the lie to the dismissive attitude of both Conservative and 
Labour ministers. It is now clear that the risk is far greater than they have told 
us," they said in a joint statement. 
Pete Riley, senior food campaigner at Friends of the Earth, said: "This new 
report highlights once again the appalling advice that the government has 
received on GM crops." 
The report is published two weeks after a US biotechnology company, 
Monsanto, was fined £17,000 for breaking GM crop test site safety rules. The 
firm failed to maintain a six metre-wide barrier around a plot of genetically-
modified oil seed rape in Lincolnshire. 
Jean Emberlin's report can be found at: 
http://www.soilassociation.org/SA/SAWeb.nsfI?Open (follow links 'library' and 
'research papers') 
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US to label GM foods 
US farmers have taken to GM crops in a big way. The US Government has said 
that it will probably agree to label genetically-modified (GM) food. At the 
moment, American law does not require this. However, European governments 
have threatened to continue their ban on the import of certain US GM products if 
the Americans do not accept such labelling. 
Up to now, the Clinton administration has opposed GM labelling, agreeing with 
the American food industry that it unfairly stigmatises what they regard as 
perfectly safe products. 
But the US Agriculture Secretary, Dan Glickman, said that relations with Europe 
on the GM issue could deteriorate into an all-out trade war and labelling was a 
way in which such a crisis might be avoided. 
Speaking before an audience of environmentalists, lobbyists and lawmakers, Mr 
Glickman extolled the benefits of biotechnology. He said the technology would 
lead to increased yields and a decrease in the use of pesticides. 
According to Mr Glickman, several European countries were letting their fears 
override these potential benefits. And he urged them to sort out their internal 
differences as soon as possible. 
"Quite frankly, the food safety and regulatory regimes in Europe are so split, 
and so divided amongst the different countries, that I am extremely concerned 
that failure to work out these bio-tech issues in a sensible way could do deep 
damage in our next trade round, and affects both agriculture and non-
agricultural issues," he said. 
"Both sides of the Atlantic must tone down rhetoric, roll  up their sleeves, and 
work towards conflict resolution, based on open trade, sound science, and 
consumer involvement. And I think this can  be done if the will is there." 
American farmers are producing more and more genetically-engineered 
products, with 44% of American soya beans and 36% of corn coming from GM 
seeds. 
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FOOD FOR ALL 
Crops that resist drought and disease promise to transform the lives of poor farmers -if 
only they could afford them 
Five million Brazilians faced starvation this year. This time it was a drought related to EI 
Nino that halved grain crops in the north-east of the country, but next year it will be 
something else. Famine is perennial in Brazil. 
In September Monsanto, the world's largest supplier of genetically modified seeds, 
announced it would invest $550 million in Brazil to build a factory producing its 
herbicide Roundup. Shortly afterwards the Brazilian government made Monsanto's 
Roundup-resistant soya beans the country's first legally approved, genetically engineered 
crop. The soya beans will boost profits for the big landowners who grow them to feed 
beef cattle for export. But most rural Brazilians are subsistence farmers who do not grow 
soya. No help will trickle down from Monsanto's beans to the starving millions. 
The story exemplifies the limited contribution genetically modified crops have made so 
far to eradicating world hunger. It is not that biotech companies are uninterested in the 
developing world. Far from it: Brazil and other newly industrialising countries are in 
fact prime targets, with their growing demand for agricultural products, little opposition 
to biotechnology, and farmers who have risen above hard graft subsistence, but have not 
yet become customers of the world's seed and agrochemicals conglomerates. 
But who will benefit from genetically modified crops in these countries? The companies 
speak of feeding the starving millions, while conserving the environment. They say that 
the new technology will have greater benefits in the Third World than anywhere else. 
"Biotechnology is a key factor in the fight against famine," claims the literature from 
EuropaBio, the association of European biotechnology companies. "Biotechnology will 
help increase the yield on limited land." Critics maintain that there is little evidence of 
this. Instead, they say most of the engineered crops developed or in the pipeline will 
benefit rich farmers, not the needy. Worse still, they fear the biotech industry's 
increasing domination of crop research will hurt, not help, the poor. 
Agriculture does need a new technological saviour. Most of the world's food calories 
come from grain. A simple redistribution of what we grow now, even if it were possible, 
will not feed the 10 billion humans expected by 2030. Traditional methods of improving 
crops seem to have gone about as far as they can. "The fact that we start from the results 
of more than 5000 years of selective breeding makes further staggering yield increases 
unlikely," says Lloyd Evans of the CSIRO Division of Plant Industry in Canberra, 
Australia. "The biggest opportunity for increasing grain yields is to produce varieties 
more precisely adapted to local conditions." 
Yet few of these crops have emerged so far. Those that are on or near the market aim to 
increase farmers' profits by cutting expensive "inputs", such as pesticides. This is little 
help to farmers who can afford no inputs to begin with, not even the reduced levels 
needed for these crops, and no help if they cannot afford the patented seed. Steven 
Briggs, head of the Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute in San Diego, which 
sequences plant genomes, points to several innovations in the pipeline which might help: 
fodder crops that contain more calories, so more meat can be produced per hectare of 
corn or soya; crops that destroy toxins produced by moulds, such as fumonisin, which 
Henriikka ClarkeburIl, June 2000 ~  Appendix XVIII - GM crops 
cause massive crop losses after harvest; and disease-resistant crops, such as sweet 
potatoes and cassava, staples of the poor, which fend off viruses. 
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Crops that thrive despite drought and salty soils could also let farmers expand 
production into marginal lands. And the nutritional content of staples could be 
improved. If maize, for example, can be made to produce more of the amino acids it 
naturally lacks, the 80 million people who live almost exclusively on maize would get 
more protein. Ganesh Kishore, head of nutrition at Monsanto, says: "We can make it 
into a complete balanced meal." 
Briggs agrees that there are contradictions inherent in bringing high-tech remedies to 
low-tech farmers. Breeding crops for subsistence, he says, is "emergency aid, not a path 
to economic growth". Pol Bamelis, from the German giant Bayer and chair of the 
German and European biotechnology associations, says that the industry "cannot help 
the fact that there are rich and poor in the world". 
Buyout 
Biotech companies think genetic engineering will be in the best position to help once 
farmers everywhere switch from small-scale subsistence to large- scale mechanisation. 
But many activists fear just that process. The high price of the technology could allow 
the few farmers who can afford it to out-compete their poorer neighbours and eventually 
buy them out, driving people from the land, says Hope Shand, of the Rural 
Advancement Fund International in Canada. 
Monsanto also argues that helping poor farmers would reap another kind of benefit: 
richer peasants who no longer need to destroy forests to get more land. But this could be 
simplistic. Steve Vosti, of the International Food Policy Research Institute in 
Washington DC, has studied poor farmers and deforestation in Amazonia. He says any 
technology that increases a farmer's profits, or reduces the labour needed per hectare, 
will cause the farmer to cut down trees to get more land. It is not clear whether the kind 
of farmer who needs to fell forests to get land, or who eats little but maize meal, will 
ever be able to afford genetically modified crops. But even if only rich farmers benefit, 
says Vosti, their expansion would tend to push poorer farmers into forest margins. 
And there are other disadvantages for the poorest farmers. "New biotechnologies 
threaten to aggravate problems of genetic uniformity, and increase the dependence of 
farmers on transnational corporations," says Shand. Even in the industrialised world, 
people are worried about genetic uniformity arising from the widespread introduction of 
genetically modified crops. In Missouri this summer, half the soya plants on some farms 
died of Fusarium mould, after three-quarters of the land was planted with Roundup-
resistant varieties which turned out not to resist mould. 
The handful of modified varieties offered by biotech companies will inevitably be more 
genetically uniform, hence more susceptible to unforeseen stress, than the plethora of 
classically bred varieties grown now. That problem could be worse in the tropics, where 
there is more existing crop diversity together with stresses that seed breeders based in 
the North may not have anticipated. Tropical countries will also have less money to pay 
multinationals for the rights to incorporate proprietary genes into several local varieties. 
The last problem stems from the big companies' growing control of both markets and 
plant genes. Crop scientists must continually breed new crop varieties to meet the ever-
evolving threats of pests and disease. In the Third World, this is mainly done by 
government-funded institutions, and the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research. But public sector breeders are losing funding, while companies 
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such as Monsanto are rapidly becoming the only source for improved varieties. It 
already, for example, sells half the maize seed in Argentina. 
Losing access 
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The public breeders are also losing access to plant genes. Last May the CGIAR 
completed a detailed study of the problems posed by the fact that the genes it needs to do 
its work are increasingly available only at a price, because companies hold the patents. 
India recently declined to pay Monsanto $8 million for the use, by its state-owned crop 
laboratories, of Monsanto's Bt insecticide gene. Those labs will not be able to provide 
Indian farmers with cheap, locally bred insect-resistant crops. Farmers who can afford to 
will have to buy whatever Monsanto has to offer. 
Even if Third World breeders get access to patented genes, they may be forced to protect 
them in ways that put them out of reach of the poor. Terminator, a gene owned by 
Monsanto, keeps a plant from producing viable seed. So farmers cannot save seed 
planted, genetically modified varieties for the next harvest. It also keeps farmers from 
crossing patented strains with other crops to create new varieties. "Public sector breeders 
could be under great pressure to use Terminator to protect patented genes in the breeds 
they produce, in exchange for access to those genes," says Shand. 
The overall effect could be that breeders will not be able to create new varieties to meet 
evolving threats unless they pay for the genes, and couple them with technologies to 
prevent the saving of seed. That means fewer, more expensive varieties, plus increased 
costs for the 1  A billion poorest farmers who grow 80 per cent of subsistence crops from 
saved seed. As big northern companies expand their control of crop genes, their choice 
may be to buy seed, or die. 
Debbie Mack 
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~~t Clinical Trials in Developing Countries 
F~7:r~~f=====================::!J 
One of the great challenges of medical research is to conduct clinical trials in 
developing countries, for the benefit of the population in those countries. Many features of 
developing countries - poverty, endemic disease, low level of investment in health care 
systems, and culturally distinct conceptions of health and disease - affect both the ease of 
performing clinical trials in these countries, and the selection of trials that would benefit 
the population in these countries (Varmus and Satcher, 1997). 
Three basic principles need to be considered in the design of a clinical trial to be 
carried out in a developing country: the balance of benefits (an acceptable balance of 
burdens and benefits of research to the research subjects), justice (equitable access to 
clinical trials), and autonomy (guaranteeing that research subjects are in a position to give 
informed consent, and do so). 
This seminar is designed to give you, by studying examples of ethical and unethical 
research set-ups, an opportunity to investigate some of the research standards accepted by 
the biomedical profession, and to develop your abilities to judge and design clinical trials 
according to ethical standards. 
Before the session you should read the attached paper by Lurie and Wolfe (1997) and the 
Declaration of Helsinki. You should write a short, one paragraph, abstract which describes 
the main points of the Lurie and Wolfe paper. You should also make notes, which will 
allow you to discuss the following questions during the seminar: 
•  Meaning of any unfamiliar words in the text 
•  What are the major themes in designing a clinical trial? 
•  How these themes relate to research in both developed and developing countries? 
•  What is your personal view on clinical trials in developing countries? 
The following papers relate directly to the subject and will help you to understand the 
issues better. Make use of them! 
ANGELL M. (1988). Ethical imperialism? Ethics in international collaborative clinical research. New 
England Journal of Medicine 319: 1081-3. 
ANGELL M.  (1997). The ethics of clinical research in  the third world [Editorial]. The New England Journal 
of Medicine 337:12:847-9. 
ANNAS GJ., GRODIN M.A. (1998). Human rights and maternal-fetal HIY transmission prevention trials 
in Africa. American Journal of Public Health 88:4:560-3. 
BARRY M., MOLYNEUX M. (1992). Ethical dilemmas in  malaria drug and vaccine trials: a bioethical 
perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics 18:4: 189-92. 
FADEN R., KASS N. (1998). Editorial: HIY Research, Ethics, and the Developing World. American 
Journal of Public Health 88:4:548-50. 
Y ARMUS H., SATCHER D.  (1997). Ethical complexities of conducting research in developing countries. 
New England Journal of Medicine 337: 14: 1003-5. 
Henriikka Clarkebul'll.  1999 
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CLINICAL TRIALS FOR A MALARIA VACCINE -
Student hand-out 
408 
This is a brief trial protocol proposal based on research on a malaria vaccine. The 
novel vaccine is based on T-cell activity when malaria is in liver stage of 
infection. This vaccine protects the vaccinated individual against new malaria 
vectors. 
The research is funded my the European Commission, biomedical framework. 
Research protocol: 
Placebo-control trial to be carried out in Botswana. Subjects recruited from rural 
villages where malaria is known to be prevalent. All recruited subjects are>  15 
years of age and seemingly healthy. The research is carried out by a European 
research team over two years. 
Steps in Botswana: 
1.  Screening for malaria in the subjects, only healthy individuals are included in 
the trial. 
2.  Subjects are randomly divided into treatment with the novel vaccine and non-
treatment groups. 
3.  The research subjects are screened for malaria every three months. Those with 
malaria are excluded from the trial. 
4.  The vaccine is re-administered after one year to those in the treatment group. 
The control group will receive placebo vaccine. 
5.  The research is considered successful if malaria incidence is reduced by 50% 
in the test group. 
Your task: 
Comment on the ethical and scientific issues of this trial. 
Prepare an improved research protocol, if you found faults in the 
proposed one. 
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Scientific Misconduct and Integrity 
The scientific enterprise is built on the foundation of trust. Scientists trust that the results 
reported by others are valid. Society trusts that the results reflect an honest attempt by the 
scientists to describe the world accurately and without bias. The level of trust that has 
characterised the relationship between science and society will endure only if the scientific 
community is able, and willing, to exemplify and transmit the values associated with the 
ethical conduct of science. The values of science, values of scientists, and the values of 
consumers of science need to interact in order to maintain the trust that allows science to 
flourish. 
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Ethical issues in science are all around us: is animal experimentation acceptable; who should 
get the credit for joint research efforts; should we try to alter the human genome; and when 
does commercial funding imply a conflict of interests, or incompatibility of values. Finding 
acceptable answers to these questions requires understanding of scientific, legal, 
economical, and ethical issues. This seminar is designed to give you some basic tools for 
dealing with the ethical elements of these, and other, questions in science. 
Before the session, you should read the attached article: 'Scientific misconduct' and make 
~
~?:Jnotes  that.:Wil~~;~a~:d~O;  ::n~~;~sis~~~::~:l:o~~::!.~ not sure of. 
For the case studies prepare short answers to the questions. 
Think of a situation where you have been, or could imagine being, tempted by 
scientific misconduct. 
Think of a research proposal that you would have to turn down because it is 
incompatible with your personal values. 
For further reading, you may want to start with the following: 
BUZZELLI D.E. (1993). A definition of misconduct in science: a view from NSF. Science 
259:584-585-647 -648. 
CHANTLER c., CHANTLER S.  (1998). Dealing with research misconduct in the United 
Kingdom. Deception: difficulties and initiatives. British Medical Journal 316:7146: 1731-2. 
GOODSTEIN D. (1992). What do we mean when we use the term 'science fraud'? The Scientist 
6:5:11 
ROY L.P. (1999). Review of research protocols. The Lancet 353:9151:428 
SCHACHMAN H.K. (1993). What is misconduct in science? Science 261:148-149-183. 
SMITH R. (1996). Time to face up to research misconduct [editorial]. British Medical Journal 
312:7034:789-90. 
Hellriikka C/arkebllm. 1999 
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MISCONDUCT AND INTEGRITY IN SCIENCE 
by Henriikka Clarkeburn 
It would  be strange  if there  was  no  misconduct or fraud  in  science,  for  why  would 
scientific  research  be  the  only  human  activity  immune  to  misbehaviour,  arrogance, 
greed,  and  selfishness?  But misconduct  in  science  has  severe  repercussions,  because 
science by  nature is  an  enterprise built on  a foundation of trust.  Within the  scientific 
community scientists trust that results reported by others are valid.  In the relationship 
between  scientific  community  and  society,  trust  reflects  on  results  to  be  an  honest 
attempt to  describe  the  world accurately  and  without bias.  Further,  there  is  trust  that 
scientists  will  co-operate  with  society  in  deciding  its  aims  and  methods,  instead  of 
withdrawing  into  a  detached  community  within  the  larger  society.  This  trust  has 
contributed  to  the  unparalleled  scientific  productivity  seen  during  the  past  century. 
Without this  trust science could not have  gained its  position as  one of the  powers in 
public decision-making, and it cannot maintain that position if the trust is  broken. For 
these reasons, for science to flourish and to  contribute to  the improvement of society, it 
is paramount that the scientific community works to maintain and strengthen this trust. 
(Alberts and Shine, 1994) 
There are two related, but separate, issues in maintaining confidence in science: 1)  'How 
far beyond what we know, should science reach and what are the methods of research 
we accept in finding  new  information?';  and  2)  'How to  disseminate research results 
without breaching this trust?'. The first refers to  actions of scientific integrity, the latter 
to scientific misconduct. 
SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT 
When most people talk about scientific fraud and/or misconduct they refer to  obligatory 
rules  that  are  not  opinions  or  attitudes.  This  means  they  are  formal  guidelines  of 
scientific practice. These rules are traditionally classified under three separate headings: 
falsification of scientific results,  fabrication  of research data,  and  plagiarism. There is 
common  acceptance  within  the  scientific  community  that  scientific  misconduct  is 
unethical and that sanctions should be imposed on those failing to comply with the rules 
(Korenman et al., 1998). Errors occur unavoidably in scientific practice, and this should 
not be confused with scientific misconduct. 
Falsification 
Falsification_of  scientific  observations  is  an  intentional  alteration  of  data  or  the 
presentation  of observations  in  a  manner  which  alters  the  end  result.  This  is  most 
commonly  done  by  altering  and/or  selecting  the  research  results  in  a  way  that  is 
scientifically  unjustifiable.  The temptation  to  falsify  results  is  encountered  by  every 
scientist,  for  one  of  the  following  three  reasons:  1)  desire  for  merit  or  career 
advancement, 2) direct financial benefits, and 3) collegial pressure. Results pave the way 
for  an  academic career, sponsors of research may  wish to  influence the  publication of 
results (possibly suggesting omitting results financially strategic to them), or we may not 
wish to  publish data that is  not  in  accordance  with  the  research of our superiors.  (see 
case 1) 
Not all cases of falsification are obvious intentional alterations of data. A far more subtle 
influence  is  felt  by  our  values  and  interests,  that  are  not  purely  scientific.  Our own 
religious  and  moral  convictions  alter  the  ways  we  view  our  own  results  and  those 
produced by others, and influence our acceptance and interpretation of them, as does our 
bias  towards  results  that  confirm  the  theory,  rather  than  dispute it.  Values  cannot be 
taken out of science, because it is impossible to function as a human being without some 
. basic  convictions  about  how  and  why  the  world  functions.  Open  scientific  practice, 
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collaboration with colleagues and susceptibility to  critique and suggestions, as  well as 
healthy scepticism help in  keeping the influence of personal values and perceptions at 
bay within scientific work. 
Fabrication 
Fabricated  observations  are 
invented  observations  not 
based on methods presented in 
the  research  report. 
Fabrications  also  include 
entirely  imaginary  results 
based  on  no  actual 
observations.  For  fabricated 
results,  a  scientist  is  hard-
pushed  to  give  any  scientific 
justification, while in  the  case 
of falsification, some scientific 
reasons for the  action may  be 
found,  though  often  they  are 
not  convincing.  Researchers 
are tempted to fabricate results 
when  they  believe  they  know 
what the results would be and 
wish  to  avoid  laborious 
research  to  prove  the 
'obvious'.  Another  reason  is 
related to external pressures to 
get publications and/or reports 
out  on  time,  or  to  gain 
financial  benefits  by 
presenting  work,  possibly 
intended,  but  not  yet  carried 
out.  Temptation  to  fabricate 
research results is obvious, but 
classifies as fraud. 
Plagiarism 
The  National Research  Ethics 
Council  of  Finland  (1998) 
Case 1: Consider the following data set 
6 T 
+ 
41  + + 
2 t+ 
o  -
o  2 
+ 
+ 
+-
4  6 
Katherine and John have been working on a new 
experimental cell culture. The graph shows their data 
set from the experiments. A newly proposed theory 
predicts the measurements to follow the curve in the 
graph. During the experiments Katherine and John had 
problems with the temperature controls. When looking 
at the results, two observations are not in accordance 
with the expected results. Katherine and John discuss 
the theory with another group doing similar 
experiments with the same cell culture, and found out 
that they had got results confirming the theory. When 
writing up this research, Katherine and John are 
tempted to leave the two rogue measurements out of 
the published graph and from the statistical analysis, 
as they are 'obviously wrong', most likely because of 
malfunctioning temperature controls during the 
experiment. It is clear that these two rogue 
measurements could be due to the temperature control 
problems, but there is no way of knowing for sure. How 
should the two suspected measurements be handled? 
What would be a suitable punishment for falsification, if 
Katherine and John choose to do so? (modified from 
an example found in  'On being a scientist') 
defines plagiarism and misappropriation as:  "the adoption of the original research idea, a 
research plan or research observations of another researcher (misappropriation); or the 
presentation, either as a whole or in part, of a research plan, a manuscript, article or other 
text  created by  another researcher  as  if it  originated from  the  researcher in  question 
(plagiarism)."  Me  copying  that  definition  without  due  credit  would  have  been 
plagiarism. 
The cases of plagiarism are often, but not always, obvious. Difficulties in defining 
plagiarism and misappropriation can be found when research ideas, methods, and results 
are informally discussed, and possibly developed further in co-operation. This leads to 
widening the focus of plagiarism and misappropriation to the problem of allocation of 
credit in general. It is expected that the principle of fairness and the role of personal 
recognition works within the reward system of scientific practice. Credit of contribution 
to a scientific work is in the standard scientific paper given in three places: 1) in the list 
of authors - all those who contributed directly to the scientific work that lead to the 
paper should be included as authors; 2) in the acknowledgement of the contributions of 
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others - those who have supported your research should be explicitly named, and 3) in 
the list of references or citations - all previous research you used to design and carry out 
your research, all the data your refer to in support of your research design and results 
and all additional information you provide based on works of others must be included in 
your list of citations and references. (see case 2) 
SCIENTIFIC 
INTEGRITY 
Where  scientific 
misconduct  in 
clearly  rejected  as 
proper  scientific 
practice,  issues  of 
scientific  integrity 
are subject to  a wide 
range  of  opinions. 
There  are  two  main 
areas  in  scientific 
integrity; 1)  methods 
and  2)  objectives  of 
scientific  enterprise. 
Far  more  than 
scientific 
misconduct,  issues 
of scientific integrity 
relate  to  personal 
values  of  what  is 
Case 2: Allocation of credit 
Over  the  past  two  years  Professor  Hewitt  has  built  a  DNA 
sequencing  machine,  which  allows  fast  detection  of 
mutations  and  she  is  now  working  on  a  large  sequencing 
project with her three graduate students. Jocelyn is in charge 
of  operating  the  machine  and  analysing  the  data  under 
Hewitt's supervision.  One  day Jocelyn notices 'a bit of scruff' 
in  the  data.  She  remembered  seeing  the  same  deviation 
earlier  and,  by  measuring  the  period  of  its  occurrence, 
determined that it must come from  mutations induced by the 
machines  power  surge.  Together  Professor  Hewitt  and 
Jocelyn  analyse  the  data  and  find  similar  occurrences 
throughout the data. This leads Hewitt, Jocelyn and the other 
graduate students to the discovery of a new mutative source 
- a major scientific break-through. Professor Hewitt proceeds 
to  report the  discovery in  a prestigious scientific journal with 
herself  as  the  sole  author.  Jocelyn  is  not  happy  with 
Professor  Hewitt's  decision.  What  can  Jocelyn  do  in  this 
situation and  how should the contribution of Jocelyn and the 
other two graduate students be recognised? 
appropriate in  science. These are not solely a matter of personal opinion on what and 
how.  The  scientific  community  holds  certain  values,  upon  which  the  trust  between 
scientists  and  society  is  based.  To  conduct  research  outside  the  accepted  scientific 
practices may jeopardise not only your personal career as  a scientist, but contribute to 
erosion of public trust in science. 
Scientific methods and integrity 
Other scientists and society care about how science is done. This is very apparent in the 
CUlTent  animal  welfare  debate  where  the  public  has  reacted  strongly  against  animal 
research, even when it is conducted according to the stringent laws regarding laboratory 
use of animals, and when the pain and discomfort of these animals is minimised. Similar 
controversial  methods  are  involved  in  embryo  research,  any  medical  research  with 
human subjects, and involving wild life (zoos, harm of observation in the wild). Some 
methods of research may  be legal,  but that does  not necessarily  indicate that they  are 
morally acceptable.  Legality does not guarantee morality,  nor does morality guarantee 
legality.  Moral  acceptability  changes  often  quicker than  legislation,  which  means  the 
following  legal  requirements  may  not  be  enough  for  scientific  integrity.  Science  has 
independent goals  and methods,  but its  functioning  is  dependent on  the  desire of the 
society to  support it financially and to  allow research to  be calTied out within the legal 
parameters set by the society. 
Objectives of  Science and Scientific Integrity 
It has long been debated whether scientists are responsible for the applications and use 
of the  knowledge  they  produce  as  a  result  of their  research  efforts,  and  if  they  are 
responsible,  to  what extent?  Discovery  of nuclear  power  is  a  case  in  point.  Nuclear 
researchers claimed that their work was purely scientific to discover the properties of the 
nucleus;  and  that  the  application  of these  discoveries  to  nuclear  warfare  was  only 
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contingently related to their research efforts, morally no different to the  eff~rt~ of ~hose, 
say, providing catering for those who made the decisions. More recently SImilar I.ssues 
of  responsibility  have  been  discussed  in  relation  to  genetic  reseat:ch;  gene~Ically 
modified organisms, cloning, sequencing the human genome etc. The dIfference IS  that 
this  time  the  quest  for  responsibility  has  begun  before  any  adverse  effects  of these 
scientific discoveries have materialised. And the discussion is  not just about safety or 
misuse of the knowledge, but also a more fundamental concern whether there is  a limit 
beyond which science should not advance. That there may be areas where research is not 
desired  where more knowledge is considered to bring either undesirable consequences 
or that'there is  a fundamental reason why humans should not attempt to  obtain certain 
knowledge. (see Case 3) 
For  your  personal  integrity  as  a 
scientist,  you  need  to  consider  the 
scientific  methods  you  carry  out, 
not  only  within  the  legal  and 
institutional  requirements,  but also 
as  a  social  and  moral  issue.  You 
should  ask  yourself  at  least  two 
questions:  'Is  what  I  do  in  the 
laboratory  in  accordance  with  the 
actions  of  a  'good  person',  and 
'How  likely  is  my  research  to 
contribute positively to the world?' 
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Case 3:  Genetic research about intelligence (details 
from Newson and Williamson, 1999). 
Professor McCarthy is writing a research proposal to 
study the genetics of intelligence.  Her research  aim 
is  to  localise several  Quantitative Trait Loci  (QTLs) 
for  high  intelligence by  allelic association that tests 
whether one of the  number of  alleles of a particular 
DNA  sequence  (marker)  occurs  at  a  higher 
frequency  in  children  with  high  intelligence  than  in 
children  with  low  intelligence.  A difference in  allelic 
frequency  of  a  DNA  marker  between  the  two 
populations  could  indicate  the  presence  of  an 
intelligence  gene  in  the  region  of  the  marker. 
Professor McCarthy believes this research  will  lead 
to  the  identification of  genes for  intelligence and  to 
an understanding of the Significance of each gene to 
intelligence.  She  also  believes  that  genes  do  not 
'determine' intelligence, but that the environment will 
have  a  significant  influence  on  the  actual 
intelligence  of  a  person.  In  writing  her  propos~l, 
Professor McCarthy engages in heated debates With 
colleagues  and  friends  about  the  usefulness  and 
acceptability  of  her research  aims.  Those  doubting 
and  objecting  to  her  research  refer  to  possible 
negative  social  implications  if  intelligence  genes 
were found - of people being branded from  birth  (or 
even  before  birth?)  to  be  of  certain  intellectual 
capacity, which may lead to discrimination in various 
degrees. They have also raised a view that research 
funds  should  rather  be  directed  towards  genetic 
research  of  pathogenic  entities,  not  personality 
traits.  Those  excited  about  the  research  idea, 
including  Professor  McCarthy  herself,  believe  that 
identification  of  intelligence  genes  would  allow  for 
testing children early on  to find  out who  might need 
extra  support  in  school  and  possibly  even  creating 
opportunities  to  enhance  the  intelligence  of  future 
generations.  Should  the  research  proposal  go 
ahead? 
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PBL - Vaccine Development 
Here is your problem for the microbiology Problem-Based Learning (PBL) course: 
414 
"As scientists in microbiology you are asked in consultation to prepare a 
recommendation for a large charity on whether to support research in 
developing a vaccine against Meningococcal Meningitis (serotype B) or 
Tuberculosis. You are asked to present scientific, sociological, economical, 
and ethical reasons to support your decision." 
According to the nature of PBL, you are free to choose any methods of learning you 
wish. But to help you to get started, I have written a learning suggestion here, which 
you are more than free to change in any way you like: 
Session 1: 
Start with a brain-storming session to list all the possible things you could 
study/research/think about before making your decision 
Brainstorm for sources of information 
Consider a division of labour - this is group work, so not everyone needs to do 
everything! 
•  Leave with a clear idea of what you are going to do between now and the next session 
Session 2 
Share information you have collected since the last session with your group 
•  Based on this information, decide what should be done next 
Make an action plan for the work to be done before the next session 
Session 3 
•  Share information from your independent study 
•  Work together towards a shared decision on the problem 
Formulate a final output for the PBL session. 
I am here to help you, to answer questions you may have and sometimes to ask you 
questions that I think might help you in your learning. That means I am not here to 
lecture or organise your learning. You are free to run the sessions yourselves and you 
are also responsible for your own learning. But don't forget, I am here help you! 
h.clarkeburn@bio.gla.ac.uk 
*6013 
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Here is your 'problem' for the second PBL: 
"Your tuberculosis vaccine project has progressed for several years, 
thanks to the funding from a charity. You now have a proto-type vaccine 
in vitro and your research team is ready to start animal and human 
testing. For a clinical trial committee you need to submit a trial protocol 
for both animal and human testing plans. The committee is particularly 
concerned about the increasing public objection to animal testing and you 
are asked to give explicit supportive reasons for animal testing you are 
planning to carry out." 
Now that you have experienced PBL before, you are in a good position to 
organise your own learning even better than last term. I hope you find ways to 
improve your group work and find the sessions successful. 
I am here to help you, but remember you need to ask for help! 
h.clarkeburn@bio.gla.ac.uk 
*6013 
Learning logs for term 2 
The assessment for term 2 is based on learning logs again. To remind you, each 
of the 10 entries should have four elements: 
•  What you did (1-2 line) 
«I  What you learnt (2-4 lines) 
•  Was it important and why (10-20 lines) 
•  How does this shape your next learning unit (1-3 lines) 
There is a 2000 word maximum for your logs, though I believe you should be 
able to say all that is relevant in 1500 words. CRYSTALLISE YOUR 
THOUGHTS! 
You are expected to do better for the next log, because now you have had 
experience and now better what is involved. 
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The following two swimmers from the same swimming team produced a positive 
test for illegal substances during out of competition testing. 
1.  Female age 21, best achievement 10
th in National Championships last year, at 
the moment recovering from shoulder injury, uncertain about the date of next 
competition. Illegal substance Dextropropoxyphene (narcotic analgesics) 
2.  Junior (14) male swimmer, in training for his first national championships. 
Illegal substance Nandralone (anabolic androgenic steroid AAS). 
The UK Anti-Doping Directorate and UK Sports Council are proposing a 2 year 
suspension for the female swimmer and a 4 year suspension for the male 
swimmer. 
As a response to these test results and proposed suspensions, the team leader 
John Williams released the following statement: 
"According to the Olympic rules, no drug may be taken that is ergogenic 
(performance enhancing). In my understanding this rule is applied in a selective 
manner. There is no ban for using legitimate drugs, for example antibiotics for 
infection, which undoubtedly enhances the performance of some athletes. This is 
considered to restore 'normal' performance, and the problem is said to be in 
substance use to enhance the performance beyond 'normal' maximum. But again, 
not all methods of such enhancement are illegal, such as blood doping, known to 
be ergogenic, is not tested for, neither are techniques of carbohydrate loading, or 
megavitamins included in the illegal methods or substances even though they 
have positive impact on performance. Enforcement of inconsistent rules is not 
morally acceptable. 
Much of the anti-doping literature emphasises the hazards of these drugs to the 
athlete. This is likewise contradictory as many sports, boxing, or rugby for 
example, by their nature are dangerous to the athlete's health. Furthermore, 
athletes often put themselves under risk of on-going physical disability by 
excessive training or training and competing while injured and sometimes this is 
facilitated by legitimate drugs, such as non-steroid painkillers. If  athletes are 
considered mature and competent enough to make decisions about their training 
and participation is sport, surely they should be granted the same freedom to 
choose the medication the wish to use? 
Everyone who follows the doping debate is familiar with the argument that use 
of ergogenic drugs in sport gives unfair advantage to some competitors. Again 
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the fairness argument follows the line of restoring normal performance (legal, 
thus not unfair) and exceeding 'normal' maxims (illegal, thus unfair). There are 
at least four ways to look at this issues. First we can ask 'why should sport be 
fair?' , especially in a society that is not fair. Is there some special element in 
sport, that sets it apart from the rest of the society and requires it to be a model 
area among variety of human activities? Second, if ergogenic drugs were not 
condemned, and it would be illegal to use them, the question of unfairness would 
no longer exist. Surely the ability to use the drugs in a best possible way would 
be in no significant way different from the current differences between training 
methods. Third, would the image and role of sport change if egrogenic drugs 
were made legal? Sport is entertainment and better results could attract bigger 
audiences and as such enhance the image of sport by enlarging the circle of 
people participating in it. And finally, athletes are professionals, they earn their 
living with their sporting performance. Why shouldn't they be allowed to earn 
their income with all the possible methods available? 
When it comes to the particular cases of positive doping-tests in my swimming 
team, I would like to make the following comments. Laura, who tested positive 
for Dextropropoxyphene, was given the drug by myself as pain relief for her 
serious shoulder injury. As was found in the Samantha Riley's case earlier, 
Dextropropoxyphene does not enhance the performance of swimmers and Laura 
is not planning to compete for the next couple of months at least. I was unaware 
that the painkillers I gave to Laura contained Dextropropoxyphene and thus she 
is no way responsible for her positive test result. As for Rob's positive test result 
for Nandralone, I was not aware of Rob's current substance use, while I was 
aware of his contacts with some steroid suppliers. Rob is a very promising young 
swimmer, who has not yet competed in any National competitions. I believe it is 
not acceptable that a young athlete of no previous national competition 
appearances is included in the out of competition testing protocol. In my view it 
results in a violation of his privacy and right to conduct his swimming pursuits in 
a manner he chooses, at least as long as they still are only for his private 
enjoyment. 
I thus put forward a motion of removing the suspension on Laura and reduce the 
suspension of Rob to three months, based on the moral considerations and case 
particulars I have put forward here." 
You, as specialist in Sport Science, are asked to collate a response to Mr 
Williams' statement. The UK Sports Council has asked for a report that would 
recommend suspensions for the two athletes and answer in detail the comments 
made by Williams. 
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LEARNING LOGS 
brief introduction 
418 
During this course you will keep a learning log. This is an important part of learning and 
it will contribute to your continual assessment. Learning logs allow you to reflect on 
how you are progressing with your study and they encourage you and help you think in 
a 'deep' manner. When you complete a log you are doing more than writing a diary. A 
diary records events and your commentary of events. The learning log is an account of 
your thinking. 
Each unit of study (it could be reading, discussion, or just inner thinking) should be 
included as an entry into your log. Your first task for every entry is to set yourself some 
starting criteria. They are best put in terms of questions: 
What have I learned from this learning unit? 
To answer this, consider your learning unit, and think what has been: 
•  important 
•  meaningful 
•  good 
•  decisive 
•  uncomfortable 
Have a conversation with yourself in the log. Write honestly/frankly about issues that 
mean something to you. 
In order for the log to be assessed, you will need to spell out the criteria for you 
comments. In other words, if you write that something is meaningful, then you must also 
note: 
'How do I know this is meaningful?' 
so that the marker will be able to understand where your thoughts come from and make 
sense of your log. 
You are free to structure your log as you choose, but in every entry you should include 
information on the following four elements: 
•  Briefly state what you factually did: what reading are your thoughts based 
upon (provide a full reference!), who did you talk to, or what spurred your 
thinking. 
•  Explain what did you learn and why it was important to learn this. 
•  Describe how the learning will shape your next learning unit. 
•  Note what issues you feel this learning unit did not answer satisfactorily. 
For this course you are asked to have minimum 10 entries in your log. The 11
th/last 
entry should be a conclusion for the entire log, which is best written as a statement of 
what you learnt, what you still feel unsure of, and how well you think you did in this 
course. 
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